By Anita Ramsak and  Eyueil Abate  

Ethiopia is a country of origin and transit, with migration primarily occurring around three main routes: (a) Eastern route through Djibouti towards Saudi Arabia; (b) Southern route through Kenya towards South Africa; and (c) Northern route through Libya towards Europe. In 2022, the number of unaccompanied children who migrated via the Eastern route doubled in comparison to 2021, and unaccompanied children made up 38 per cent of all children on the move from Ethiopia in 2022. En route, children may face protection risks including arbitrary arrest and detention, human trafficking for the purposes of labour or sexual exploitation, gender-based violence, extortion and denial of access to basic needs. Broad structural factors, such as conflict, drought and poverty are driving children and adults to migrate despite the protection risks. To understand the current knowledge gaps in the nexus between migration and child protection, as well as propose improvements, this study relies on primary and secondary data analysis. With a particular focus on exploring linkages between child migration and trafficking in children in Ethiopia, the report concludes with the institutional and legal landscape for children on the move and highlights key policy gaps in protecting children on the move across Ethiopia.Geneva, SWIT:  International Organization for Migration. 2023, 94p.

By The 

Greater Manchester Immigration Aid Unit

Over recent years, thousands of children have been wrongly treated as adults by the Home Office. These children are in the UK on their own seeking asylum. Following decisions made by UK border officials that they are “significantly over 18” they have been sent alone to adult asylum accommodation, usually hotels. This is a report about children housed in adult hotels after these decisions at the border, based on Greater Manchester Immigration Aid Unit’s legal and place-based expertise and experience, and on the experiences that the children we work with have shared.  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY “You can’t stop feeling sad. You have to feel sad and angry when someone says you are a liar. It is in your heart.” Between January 2024 and February 2025, at least 296 children were wrongly sent to adult asylum accommodation, usually hotels, in the North West. This is a report about what children experience in asylum hotels, how theyare sentthere,andthe supportthey needtoget out. We are sounding the alarm – as others have done before us – that these children are being put at significant risk. Much harm has already been done, and must be acknowledged; and the government, local authorities andaccommodationprovidersmustact now topreventfurther harm. We are sounding the alarm – as others have done before us – that these children are being put at significant risk. Much harm has already been done, and must be acknowledged; and the government, local authorities and accommodation providers must act now to prevent further harm.

Our recommendations:

To the Home Office:

• The Home Office must admit children are wrongly treated as adults at the border and suspend all “significantly over 18” decisions until investigated.

• Repeal recent changes to age assessments introduced by the Nationality and Borders Act, and end the for-profit asylum housing model.

• Meanwhile, the Home Office should notify local authorities when children are placed in hotels and publish clearer data on age disputes.

To accommodation providers:

• Immediately refer to the local authority when staff become aware that a potential child is in adult asylum accommodation.

• Take all possible measures to safeguard potential children.

• Update training for hotel staff so they are aware of the high likelihood of children being treated as adults.

To local authorities: 

• Ensure social workers’ decisions and training include an understanding of the child’s experience in the UK, including being traumatised by Home Office age assessment practice.

• Ensure that potential children are not held to higher thresholds in assessments when local authority capacity is stretched.

• Do not refer children to the National Age Assessment Board (NAAB).

Manchester, UK: Greater Manchester Immigration Aid Unit, 

2025. 49p.

By Fatemeh Bakhshalizadeh, Clinton Gudmunson, Kimberley Greder

Previous literature on Latinx immigrants in the US mostly focuses on the negative effects of fear of deportation on this population. However, limited studies highlight coping resources that can mitigate the fear of deportation. This quantitative study, through logistic regression and conservation of resource theory, explored how resilience and social support may influence fear of deportation among 130 rural Latina immigrant mothers in a Midwestern state. Findings revealed that resilience, receiving emotional support from family members, and earned income were associated with lower fear of deportation among Latina mothers in the study. Additionally, other types of social support, such as providing instrumental support to people outside of their household and receiving emotional support from friends, were associated with higher levels of fear of deportation among the mothers.

