By Cecilia Menjívar & Krista M. Perreir

Thousands of minors are migrating unaccompanied to high-income countries. This special issue focuses on unaccompanied migrant minors from the Global South to Europe and the U.S. In this introduction, we seek to complement the contributions to this special issue by shedding light on what resources and experiences unaccompanied migrants arrive with, stressing these young migrants’

challenges at each stage prior to arrival and the challenges they face navigating the receiving context. We first clarify how the international community defines ‘unaccompanied minors’ or ‘unaccompanied children’. We then provide brief histories of unaccompanied minors in immigration flows to the U.S. and the EU. Next, we review the literature on the experiences of

unaccompanied minors before, during, and after migration. Finally, we discuss key themes and insights from the articles provided in this special issue.

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 22p.

By Ben Laws

This open access Palgrave Pivot explores the experiences of nonreligious asylum seekers in Northern Europe. While religious persecution is often cited as a reason for seeking asylum, nonbelievers also face significant persecution in their home countries due to their lack of religious affiliation. Despite this, their experiences are frequently overlooked in academic discussions, and asylum assessment centers have been slow to develop frameworks that address their unique challenges. Drawing on in-depth qualitative research from Sweden, Norway, and the Netherlands, this book provides a comprehensive examination of the challenges nonbelievers face, as well as the opportunities they create as agents within the system. Emotions offer an analytical window into the world of nonbelievers, highlighting their desperation and innovative practices of evidence creation. Throughout the book, the logics of credibility assessment are critically explored, revealing the cultural chasm between assessors and nonreligious claimants.

Cham: Springer Nature, 2024.

By

The Global Campaign to Decriminalise Poverty and Status

Throughout the globe, governments use petty offenses, such as vagrancy and loitering laws, to exert social control over poor and marginalized communities. Moreover, people experiencing homelessness regularly face the threat of criminal sanctions for fulfilling basic needs. These petty offenses enable the policing of public spaces to reinforce social hierarchies and rigid gender norms. Many of these laws are in place in the Caribbean, inherited as part of the colonial legacy that permeates its systems today.

This report provides a baseline assessment of the criminalization of homelessness in the Dominican

Republic, Jamaica, and Puerto Rico. The analysis thus focuses on three Caribbean localities with diverse

histories connected to Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States (U.S.). The report addresses both laws criminalizing vagrancy and loitering, as well as life-sustaining activities. It further examines the laws on the books, their implementation in practice, and their various impacts on people in each country.

Miami: Human Rights Clinic, University of Miami School of Law, 2024. 60p.

By Victoria A. Greenfield, Tobias Sytsma, Amanda Kerrigan, Maya Buen

Forced labor—work performed involuntarily and under menace of penalty—occurs globally, with reports of abuses in all countries. About 28 million people—one in every 300 people worldwide—work against their will, bound through physical violence, threats, debt bondage, and other exploitative means. The United States has long imposed prohibitions on imports of goods made with forced labor—notably, under the Tariff Act of 1930 and the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act of 2021 (UFLPA). The UFLPA targets China's extensive use of forced labor as a state-sponsored, coercive policy tool in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), by barring U.S. imports of goods made in the XUAR or sourced from entities connected to it. Still, such goods flow through global supply chains. In 2021, the United States accounted for over one-fifth of the world's imports of goods that were at risk of being made with forced labor.The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which leads trade enforcement under these laws, requested an analysis of trade enforcement and its impact. Researchers set out to (1) assist DHS in developing analytical capabilities for assessing the impact of its efforts to combat forced labor through trade enforcement and (2) evaluate the impact that DHS's actions and investments have had on meeting the goals of eliminating U.S. imports of goods made with forced labor and eliminating the use of forced labor globally. This report outlines the

researchers' methods for evaluating DHS's impact and presents findings on efforts and recommendations for strengthening enforcement.

Key Findings

DHS's impact in trade enforcement depends on stakeholders.

Trade enforcement is making measurable progress, but stakeholders are encountering impediments that DHS cannot address entirely on its own. U.S. businesses—and consumers—remain exposed to goods made with forced labor through indirect supply chain linkages with limited visibility.

Trade enforcement still holds value even if it, alone, cannot change China's policy on forced labor in the XUAR. Economic sanctions face inherent obstacles, but trade enforcement can help limit U.S. imports of goods made with forced labor, prevent U.S. complicity in other countries' labor abuses, and send a strong policy signal.

Trade enforcement comes with costs that can undermine its aims. U.S. businesses can incur costs from tracing supply chains, switching suppliers, and mitigating commercial disruptions; the environment could experience related harms; and China could retaliate and obfuscate.

DHS can track trade enforcement progress and unintended consequences, but it might be unable to know whether it is meeting its ultimate aims. Capturing broad effects on U.S. businesses, workers, and consumers; the environment; and global working conditions might be harder than capturing those on immediate goals for enforcement efforts.

DHS needs enough of the right resources and information to do its job, but stakeholders have suggested that it does not have them. Concerns about staffing included hiring, skills, burnout, and retention.

DHS and its stakeholders would benefit from more and higher-quality information. Better visibility into global working conditions, supply chain composition, the content of goods, and enforcement processes could strengthen trade enforcement.

Recommendations

Look for opportunities to encourage robust stakeholder participation by improving the flow and quality of information through greater transparency and improvements in tools, technology, and methods of data analysis.

Consider a more comprehensive approach to combating forced labor in global supply chains by working with other U.S. agencies and other countries to better leverage potential complementarities of economic sanctions and other types of measures.

Consider options for mitigating unintended consequences in concert with other U.S. agencies and with input from nongovernmental stakeholders, either by reducing them or responding to them, depending on their severity and likely prevalence.

Work with other U.S. agencies to monitor indicators of progress and unintended consequences over time to better understand how conditions are evolving.

Develop evidence with stakeholders to inform public debates on trade enforcement, including those on concerns about de minimis entries and environmental initiatives.

Continue to make the case for funding and staffing, which are critical resources for trade enforcement and are likely to need to increase.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2025. 196p.

By Ahmed Hussain, Ayla Bonfiglio

This report focuses on the nature and dynamics of human smuggling along this Eastern Route from the Horn of Africa across the Red Sea between locations of origin in Ethiopia and points of arrival along the coast of Lahj Governorate in Yemen. It examines the role of smugglers, the services they offer, the financial aspects of the journey, and how migrants perceive their

smugglers. The study is based on 346 surveys with migrants in Lahj, Yemen and 16 with smugglers in Ethiopia.

