By Rodante van der Waal

Reproductive injustice is an urgent global problem. We are faced with the increased criminalization of abortion, higher maternal and neonatal mortality rates for people of color, and

more and more research addressing the structural nature of obstetric violence. In this collection of essays, the cause of reproductive injustice is understood as the institutionalized isolation of (potentially) pregnant people, making them vulnerable for bio- and necropolitical disciplination and control. The central thesis of this book is that reproductive justice must be achieved through a radical reappropriation of relationality in reproductive care to safeguard the access to knowledge and care needed for safe bodily self-determination. Through empirical research as well as decolonial, feminist, midwifery, and Black theory, reproductive justice is reimagined as abolitionist care, grounded in the abolition of authoritative obstetric institutions, state control of reproduction, and restrictive abortion laws in favor of community practices that are truly relational.

Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2025. 496p.

By Nina Mast

This spotlight details the racist history of tipping, federal and state policy governing tipped work, and the experience of tipped workers in the economy—both nationwide and in the South. Across the country, tipped workers are more likely to be people of color, women, women of color, or single parents, and are disproportionately born outside of the United States. Tipped workers earn low wages, experience high rates of poverty, and are vulnerable to exploitation in the workplace—particularly in the form of wage theft and sexual harassment. The South has the largest tipped workforce of any region. Tipped workers in the South are paid the second lowest median wage of any region, and most Southern states allow employers to pay tipped workers as little as $2.13 an hour. Hispanic workers in the South are overrepresented in tipped work, as are women—who account for 70% of the tipped workforce despite making up less than half of all workers in the region.

Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute, June 18, 2024. 14p.

By Iran Human Rights

Qarchak Prison in Varamin (Tehran province) has become one of the darkest symbols of systematic human rights violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Originally designed as a poultry farm, the facility has been transformed into an inhumane detention centre for women prisoners, including political prisoners. The conditions in this prison not only violate international principles such as the Bangkok Rules1 and the Nelson Mandela Rules but also disregard the most basic principles of human dignity. At Qarchak, women are confined in extremely cramped spaces with inadequate ventilation and lighting. They endure unsanitary drinking water, poor-quality food, lack of adequate healthcare services, and degrading, gender-based treatment as part of their daily suffering. Qarchak is not only a prison filled with violence and abuse but also, due to severe overcrowding and lack of basic facilities, many prisoners are deprived even of sleeping space, forced to sleep on the floor. The prison is also a glaring symbol of violations against women and mothers. Mothers whose children stay with them in this hazardous and polluted environment until the age of two when they are taken into state care. Often, these mothers have no means to find out about their children’s fate. Undocumented children born in this prison are caught in a cycle of deprivation and injustice from the moment they are born. IHRNGO Director, Mahmood Amiry-Moghaddam stated: “Qarchak Prison is a symbol of the blatant denial of humanity and human dignity. The continued operation of such facilities is a stain on the conscience of the world. Today, more than ever, we must call on the international community not to remain silent in the face of such widespread human rights violations.” By publishing this report, IHRNGO reiterates its demand for the immediate closure of Qarchak Prison and the transfer of all prisoners to facilities that meet minimum international standards. The existence of such places, especially in the 21st century, is a stark reminder that justice and human dignity are still sacrificed in many parts of the world. We call on the international community, human rights organisations, and all conscientious individuals to take action to close down Qarchak Prison. This should not merely be seen as a domestic issue; it is a test for the international community to unite in defending human dignity and rights. The closure of Qarchak Prison is a necessary step toward securing prisoners’ rights and a symbol of global commitment to justice and humanity.

Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO) , 2024. 18p.

By Alex Papadovassilakis, et al.

One year ago, in the early hours of January 15, 2024, Bernardo Arévalo was sworn in as president of Guatemala. His inauguration marked the culmination of a historic upset, in which Arévalo – a rank outsider campaigning on a promise to root out high-level graft – bested a series of candidates linked to elite corruption networks attempting to tighten their grip on the state. Arévalo and his party, the Seed Movement (Movimiento Semilla), then survived a wave of legal attacks that sought to prevent the president-elect from even taking office. Having accomplished his improbable rise to the presidency, Arévalo has spent his first year in power pursuing the paradoxical task of advancing an anti-corruption agenda in a country where corruption is the norm. Guatemala’s institutions have long been infiltrated by corrupt actors seeking to plunder state funds for personal gain and further illicit schemes, while the justice system has long responded to the interests of elites seeking to shield themselves from prosecution for these transgressions. Arévalo took on this mission with only limited tools at his disposal. The president inherited a compromised set of ministries and executive agencies, responsible for administering billions of dollars in public funds. His inexperienced party, Semilla, founded in July 2017 and thrust into power for the first time, remains a minority force in a Congress dominated by old guard lawmakers. And the administration is reckoning with a hollowed-out justice system that has shown far more interest in persecuting Arévalo and Semilla than investigating high level corruption and organized crime. Faced with these restraints, the Arévalo administration has neither been able to develop a coherent plan for tackling corruption nor succeed in enacting tangible anti-graft reforms. The government has also dedicated valuable time and resources to repelling controversial legal attacks from prosecutors linked to the elite networks that oppose Arévalo’s reformist platform. Within this highly unstable environment, InSight Crime embarked on an investigation aimed at evaluating the main roadblocks to implementing an anti-corruption agenda in the current political climate in Guatemala. We have focused on resistance presented by corruption networks embedded in key branches of the state.