International Migration, Volume 63, Issue 5, Sep 2025

By Neil Brodie,Morag M. Kersel,Simon Mackenzie,Isber Sabrine,Emiline Smith &Donna Yates

Fifty years after the adoption of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, the illicit trade in cultural objects endures, with harmful consequences to local communities, knowledge acquisition, and archaeological landscapes and objects. In this article, we present a gap analysis to assess under-performing policy and practice. We argue that a poor understanding of how the trade is organized and operates and of how it might be regulated hinders effective policy formulation. Funding structures which encourage short-term ad hoc research and inhibit information sharing are in part responsible for some of the gaps. We conclude by suggesting how sustained theoretically informed, evidence-led collaborative analyses might help reduce or mitigate these problems, preventing another 50 years of illicit trade.

Journal of Field Archaeology 

Volume 47, 2022 - Issue 2

By Jonathan Gilbert  · Michael Levi

 This article examines the role of organised crime groups (OCGs) in the organisation and commission of mortgage and property related frauds. Whilst conventionally in criminological and policing studies, serious and organised crime has been associated with the commission of violent, gang and drug-related crimes, there is an increasing focus on the collective and facilitative role that motivated ofenders and ‘professional enablers’ like lawyers and accountants have in the commission of fnancial crimes for gain. This article utilises case studies and social network analysis (SNA) of police-defned OCGs to identify the ties criminal actors have with other ‘members’ and broader connections. It considers causal agency and the social relations that exist within the OCG that support highly organised and sophisticated operational dynamics necessary to the commission and reproduction of organised fraud. In addition to a review of the current literature, empirical data was collected from regulatory enforcement proceedings, criminal prosecution fles, trial transcripts, witness statements and interviews with law enforcement, regulators, victim-lender participants and lead members of mortgage and property fraud OCGs. SNA is used to show how members collectively share motivations to plan and co-ordinate criminal behaviour for fnancial gain, communicate and collaborate on both an ongoing enterprise and individual project basis, and how recruitment strategies, based on kinship, support resilience and the ability to reproduce organised fraud. Examining the social network of mortgage fraud OCGs, including biographies, roles, responsibilities of members, including professional enablers and straw persons and the ties and interactions between them, will assist in understanding mortgage fraud. In particular, they will show how these individual, proximal and causal factors ft within the broader, macro- crime facilitative environment in which mortgage and property related frauds are organised and are capable of being reproduced. 

By Tan E-Reng

SYNOPSIS Social listening tools are a vital part of the disinformation and online harms researcher's toolkit, offering both depth and breadth in the insights they provide. However, there are inherent pitfalls that come with their use. This commentary elucidates what these pitfalls are and proposes steps to mitigate them. COMMENTARY Social listening tools, which are software applications that enable end-users to gather and analyse vast amounts of user-generated content propagated online on social media platforms, are a vital component of the toolkit for analysts who study disinformation and online harms. They help analysts to develop a clearer overall understanding of the disinformation and online harms landscape, and support investigations into ongoing information operations. While these tools are undoubtedly essential for the researcher’s toolkit, there are inherent pitfalls that may arise from their use, which could have negative repercussions for national security. This commentaary aims to elucidate some of these pitfalls and offer recommendations to mitigate them 

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore,  2025. 6p.

By Kundai Manamere

In Zimbabwe, sex work has long been associated with immorality. This became a primary justification for the criminalisation of young women’s presence in urban areas since the colonial period. However, the legislation failed to keep women out of towns. Instead, they slowly carved a niche in urban development, especially as sex workers. Literature on sex work has consistently reflected the need for change in public attitudes towards sex work, revealing long-standing irreconcilable feminist perspectives between those who view sex workers as either victims or agents in society.This article moves away from these single-thread narratives of sex work and potray sex workers as political agents who negotiate various social, political, legal and economic circumstances to challenge the various processes that have largely relegated their voices to the margins.This article also updates debates on public attitudes to sex work. Few studies have focused on public attitudes towards sex work and factors that shape, maintain, or transform this over time. I argue for the incorporation of voices from communities where sex workers work and live, where possible. This approach moves the focus from state-centric legislative sites and debates to quotidian micro-practices in communities shedding more light on public attitudes to sex work.