The Eastern Route is widely regarded as among the most dangerous mixed migration routes originating from the African continent, in terms of migrants' exposure to violence, abuse, and exploitation. This report, based on 346 surveys with migrants in Lahj, Yemen and 16 with smugglers in Ethiopia, focuses on the nature and dynamics of human smuggling along this route between locations of origin in Ethiopia and points of arrival along the coast of Lahj Governorate in Yemen. It examines the role of smugglers, the services they offer, the financial aspects of the journey, and how migrants perceive their smugglers. Additionally, the report delves into the abuses associated with smugglers, migrants’ protection strategies, and the forms of assistance that migrants receive from smugglers. This study was carried out against the backdrop of reduction in recorded migrant arrivals in Yemen, not merely because of the joint military campaign in the Red Sea and anti-smuggling campaigns by Yemeni and Djiboutian coastguards since August 2023, but also owing to decreased access to data collection in key transit locations along this route. The data provide some insight into these dynamics, which is critical to informing the work of humanitarian actors and policymakers, and fundamental for developing interventions that address the vulnerabilities of migrants along this precarious route. The key findings include: • Smugglers played a limited role in influencing respondents’ migration decisions (9%) and route selection (11%) between Ethiopia and coastal departure points in Djibouti or Somalia. Indeed, more than half of the respondents (57%) stated that they were not influenced by anyone in their decision to migrate, indicating that their choice was largely self-motivated rather than driven by persuasion. • Far from being coerced into using smugglers, migrants reported hiring smugglers to make the journey easier (75%) and cheaper (45%), and they were often proactive in initiating contact (85%) themselves. • The vast majority of respondents (95%) employed the services of one smuggler on their journey to Lahj, Yemen. Of these, most (62%) employed them for one part of the journey—likely for the Red Sea crossing. • In contrast to 4Mi data from the Central Mediterranean Route or the Southern Route (towards South Africa), showing smugglers provide a range of services to migrants, the primary service provided by smugglers along this section of the Eastern Route was arranging transit across borders (99%). • On average, 97% of the respondents paid around 300 USD to the smuggler for their services, largely for the sea crossing. With an average of 100,000 migrants crossing annually, this would amount to a smuggling business worth 30 million USD annually, a significant source of income for smugglers operating out of Djibouti. • Over half of surveyed migrants (60%) paid their smuggler in full before starting the journey, which, according to past MMC research, can be a driver of vulnerability, as migrants deplete their resources at the start of the journey and fall victim to smugglers extracting further compensation. • Despite actively seeking to employ smugglers and reporting that smugglers helped them to achieve their migration goal (99%), strikingly, all migrants felt that smugglers intentionally misled them. This finding stands out for its stark contrast with other migration routes, which portray a more mixed picture of misinformation, underscoring the unique and exploitive dynamics of the Eastern Route. • Smugglers were rarely trusted (2%) by migrants as reliable sources of information; with this in mind, few respondents used smugglers as information sources before (12%) and during the journey (28%). • 72% perceived smugglers as perpetrators of abuse in dangerous locations along the route, identifying physical violence (82%), death (68%), and robbery (58%) as the top

dangers. • While smugglers were rarely regarded as trustworthy and were seen as perpetrators of abuse, only 22% of surveyed migrants viewed them as criminals. Indeed, most perceived their smugglers as service providers (64%), highlighting an inherent complexity in migrant-smuggler relationships. The same complexity can be seen in migrants’ strategies for keeping safe along the route: 18% cited hiring smugglers while 1% cited avoiding them to reduce the risk of abuse and crime.

London/Denmark: Mixed Migration Centre, 2024. 24p.

By Amnesty International
Tens of thousands of migrant workers travel every year to Canada in the hope of providing a better life for their families. They are promised labour opportunities and working conditions that very often they cannot enjoy in their countries of origin. Yet, many find a different reality upon arrival. This report investigates the human rights impact of Canada’s Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP), a temporary migration scheme that allows employers to hire migrant workers, primarily in low-pay occupations.

London: Amnesty International, 2025. 71p.

By Tel Aviv University and the Anti-Defamation League (ADL),

In the aftermath of the October 7 war crimes committed by Hamas, the world has seen the worst wave of antisemitic incidents since the end of the Second World War. This Report is a messenger of bad news. The data collected from law enforcement authorities, governmental agencies, Jewish organizations, and media platforms tell a story of Jewish existence under growing threat. Particularly alarming is that also in the nine months leading to October 2023, in which no exceptional event happened, most countries with significant Jewish populations saw a rise in the number of antisemitic incidents compared to the same period in 2022, including the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Australia, Italy, Brazil, and Mexico. This means that the war in Gaza helped spread a fire that was already out of control. And it was already out of control despite the significant efforts invested in recent years by governments on educational and legal initiatives aimed at reversing the trend. Two years ago, this Report stated that the fight against antisemitism was failing. The data from 2023 show that bad has come to worse. It is time for soul searching. More slogans and more speeches will certainly not do the job. It is equally naïve to think that more budgets will solve everything. There is a need for careful, independent, and transparent studies of the methods applied so far to inform which are effective and which are not, which need to be expanded, and which should be neglected. The obvious must be mentioned: As in the case of any social evil, the test for programs applied against antisemitism is whether they lead to a decline in the phenomenon. The distress and danger Jews currently experience should not be overstated. This is not 1939, let alone 1942, not anywhere. Yet while being attacked or harassed has not been the experience of most Jews outside Israel, the data indicate that if current trends persist and continue to deteriorate, the curtain will descend on the ability of Jewish identities to be manifested with security and freedom in the West. The severe nature of the crisis should be duly recognized by governments and law enforcement agencies. There is no good racism and bad racism, racism that can be ignored and racism that cannot. Racism directed against groups considered socially strong is as destructive as any other form of racism. No society can be truly free and peaceful if its Jews are subjected to intimidation and harassment based on their ethnicity and beliefs. October 7 highlighted how poisonous antisemitism is. While antisemitism does not define the ideology of Hamas, it has been, from its inception, an inseparable part of Hamas’ dehumanization of Jews and its depiction of the war against Israel in ahistorical, essentialist binary religious terms. The reactions to Hamas’ crimes reveal how deep-seated antisemitic narratives have become across the Muslim world. Analyses in this Report demonstrate their spread across Arab societies (p. 47) as well as in Turkey (p. 59) and Iran (p. 73). As a conspiracy theory, the oldest in history, antisemitism is a sickness that blinds those who consume it from seeing the truth for what it is and from respecting the humanity of others. An important lesson to draw from the Gaza war is that peace in the Middle East will not be achieved unless antisemitism is firmly uprooted from Arab societies. Demanding actions to that effect should become fundamental in all future diplomatic processes. Social media is a primary tool in the present-day proliferation of antisemitism. It allows extremist evil-wishers to spread falsehoods, defamations, and conspiracy theories without being held accountable. No significant improvement in the fight against antisemitism will be accomplished unless those who provide platforms for hate speech will be made to apply responsible editorial discretion, including such that hinders the abuse of social media by global agents of chaos. A comprehensive study conducted for the Report on the profiles of the conveyers of antisemitic propaganda on X (formerly Twitter) in English, Arabic,