Insight Crime, 2025. 7p,

Edited by Gemma Blok and Jan Oosterholt  

This volume analyses cultural perceptions of safety and security that have shaped modern European societies. The articles present a wide range of topics, from feelings of unsafety generated by early modern fake news to safety issues related to twentieth-century drug use in public space. The volume demonstrates how ‘safety’ is not just a social or biological condition to pursue but also a historical and cultural construct. In philosophical terms, safety can be interpreted in different ways, referring to security, certainty or trust. What does feeling safe and thinking about a safe society mean to various groups of people over time? The articles in this volume are bound by their joint effort to take a constructionist approach to emotional expressions, artistic representations, literary narratives and political discourses of (un)safety and their impact on modern European society.

Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2024. 279p.

Edited by Anniina Autero, Marcela de Moraes Batista Simão, Ilari Karppi

This open access book explores the use of technologies for urban safety and security. Rather than focusing on the technologies themselves, it provides and in-depth analysis of the complex urban transformations linked to the increasing integration of technical systems in the built environment. Interdisciplinary contributions explain how technologies can improve urban safety, whilst offering a broader discussion relative to urban, socio-economic and political factors. Against simplistic techno-solutionist ideas, the authors illustrate the role of technology as means to an end and show how technologies can widen our understanding of safety and security. Readers are introduced to issues relative to the practical implementation, development, and testing of urban technologies via numerous case studies from cities around the world.

Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2025. 317p.

By Hilary Francis

In recent years, child migrants from Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador have made the perilous journey to the United States in unprecedented numbers, but their peers in Nicaragua have remained at home. Nicaragua also enjoys lower murder rates and far fewer gang problems when compared with her neighbours. Why is Nicaragua so different? The present government has promulgated a discourse of Nicaraguan exceptionalism, arguing that Nicaragua is unique thanks to the heritage of the 1979 Sandinista revolution. This volume critically interrogates that claim, asking whether the legacy of the revolution is truly exceptional. An interdisciplinary work, the book brings together historians, anthropologists and sociologists to explore the multifarious ways in which the revolutionary past continues to shape public policy – and daily life – in Nicaragua’s tumultuous present.

London: University of London Press, 2020. 198p.

By Timothy Gitzen

The decades-long fear of South Korean national destruction has routinized national security and the sense of threat. In present day South Korea, national security includes not only war and the military, but national unity, public health, and the family. As a result, queer Koreans have become a target as their bodies are thought to harbor deadly viruses and are thus seen as carriers of diseases. The prevailing narrative already sees being queer as a threat to traditional family and marriage. By claiming that queer Koreans disrupt military readiness and unit cohesion, that threat is extended to the entire population. Queer Koreans are enveloped by the banality of security, treated as threats, while also being overlooked as part of the nation. What does it mean to be perceived as a national threat simply based on who you would like to sleep with? In their desire to be seen as citizens who support the safety and security of the nation, queer Koreans placate a patriarchal and national authority that is responsible for their continued marginalization. At the same time, they are also creating spaces to protect themselves from the security measures and technologies directed against them. Taking readers from police stations and the galleries of the Constitutional Court to queer activist offices and pride festivals, Banal Security explores how queer Koreans participate in their own securitization, demonstrates how security weaves through daily life in ways that oppress queer Koreans, and highlights the work of queer activists to address that oppression. In doing so, queer Koreans challenge not only the contours of national security in South Korea, but global entanglements of security.

Helsinki: Helsinki University Press, 2023, 265 p.