Third World Quarterly, 2025.

By RADJENOVIC, Anja

Issues at stake: • Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, is mandated to support EU Member States in managing external borders, combating cross-border crime, and managing migration, through joint operations, surveillance and data analysis. The agency also cooperates with non-EU countries through status agreements and working arrangements, and plays a key role in organising and executing migrants' returns. • The European Commission is considering a revised mandate in 2026 for Frontex to address growing geopolitical, security and migration challenges. Reforms are driven by hybrid threats, the implementation of the new pact on migration and asylum, and demands for swifter returns of individuals ineligible for asylum. • There is broad support among Member States for more flexible, informal arrangements with third countries. While Member States oppose a radical overhaul of Frontex's mandate, they prioritise operational efficiency, particularly in returns and border management, and stress maximising the current mandate's potential before considering major changes. Member States also back a new legal basis for Frontex to support returns from non-EU countries to other non-EU countries. • The European Parliament's discharge procedure has been a critical tool in scrutinising Frontex, particularly amid allegations of fundamental rights violations and pushbacks at the EU's external borders. Parliament has repeatedly warned that oversight has not kept pace with the expansion of Frontex's mandate.

Brussels: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service,   2026. 8p.

By Juan Cuéllar Torres, Sr. , Tracey Horan, and Adam Isacson

One year ago, on March 21, 2025, hundreds of experienced employees overseeing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) abruptly learned that the Trump administration was firing them. The Department’s Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL), Office of the Immigration Detention Ombudsman (OIDO), and Office of the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman (CISOMB), if not abolished, were to be shrunk to their “absolutely irreducible minimum.” The “Reductions in Force” came at the same time that the new administration was launching a “mass deportation” campaign, supercharging often aggressive arrests, detentions, and repatriations while dramatically increasing the capacities of the Department’s border and migration law enforcement agencies, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Border Patrol, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). This report focuses mainly on the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties office and the Detention Ombudsman’s office, which most frequently oversaw the law enforcement agencies. A year later, including contract personnel, the first has seen its staff cut by 80 percent and the second by 96 percent. Litigation to undo the cuts continues in federal court. 

Even before the Trump administration took an axe to them, these offices were far too small and under-resourced to oversee a Department with about 240,000 employees. They lacked the authority to initiate investigations and to make their recommendations stick. As the Kino Border Initiative found during years of submitting abuse complaints on behalf of migrants arriving at its Nogales, Sonora shelter, a lack of transparency was a chronic problem. But since the agencies’ near-total dismantling on March 21, the experience has been far worse. Many complaint investigations have been halted. No new recommendations have been issued. The ability to submit new complaints—through web forms in English—has been truncated. Investigations now stop if the complainant is no longer in ICE custody. Case updates are almost impossible to obtain after receiving a sparse form email. In Nogales, over the past year, the Kino Border Initiative has experienced months of radio silence from offices that were more communicative in the past, followed by a wave of case-closure notices offering no indication that complaints were meaningfully investigated or that any recommendations resulted. 

This deep reduction in oversight could not come at a worse time, as regular front-page revelations of abuse and rights violations committed by DHS agencies, from the streets of Minneapolis to the cells of the U.S. detention network, make urgently clear. These times call for more oversight, more accountability, more transparency, and more embedding of democratic, rights-respecting values throughout the Department. This report, from two organizations with decades of combined experience monitoring human rights at the U.S.-Mexico border, contains a series of recommendations to guide a restoration of internal oversight capacity at DHS. While the March 2025 reductions in force must be reversed immediately, the Department can go further. Assisted by new authorities and appropriations from Congress, it can take a series of common-sense steps to uphold the dignity of victims, make repeated abuses less likely, and instill a culture that recognizes that respect for civil rights, civil liberties, privacy, and detainees’ rights is a necessary element of success in securing the homeland—never an obstacle. 

