By Ben Grunwald

With mounting support for dramatic criminal justice reform, the question is no longer whether we should decarcerate American prisons but how. This question is far more complicated than it might seem. We could cut the prison population in half, for example, by drastically shortening sentences. Or we could reduce prison admissions. Or we could do both. And we could do either or both for countless combinations of criminal offenses. Moreover, even when they reach the same numeric target, these strategies are not equivalent. They would have vastly different consequences for both prisoners and the public and widely varying timeframes to take effect. To pick among them, we need richer metrics and more precise empirical estimates to evaluate their consequences.

This Article begins by proposing metrics to evaluate the relative merits of competing decarceration strategies. The public debate has focused almost exclusively on how we might decarcerate while minimizing any increases in crime and has, therefore, underappreciated the costs of prison itself. We should consider at least three more metrics: the social harm of incarceration, racial disparity, and timing. Next, the Article develops an empirical methodology to identify the range of strategies that would reduce the national prison population by 25, 50, and 75%. Finally, it identifies the best performing strategies against each metric.

The results have several broader takeaways. First, the optimal approach to decarceration depends heavily on which metrics we value most. The results thus quantify a stark set of policy choices behind a seemingly simple objective. Second, the results confirm that, to dramatically shrink prisons, it is critical to decarcerate a substantial number of people convicted of violent offenses—a fact that may surprise the majority of Americans who believe people convicted of drug offenses occupy half of prison beds. Finally, the results show that race-neutral decarceration strategies are likely to exacerbate rather than mitigate racial disparities. Armed with the conceptual tools and methodologies developed in this Article, we can make more informed decisions about how to best scale down prisons, given our priorities and constraints.

33 Stanford Law & Policy Review (2022 Forthcoming), Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2021-41,

By Richard Walton

Prisons exist to keep the public safe by depriving the most serious offenders of their liberty, and to enable them to become law-abiding citizens. In recent years, those priorities increasingly have been neglected by the Ministry of Justice and Her Majesty’s Prisons and Probation Service. The collective rights of the vast majority of the public have been overlooked, without noticeable benefit to those who have been sentenced to prison. The case of Usman Khan, who launched an Islamist terror attack in central London in November, despite being released on supposedly strict licence conditions, illustrates the inherent risks of an approach that appears to set poorly researched offender rehabilitation programmes above the safety of ordinary citizens. This is especially true in the context of extremist offenders, who are ideologically motivated and more difficult, sometimes impossible, to rehabilitate. Khan, previously convicted for involvement in a plot to bomb the London Stock Exchange, hoodwinked his supervisors, who allowed him to travel to the heart of the capital, with fatal consequences for two young people and their families. This should not have happened: the process that led to it has to be re-examined. It is clear that a reordering of priorities for ministers, officials, police and probation officers is urgently required. The alleged terrorist attack at HMP Whitemoor, which is said to have featured replica suicide vests, is further evidence that the most dangerous offenders are not being monitored effectively and in the public interest – even within a Category A prison. This report sets out some of the organisational changes that would help to achieve the necessary change.The recommendation for the Home Office to reabsorb Her Majesty’s Prisons and Probation Service (HMPPS) is persuasive. The Ministry of Justice, formed in 2007, has proven to be institutionally flawed and a cultural timidity still persists among officials around the management of terrorist offenders. The 13-year experiment, which removed prisons from the purview of the Home Office, has failed and should be brought to a close. It would make far more sense – in operational and strategic terms – for the Home Secretary, who has ministerial responsibility for domestic security, policing and public safety, to be once again accountable for the management of all prisoners, with the assistance of an able and knowledgeable Prisons Minister. A Home Office structured along traditional lines would also be in a stronger position to direct information-sharing and more carefully assess the risks to public safety posed by prisoners – notably terrorist offenders – on their release. A revamped Home Office must review how prisoner behaviour is evaluated, as well as the schemes designed to deradicalise terrorist offenders and rehabilitate other dangerous offenders. As the report explains, there has been little empirical study into the effectiveness of schemes designed to challenge extremist world views. Specialist training is vital here, and the use of the best psychological and neurological techniques to assess risk and danger. This is not work for the generalist: as Usman Khan’s case shows, those who are ideologically motivated of Islamist extremism are capable of hiding their true intent for long periods in order to carry out devastating acts of violence. Finally, legislating to prevent seriously dangerous convicted terrorists and possibly some other dangerous offenders from being released early into the community on licence is an idea that deserves serious consideration (and properly informed debate in both Houses of Parliament). It is likely to gain public support but judges must be persuaded of its legal integrity too. As the Government explores these legislative changes and structural changes in the round, it must ensure that public safety is paramount.