By Joseph V. Cuffari

Why We Did This Audit - The dramatic increases in migrant encounters and traffic at the Southwest border have magnified existing staffing challenges at CBP and ICE. In light of these intensifying issues, we conducted this audit to determine whether CBP and ICE are effectively managing law enforcement staffing resources to accomplish their mission at the Southwest border. What We Recommend We made three recommendations to help CBP and ICE better manage resources along the Southwest border.

Washington, DC: OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security, 2023. 65p.

By Denise Gilman

The United States treats asylum as exceptional, meaning that asylum is presumptively unavailable and is offered only in rare cases. This exceptionality conceit, combined with an exclusionary apparatus, creates a problematic cycle. The claims of asylum seekers arriving as part of wide-scale refugee flows are discounted, and restrictive policies are adopted to block these claims. When asylum claims nonetheless continue to mount, the United States asserts “crisis” and deploys new exclusionary measures. The problems created by the asylum system are not addressed but are instead deepened. This Article encourages a turn away from policies that have led down the same paths once and again. This Article first describes the development of the modern U.S. asylum system, highlighting data that demonstrates the extent to which exceptionality is a basic feature of the system. In doing so, this Article reconsiders an assumption underlying much scholarship and commentary—that the U.S. asylum system is fundamentally generous even if it has sometimes failed to live up to its promise. This Article then establishes that the emphasis on exceptionality has led to an exclusionary asylum process. Most asylum claims are adjudicated within deportation proceedings, and policymakers have imposed layers of additional procedural barriers. Next, this Article presents the problems created by the system. It documents how the system places genuine asylees in danger while causing violence at the border. Further, embedded bias in the system, resulting from the focus on exceptionality, favors asylum claims from far-flung nations such as China over commonly arising claims from nearby troubled countries. This bias creates a legitimacy problem. The system also violates U.S. law and international human rights and refugee law  This Article concludes by offering suggestions for more stable, effective, and humane policies to address asylum seekers in the United States. In addition to eliminating many existing substantive restrictions on asylum, the system should incorporate group-based eligibility for applicants from designated nations or situations that are sending significant refugee flows. Finally, the United States should adopt a specialiZed non-adversarial asylum system for all cases, apart from the deportation system and with genuine independent review of denials of asylum.

  Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, 2023.

By Cecilia Menjívar

Stumpf and Manning’s Article, Liminal Immigration Law, explains the origin, mechanisms, and persistence of liminal laws in three cases they analyze: DACA, immigration detainers, and administrative closure. Their analysis unearths key similarities across these cases: the “stickiness” and robustness of liminal rules, their transitory nature, and their flexibility in contrast to the inflexibility of traditional law. This Essay expands Stumpf and Manning’s analysis by considering social science scholarship on the legal production of legal statuses. It examines the liminal case of Temporary Protected Status to capture the effects of liminality on the ground for individuals and families, the power of liminal rules as an instrument of immigration control and governance, and the key role of racialization practices in the creation, interpretation, and implementation of liminal rules. The conceptual extension in this Essay exemplifies how the analytic lens that Stumpf and Manning propose will prove generative for legal, socio-legal, and social science scholarship more generally.  

  IOWA LAW REVIEW ONLINE,  Vol. 110:51 2024, 16 p.