Kino Border Initiative (Nogales, Arizona/Sonora) and the Washington Office on Latin America (Washington, DC) 

2026. 30p.

Delphine Brisson-Burns

Abstract

Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence proscribes criminalization based on “status.” Based on United States Supreme Court case law, for the purposes of this paper, “status” is understood to mean an “ongoing state of being.” This paper argues that race is “status” and thus criminalizing people of color based on race violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Further, in the United States, racial “status” is criminalized both directly and indirectly. Racial “status” is criminalized directly by police officers’ frequent use of racial profiling to build criminal cases against people of color. On the other hand, racial status is criminalized indirectly when police officers interpret conduct that is inextricably tied to racial “status” as inherently criminal. Finally, this paper argues that recriminalization of “felons” is an unconstitutional criminalization of “status,” disproportionately harming communities of color.

Recommended Citation

Delphine Brisson-Burns, Criminalizing Race: How Direct And Indirect Criminalization Of Racial “Status” Constitutes Cruel And Unusual Punishment, 21 UC Law SF Race & Econ. Just. L.J. 71 (2024).

By Raoul Sumo Tayo

This report explores current and emerging maritime piracy trends and the associated flow of criminal activities in Cameroon.

Maritime piracy has become one of the most urgent security issues in the Gulf of Guinea, which is currently the second-most affected region worldwide. Cameroon’s coastline is at the centre of these dynamics, with attacks, shifting routes and an expanding set of criminal activities that both accompany and sustain piracy. Understanding these trends is essential to analysing how violence is maintained at sea, in mangrove areas and on land.

This report provides an overview of current and emerging patterns of maritime piracy and the cohabitant flows that reinforce it. It tracks the evolution of incidents on and off the Cameroonian coast, describing the methods used by individuals commonly referred to as pirates, including timing of attacks, routes, targets and operational tactics. While vessel boardings, attempted attacks, hijackings and kidnappings have generally decreased, illegal activities that generate alternative income have increased, particularly hostage-taking, extortion and illegal taxation. These criminal flows sustain pirate economies and strengthen their resilience when groups are not directly involved in kidnapping-for-ransom operations.

PretoriaL  Institute for Security Studies, 2025. 42p.

By Philip Mendes

The paper describes the emergence of antisemitism as a defining characteristic of significant sectors of Australia’s self-described ‘progressive’ institutions. It argues that antisemitism is rife in institutions such as universities, schools, the arts, trade unions, human rights and civil liberties bodies and the media – and predominant among younger Australians.

The paper documents a systematic pattern of hostility toward Jews going far beyond legitimate criticism of Israeli government policy. It presents case studies of pro-racist groups and activities, and of a bystander approach. The paper outlines three steps towards a best practice anti-racist response of zero tolerance.

A combination of universal and targeted education among other strategies are needed to prevent antisemitism becoming embedded longer-term within key sections of Australian society. The paper identifies mandatory education is badly needed both within all secondary schools – public, private and faith-based – and universities to directly counter antisemitic arguments that are prevalent and currently uncontested.

Australian policymakers attempting to combat manifestations of antisemitic intolerance will need to take a long-term approach given the ingrained nature of the racist and illiberal views within sections of academia and the wider community.

Key findings

The levels of antisemitic incidents in Australia are unprecedented, reaching a high in 2024 rising sharply after the October 7 massacre of innocent Jews in southern Israel in 2023.

Incidents range from systemic vilification in universities and trade unions, to extreme acts of violence.

There is a major generational divide between older Australians who are less likely to hold antisemitic views, and younger Australians aged 18 to 24 years who are more likely to hold negative views concerning Zionism, Israel and Jews generally.

Key recommendations

Exclude antisemites from Australia's immigration admission processes.

Prevent hate speech.

Interventions within educational institutions to stop young Australians absorbing racist ideas.

Centre for Independent Studies, 2026. 30p.