and German, as well as the contents of their messages (p. 99), highlights the need for more profound and meaningful treatment of the problem. One of the biggest challenges presented by contemporary antisemitism is that it is expressed by the extreme right and the extreme left and that both expressions increasingly encroach on the mainstream. This phenomenon is particularly evident in the United States (p. 35). It makes the choice of allies and priorities more difficult. Being between a rock and a hard place should not lead to despair, though; Jewish communities and organizations need to tirelessly reach out for broader alliances and cooperation with those committed to righteous causes. While antisemitic activists often emphasize their problem is with Israel and not with Jews, some target Jewish individuals, institutions and symbols. There is only one name for such actions. It is tempting to treat the post-October 7 antisemitic wave as an emotional response to the war and the catastrophe it brought on a civilian population which Hamas has been using as human shields. That, however, is simply not the case. Some of the most outrageous antisemitic expressions in the context of the conflict were articulated in the first days following October 7, before Israel had begun its military campaign. Criticizing Israel, including in harsh terms, is not antisemitism. Seeking its elimination as the national home of the Jewish people, including through the false argument that it is an unlawful colonial enterprise, is antisemitic. The historical facts are that the Land of Israel is the ancestral homeland of Jews, where they maintained a continued presence, and where, with the rise of Zionism, they purchased the lands on which they settled and were given the right to a state by an overwhelming majority of the UN General Assembly. Those who believe that all the above does not make Israel in its recognized borders a legitimate state, should realize that unless they come up with a good explanation why their historical-moral criteria apply to Israel only, they will not avoid the label they try to disavow. The rise of populism across the Western world presents the fight against antisemitism with uneasy dilemmas. How should populist leaders, who are philosemites and pro-Israel, be treated if their movements host antisemites, have neo-Nazi pasts, or distort the history of their nations? To what extent can the fight against Jew-hatred be blind to hate directed against other minority groups and remain morally credible? A special section of the Report (p. 77) analyzes the reasons for the ascendance of populism and its potential implications for Jews, with special attention to Germany and the Netherlands. At the beginning of 2023, the Chief Rabbi of Moscow in exile, Pinchas Goldschmidt, warned that Jews should leave Russia before they are scapegoated. These were words of wisdom from a courageous spiritual leader who knows the Russian regime and Russian history well, and who refused to support the failed military aggression and the crimes against humanity committed against Ukraine. Sadly, Rabbi Goldschmidt has not been disproven. During 2023, the Russian dictator Putin and senior members of his regime made blatant antisemitic attacks and continued to engage in Holocaust distortion as part of their broader campaign against the liberal West, liberal values, and human decency. Russia has also supported Hamas in its war against Israel (p. 55). Fascists and Jew-hatred are twains that often meet, especially in times of crisis, and the future risk for Russian Jews should be recognized. Following October 7, antisemitic propaganda also spread in places from which it had been largely absent in the past, including China. In a country like China, the spread of antisemitic content online can hardly occur if the regime objects. China prides itself, and rightly so, for taking part in the rescuing of thousands of Jews in the Holocaust when few others did. That legacy should not be stained. The regime should make a clear stand against antisemitism, as well as call Islamist terrorism by its name. Since October

7, across the Western world, some Jewish parents have been afraid to send their children to school. The sense of security in some Jewish communities has been undermined, including in socially peaceful countries with a passion for human rights, such as Scandinavia (p. 65). In France, home to the largest Jewish population in Europe and the largest in the world outside Israel and the United States, Jewish intellectuals and Rabbis express uncertainty that their children and grandchildren will enjoy the same security, freedom, and sense of belonging they had (p. 27). The troubling developments discussed in this Report call for contemplation – and for action. Four of the global leaders in the fig (continued)

Tel AvivThe Center for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry at Tel Aviv University , The Irwin Cotler Institute at Tel Aviv University , Anti-Defamation League, 2024. 148p.

By Omar Mohammed

This study explores the deep-rooted and evolving nature of antisemitism in the Arabic-speaking world. It traces its historical roots from pre-1948 socio-cultural and religious dynamics, through the impact of Nazi Germany and Soviet-era propaganda, to contemporary times where radical Islamist groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and ISIS perpetuate antisemitic ideologies. The digital age has amplified the spread of hate speech via social media. Addressing antisemitism is challenging due to widespread denial and lack of Holocaust education in the Arab world. The

study recommends educational reforms, interfaith dialogues, and international collaboration to combat antisemitism and promote tolerance .

Washington, DC: Program on Extremism at George Washington University , 2025. 55p.

By William A. Darity Jr., Raffi E. García, Lauren Russell & Jorge N. Zumaeta

This paper examines the financial health of racial-ethnic groups in Tulsa, Oklahoma, nearly a century after the 1921 Tulsa Massacre. We use data from the Tulsa National Asset Scorecard for Communities of Color (NASCC) survey to assess the financial health of two demographic groups that were historically the victims of racial violence - Native Americans and Black Americans. Specifically, we investigate financial outcomes a century after these groups made significant economic gains during the Tulsa oil boom in the early 1900 s and were subsequently victimized by racial violence. We find that Black households have statistically significantly less wealth and income than Whites in Tulsa. Our decomposition analysis shows household demographic differences between Blacks and Whites largely do not explain these wealth and income gaps, suggestive of historical discrimination. While in the case of the Native American tribes and Whites, the findings generally show no statistical significance. Compared to other NASCC-surveyed cities that did not experience destruction to the level of the Tulsa Massacre, the Black-White wealth and income gaps and the unexplained portion of the decompositions are the largest in Tulsa. Our results provisionally suggest that past exposure to racial violence can have long-term effects on the economic outcomes of the affected groups decades later.