London: PolIcy Exchange, 2020. 28p.

By Daniela Ronco, Alvise Sbraccia, Giovanni Torrente

This project’s goal is to assess strategies and programmes which prevent, deter and counter radicalization in prison and identify and analyse good practices regarding new or existing deradicalization, disengagement and rehabilitation programmes and risk assessment tools. The analysis has been carried out having in mind the international and European standards for the the protection of detainees' rights. Research incorporates qualitative and quantitative data analysis on official government documents and interviews with stakeholders from prison administration and management, prison staff, Imams, chaplains and other religious representatives. The relevance of results is to develop practices across Europe to effectively manage individuals considered radicalized, at risk of being or to prevent others. Ensuring common knowledge by disseminating to national and European networks will improve de-radicalization measures across prisons.

European Prison Observatory 2019. 47p.

By Gary LaFree , · Bo Jiang and· Lauren C. Porter

Abstract Objectives In the current study we consider the link between imprisonment and post-prison participation in violent political extremism. We examine three research questions: (1) whether spending time in prison increases the post-release risk of engaging in violent acts; (2) whether political extremists who were radicalized in prison are more likely to commit violent acts than political extremists radicalized elsewhere; and (3) whether individuals who were in prison and radicalized there were more likely to engage in post-prison violent extremism compared to individuals who were in prison and did not radicalize there. Methods We perform a two-stage analysis where we frst preprocess the data using a matching technique to approximate a fully blocked experimental design. Using the matched data, we then calculate the conditional odds ratio for engaging in violent extremism and estimate average treatment efects (ATE) of our outcomes of interest. Results Our results show that the efects of imprisonment and prison radicalization increases post-prison violent extremism by 78–187% for the logistic regression analysis, and 24.6–48.53% for the ATE analysis. Both analyses show that when radicalization occurs in the context of prison, the criminogenic efect of imprisonment is doubled. Conclusions In support of longstanding arguments that prison plays a major role in the identity and behavior of individuals after their release, we fnd consistent evidence that the post-prison use of politically motivated violence can be estimated in part by whether perpetrators spent time in prison and whether they were radicalized there.

Journal of Quantitative Criminology, (2020) 36:473–498

By Sandra M. Bucerius, William Schultz and Kevin D. Haggerty

Many observers describe prison subcultures as inherently and irredeemably antisocial. Research directly ties prison subcultures to violence, gang membership, and poor reintegration. In extreme cases, research has also suggested that prison subcultures contribute to incarcerated people joining radical groups or embracing violent extremist beliefs. These claims, however, ignore key differences in the larger cultural and social context of prisons. We examine the relationship between prison subcultures and prison radicalization based on semi- structured qualitative interviews with 148 incarcerated men and 131 correctional officers from four western Canadian prisons. We outline several imported features of the prison subculture that make incarcerated people resilient to radicalized and extremist messaging. These features include 1) national cultural imaginaries; 2) the racial profile of a prison, including racial sorting or a lack thereof; and 3) how radicalization allowed incarcerated men and correctional officers to act outside the otherwise agreed-to subcultural rules. Our research findings stress the importance of contemplating broader sociocultural influences when trying to understand the relationship between radicalization and prison dynamics and politics

Criminology, 2023.