By William A. Kandel

Four major principles underlie current U.S. legal permanent immigration policy: allowing families to reunify, admitting needed skilled workers, providing humanitarian protection, and fostering geographic diversity among lawful permanent residents (LPRs; also referred to as immigrants). These principles are embodied in provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) for family-sponsored immigration, employment-based immigration, the U.S. refugee and asylee programs, and the diversity immigrant visa, respectively. Additional INA provisions provide LPR status but account for relatively few immigrants. Among these are special immigrant visas for certain Iraqis and Afghans employed by U.S. Government and their spouses and children; cancellation of removal for foreign nationals in removal proceedings; U nonimmigrant visas for crime victims who assist law enforcement agencies; and T status for human trafficking victims. As defined in the INA, the term “immigrants” is synonymous with LPRs, also known more informally as green card holders, and refers to foreign nationals who come to live lawfully and permanently in the United States. Foreign nationals can either apply to adjust from a temporary, typically nonimmigrant status to LPR status from within the United States, or apply for an immigrant visa from a U.S. embassy or consulate and request admission as an LPR upon arrival to the United States from abroad. The INA imposes an annual worldwide permanent immigration level of 675,000 persons: 480,000 family-sponsored immigrants, made up of family-sponsored “immediate relatives” and “preference immigrants”; 140,000 employment-based immigrants; and 55,000 diversity immigrants. However, the INA worldwide limit is a permeable cap that is regularly breached because immediate relatives and asylees are not numerically limited. In addition, the number of refugees admitted each year is determined by the President in consultation with Congress. As a result, the number of individuals approved for LPR status each year typically exceeds the INA numerical limits that are intended to process this demand fairly and in accordance with the national interest. In FY2023, the United States granted LPR status to 1,172,910 foreign nationals. The INA further imposes, for family-sponsored preference and employment-based immigrants, a per-country limit of 7% of their annual worldwide levels. The 7% limit is intended to prevent nationals of one or a few countries from dominating immigrant flows. For countries that send many prospective immigrants to the United States, the 7% limit often results in years-long waits for LPR status. From FY2014 to FY2023, the United States granted LPR status to an average of about 1 million foreign nationals each year. Of these, 65% acquired LPR status as family-based immigrants, 16% as employment-based immigrants, 11% as refugees and asylees adjusting to LPR status, 4% as diversity immigrants, and 4% as other immigrants. On average, 54% of all immigrants adjusted to LPR status from within the United States during this time. Top immigrant source countries over the period included Mexico (14%), China (7%), India (6%), the Philippines (5%), and the Dominican Republic (5%). In FY2024, an estimated 4 million prospective family-sponsored preference immigrants possessed approved immigrant petitions and were waiting overseas to apply for a statutorily numerically limited immigrant visa. In addition, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has approved a sizeable number of petitions for family-sponsored preference and employment-based immigrants based in the United States and overseas who represent an indeterminate number of prospective immigrants in a corresponding and sometimes overlapping queue. USCIS also has about 230,000 pending petitions for U nonimmigrant status pertaining to crime victims which, if approved, would make these petitioners eligible for LPR status. Proponents of reducing permanent immigration often contend that family-sponsored immigration allows relatively large numbers of foreign nationals to settle permanently in the United States without regard to their skills, education levels, potential contributions to the U.S. economy or potential fiscal impacts on U.S. taxpayers. Others argue that family-sponsored immigration should be limited to immediate relatives of U.S. citizens and LPRs. Still others support limiting employmentbased LPRs to only very highly skilled workers, admitting employment-based immigrants using merit-based point systems instead of or in addition to employer sponsorship, and eliminating the diversity immigrant program. Proponents of increasing permanent immigration typically emphasize the positive impacts of skilled and other migration generally to the U.S. economy, the need for more workers in labor-short occupations and industries, or concerns over demographic trends that portend future U.S. population decline.  

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service 2024.   27p.

 By Aşkım Beste Özdoğan

The history of Haiti reflects a journey filled with various challenges from the colonial period to the present day. The process that began with Christopher Columbus’s arrival in 1492 continued under Spanish colonialism. Subsequently, in the early 17th century, the French settled on the island, seizing the western half of Hispaniola in 1697. The slave trade became the main factor shaping the island’s economy, and Haiti became one of France’s most important colonies. However, following slave uprisings and the Haitian Revolution (1791- 1804), which led to Haiti’s declaration of independence in 1804, a historical turning point occurred. This revolution was significant both as the successful uprising by the world’s first black slaves to abolish slavery and as an inspiration for independence struggles in Latin America. However, post-independence Haiti faced a series of problems such as internal turmoil, external interventions, and political instability. This historical background provides a fundamental basis for understanding Haiti’s current political, economic, and social dynamics. Haiti has long struggled with poverty, external interventions, coups, and economic issues. Additionally, it grapples with significant natural disasters such as the 2010 earthquake, environmental problems, and poor social services and infrastructure. There are numerous obstacles to the country’s development and progress. Since the beginning of 2021, a new battleground has emerged: Gang Violence. In 2021, then-President Jovenel Moïse was assassinated by foreign mercenaries alleged to be Colombian. Following this pivotal moment, armed gang attacks and violent incidents have rapidly increased nationwide. Additionally, Ariel Henry is not actually an elected leader. He was selected as the next President of Haiti by Moïse just two days before Moïse’s assassination in 2021. Henry’s swearing in as Prime Minister with the support of the international community has influenced the controversial process in the country and exacerbated the situation. Rising prices, inflation, and crumbling infrastructure in Haiti have posed significant obstacles to Henry’s consolidation of authority. Analysis of data from the United Nations on March 14, 2024, reveals that more civilians were killed in Haiti in the first four months of 2023 than in Ukraine (World Food Program USA, 2024). The most significant consequences of this conflict have been devastating hunger and displacement. Gang violence continues to escalate in 2024; particularly, the prison raid in March has escalated political instability and violence to a new level. It is observed that civilians are being killed, displaced, subjected to hunger, and exposed to violence on a daily basis nationwide. The international community’s response, which goes beyond condemnation, is noteworthy. Haiti has been a country in chaos for years, and the situation has worsened with the 2021 presidential assassination. Especially, the Port-au-Prince Prison raid in February 2024, while Prime Minister Henry was out of the country, is crucial in understanding the level of violence and the power of gangs in the country. Escaped prisoners and armed gangs roam the city, killing civilians. This analysis seeks to answer two important questions: What is happening in Haiti? What is the reason behind the recent surge in violence in Haiti, the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere? 