By FATF/OECD - GAFILAT 

This report summarises the AML/CFT measures in place in Brazil as at the date of the on-site visit, 13-31 March 2023. It analyses the level of compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations and the level of effectiveness of Brazil’s AML/CFT system, and provides recommendations on how the system could be strengthened. Key Findings a) Brazil has a strong domestic coordination mechanism to address risks from money laundering, ENCCLA. Brazil has built a legal and structural framework largely enabling competent authorities to prevent and combat ML. More recently, Brazil has also improved its framework to fight terrorist financing (TF) by passing legislation criminalising the offence and enabling implementation of targeted financial sanctions (TFS). Informed by the longstanding coordination within ENCCLA and a National Risk Assessment conducted in 2021, authorities have shared and robust understanding of national ML threats, namely, corruption, drug trafficking and organised crime, environmental crimes, and tax crimes. There is a precise understanding of the ML risks and vulnerabilities linked to most threats— including informal and illicit value transfers, misuse of cash, and front companies—however, there is a lack of depth in the understanding of financial flows linked to environmental crimes. b) Through ENCCLA, since 2003, Brazil has developed and refined policies to tackle many of its higher ML risks, particularly those stemming from corruption. Brazil has taken many steps to address other higher risk areas, however, these actions are taken without longer-term, comprehensive strategies, which results in occasional disjointed efforts and misalignment of objectives and priorities (such as ML from environmental crimes where interagency cooperation is growing but limited, and where some keyauthorities lack sufficient resources). At times, structural issues inhibit effective coordination in combatting ML/TF, including cooperation between police and prosecution offices and resources to handle the complex criminal justice system. In addition, the tax authority (RFB) has a central role in the AML/CFT system given that it controls access to many pieces of relevant information, but legal obstacles frustrate its full ability to assist other authorities in tackling ML/TF and its own AML/CFT activities are not adequately prioritised. c) Brazil has successfully prosecuted high-end cases of ML, including from corruption, reflecting the capacity to conduct financial investigations and the development of supportive institutional structures. Despite important successes, there is a mismatch between the investigative input and the results seen in terms of prosecutions and convictions. Structural issues have a major impact. Among other things, ML proceedings take too long due to appeals and when convictions are obtained, sometimes a decade or more after charges, and the sanctioning regime needs major improvements. Criminal assets are generally identified and temporarily seized, and in some major cases Brazil was able to recuperate large sums of criminal money; however, there was not sufficient evidence of final confiscation and asset recovery is mainly accomplished through agreements. While there is highlevel commitment to fighting ML/TF, the resources available to competent authorities are largely insufficient, particularly those of COAF and prosecutors. Lack of resources hinders the production of deeper financial intelligence to identify a larger number of complex ML schemes and frustrate efforts to trace criminal financial networks. d) Brazil is committed to fighting terrorism and terrorist financing and has an improving understanding of its TF risks including those stemming from farright extremism. While it has expertise to investigate TF activity, the legal framework in place and the corresponding view of the authorities hinder successful prosecutions. The authorities are not always well coordinated to identify, prosecute, or prevent TF. The framework to implement targeted financial sanctions without delay for TF and proliferation financing is in place, although it remains largely untested at the time of the onsite visit as no designations had been made by Brazil and no funds or assets were frozen. Sanctions implementation by the private sector is improving particularly in the financial sector, thanks to the supervisory activity of the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB), and more slowly in other sectors. There is a lack of interagency coordination on issues related to the financing of proliferation and guidance is needed for the private sector. NPOs are not yet subject to risk-based measures specifically to prevent TF. e) As a major regional and global economy, Brazil has a large and diverse universe of financial and non-financial sectors with increasing sophistication. BCB is the key supervisor for the most material financial institutions and its long-standing risk-based activities have contributed to significantly improve the ability of financial institutions to detect and prevent ML and TF, particularly the largest ones. With few exceptions, other supervisors have not been able yet to take sufficient measures to ensure sufficient implementation of the AML/CFT framework. At the time of the on-site visit, some activities remained unregulated, notably those of lawyers and virtual asset service providers, leaving serious vulnerabilities. f) The misuse of companies is a feature in many ML schemes and Brazil has been able to detect abusers in many cases by using the information available through REDESIM to map out the company structure. Brazil has also created a requirement for companies to provide beneficial ownership (BO) information to RFB, however, this database is largely unpopulated. Moreover, declaratory BO information is considered by law to be “tax secret,” which means that LEAs need to request a court order to obtain it and that COAF and other administrative authorities (including those involved in the fight against corruption) cannot access it for their analysis. g) Brazil generally cooperates well in ML/TF areas with its international partners. As many ML schemes include the sending of money abroad, LEAs and COAF are very proactive in seeking assistance to obtain information and restrain criminal assets. As a major financial centre, Brazil also receives requests for cooperation from abroad, and competent authorities provide high quality assistance, with soon-site visit, some activities remained unregulated, notably those of lawyers and virtual asset service providers, leaving serious vulnerabilities. f) The misuse of companies is a feature in many ML schemes and Brazil has been able to detect abusers in many cases by using the information available through REDESIM to map out the company structure. Brazil has also created a requirement for companies to provide beneficial ownership (BO) information to RFB, however, this database is largely unpopulated. Moreover, declaratory BO information is considered by law to be “tax secret,” which means that LEAs need to request a court order to obtain it and that COAF and other administrative authorities (including those involved in the fight against corruption) cannot access it for their analysis. g) Brazil generally cooperates well in ML/TF areas with its international partners. As many ML schemes include the sending of money abroad, LEAs and COAF are very proactive in seeking assistance to obtain information and restrain criminal assets. As a major financial centre, Brazil also receives requests for cooperation from abroad, and competent authorities provide high quality assistance, with so on-site visit, some activities remained unregulated, notably those of lawyers and virtual asset service providers, leaving serious vulnerabilities. f) The misuse of companies is a feature in many ML schemes and Brazil has been able to detect abusers in many cases by using the information available through REDESIM to map out the company structure. Brazil has also created a requirement for companies to provide beneficial ownership (BO) information to RFB, however, this database is largely unpopulated. Moreover, declaratory BO information is considered by law to be “tax secret,” which means that LEAs need to request a court order to obtain it and that COAF and other administrative authorities (including those involved in the fight against corruption) cannot access it for their analysis. g) Brazil generally cooperates well in ML/TF areas with its international partners. As many ML schemes include the sending of money abroad, LEAs and COAF are very proactive in seeking assistance to obtain information and restrain criminal assets. As a major financial centre, Brazil also receives requests for cooperation from abroad, and competent authorities provide high quality assistance, with some improvements needed in extradition and the speed of responses.