Anna Schlieher and Ben Crewe

The politics involved in cell-sharing reach into the most personal parts of prisoners’ lives and are highly determinate of their experiences of imprisonment. While there is a small amount of research on the impact of cell-sharing on personal wellbeing and prison quality, much less has been written about the daily dynamics and significance of negotiating shared space under conditions of coercion. In this paper, based on in-depth research undertaken in England & Wales, we explore the experience of cell-sharing and how dynamics in the cell matter both intimately and socially. Essentially, we locate the cell as one of the primary sites of ‘where the action is’ in prisons, and where matters of safety, dignity and abjection are of particular relevance.

The British Journal of Criminology, 2022, 62, 484–500

By Ben Laws

Recent calls from senior managers, human rights groups and academics continue to scrutinize the impact of solitary confinement. But much less attention has been paid to prisoners’ own motivations for segregation. By analysing interviews with 16 segregated men in a high-security prison (Category-A) in England, this article foregrounds motivation. The argument involves a detailed description of the complex, and sometimes contradictory, motives that may lead prisoners into seeking isolation. It further attempts to explore the relationship between segregation and the wider prison environment. For many prisoners, segregation has a ‘negative benefit’ or amounts to a form of ‘lesser evil’. Such phrasing hints at the difficult decisions that prisoners navigate and offers an alternative perspective on solitary confinement.

The British Journal of Criminology, 2021, 61, 1452–1468

Ryan Williams, and Alison Liebling

Sociological studies of prisons require expanded methodologies and interdisciplinary concepts to address challenges posed by changing prisoner demographics and transformed geopolitics. We aim to revitalize sociological inquiry on prisons and prisoner leadership by focussing on the question of whether prisons cause radicalization. Our findings support those of the most persuasive original studies: distinct prison climates generate different hierarchies, only some of which are violent. Through extensive fieldwork we explore the differences between a prison with high levels of ‘political charge’, or anger, and another with less, drawing on extremist events that unfolded over time. We contrast the dangerous dynamics of prison 1 with the more fluid, prosocial religious explorations facilitated by prison 2, considering the implications for prison radicalization studies.

The British Journal of Criminology, 2023, 63, 97–114

By Susan McNeeley

Prior research found routine activities in prison affect risk of victimization among incarcerated people. However, most of this work is cross-sectional in nature and does not establish temporal order between the expected risk factors and victimization. To address this gap, the current study examines a snapshot population of individuals incarcerated in Minnesota state prisons on January 1, 2021, following them forward to examine violent victimization during a six-month follow-up period. Results of Cox regression models and negative binomial models showed several inprison activities (e.g., treatment, work, visitation, misconduct) and individual characteristics (e.g., race, age, mental and physical health) were related to risk of victimization and/or the number of violent incidents experienced. In addition, race-specific models showed the specific predictors of victimization vary across racial groups. The results confirm the utility of lifestyleroutine activities theory as a framework for understanding victimization in prisons.

St. Paul: Minnesota Department of Corrections, 2022. 37p.

By Scott H. Decker and David C. Pyrooz

There is considerable speculation that prisons are a breeding ground for radicalization. These concerns take on added significance in the era of mass incarceration in the United States, where 1.5 million people are held in state or federal prisons and around 600,000 people are released from prison annually. Prior research relies primarily on the speculation of prison officials, media representations, and/or cross-sectional designs to understand the imprisonment-extremism nexus. We develop a tripartite theoretical model to examine continuity and change in activism and radicalism intentions upon leaving prison. We test these models using data from a large probability sample of prisoners (N = 802) in Texas interviewed in the week preceding their release from prison and then re-interviewed 10 months later using a validated scale of activism and radicalism intentions. We arrive at three primary conclusions. First, levels of activism decline upon reentry to the community (d = -0.30, p < .01), while levels of radicalism largely remain unchanged (d = -0.08, p = .28). What is learned and practiced in prison appears to quickly lose its vitality on the street. Second, salient groups and organizations fell in importance after leaving prison, including country, race/ethnicity, and religion, suggesting former prisoners are occupied by other endeavors. Finally, while we identify few correlates of changes in extremist intentions, higher levels of legal cynicism in prison were associated with increases in both activism and radicalism intentions after release from prison. Efforts designed to improve legal orientations could lessen intentions to support non-violent and violent extremist actions. These results point to an imprisonment-extremism nexus that is diminished largely by the realities of prisoner reentry.