Journal of Family and Economic Issues (2024) 45:256–275

By Wilder Research

In the decade since Safe Harbor became Minnesota law, the state has built an extensive network in response to the sexual exploitation of youth, and more recently human trafficking, both sex and labor. The network spans from state and local government to Tribal Nations and community-based nonprofit programs. Founded on a public health approach within the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) in recognition of the significant health and social impacts created by exploitation and trafficking on populations, Safe Harbor also partners extensively with entities in public safety, human services, and human rights, including the Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS), the Minnesota Department of Public Safety (DPS) and the Minnesota Coalition Against Sexual Assault (MNCASA) to offer a comprehensive multidisciplinary response. State law requires the Safe Harbor Director, based in MDH, to submit a biennial evaluation of the program to the Commissioner of Health under Minnesota Statute Section 145.4718. The purpose of the evaluation is to ensure Safe Harbor is reaching its intended participants, increasing identification of sexually exploited youth, coordinating across disciplines including law enforcement and child welfare, providing access to services, including housing, ensuring the quality of services, and utilizing penalty funds to support services. The Safe Harbor law passed in 2011 and after a three-year planning period called No Wrong Door, the Safe Harbor system was fully enacted in 2014. In the years since, Safe Harbor has submitted three evaluation reports to the legislature, beginning in 2015. Each evaluation was conducted by Wilder Research at the Amherst H. Wilder Foundation (Wilder) under a competitive contract with MDH. The evaluation process is an opportunity to hear and learn from trafficked and exploited youth as well as participants from a variety of disciplines who respond to the needs of these youth on a daily basis. For the current Phase 4 report, MDH contracted with Wilder again while MDH’s Safe Harbor Program produced accompanying evaluation materials. As a result, this Phase 4 Safe Harbor evaluation draws from complementary background reports that are combined to represent a variety of perspectives from both outside and within the Safe Harbor network. These resources not only evaluate Safe Harbor’s activities, but also address these activities in the context of significant current events including the global COVID-19 pandemic and the civil rights movement in Minnesota, as well as around the nation and world, in the wake of George Floyd’s murder. The supplemental evaluation materials, containing expanded findings, data, and appendix are contained in this document. All findings focus on the Safe Harbor network and activities between April 1, 2019, and June 30, 2021. The Wilder data collection and analysis took place between January 1, 2021, and June 30, 2021. The MDH data collection and analysis took place between September 1, 2020, and August 1, 2021. Between January 2021 and June 2021, Wilder interviewed grantees, multidisciplinary partners, and youth clients, and also surveyed youth clients to evaluate Safe Harbor. Wilder submitted its report including several findings and recommendations to MDH. Wilder found evidence for outcomes related to multidisciplinary partnership and access to services, including culturally specific services; the factors contributing to Safe Harbor’s impact; gaps and challenges; opportunities for improvement; and the pandemic’s impact on service provision. MDH analyzed the provision of the statewide Safe Harbor Regional Navigator component and the reach of the Safe Harbor Network to identify and serve youth, as well as availability, accessibility, and equity of Safe Harbor supportive services and shelter and housing, in addition to training for providers. MDH then submitted a Phase 4 evaluation report to the legislature including combined findings, recommendations, and conclusions. Summary recommendations are listed here, but included with further detail in the legislative report and within the supplemental evaluation materials included in this document: Recommended actions: ▪ Increase stakeholder ability to identify youth. ▪ Expand protections and services regardless of age and remain flexible in identifying service needs. ▪ Increase and improve access to services, especially for youth from marginalized cultures and greater Minnesota. ▪ Support more diverse and consistent staffing. ▪ Increase amount and cultural appropriateness of technical assistance, education, and training provided. ▪ Increase prevention efforts (by decreasing demand and identifying risk factors). ▪ Support improvement of more continuous, comprehensive, and robust outcome and process evaluation as well as inferential research. ▪ De-silo the response to sex and labor trafficking. ▪ Increase youth voice and opportunities within Safe Harbor. ▪ Heal organizational trauma to better help organizations, staff, and clients. ▪ Improve equity by conducting a cultural needs assessment with several cultural groups as well as strategically directing allocations of funds and resources to culturally specific groups. ▪ Strengthen relationships within the public health approach. ▪ Further promote government agency collaboration.

St. Paul, MN : Minnesota Department of Health, Safe Harbor, Violence Prevention Unit, Health Promotion and Chronic Disease Division 2021. 130p.

By Rafael Muñoz Sevilla , Bladimir Chicaiza. et al.

The U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of International Labor Affairs (USDOL-ILAB) has contracted with the American Institutes for Research® (AIR®) to assess the current landscape of efforts to address child and forced labor in the cocoa supply chains in Ecuador, Brazil, and Indonesia. The main research questions focused on (a) the identification of efforts of governments, industry, and civil society organizations, including international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and workers’ organizations, to address child and forced labor in the cocoa sectors; (b) identification of the challenges encountered in these efforts; (c) review of situations that could potentially increase child and forced labor in the cocoa supply chain; and (d) identification of indications that these child labor and forced labor situations exist in the cocoa sector in these countries. The research methodology employed a comprehensive approach involving desk research, stakeholder interviews, and mixed-methods data analysis. The research team conducted a thorough review of more than 70 documents and websites, encompassing a wide range of sources. The team conducted interviews with 46 stakeholders, representing a total of 35 institutions and companies across the three countries. The research team adopted a mixedmethods data analysis approach, combining both primary qualitative data from stakeholder interviews and secondary data from document review. The research team adopted two conceptual frameworks to guide each country case’s analysis and triangulation between secondary data from document review and information gathered from key informants. The use of conceptual frameworks allows for comparability across the case studies, while recognizing and capturing the unique contexts and challenges of child and/or forced labor in cocoa in each country landscape. This study uses the structure of the (1) Cocoa Production Stages Framework, 1 to review phases of cocoa production in the supply chain in each country for relevant child labor and forced labor risks, as well as the (2) Systems Framework of Key Dimensions to Reduce Child and/or Forced Labor, 2 to assess the current efforts by actors in that country to make progress on child labor and forced labor reduction in cocoa. Qualitative data from interviews and the desk research were systematically analyzed to respond to the research questions and identify patterns, themes, and variations within these frameworks.

Arlington, VA: American Institutes for Research | 2024. 162p.