Paris, FATF, 2023. 354p.

By Jeffry A. Collins

Cryptocurrencies and Financial Crimes: The Role of Decentralized Cryptocurrency in Facilitating Money Laundering and the Challenges Posed on Anti–Money Laundering Regulations, 

By Jeffry A. Collins

This research examines the role of decentralized cryptocurrencies in facilitating money laundering and the challenges they pose to Anti–Money Laundering (AML) regulations through literature review and regulatory analysis. The study reveals that the decentralized, anonymous, and borderless nature of cryptocurrency enables illicit activities via cryptocurrency ATMs, mixing services, and decentralized exchanges (DEXs). For over a decade, the same regulatory problems persist today as were present at the inception of cryptocurrencies. Current AML frameworks, such as the Bank Secrecy Act and the Money Laundering Control Act, are inadequate for this decentralized ecosystem. The analysis critiques the fragmented efforts of U.S. regulatory agencies, identifying enforcement gaps and inconsistencies. To address these vulnerabilities, the paper proposes three solutions: mandating privacy–preserving technologies like zero–knowledge proofs for mixing services, requiring decentralized identity solutions for cryptocurrency ATMs and DEXs, and enhancing public education oncryptocurrency risks and safe practices. The study concludes with an urgent call for comprehensive regulatory reforms and educational initiatives to balance innovation, privacy, and security while combating money laundering in the cryptocurrency sector.