PLoS ONE 15(11):. 2020. e0242910. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal. pone.0242910

By Kevin R. Reitz

This article recommends the development of broad policies of preclusion regarding the use of incarceration for offenders who are highly unlikely to commit a violent crime in the future. The proposal builds on the new Model Penal Code: Sentencing's provision on the limited utilitarian purposes of incarceration. Such low-violence-risk-preclusion strategies (LVRPs) would stand on the most powerful predictive capabilities of today's risk assessment technology. If implemented properly, there is reason to believe that substantial drops in prison rates could be realized in most states. The preclusion groups would include defendants who should not be sent to prison or jail by sentencing judges even though the law allows for such penalties; those serving prison sentences who should be released by parole boards or other releasing authorities at the earliest opportunity; and probation and parole violators who should not be revoked to prison or jail. The strongest objection to the LVRP proposal is the fear of racial or other unacceptable biases in its apportionment of reduced-incarceration benefits. Given current high levels of disproportionality in prison and jail populations, however, there is reason to think that the benefits of LVRP would be especially pronounced in disadvantaged communities.

Behav Sci Law. 2020;38:207–217.

By The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

(U) Objective (U) The objective of this audit was to review the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) policies, procedures, and practices for monitoring terrorist inmates and the BOP’s efforts to prevent further radicalization within its inmate population. (U) Results in Brief (U) As of March 2018, the BOP had more than 500 incarcerated inmates with a known nexus to domestic or international terrorism (terrorist inmates). BOP policy requires that all social communications of high-risk inmates, including terrorist inmates, are monitored. However, we found that the BOP had not identified all terrorist inmates in its custody and thus did not adequately monitor their communications. Although the BOP, in 2005, began to provide the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) with a list of soon to be released inmates, we found BOP did not take appropriate steps to ensure that information about all formerly incarcerated terrorists was provided to the FBI. In addition, we found that terrorist inmates who had been placed under a Special Administrative Measure (SAM) requiring 100-percent live communication monitoring by the sponsoring law enforcement agency, which for most terrorist inmates is the FBI, were not being monitored effectively because of the technological limitations of the BOP’s monitoring capabilities. Further, between January 2015 and December 2017, we found that the BOP had not monitored or only partially monitored thousands of communications of high-risk inmates, including terrorist inmates not under a SAM directive; did not review thousands of inmate emails, some of which contained potentially concerning language; and permitted terrorist inmates to communicate with unknown or un-vetted contacts. (U) Recommendations (U) We make 19 recommendations to improve the BOP’s accounting for, monitoring of, and security over terrorist inmates

Washington, DC: The Department, 2020. 67p.

Johan Axelsson, Leni Eriksson & Lina Grip

The literature on terrorism and the rehabilitation of terrorists is growing continuously, but primary studies of high quality are still scarce. In many countries, the number of clients convicted of terrorist offences is increasing. As such, prison and probation services serve as important actors in the prevention of recidivism and radicalisation. This scoping review identifies viable management and treatment methods and approaches to (a) prevent violent extremism in prison and probation services, and (b) manage violent extremist clients in prison and probation services. The findings of twentyseven primary studies highlight the importance of so-called soft approaches by building trust and resilience among violent extremist clients, and facilitating their prosocial engagement. Strength-based models could be considered as an alternative to the predominant risk-oriented practices in prison and probation services.

Terrorism And Political Violence. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2023.2169144, 2023.