Istanbul: DİPAM, Center for Diplomatic Affairs and Political Studies, 2024. 12p.

By Cecilia Menjívar & Krista M. Perreir

Thousands of minors are migrating unaccompanied to high-income countries. This special issue focuses on unaccompanied migrant minors from the Global South to Europe and the U.S. In this introduction, we seek to complement the contributions to this special issue by shedding light on what resources and experiences unaccompanied migrants arrive with, stressing these young migrants’

challenges at each stage prior to arrival and the challenges they face navigating the receiving context. We first clarify how the international community defines ‘unaccompanied minors’ or ‘unaccompanied children’. We then provide brief histories of unaccompanied minors in immigration flows to the U.S. and the EU. Next, we review the literature on the experiences of

unaccompanied minors before, during, and after migration. Finally, we discuss key themes and insights from the articles provided in this special issue.

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 22p.

By Ben Laws

This open access Palgrave Pivot explores the experiences of nonreligious asylum seekers in Northern Europe. While religious persecution is often cited as a reason for seeking asylum, nonbelievers also face significant persecution in their home countries due to their lack of religious affiliation. Despite this, their experiences are frequently overlooked in academic discussions, and asylum assessment centers have been slow to develop frameworks that address their unique challenges. Drawing on in-depth qualitative research from Sweden, Norway, and the Netherlands, this book provides a comprehensive examination of the challenges nonbelievers face, as well as the opportunities they create as agents within the system. Emotions offer an analytical window into the world of nonbelievers, highlighting their desperation and innovative practices of evidence creation. Throughout the book, the logics of credibility assessment are critically explored, revealing the cultural chasm between assessors and nonreligious claimants.

Cham: Springer Nature, 2024.

By

The Global Campaign to Decriminalise Poverty and Status

Throughout the globe, governments use petty offenses, such as vagrancy and loitering laws, to exert social control over poor and marginalized communities. Moreover, people experiencing homelessness regularly face the threat of criminal sanctions for fulfilling basic needs. These petty offenses enable the policing of public spaces to reinforce social hierarchies and rigid gender norms. Many of these laws are in place in the Caribbean, inherited as part of the colonial legacy that permeates its systems today.

This report provides a baseline assessment of the criminalization of homelessness in the Dominican

Republic, Jamaica, and Puerto Rico. The analysis thus focuses on three Caribbean localities with diverse

histories connected to Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States (U.S.). The report addresses both laws criminalizing vagrancy and loitering, as well as life-sustaining activities. It further examines the laws on the books, their implementation in practice, and their various impacts on people in each country.

Miami: Human Rights Clinic, University of Miami School of Law, 2024. 60p.

By Victoria A. Greenfield, Tobias Sytsma, Amanda Kerrigan, Maya Buen

Forced labor—work performed involuntarily and under menace of penalty—occurs globally, with reports of abuses in all countries. About 28 million people—one in every 300 people worldwide—work against their will, bound through physical violence, threats, debt bondage, and other exploitative means. The United States has long imposed prohibitions on imports of goods made with forced labor—notably, under the Tariff Act of 1930 and the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act of 2021 (UFLPA). The UFLPA targets China's extensive use of forced labor as a state-sponsored, coercive policy tool in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), by barring U.S. imports of goods made in the XUAR or sourced from entities connected to it. Still, such goods flow through global supply chains. In 2021, the United States accounted for over one-fifth of the world's imports of goods that were at risk of being made with forced labor.The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which leads trade enforcement under these laws, requested an analysis of trade enforcement and its impact. Researchers set out to (1) assist DHS in developing analytical capabilities for assessing the impact of its efforts to combat forced labor through trade enforcement and (2) evaluate the impact that DHS's actions and investments have had on meeting the goals of eliminating U.S. imports of goods made with forced labor and eliminating the use of forced labor globally. This report outlines the

researchers' methods for evaluating DHS's impact and presents findings on efforts and recommendations for strengthening enforcement.

Key Findings

DHS's impact in trade enforcement depends on stakeholders.