34 U. MIA Bus. L. Rev. 71 (2025).

By The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have worked together to provide an overview of the common food fraud cases in the aquatic sector and the associated health risks. The report resulting from this collaboration provides information on tools that can be used to fight food fraud for aquatic products, and international case studies illustrate the scope and impact of fraud. The report reviews regulatory frameworks as well as standards such as those set by Codex Alimentarius, FAO guidelines, and GFSI‑benchmarked schemes, advocating for harmonized labelling, mandatory scientific names, and improved traceability. It emphasizes the role of consumer awareness and industry transparency in combating fraud.

Fisheries and Aquaculture Technical Paper, No. 742. Rome.

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)2026. 179p.

By Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Bobby Boxerman and Celeste Barry
Prior criminal records account for a large share of already lengthy prison sentences, often adding years or even decades to sentences, without evidence of community safety benefits.



What’s new? Recruitment of children to fight in armed and criminal groups has boomed across Colombia over the last decade, with hundreds of minors lured into joining violent groups on false promises of wealth, status and protection. This war crime disproportionately affects Colombia’s ethnic communities and those who live in conflict zones.

Why does it matter? Armed groups rely on minors to maintain territorial control. Children carry out high-risk tasks, suffer abuse, and are punished with death if caught escaping. Recruitment shatters communities’ ability to resist armed groups because locals fear their own family members will be the targets of reprisals if they speak out.

What should be done? Colombia should act promptly to identify children at risk, boost protection at schools (where recruitment often happens) and strengthen its criminal investigations into the perpetrators. Foreign donors should support police efforts to track recruiters and help strengthen communities’ ability to prevent the crime from taking place.

International Crisis Group, 2026, 28p.

By Mark Galeotti

Weaponized migration, which is sometimes called instrumentalized migration or coercive engineered migration, is by no means a new challenge, but it is one that is arguably easier to apply in the modern age of cheap and easy international travel and growing awareness of the wealth and security disparities across the globe. It is also more likely to have local and widespread political impacts within democratic governments with free media.

This report considers particular case studies from the Russian–Finnish border in 2015 and, especially, the Belarusian borders with Poland and Lithuania in 2021, and Russia’s with Finland and Norway in 2023/24. In subtly different ways, these were all examples of attempts to use weaponized migration to bring pressure to bear on the target countries, in the hope of influencing their leaderships by generating division, disruption and costs, both practical and political. They certainly all proved problematic and, although there is scope for serious debate as to whether they were ultimately effective or counter-productive, the consensus appears to be that both Minsk and Moscow were left with the sense that, in the short term at least, weaponized migration remained a viable tool within their ‘hybrid war’ toolbox.

Given the scope for the renewed use of this tool by Belarus and, especially, the Russian Federation, as well as its potential use by other nations such as Türkiye, which has already employed it, European societies in particular must consider the contexts in which it can be used against them in the future and potential responses. This report, therefore, concludes with future scenarios for the weaponization of migration, ranging from facilitating flows from North Africa to the online encouragement of would-be asylum seekers, as well as a range of recommendations for both the EU and individual states, ideally that do not simply depend on a dangerous ‘Fortress Europe’ approach.

Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) , 2026.