By Beverly Powis, Louise Dixon and Jessica Woodhams

Study aims This exploratory qualitative study explores the extent and nature of prisoner radicalisation in three high security prisons in England, how the establishments were managing extremist prisoners and responding to the risk of radicalisation. Approach and interpreting findings Interviews were conducted, between January 2014 and January 2015, with 83 male prisoners and 73 staff from a range of disciplines, including, prison wing officers, security staff, psychologists, offender supervisors and chaplains across the three establishments. Interview material was analysed using thematic analysis. The findings should be viewed with a degree of caution as the views presented may not be representative of all prisoners or staff. Key findings While the study aimed to examine all forms of extremism, only Islamist extremism was reported by respondents, as this was considered to be the most prevalent extremist ideology in prisons at the time of the fieldwork. This study found that, despite their small number, those convicted of Islamist extremist offences had a disproportionately disruptive influence in the prisons, exerting power and influence over other prisoners. However, not all were interested in pursuing an Islamist extremism agenda. They tended to either be motivated by an extremism agenda or interested in orchestrating anti-establishment and criminal activities of what was frequently described as a ‘prison gang’. Those who were motivated by extremism were making attempts to radicalise others. While some prisoners outside of these groups were reported to express sympathies with Islamist extremism, there was little suggestion they would act upon this when released. Prisoners who were considered to be more susceptible to Islamist radicalisation were those thought to be most vulnerable within prison, who had the strongest sense of loss, loneliness, and alienation. They also tended to have grievances against society and the prison system, channelling their anger and frustration into extremism

Ministry of Justice Analytical Series 202. London: Ministry of Justice, 2021. 35p.

By Julia Laskorunsky, Kelly Lyn Mitchell and Sandy Felkey Mullins

This report examines the challenges and opportunities that states faced in deciding whether to release people from prison during the COVID-19 pandemic. It focuses on the legal mechanisms available to jurisdictions and the factors that influenced whether they were willing or able to use those mechanisms to release people from prison. Our goal is to illuminate whether back-end release mechanisms can be used to reduce prison populations that have been bloated by the policies of the mass-incarceration era or whether relief from mass incarceration must take some other form. The report presents case studies of six states—Alabama, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Washington—to gain a more in-depth view of how events unfolded during the pandemic. Overall, our study found that the number of individuals released early from prisons during the pandemic was limited due to a variety of factors, including politics, risk-averse decision-making, shifting external pressures, the limited scope of compassionate and medical release statutes and the use of discretion to deny release. In addition, few changes to policy or practice that occurred during the pandemic had a lasting impact on back-end release practices. We conclude that the back-end release mechanisms offer only a modest opportunity to reduce mass incarceration, and the current system is unlikely to make a substantial difference in addressing mass incarceration due primarily to risk aversion. Instead, state-level carceral policies that focus on diffusing responsibility for back-end release and that reduce incarceration in the first place have the greatest chance of achieving long-term reductions in prison populations.

St. Paul, MN: University of Minnesota Robina Institute of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 2023. 73p.

By Michelle S. Phelps

Between 1980 and 2007, probation rates in the United States skyrocketed alongside imprisonment rates; since 2007, both forms of criminal justice control have declined in use. Although a large literature in criminology and related fields has explored the causes and consequences of mass incarceration, very little research has explored the parallel rise of mass probation. This review takes stock of our knowledge of probation in the United States. In the first section, I trace the expansion of probation historically, across states, and for specific demographic groups. I then summarize the characteristics of adults on probation today and what we know about probation revocation. Lastly, I review the nascent literature on the causal effects of probation for individuals, families, neighborhoods, and society. I end by discussing a plan for research and the growing movement to blunt the harms of mass supervision.

Annual Review of Criminology, Annu. Rev. Criminol. 2020. 3:261–79

By Kevin R. Reitz and Edward F. Rhine

Decisions tied to parole release, supervision, and revocation are major determinants of the ebb and flow of prison populations across two-thirds of US states. We argue that parole release, as an institution, has been an underacknowledged force in American incarceration and reincarceration policy and an important contributor to the nation's buildup to mass incarceration. In paroling states, no court or state agency holds greater power than parole boards over time actually served by the majority of offenders sent to prison. We examine the leverage exercised by parole boards through their discretionary release decisions and their powers to sanction violators of parole conditions. We note the state-by-state diversity and complexity associated with parole-release decisions and the absence of successful state systems that might serve as a model for other jurisdictions. We highlight the procedural shortfalls universally associated with parole decision-making. We discuss the long reach of parole supervision and the pains it imposes on those subject to its jurisdiction, including the substantial financial burdens levied on parolees. We then turn to the prospects for parole reform and outline a comprehensive blueprint for improving parole release in America.