By Mei Zegers

The United States Department of Labor’s Bureau of International Labor Affairs (USDOL-ILAB) has contracted with the American Institutes for Research® (AIR®) to research, identify, and develop indicators of progress and to assess efforts to address child labor and forced labor in the cocoa sectors of Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. Based on a participative process, this report covers the analysis of stakeholders’ implementation of efforts, with emphasis on the period since 2019. The main research questions focused on (a) the identification of the initiatives and good practices of governments, industry, and workers’ and farmer-based organizations (FBOs) to address child labor and forced labor in the cocoa sectors in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana; (b) identification of the challenges of and the extent to which and workers’ organizations and FBOs are actively and meaningfully involved in efforts to address child labor and forced labor in the cocoa sectors; and (c) a review of the efforts under and outside the Child Labor Cocoa Coordinating Group (CLCCG) to address child labor and forced labor in the cocoa sector. The main stakeholders asked to contribute to the research were the governments of Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire; private-sector cocoa representatives; international development agencies; and international and national civil societies, including workers’ organizations and FBOs. The specific individuals contacted were selected on the basis of their membership in the CLCCG or as identified in mapping exercises of key cocoa production stakeholders. This research was based on a systems approach to data gathering, analysis, and interpretation. The approach identifies interrelationships, dependencies, and feedback loops to analyze dynamics, identify patterns, and make informed planning decisions for maximum results. A thorough literature review of 613 documents and websites was conducted for the analysis covered in the report. Interviews were conducted with 79 individuals. One-day workshops were conducted in May 2023 in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana to discuss the development of a repository of progress indicators. These workshops also provided some information that was useful for the report. Further useful information resulted from email correspondence with representatives of 14 types of stakeholders that particularly focused on issues regarding needed support to strengthen the capacities of workers’ organizations and FBOs to address child labor and forced labor. Data analysis was primarily conducted using the qualitative data analysis software Atlas.ti and with Mind Mapping software.

Most research limitations fell into three categories. First, although child labor and forced labor are both considered throughout our research, much more information is available on child labor. There has been increasing attention, as well as strategy development, to address forced labor in cocoa among key stakeholders. However, there have been very few in-depth initiatives aimed at addressing this issue in cocoa, aside from examples such as the Forced Labor Indicators Project (FLIP),1 and a collaboration between the Rainforest Alliance, International Cocoa Initiative and Solidaridad. 2 Given the lack of existing data on forced labor initiatives, it is difficult to cover forced labor in the same depth as child labor. Second, some studies have identified good practices to reduce child labor in cocoa production, but these do not cover the breadth of approaches and initiatives used. Ideally, good practices should be identified through independent studies instead of through self-assessment of implementers. Independent studies may include evaluations of projects, but these are limited in number on this specific subject matter. Third, throughout the report we refer to a broad range of types of strategies and initiatives; although there are some commonalities, there are also major differences that need to be taken into account because they limit comparability. Main Findings The research confirmed that there is no one way to approach child labor and forced labor reduction; rather, it is the combination of implemented strategies and practices that will lead to greater success in reducing child labor and forced labor. Since 2019, there have been positive changes in terms of strengthened collaboration, coverage, and (new) directions in the efforts to reduce child and forced labor in cocoa in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. However, there are still many aspects that need attention to reach higher levels of impact on the reduction of child labor and forced labor. Currently, the focus on eliminating child labor at a household level has rightly expanded to consider many contextual issues and child well-being overall. This means focus on encompassing the availability of social services—including education and social protection coverage— functioning of workers’ organizations and FBOs and their voices, and deforestation and other environmental issues. In addition, the need to ensure that child labor is reduced consistently in communities, and not just among children currently working in cocoa, has gained recognition. efficiency and safety in cocoa production contributes to increased incomes. Application of methods to reduce accidents and illnesses caused by occupationally unsafe production technologies helps to simultaneously reduce the loss of income from such events. While awareness of the dangers of child labor has increased in both Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, forced labor remains a subject that is not sufficiently covered. Awareness raising on subjects such as how and where to report child labor and forced labor and available grievance mechanisms for community members is still too limited. There is still scope for better collection and consolidation of data at local and national levels on child labor and forced labor reduction initiatives and their impact on informing decision making. Data gathering and sharing of data to ensure that lessons learned,

implementation challenges identified, and good practices were used to inform future efforts was a challenge repeatedly identified throughout the research. Although the various multistakeholder platforms discuss some of the data, the concrete use of data for planning still needs greater attention, using methodologically appropriate means. The need to strengthen technical and logistics capacities at a local level to provide services to cocoa communities remains clear. The reduction of dependence on nonstate actors (international development agencies including foundations, NGOs) instead of on local government to provide services is necessary for long term sustainability. For this purpose, increased funding of local government services is key to enabling direct work with and sustainably of communities on child labor and forced labor reduction. Together with technical strengthening and support for logistics, including transport, impact of child labor and forced labor reduction initiatives will be exponentially increased, particularly if accompanied by improved infrastructure, such as schools, health provision structures, and improved roads. There are increased efforts to involve and strengthen workers’ organizations and FBOs, but their potential to contribute to addressing child labor and forced labor is not being fully realized. Although not all cocoa farmers are members of cooperatives and other farmer associations, many are. Efforts to encourage more farmers to organize and formalize them are underway, thus increasing the reach of workers’ organizations and FBOs. The necessity of increasing focus on including their voices and their local representatives to contribute to reduction of child labor and forced labor in cocoa is evident. This research found that there is still scope to improve the functioning of the CLCCG. Some aspects are similar to the need to join in streamlining the multistakeholder platforms. However, it is crucial to expand membership of the CLCCG to create greater diversity of inputs from key stakeholders. Further, as is relevant throughout all initiatives, the more concrete integration of specific forced labor reduction methods and initiatives can be scaled up The conclusions and recommendations presented in this research require a comprehensive and flexible approach to implementation. Continuous verification of the effects of the steps undertaken to reduce child labor and forced labor will be necessary on a regular basis and in an integrated manner. Recommendations are clustered around eight thematic types that this research identified as needing more focus and streamlining for initiatives to achieve greater impact on reducing child labor and forced labor in cocoa in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. The thematic areas and main focus of key recommendations are briefly summarized here. Detailed recommendations, their priority level, and main proposed responsible entities for their implementation are listed in the “Conclusions and Recommendations” section of the report.

American Institutes for Research® | 2024. 120p.