By Alice Fereday ̵and Alexandre Bish

Human smuggling in Chad mostly involves northbound movements linking southern and eastern areas of the country to the north, in particular the gold mining areas in the Tibesti mountains, and to Libya. As a result, these dynamics are often connected to and impacted by the situation in northern Chad, where decades of political unrest, successive rebellions, intercommunity conflict, and deeply entrenched illicit economies and transnational organized crime dynamics are key factors of instability. Chadian authorities have long responded to these risks through securitization, including, in recent years, tight control over key routes and hubs, and a ban on travel to the north, further increasing demand for smuggling services among Chadians travelling to the goldfields or further afield to Libya, and in some cases, Europe. In 2022, human smuggling activity in Chad continued to be heavily affected by the political and security developments that followed the incursion led by the Front pour l’Alternance et la Concorde au Tchad (Front for change and concord in Chad – FACT) and ensuing death of President Idriss Déby, the country’s long-time leader, in April 2021. This upheaval interrupted what had been a broader rise of human smuggling from and through Chad, which, despite being illegal, had increased since 2016. This rise was in part due to the displacement of smuggling routes from Niger and Sudan, following anti-smuggling interventions in those two countries, which led to the use of Chad as a transit hub for human smuggling networks. Despite the displacement of routes, the number of migrants transiting the country still paled in comparison to the numbers that continued transiting Sudan and Niger. The most significant human smuggling itinerary in Chad remains the transport of migrants, both Chadian and foreign, to the gold mining economy along the country’s northern border with Libya. Since their discovery in 2012 and 2013, goldfields in the north have developed into major economic hubs attracting mostly poor migrants from across the region. The COVID-19 pandemic and linked travel restrictions in 2020 had little impact on movement to the goldfields. Rather, following the October 2020 ceasefire in Libya, the arrival of former mercenaries previously engaged in Libya to Kouri Bougoudi resulted in an uptick in gold mining, which in turn fuelled demand for workers. This development caused a surge in the movement of Sudanese and Chadian miners towards the goldfield since mid-2020.

By the United Nations.  High Commissioner for Human Rights

UN Human Rights is calling urgent attention to the continuing and critical need for a human rights solution to a particularly “wicked problem” - the complex crisis of trafficking in persons, slavery and other serious human rights violations and abuses that are taking place in South-East Asia in the context of extensive criminal operations set up to perpetrate cyber-enabled fraud. This report centers the lived experience of victims subjected to abuses within these scam operations and who in many cases continue to suffer human rights harms after their release. Through a behavioural science and systems analysis lens, the report also seeks to understand the barriers and enablers that lead victims into these operations through fraudulent recruitment pathways. The report concludes with key messages which call on States, and where relevant other stakeholders, to ensure a human rights-based response to this multidimensional issue, placing the rights, dignity, safety, and well-being of victims of trafficking at its core including through ensuring full respect of the non-punishment principle.

by Lord Hugh Charles Clifford. (Author), Graeme R. Newman (Introduction)

In a world still grappling with the echoes of systemic inequality, Christianity Versus Slavery (1841) emerges not merely as a historical relic, but as a prescient manifesto on human dignity and the moral imperatives of justice. This collection—comprising the fiery oratory of George Thompson, the strategic appeals of Lord Clifford to the Catholics of Ireland, and the authoritative weight of centuries of Papal Briefs—challenges the modern reader to confront the persistent "complicated interests" and "rotten politics" that continue to shape global structures of exploitation. At its heart, the work champions the "Scriptural doctrine of equality," asserting that the "innate dignity of man" is an immutable truth that transcends "complexion" or state borders. This 19th-century insistence that "God has made of one blood the varied tribes of man" serves as a foundational precursor to our modern concept of universal human rights.
The book’s relevance to the modern era is perhaps most striking in its sophisticated analysis of the intersection between global exploitation and domestic economic health. Lord Clifford’s address highlights how the "ruinous, than unchristian and inhuman traffic" of slavery in the colonies was inextricably linked to the "general distress" and "awful distress" of the manufacturing interests and the "starving workman" at home. This early critique of an "equally wicked and foolish policy" that prioritized "sordid lucre" over justice prefigures modern debates regarding ethical supply chains, globalized labor rights, and the hidden human costs of consumer goods. By linking the oppression of India and Ireland to the struggle for abolition, the text invites a contemporary audience to view justice as an indivisible, global pursuit.
Furthermore, the work offers a timeless strategy for social change through the "regeneration of public sentiment". In an age often dominated by digital echo chambers and a "venal press," the book’s emphasis on the "power of truth" and "moral power" as weapons "mightier than armies" remains a potent call to action. It warns that the struggle for justice is "slow and progressive," requiring a "struggle continued through a series of years" against "deep-seated prejudices" and "long-cherished pride". Ultimately, Christianity Versus Slavery serves as a rigorous moral compass, reminding the modern era that the "spiritual nature and affinity of the races" is the only legitimate basis for a sane and just civilization.

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