Annual Review of CriminologyVol. 3:281-29, 2020.

By Edward E. Rhine, Kelly Lyn Mitchell, and Kevin R. Reitz

Paroling authorities play an important, if often unrecognized role, in American prison policies. Discretionary parole processes decide the actual release dates for most individuals subject to confinement in 34 states. Additional leverage over time served is exercised through parole boards’ revocation and re-release authority. The degree of discretion these back-end officials exert over the dosage of incarceration is vast, sometimes more than that held by sentencing courts.

Any comprehensive program to change American prison policy must focus to a significant degree on prison-release discretion, where it exists, and its relationship to time served. During the buildup to mass incarceration, many parole boards became increasingly reluctant to grant release to eligible prisoners. Today, if it were possible to reverse this upward driver of prison populations, parole boards could be important contributors to a new evidence-based status quo of lower prison rates in many states. Reasonable objectives of reform include policy-driven increases in the likelihood of parole release, and more rational decision making overall about time served.

This report describes twelve “levers of change,” each associated with potential reforms in the realm of discretionary parole release. The reforms are called “change levers” because, once a lever is pulled, it is designed to impact prison populations by altering parole grant rates and durations of time served. The report identifies 12 areas of innovation that, to some degree, have already been tried by a number of states. In most cases, from a distance, it is impossible to evaluate the quality of each state’s implementation of one or more change levers, or the results that have been achieved. But the fact that states have begun to experiment in specific areas shows that there is an appetite for reform. In addition, actual experimentation indicates that some of the groundwork has been laid for evaluation, improvement, and dissemination of promising ideas to many additional states.

Some levers have become embedded in the decision protocols of parole boards over the past 20 years and more, while others have emerged only recently. One of the goals of this report is to demonstrate how combining the levers is key to reform. This report maps the terrain of the 12 identified change levers, to the degree permitted by available information. The map shows a huge amount of state-by-state variation, even without hands-on study of each system. The report further classifies individual levers based on the number of jurisdictions in which they have been identified, and their potential impact on states’ prison populations.

St. Paul, MN: Robina Institute of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 2022. 36p.

By Kelly Lyn Mitchell, Lily Hanrath, Erin Harbinson

Ramsey County Community Corrections (RCCC) and the Robina Institute of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice partnered to participate in the Reducing Revocations Challenge, a national initiative of Arnold Ventures and the CUNY Institute for State and Local Governance dedicated to understanding the drivers of probation revocations and identifying ways to reduce them when appropriate. The study involved two broad questions. First, what is the pathway to revocation for people on probation in Ramsey County? Second, what are the drivers of revocations in Ramsey County? Drawing from three sources of information—a legal and policy review, data regarding a cohort starting probation in 2016, and interviews with criminal justice system stakeholders—the primary goals were to identify the factors driving revocations and to collaborate with other stakeholders and members of the community to identify changes in policy and practice that can reduce probation revocations and lead to better outcomes for individuals on probation while protecting public safety

St. Paul, MN: Robina Institute of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, Minneapolis, MN2022. 70p.

By Sara Rahman

LCM is a multiagency approach to offender management where the Department of Communities and Justice, the NSW Police Force and NSW Health work in partnership to provide tailored case management and wraparound support to offenders under Community Corrections supervision. This support may include referrals to housing services, disability services, health and mental health services, drug and alcohol services, victim services, and relationship services in addition to any rehabilitation programs.
We study whether LCM is associated with changes in four outcomes: any reoffending, serious drug, violent, and property reoffending, domestic violence reoffending, and return to custody, each within 12 months of referral.
To do this, we compare reoffending rates of LCM offenders with reoffending rates of a matched control group.
We supplemented this analysis with an event study analysis comparing offending before and after referral to LCM versus a matched group with similar community order start dates.
Crime and Justice Bulletin No. CJB257

Sydney: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 2023. 37p.