By Francisco Alba

In This Article

● Large-scale Mexican migration to the United States began in the early 1940s ● After flatlining for several years, emigration has started to bounce back ● The shift into a country of transit is perhaps Mexico's recent defining migration feature ● Immigration is largely a product of return migration from the United States and transit migrants who remain ● There has been a change in the government’s posture regarding transit migration

Migration Information Source, May 23, 2024

By Wilder Research

In the decade since Safe Harbor became Minnesota law, the state has built an extensive network in response to the sexual exploitation of youth, and more recently human trafficking, both sex and labor. The network spans from state and local government to Tribal Nations and community-based nonprofit programs. Founded on a public health approach within the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) in recognition of the significant health and social impacts created by exploitation and trafficking on populations, Safe Harbor also partners extensively with entities in public safety, human services, and human rights, including the Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS), the Minnesota Department of Public Safety (DPS) and the Minnesota Coalition Against Sexual Assault (MNCASA) to offer a comprehensive multidisciplinary response. State law requires the Safe Harbor Director, based in MDH, to submit a biennial evaluation of the program to the Commissioner of Health under Minnesota Statute Section 145.4718. The purpose of the evaluation is to ensure Safe Harbor is reaching its intended participants, increasing identification of sexually exploited youth, coordinating across disciplines including law enforcement and child welfare, providing access to services, including housing, ensuring the quality of services, and utilizing penalty funds to support services. The Safe Harbor law passed in 2011 and after a three-year planning period called No Wrong Door, the Safe Harbor system was fully enacted in 2014. In the years since, Safe Harbor has submitted three evaluation reports to the legislature, beginning in 2015. Each evaluation was conducted by Wilder Research at the Amherst H. Wilder Foundation (Wilder) under a competitive contract with MDH. The evaluation process is an opportunity to hear and learn from trafficked and exploited youth as well as participants from a variety of disciplines who respond to the needs of these youth on a daily basis. For the current Phase 4 report, MDH contracted with Wilder again while MDH’s Safe Harbor Program produced accompanying evaluation materials. As a result, this Phase 4 Safe Harbor evaluation draws from complementary background reports that are combined to represent a variety of perspectives from both outside and within the Safe Harbor network. These resources not only evaluate Safe Harbor’s activities, but also address these activities in the context of significant current events including the global COVID-19 pandemic and the civil rights movement in Minnesota, as well as around the nation and world, in the wake of George Floyd’s murder. The supplemental evaluation materials, containing expanded findings, data, and appendix are contained in this document. All findings focus on the Safe Harbor network and activities between April 1, 2019, and June 30, 2021. The Wilder data collection and analysis took place between January 1, 2021, and June 30, 2021. The MDH data collection and analysis took place between September 1, 2020, and August 1, 2021. Between January 2021 and June 2021, Wilder interviewed grantees, multidisciplinary partners, and youth clients, and also surveyed youth clients to evaluate Safe Harbor. Wilder submitted its report including several findings and recommendations to MDH. Wilder found evidence for outcomes related to multidisciplinary partnership and access to services, including culturally specific services; the factors contributing to Safe Harbor’s impact; gaps and challenges; opportunities for improvement; and the pandemic’s impact on service provision. MDH analyzed the provision of the statewide Safe Harbor Regional Navigator component and the reach of the Safe Harbor Network to identify and serve youth, as well as availability, accessibility, and equity of Safe Harbor supportive services and shelter and housing, in addition to training for providers. MDH then submitted a Phase 4 evaluation report to the legislature including combined findings, recommendations, and conclusions. Summary recommendations are listed here, but included with further detail in the legislative report and within the supplemental evaluation materials included in this document: Recommended actions: ▪ Increase stakeholder ability to identify youth. ▪ Expand protections and services regardless of age and remain flexible in identifying service needs. ▪ Increase and improve access to services, especially for youth from marginalized cultures and greater Minnesota. ▪ Support more diverse and consistent staffing. ▪ Increase amount and cultural appropriateness of technical assistance, education, and training provided. ▪ Increase prevention efforts (by decreasing demand and identifying risk factors). ▪ Support improvement of more continuous, comprehensive, and robust outcome and process evaluation as well as inferential research. ▪ De-silo the response to sex and labor trafficking. ▪ Increase youth voice and opportunities within Safe Harbor. ▪ Heal organizational trauma to better help organizations, staff, and clients. ▪ Improve equity by conducting a cultural needs assessment with several cultural groups as well as strategically directing allocations of funds and resources to culturally specific groups. ▪ Strengthen relationships within the public health approach. ▪ Further promote government agency collaboration.

St. Paul, MN : Minnesota Department of Health, Safe Harbor, Violence Prevention Unit, Health Promotion and Chronic Disease Division 2021. 130p.

By Anniina Jokinen, Anna-Greta Pekkarinen, Jessiina Rantanen

Forced marriage is a multifaceted phenomenon encompassing sev - eral intersecting factors that relate to situations in which individu - als are compelled to marry or stay married against their will. Forced marriage is widely recognized as a violation of human rights and in particular as a form of gender-based violence and honour-based vio - lence. The harms and negative consequences of forced marriages are multifold and challenge many service providers as well as the crimi - nal justice system. This report outlines the concrete challenges, factors and con - cepts that must be addressed when developing effective responses to tackle forced marriages and providing support to victims and persons affected. It is targeted towards various professionals and practitioners who may encounter victims of forced marriage or persons, families or communities affected by the phenomenon in their line of work. The content is based on a desk review of academic and other relevant liter - ature, as well information collected by the EASY project partners: the European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, affiliated with the United Nations (HEUNI), University of Lleida (Spain), Associació Valentes I Acompanyades (Spain), SOLWODI (Germany), and the Im - migrant Council of Ireland, to identify approaches that have relevance in the development of effective and victim-centred interventions for victims of forced marriages. The best practices were collected mainly via semi-structured (individual or group) interviews with experts and/or survivors, that were based on a shared interview framework. The interviews were conducted in the summer and autumn of 2023.1 The experts interviewed included, e.g., NGO representatives and counsellors working with topics related to forced marriage, migrant women’s rights, honor-based violence and human trafficking, shelter/residential counsellors, government officials and policymakers, and law enforcement authorities from Finland, Germany, Ireland, and Catalonia (Spain). The survivors interviewed included, e.g., victim-survivors who work as mentors and/or had been supported by the interviewing organisation. Throughout the report there are quotes from the interviews to demonstrate the challenges, experiences and solutions identified. Table 1. Number of persons interviewed to collect best practices by each country and in total. The best practices collected were also shared and discussed with partners in a best practice workshop hosted by SOLWODI in Bonn, Germany on 20–21 November 2023. Each partner identified 4–8 best practices with a focus on themes such as proactive methods to identify victims, engaging with persons from impacted communities and reducing the risk of forced marriage; ways to support and assist victims; training and awareness-raising activities targeting professionals; multi-agency collaboration at local, national and international levels; and municipal, regional or national strategies to tackle or address honor-related violence and/or forced marriages. Ten of the collected best practices were selected and summarised for this publication. Moreover, in early 2024, the EASY project partners launched a legislative overview which presents the results of comparative desk research on the legal approach to forced marriage in Germany, Finland, Ireland and Spain (Villacampa and Salat 2023). Therefore, this report does not cover legislative frameworks and procedures in place in the four countries to address forced marriages and to protect the victims as they are covered in detail in the legislative overview. The two reports are complimentary. The ultimate aim of the EASY project is to enhance support for victims/survivors of forced marriage and strengthen the work against forced marriage in the four partner countries.