Trade enforcement is making measurable progress, but stakeholders are encountering impediments that DHS cannot address entirely on its own. U.S. businesses—and consumers—remain exposed to goods made with forced labor through indirect supply chain linkages with limited visibility.

Trade enforcement still holds value even if it, alone, cannot change China's policy on forced labor in the XUAR. Economic sanctions face inherent obstacles, but trade enforcement can help limit U.S. imports of goods made with forced labor, prevent U.S. complicity in other countries' labor abuses, and send a strong policy signal.

Trade enforcement comes with costs that can undermine its aims. U.S. businesses can incur costs from tracing supply chains, switching suppliers, and mitigating commercial disruptions; the environment could experience related harms; and China could retaliate and obfuscate.

DHS can track trade enforcement progress and unintended consequences, but it might be unable to know whether it is meeting its ultimate aims. Capturing broad effects on U.S. businesses, workers, and consumers; the environment; and global working conditions might be harder than capturing those on immediate goals for enforcement efforts.

DHS needs enough of the right resources and information to do its job, but stakeholders have suggested that it does not have them. Concerns about staffing included hiring, skills, burnout, and retention.

DHS and its stakeholders would benefit from more and higher-quality information. Better visibility into global working conditions, supply chain composition, the content of goods, and enforcement processes could strengthen trade enforcement.

Recommendations

Look for opportunities to encourage robust stakeholder participation by improving the flow and quality of information through greater transparency and improvements in tools, technology, and methods of data analysis.

Consider a more comprehensive approach to combating forced labor in global supply chains by working with other U.S. agencies and other countries to better leverage potential complementarities of economic sanctions and other types of measures.

Consider options for mitigating unintended consequences in concert with other U.S. agencies and with input from nongovernmental stakeholders, either by reducing them or responding to them, depending on their severity and likely prevalence.

Work with other U.S. agencies to monitor indicators of progress and unintended consequences over time to better understand how conditions are evolving.

Develop evidence with stakeholders to inform public debates on trade enforcement, including those on concerns about de minimis entries and environmental initiatives.

Continue to make the case for funding and staffing, which are critical resources for trade enforcement and are likely to need to increase.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2025. 196p.

By Ahmed Hussain, Ayla Bonfiglio

This report focuses on the nature and dynamics of human smuggling along this Eastern Route from the Horn of Africa across the Red Sea between locations of origin in Ethiopia and points of arrival along the coast of Lahj Governorate in Yemen. It examines the role of smugglers, the services they offer, the financial aspects of the journey, and how migrants perceive their

smugglers. The study is based on 346 surveys with migrants in Lahj, Yemen and 16 with smugglers in Ethiopia.

The Eastern Route is widely regarded as among the most dangerous mixed migration routes originating from the African continent, in terms of migrants' exposure to violence, abuse, and exploitation. This report, based on 346 surveys with migrants in Lahj, Yemen and 16 with smugglers in Ethiopia, focuses on the nature and dynamics of human smuggling along this route between locations of origin in Ethiopia and points of arrival along the coast of Lahj Governorate in Yemen. It examines the role of smugglers, the services they offer, the financial aspects of the journey, and how migrants perceive their smugglers. Additionally, the report delves into the abuses associated with smugglers, migrants’ protection strategies, and the forms of assistance that migrants receive from smugglers. This study was carried out against the backdrop of reduction in recorded migrant arrivals in Yemen, not merely because of the joint military campaign in the Red Sea and anti-smuggling campaigns by Yemeni and Djiboutian coastguards since August 2023, but also owing to decreased access to data collection in key transit locations along this route. The data provide some insight into these dynamics, which is critical to informing the work of humanitarian actors and policymakers, and fundamental for developing interventions that address the vulnerabilities of migrants along this precarious route. The key findings include: • Smugglers played a limited role in influencing respondents’ migration decisions (9%) and route selection (11%) between Ethiopia and coastal departure points in Djibouti or Somalia. Indeed, more than half of the respondents (57%) stated that they were not influenced by anyone in their decision to migrate, indicating that their choice was largely self-motivated rather than driven by persuasion. • Far from being coerced into using smugglers, migrants reported hiring smugglers to make the journey easier (75%) and cheaper (45%), and they were often proactive in initiating contact (85%) themselves. • The vast majority of respondents (95%) employed the services of one smuggler on their journey to Lahj, Yemen. Of these, most (62%) employed them for one part of the journey—likely for the Red Sea crossing. • In contrast to 4Mi data from the Central Mediterranean Route or the Southern Route (towards South Africa), showing smugglers provide a range of services to migrants, the primary service provided by smugglers along this section of the Eastern Route was arranging transit across borders (99%). • On average, 97% of the respondents paid around 300 USD to the smuggler for their services, largely for the sea crossing. With an average of 100,000 migrants crossing annually, this would amount to a smuggling business worth 30 million USD annually, a significant source of income for smugglers operating out of Djibouti. • Over half of surveyed migrants (60%) paid their smuggler in full before starting the journey, which, according to past MMC research, can be a driver of vulnerability, as migrants deplete their resources at the start of the journey and fall victim to smugglers extracting further compensation. • Despite actively seeking to employ smugglers and reporting that smugglers helped them to achieve their migration goal (99%), strikingly, all migrants felt that smugglers intentionally misled them. This finding stands out for its stark contrast with other migration routes, which portray a more mixed picture of misinformation, underscoring the unique and exploitive dynamics of the Eastern Route. • Smugglers were rarely trusted (2%) by migrants as reliable sources of information; with this in mind, few respondents used smugglers as information sources before (12%) and during the journey (28%). • 72% perceived smugglers as perpetrators of abuse in dangerous locations along the route, identifying physical violence (82%), death (68%), and robbery (58%) as the top

