By Tim Lyman, Frank R. Baumgartner, and Glenn L. Pierce

Out of 6,512 homicides from 1976 through 2014, we review the outcomes of 1,822 capitallycharged homicide cases across eight judicial districts in Louisiana. In most cases, capital charges were reduced; but in 385 cases, the state sought death to the final stage of the prosecution. In 107 cases, a death sentence was imposed. We analyze these outcomes, looking at legally relevant factors, as well as legally irrelevant ones, in determining final capital charges and death sentences. Legally relevant factors include the number of victims as well as various statutory aggravating circumstances (e.g., victims under 12 or over 64, simultaneous felony circumstances, the type of weapon, the relationship between the victim and offender). Legally irrelevant factors include the judicial district and the race and gender of the offenders and victims, respectively. Many legally relevant factors have powerful impacts: the number of victims, certain felony circumstances, child victims, elderly victims are all associated with higher rates of final capital charging or death sentencing. But we also show that factors which appear legally irrelevant in theory have have powerful effects; rates of capital prosecution and death sentencing are substantially different based on the race of victim and the combined races of the offenders and the victims, for example. We found only modest differences across the eight judicial districts we studied, but especially significant differences in rates of final capital charges and death sentences in cases that involved white victims, particularly white females. No demographic combination was as likely to see a final capital charge or a death sentence as those cases with a black male offender and a white female victim, which were more than five times as likely to lead to a final capital charge or a death sentence, compared to the much more frequent crimes involving black offenders and black victims. These findings come after a review of the bivariate relations as well as a series of multivariate logistic regressions. The Louisiana death penalty system is heavily weighted by a tendency to seek the harshest penalties in those cases with white female victims. Our powerful and consistent findings of racial and gender-based disparities hold in a multivariate analysis and are inconsistent with the equal protection of the law or any common understanding of equality or justice.

SUL Rev., 2021

By Henrice Altink

This book analyzes textual representations of Jamaican slave women in three contexts--motherhood, intimate relationships, and work--in both pro- and antislavery writings. Altink examines how British abolitionists and pro-slavery activists represented the slave women to their audiences and explains not only the purposes that these representations served, but also their effects on slave women’s lives.

London; New York: Routledge, 2005.272p.

By Maik Fielitz and Reem Ahmed,  Radicalisation Awareness Network

Humour has become a central weapon of extremist movements to subvert open societies and to lower the threshold towards violence. Especially within the context of a recent wave of far-right terrorist attacks, we witness “playful” ways in communicating racist ideologies. As far-right extremists strategically merge with online cultures, their approach changes fundamentally. This trend has been especially facilitated by the so-called alt-right and has spread globally. This predominantly online movement set new standards to rebrand extremist positions in an ironic guise, blurring the lines between mischief and potentially radicalising messaging. The result is a nihilistic form of humour that is directed against ethnic and sexual minorities and deemed to inspire violent fantasies — and eventually action. This paper scrutinises how humour functions as a potential factor in terms of influencing far-right extremist violence. In doing so, we trace the strategic dissemination of far-right narratives and discuss how extremists conceal their misanthropic messages in order to deny ill intention or purposeful harm. These recent developments pose major challenges for practitioners: As a new generation of violent extremists emerges from digital subcultures without a clear organisational centre, prevention strategies need to renew focus and cope with the intangible nature of online cultures.  

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2021. 18p.

By  Jacob Davey, Jakob Guhl, and Carl Miller

As Ofcom prepared for its duties as the UK’s incoming social media regulator, it commissioned ISD to produce two reports to better understand the risk of UK users encountering online terrorists, incitement to violence, and hate content across a range of digital services. This report provides an overview of public English-language messages collected from Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Reddit, and 4chan across the month of August 2022 which we class as ‘plausibly hateful’. This is where at least one of the reasonable interpretations of the message is that it seeks to dehumanize, demonize, express contempt or disgust for, exclude, harass, threaten, or incite violence against an individual or community based on a protected characteristic. Protected characteristics are understood to be race, national origin, disability, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, sex, or gender identity.

Amman | Berlin | London | Paris | Washington DC: Institute for Strategic Dialogue. 2023. 34p.

By Anne Craanen, Charley Gleeson and Anna Meier

This report investigates the rise of online anti-trans activism following two prominent attacks involving LGBTQ+ communities, namely the October 2022 attack on a gay bar in Bratislava, Slovakia, and the March 2023 shooting at a school in Nashville, Tennessee perpetrated by a trans man.

We use a postcolonial approach, through which we find that the transphobia espoused online following the attacks was predominantly transmisogynistic, a consequence of the colonial logics around gender which assign the monopoly of violence to white cisgender men. The main themes identified were the erasure of trans identities, particularly transmasculinity, the overlap between transmisogyny and other forms of discrimination, and the demonization of trans people. 