Helsinki: European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, affiliated with the United Nations (HEUNI) HEUNI, 2024. 58p.

By Rafael Muñoz Sevilla , Bladimir Chicaiza. et al.

The U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of International Labor Affairs (USDOL-ILAB) has contracted with the American Institutes for Research® (AIR®) to assess the current landscape of efforts to address child and forced labor in the cocoa supply chains in Ecuador, Brazil, and Indonesia. The main research questions focused on (a) the identification of efforts of governments, industry, and civil society organizations, including international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and workers’ organizations, to address child and forced labor in the cocoa sectors; (b) identification of the challenges encountered in these efforts; (c) review of situations that could potentially increase child and forced labor in the cocoa supply chain; and (d) identification of indications that these child labor and forced labor situations exist in the cocoa sector in these countries. The research methodology employed a comprehensive approach involving desk research, stakeholder interviews, and mixed-methods data analysis. The research team conducted a thorough review of more than 70 documents and websites, encompassing a wide range of sources. The team conducted interviews with 46 stakeholders, representing a total of 35 institutions and companies across the three countries. The research team adopted a mixedmethods data analysis approach, combining both primary qualitative data from stakeholder interviews and secondary data from document review. The research team adopted two conceptual frameworks to guide each country case’s analysis and triangulation between secondary data from document review and information gathered from key informants. The use of conceptual frameworks allows for comparability across the case studies, while recognizing and capturing the unique contexts and challenges of child and/or forced labor in cocoa in each country landscape. This study uses the structure of the (1) Cocoa Production Stages Framework, 1 to review phases of cocoa production in the supply chain in each country for relevant child labor and forced labor risks, as well as the (2) Systems Framework of Key Dimensions to Reduce Child and/or Forced Labor, 2 to assess the current efforts by actors in that country to make progress on child labor and forced labor reduction in cocoa. Qualitative data from interviews and the desk research were systematically analyzed to respond to the research questions and identify patterns, themes, and variations within these frameworks.

Arlington, VA: American Institutes for Research | 2024. 162p.

By Mei Zegers

The United States Department of Labor’s Bureau of International Labor Affairs (USDOL-ILAB) has contracted with the American Institutes for Research® (AIR®) to research, identify, and develop indicators of progress and to assess efforts to address child labor and forced labor in the cocoa sectors of Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. Based on a participative process, this report covers the analysis of stakeholders’ implementation of efforts, with emphasis on the period since 2019. The main research questions focused on (a) the identification of the initiatives and good practices of governments, industry, and workers’ and farmer-based organizations (FBOs) to address child labor and forced labor in the cocoa sectors in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana; (b) identification of the challenges of and the extent to which and workers’ organizations and FBOs are actively and meaningfully involved in efforts to address child labor and forced labor in the cocoa sectors; and (c) a review of the efforts under and outside the Child Labor Cocoa Coordinating Group (CLCCG) to address child labor and forced labor in the cocoa sector. The main stakeholders asked to contribute to the research were the governments of Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire; private-sector cocoa representatives; international development agencies; and international and national civil societies, including workers’ organizations and FBOs. The specific individuals contacted were selected on the basis of their membership in the CLCCG or as identified in mapping exercises of key cocoa production stakeholders. This research was based on a systems approach to data gathering, analysis, and interpretation. The approach identifies interrelationships, dependencies, and feedback loops to analyze dynamics, identify patterns, and make informed planning decisions for maximum results. A thorough literature review of 613 documents and websites was conducted for the analysis covered in the report. Interviews were conducted with 79 individuals. One-day workshops were conducted in May 2023 in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana to discuss the development of a repository of progress indicators. These workshops also provided some information that was useful for the report. Further useful information resulted from email correspondence with representatives of 14 types of stakeholders that particularly focused on issues regarding needed support to strengthen the capacities of workers’ organizations and FBOs to address child labor and forced labor. Data analysis was primarily conducted using the qualitative data analysis software Atlas.ti and with Mind Mapping software.