dangers. • While smugglers were rarely regarded as trustworthy and were seen as perpetrators of abuse, only 22% of surveyed migrants viewed them as criminals. Indeed, most perceived their smugglers as service providers (64%), highlighting an inherent complexity in migrant-smuggler relationships. The same complexity can be seen in migrants’ strategies for keeping safe along the route: 18% cited hiring smugglers while 1% cited avoiding them to reduce the risk of abuse and crime.

London/Denmark: Mixed Migration Centre, 2024. 24p.

By Amnesty International
Tens of thousands of migrant workers travel every year to Canada in the hope of providing a better life for their families. They are promised labour opportunities and working conditions that very often they cannot enjoy in their countries of origin. Yet, many find a different reality upon arrival. This report investigates the human rights impact of Canada’s Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP), a temporary migration scheme that allows employers to hire migrant workers, primarily in low-pay occupations.

London: Amnesty International, 2025. 71p.

By Tel Aviv University and the Anti-Defamation League (ADL),

In the aftermath of the October 7 war crimes committed by Hamas, the world has seen the worst wave of antisemitic incidents since the end of the Second World War. This Report is a messenger of bad news. The data collected from law enforcement authorities, governmental agencies, Jewish organizations, and media platforms tell a story of Jewish existence under growing threat. Particularly alarming is that also in the nine months leading to October 2023, in which no exceptional event happened, most countries with significant Jewish populations saw a rise in the number of antisemitic incidents compared to the same period in 2022, including the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Australia, Italy, Brazil, and Mexico. This means that the war in Gaza helped spread a fire that was already out of control. And it was already out of control despite the significant efforts invested in recent years by governments on educational and legal initiatives aimed at reversing the trend. Two years ago, this Report stated that the fight against antisemitism was failing. The data from 2023 show that bad has come to worse. It is time for soul searching. More slogans and more speeches will certainly not do the job. It is equally naïve to think that more budgets will solve everything. There is a need for careful, independent, and transparent studies of the methods applied so far to inform which are effective and which are not, which need to be expanded, and which should be neglected. The obvious must be mentioned: As in the case of any social evil, the test for programs applied against antisemitism is whether they lead to a decline in the phenomenon. The distress and danger Jews currently experience should not be overstated. This is not 1939, let alone 1942, not anywhere. Yet while being attacked or harassed has not been the experience of most Jews outside Israel, the data indicate that if current trends persist and continue to deteriorate, the curtain will descend on the ability of Jewish identities to be manifested with security and freedom in the West. The severe nature of the crisis should be duly recognized by governments and law enforcement agencies. There is no good racism and bad racism, racism that can be ignored and racism that cannot. Racism directed against groups considered socially strong is as destructive as any other form of racism. No society can be truly free and peaceful if its Jews are subjected to intimidation and harassment based on their ethnicity and beliefs. October 7 highlighted how poisonous antisemitism is. While antisemitism does not define the ideology of Hamas, it has been, from its inception, an inseparable part of Hamas’ dehumanization of Jews and its depiction of the war against Israel in ahistorical, essentialist binary religious terms. The reactions to Hamas’ crimes reveal how deep-seated antisemitic narratives have become across the Muslim world. Analyses in this Report demonstrate their spread across Arab societies (p. 47) as well as in Turkey (p. 59) and Iran (p. 73). As a conspiracy theory, the oldest in history, antisemitism is a sickness that blinds those who consume it from seeing the truth for what it is and from respecting the humanity of others. An important lesson to draw from the Gaza war is that peace in the Middle East will not be achieved unless antisemitism is firmly uprooted from Arab societies. Demanding actions to that effect should become fundamental in all future diplomatic processes. Social media is a primary tool in the present-day proliferation of antisemitism. It allows extremist evil-wishers to spread falsehoods, defamations, and conspiracy theories without being held accountable. No significant improvement in the fight against antisemitism will be accomplished unless those who provide platforms for hate speech will be made to apply responsible editorial discretion, including such that hinders the abuse of social media by global agents of chaos. A comprehensive study conducted for the Report on the profiles of the conveyers of antisemitic propaganda on X (formerly Twitter) in English, Arabic,