The most important conclusion from our research is for everyone – technology companies, policymakers and other stakeholders – to take transphobia and transmisogyny seriously. Too often transmisogyny is seen as a side problem, or as a complement to another set of more radical ideas, including but not limited to white nationalism or anti-government sentiment. It can often be the case that transphobia, alongside misogyny, hate speech, or other forms of discrimination, is seen as “harmful but lawful” or described as “borderline content”, thereby not in need of online moderation. While simply removing such material from platforms may be neither appropriate nor advisable in all cases, there are other forms of content moderation that platforms can consider, depending on how online transphobia manifests itself. 

In the conclusion of our work, we provide practical recommendations to technology companies of all sizes for tackling transphobia more effectively. Key among these are the importance of knowledge-sharing between platforms and subject matter experts, defining transphobia and transmisogyny in platforms’ terms of service, and employing content moderation practices such as disinformation tags and algorithmic deprioritization. 

Recommendations for technology companies:

1. Increase online monitoring following attacks that are directly relevant to the LGBTQ+  community as transphobic content is likely to increase, including material that violates terms of service, incites violence or is otherwise illegal. 

2. Collaborate with experts to comprehend and classify transphobic rhetoric, and produce a taxonomy alongside subject-matter specialists, technology representatives, civil society, and government partners.

3. Consider diverse moderation methods, removing illegal content and also using alternatives to removal such as fact-checking and algorithmic adjustments to mitigate exposure to transphobic channels and content.

4. Define transphobia in terms of service to guide users as to what is allowed on platforms and enable user reporting. 

5. Design clear reporting and appeal mechanisms for moderated content, including online transphobia, to protect digital and human rights.

” London: Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET), May 2024.2024. 26p.

By Emily Thompson and Galen Lamphere-Englund

Violent extremist, terrorist, and targeted hate actors have been actively exploiting video games to propagandize, recruit, and fundraise for more than 30 years. This report presents an analysis of that history using a unique dataset, the Extremist and Terrorist Games Database (ETGD), developed by the authors. It contains 155 reviewed entries of standalone games, modifications for existing games (mods), and browser‑based games dating from 1982 to 2024. The titles analyzed appear across the ideological spectrum: far right (101 titles), jihadist (24), far left (1), and other forms of extremism and targeted hate (29), including school‑massacre ideation (12). They span platforms ranging from simple standalone games for Atari in the 1980s to sophisticated mods for some of today’s most popular games. The number of titles has increased year on year – in line with global conflict and extremist ideological trends, and revealing a continued push by malicious actors to exploit gaming. Meanwhile, the means of distribution have shifted from violent extremist organizations and marketplaces – such as white supremacist, neo‑Nazi, and jihadist organizations – to distributed repositories of extremist games hosted on internet archives, Ethereum‑hosted file‑sharing, Telegram and with subtly coded titles on mainstream platforms like Steam. While most of the titles in the ETGD are available for free, several that have been sold (often at symbolic prices like $14.88 or $17.76) appear to have generated revenue for groups ranging from Hezbollah to the National Alliance, an American neo‑Nazi group. Through new analysis of Steam data, we also show that a small number of extremist and targeted hate titles have generated almost an estimated $600,000 in revenue for small publishers on the platform. Far from being a comprehensive analysis of the ETGD, we intend this preliminary launch report to form a basis for future research of the dataset and a framework for continued contributions to the ETGD from Extremism and Gaming Research Network (EGRN) members. Above all, we seek to contribute to sensible policymaking to prevent violent extremism that situates games as part of a wider contested and exploited information space, which deserves far more attention from those working towards peaceful ends. Complete recommendations are provided in the conclusion section of this report but include the following: 1. Prohibit and prevent violent extremist exploitation: Gaming platforms should explicitly prohibit violent extremist and terrorist behaviors and content. Leadership exists here from Twitch, Discord, Microsoft/Xbox, and the affiliated Activision‑Blizzard.  a. Audio and video platforms, such as Spotify, Apple Music, and YouTube should seek to identify extremist gaming content currently available under misleading titles and tags. b. Flag and remove extremist titles across platforms: Hashing and preventing outlinking to ETGD games and links should be a priority across platforms. 2. Improve reporting mechanisms: Platforms must improve reporting mechanisms to make it easier for players to report violative content found in games and in‑game conduct. 3. Understand and take down distributed repositories: Larger repositories of extremist gaming content readily available on the surface web accelerate user exposure. 4. Collaborate across sectors: Addressing the spread of extremist games requires a collaborative effort between tech companies, government agencies, and civil society organizations. 5. Educate across sectors: Programmes supporting educators and frontline community moderators should be developed. 6. Support research and innovation: Including cross‑sector initiatives like the Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET) and EGRN, which produced this database. 7. Enhance regulatory frameworks: Governments should update regulatory frameworks applying to digital platforms, recognizing the nuances of gaming platforms and complying with human rights. 8. Encourage positive community engagement: Thoughtful, well-designed community guidelines, moderation policies, and reporting mechanisms can support community‑building.  

London: The Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET) , 2024. 40p.'