Most research limitations fell into three categories. First, although child labor and forced labor are both considered throughout our research, much more information is available on child labor. There has been increasing attention, as well as strategy development, to address forced labor in cocoa among key stakeholders. However, there have been very few in-depth initiatives aimed at addressing this issue in cocoa, aside from examples such as the Forced Labor Indicators Project (FLIP),1 and a collaboration between the Rainforest Alliance, International Cocoa Initiative and Solidaridad. 2 Given the lack of existing data on forced labor initiatives, it is difficult to cover forced labor in the same depth as child labor. Second, some studies have identified good practices to reduce child labor in cocoa production, but these do not cover the breadth of approaches and initiatives used. Ideally, good practices should be identified through independent studies instead of through self-assessment of implementers. Independent studies may include evaluations of projects, but these are limited in number on this specific subject matter. Third, throughout the report we refer to a broad range of types of strategies and initiatives; although there are some commonalities, there are also major differences that need to be taken into account because they limit comparability. Main Findings The research confirmed that there is no one way to approach child labor and forced labor reduction; rather, it is the combination of implemented strategies and practices that will lead to greater success in reducing child labor and forced labor. Since 2019, there have been positive changes in terms of strengthened collaboration, coverage, and (new) directions in the efforts to reduce child and forced labor in cocoa in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. However, there are still many aspects that need attention to reach higher levels of impact on the reduction of child labor and forced labor. Currently, the focus on eliminating child labor at a household level has rightly expanded to consider many contextual issues and child well-being overall. This means focus on encompassing the availability of social services—including education and social protection coverage— functioning of workers’ organizations and FBOs and their voices, and deforestation and other environmental issues. In addition, the need to ensure that child labor is reduced consistently in communities, and not just among children currently working in cocoa, has gained recognition. efficiency and safety in cocoa production contributes to increased incomes. Application of methods to reduce accidents and illnesses caused by occupationally unsafe production technologies helps to simultaneously reduce the loss of income from such events. While awareness of the dangers of child labor has increased in both Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, forced labor remains a subject that is not sufficiently covered. Awareness raising on subjects such as how and where to report child labor and forced labor and available grievance mechanisms for community members is still too limited. There is still scope for better collection and consolidation of data at local and national levels on child labor and forced labor reduction initiatives and their impact on informing decision making. Data gathering and sharing of data to ensure that lessons learned, implementation challenges identified, and good practices were used to inform future efforts was a challenge repeatedly identified throughout the research. Although the various multistakeholder platforms discuss some of the data, the concrete use of data for planning still needs greater attention, using methodologically appropriate means. The need to strengthen technical and logistics capacities at a local level to provide services to cocoa communities remains clear. The reduction of dependence on nonstate actors (international development agencies including foundations, NGOs) instead of on local government to provide services is necessary for long term sustainability. For this purpose, increased funding of local government services is key to enabling direct work with and sustainably of communities on child labor and forced labor reduction. Together with technical strengthening and support for logistics, including transport, impact of child labor and forced labor reduction initiatives will be exponentially increased, particularly if accompanied by improved infrastructure, such as schools, health provision structures, and improved roads. There are increased efforts to involve and strengthen workers’ organizations and FBOs, but their potential to contribute to addressing child labor and forced labor is not being fully realized. Although not all cocoa farmers are members of cooperatives and other farmer associations, many are. Efforts to encourage more farmers to organize and formalize them are underway, thus increasing the reach of workers’ organizations and FBOs. The necessity of increasing focus on including their voices and their local representatives to contribute to reduction of child labor and forced labor in cocoa is evident. This research found that there is still scope to improve the functioning of the CLCCG. Some aspects are similar to the need to join in streamlining the multistakeholder platforms. However, it is crucial to expand membership of the CLCCG to create greater diversity of inputs from key stakeholders. Further, as is relevant throughout all initiatives, the more concrete integration of specific forced labor reduction methods and initiatives can be scaled up The conclusions and recommendations presented in this research require a comprehensive and flexible approach to implementation. Continuous verification of the effects of the steps undertaken to reduce child labor and forced labor will be necessary on a regular basis and in an integrated manner. Recommendations are clustered around eight thematic types that this research identified as needing more focus and streamlining for initiatives to achieve greater impact on reducing child labor and forced labor in cocoa in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. The thematic areas and main focus of key recommendations are briefly summarized here. Detailed recommendations, their priority level, and main proposed responsible entities for their implementation are listed in the “Conclusions and Recommendations” section of the report.

American Institutes for Research® | 2024. 120p.

By Human Rights Watch

In December 2024, Saudi Arabia will be awarded the 2034 Men’s World Cup hosting rights, which FIFA has engineered without competition. The tournament is just one of many massive, planned projects requiring immense construction under Vision 2030, such as the $500 billion futuristic NEOM city. “Die First, and I’ll Pay You Later” shows how migrant workers continue to face widespread abuses across employment sectors and geographic regions including exorbitant recruitment fees, wage theft, job immobility, inadequate heat protections and uninvestigated deaths. Saudi authorities promised labor reforms, but the report based on interviews with more than 150 migrant workers and their families shows how Saudi authorities are systematically failing to protect migrant workers and remedy abuses. Migrant workers are the human engine of Saudi Arabia’s massive construction boom. There are 13.4 million migrant workers in the country and planned projects will result in millions more. The report shows how businesses and giga-projects funded by or linked to the Public Investment Fund (PIF), the country’s sovereign wealth fund, are among those exploiting and abusing migrant workers. This blatant failure to protect workers creates a near certainty that the 2034 World Cup will come at a large human cost. The report includes recommendations to the governments of Saudi Arabia and migrant origin countries, as well as to relevant international entities including FIFA, sponsors and businesses looking to profit from Saudi Arabia’s mega- and giga-projects.  

New York: Human Rights Watch, 2024. 130p.

By Human Rights Watch

The Rwandan government has long presided over the torture and ill-treatment of detainees, whether held in official or unofficial detention facilities across the country. In “They Threw Me in the Water”: The Need for Accountability for Torture in Rwanda, Human Rights Watch documents an array of serious human rights abuses, including torture, in detention facilities in Kigali and the west of the country. The case of Innocent Kayumba, the former director of Rubavu and Nyarugenge prisons, convicted on April 5, 2024, for the assault and murder of a detainee at Rubavu prison in 2019 underscores serious failings in the Rwandan judiciary’s response to evidence of torture. The judiciary, as well as the national human rights institution, have largely failed to investigate or address repeated and credible allegations of torture made by detainees and former detainees since at least 2017. While Kayumba’s trial is a significant first step towards breaking the near total impunity around abuse in detention, much more is needed for Rwanda to end the practice and hold accountable those responsible for torture and other ill-treatments in prisons and unofficial detention facilities. Rwanda should comply with the provisions of its own constitution and fulfill its obligations under international human rights law by urgently conducting a comprehensive investigation into torture in prisons, that is capable of leading to both accountability and redress for victims.

New York: Human Rights Watch, 2024. 39p.

By Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International

Amnesty International Kenya and Human Rights Watch document the abuses committed by police and other state agents during the 2023 nationwide protests. The opposition, Azimio La Umoja One Kenya Coalition, organized the protests over alleged fraud and malpractices during the 2022 elections, and against the high cost of living and tax hikes proposed by the new administration of President William Ruto. “Unchecked Injustice” is based on 224 interviews with survivors and witnesses to abuses in Nairobi, Kisumu, Machakos, Migori, Nakuru, Kisii, Nyamira, Homa Bay, Siaya, and Makueni counties. The report documents how police used arbitrary and excessive force against protesters between March-July 2023. They shot directly into crowds with lethal weapons and lesslethal “rubber bullets,” fired tear gas into residential areas and schools, and carried out violent and abusive house-to-house operations, beating and shooting residents, killing at least 31 people. The Independent Policing Oversight Authority, which provides civilian oversight of the work of the police in Kenya, recorded that at least 67 were killed during this period. The report also documents arbitrary arrests, detention, torture and other ill-treatment of people including children under 18, and the long-term health and socio-economic impact of abuses. Amnesty International Kenya and Human Rights Watch call on the Kenyan government to acknowledge, condemn and investigate the killings and use of excessive force by police, and hold to account those credibly implicated in abuses. The government should also introduce credible police reforms.

New York: Human Rights Watch, 2024. 96p.