and German, as well as the contents of their messages (p. 99), highlights the need for more profound and meaningful treatment of the problem. One of the biggest challenges presented by contemporary antisemitism is that it is expressed by the extreme right and the extreme left and that both expressions increasingly encroach on the mainstream. This phenomenon is particularly evident in the United States (p. 35). It makes the choice of allies and priorities more difficult. Being between a rock and a hard place should not lead to despair, though; Jewish communities and organizations need to tirelessly reach out for broader alliances and cooperation with those committed to righteous causes. While antisemitic activists often emphasize their problem is with Israel and not with Jews, some target Jewish individuals, institutions and symbols. There is only one name for such actions. It is tempting to treat the post-October 7 antisemitic wave as an emotional response to the war and the catastrophe it brought on a civilian population which Hamas has been using as human shields. That, however, is simply not the case. Some of the most outrageous antisemitic expressions in the context of the conflict were articulated in the first days following October 7, before Israel had begun its military campaign. Criticizing Israel, including in harsh terms, is not antisemitism. Seeking its elimination as the national home of the Jewish people, including through the false argument that it is an unlawful colonial enterprise, is antisemitic. The historical facts are that the Land of Israel is the ancestral homeland of Jews, where they maintained a continued presence, and where, with the rise of Zionism, they purchased the lands on which they settled and were given the right to a state by an overwhelming majority of the UN General Assembly. Those who believe that all the above does not make Israel in its recognized borders a legitimate state, should realize that unless they come up with a good explanation why their historical-moral criteria apply to Israel only, they will not avoid the label they try to disavow. The rise of populism across the Western world presents the fight against antisemitism with uneasy dilemmas. How should populist leaders, who are philosemites and pro-Israel, be treated if their movements host antisemites, have neo-Nazi pasts, or distort the history of their nations? To what extent can the fight against Jew-hatred be blind to hate directed against other minority groups and remain morally credible? A special section of the Report (p. 77) analyzes the reasons for the ascendance of populism and its potential implications for Jews, with special attention to Germany and the Netherlands. At the beginning of 2023, the Chief Rabbi of Moscow in exile, Pinchas Goldschmidt, warned that Jews should leave Russia before they are scapegoated. These were words of wisdom from a courageous spiritual leader who knows the Russian regime and Russian history well, and who refused to support the failed military aggression and the crimes against humanity committed against Ukraine. Sadly, Rabbi Goldschmidt has not been disproven. During 2023, the Russian dictator Putin and senior members of his regime made blatant antisemitic attacks and continued to engage in Holocaust distortion as part of their broader campaign against the liberal West, liberal values, and human decency. Russia has also supported Hamas in its war against Israel (p. 55). Fascists and Jew-hatred are twains that often meet, especially in times of crisis, and the future risk for Russian Jews should be recognized. Following October 7, antisemitic propaganda also spread in places from which it had been largely absent in the past, including China. In a country like China, the spread of antisemitic content online can hardly occur if the regime objects. China prides itself, and rightly so, for taking part in the rescuing of thousands of Jews in the Holocaust when few others did. That legacy should not be stained. The regime should make a clear stand against antisemitism, as well as call Islamist terrorism by its name. Since October

7, across the Western world, some Jewish parents have been afraid to send their children to school. The sense of security in some Jewish communities has been undermined, including in socially peaceful countries with a passion for human rights, such as Scandinavia (p. 65). In France, home to the largest Jewish population in Europe and the largest in the world outside Israel and the United States, Jewish intellectuals and Rabbis express uncertainty that their children and grandchildren will enjoy the same security, freedom, and sense of belonging they had (p. 27). The troubling developments discussed in this Report call for contemplation – and for action. Four of the global leaders in the fig (continued)

Tel AvivThe Center for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry at Tel Aviv University , The Irwin Cotler Institute at Tel Aviv University , Anti-Defamation League, 2024. 148p.