By Cynthia Fraga Rizo and Tonya Van Deinse

Intimate partner violence (IPV)—the intentional physical or nonphysical violence between current or former intimate partners—and sexual violence (SV)—non-consensual sexual activities—are pervasive, serious criminal legal system and public health problems in the United States (Centers for Disease Control [CDC], 2017; CDC, 2019; Smith et al., 2018). Survivors of IPV and SV bear the burden of numerous deleterious short- and long-term consequences. To address their myriad service needs, survivors must navigate multiple systems, organizations, and professionals. The complexity of navigating multiple service sectors means IPV/SV survivors often do not receive the help they need at the time when services are most needed. Recognizing this barrier, IPV/SV service providers, including advocates, criminal legal system professionals, and healthcare providers, have been increasingly interested in using cross-sectoral approaches (CSA) to coordinate service delivery to IPV/SV survivors (Gwinn et al., 2007). Family Justice Centers (FJC) and Multi-Agency Model Centers (MAMC) are two commonly implemented CSA models (Alliance for Hope International, 2024; Rizo et al., 2022; Shorey et al., 2014; Simmons et al., 2016). A key underlying assumption of FJCs and MAMCs is that colocation, collaboration, and coordination of services across multiple providers and disciplines will increase survivors’ access to services and ultimately lead to better outcomes. However, limited research exists regarding the implementation and effectiveness of these co-located models. To address these gaps, the research team conducted an evaluability assessment and formative evaluation of IPV/SV CSAs, with a focus on the similarities and differences across colocated models. The project was comprised of two phases: • Phase 1: Evaluability assessment of IPV/SV co-located CSAs. • Phase 2: Formative evaluation of IPV/SV co-located CSAs. The project was conducted in North Carolina, with eight co-located centers participating in the evaluability assessment and six participating in the formative evaluation.

Approach The evaluability assessment was guided by the Exploration, Preparation, Implementation, and Sustainment (EPIS) framework (Aarons et al., 2011) and followed the four steps outlined by Trevisan and Walser’s (2014) evaluability assessment model: (1) focus the assessment, (2) develop the program theory and logic, (3) gather feedback, and (4) apply the assessment findings. Prior to developing the proposal and launching the project, our team worked with a group of statewide leaders to determine the focus of the assessment (e.g., goals, objectives, research questions). The research team then engaged in three primary data collection activities— document review, affiliate interviews, and client-survivor interviews—to document the program theory and logic model of co-located service models and to identify promising strategies for evaluating co-located IPV/SV service models. In total, the team reviewed 199 documents and conducted interviews with 58 affiliates and 30 client-survivors. Following these activities, the research team sought feedback from our Expert Advisory Group (EAG) and partnering sites and used the evaluability assessment findings to develop practice and research materials. The formative evaluation comprised three components—a process evaluation focused on implementation, a client outcome evaluation, and an assessment of the evaluation’s overall feasibility. The implementation evaluation research activities consisted of gathering four different types of data: (1) aggregate annual programmatic data from six partnering sites; (2) client-level service need data (n = 764 completed service navigation logs); (3) staff collaboration survey data (n = 126); and (4) adaptive fidelity self-assessment data (n = 11). The outcome evaluation research activity involved collecting survey data from clients at three-time points (i.e., intake/baseline: n = 41; 3-month follow-up: n = 28; 6-month follow-up: n = 24). The feasibility assessment was based on focus group data with leaders and key contacts at partnering centers (n = 12) to explore their perspectives on the overall evaluation and specific research activities.       

Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, 2024.146p.

By Reed T. DeAngelis

This research note provides new evidence consistent with systemic anti-Black racism in police killings across the United States. Data come from the Mapping Police Violence Database (2013–2021). I calculate race-specific odds and probabilities that victims of police killings exhibited mental illness, were armed with a weapon, or attempted to flee the scene at the time of their killing. Multilevel, multivariable logistic regression techniques are applied to further account for the victim's age, gender, year of killing, and geographical clustering. I find that White victims are underrepresented, and Black victims overrepresented in the database. Relative to White victims, Black victims also have 60% lower odds of exhibiting signs of mental illness, 23% lower odds of being armed, and 28% higher odds of fleeing. Hispanic victims exhibit 45% lower odds of being armed relative to their White peers but are otherwise comparable. These patterns persist regardless of the victim's age, gender, year of killing, or geographical location (state, zip code, and neighborhood type). Thus, the threshold for being perceived as dangerous, and thereby falling victim to lethal police force, appears to be higher for White civilians relative to their Black or Hispanic peers. Current findings provide empirical support for political initiatives to curb lethal police force, as such efforts could help to reduce racial disparities in deaths by police nationwide.

Race and Justice Volume 14, Issue 3, July 2024, Pages 413-422

By Suraj Lakhani 

This paper provides an overview of the intersection between (violent) extremism and video gaming, examining the current landscape, trends, and threats. Analysing existing literature and open-source materials, this paper discussesthe types of games, platforms, and services that are vulnerable to this type of infiltration and use; particularly focussing on content, platform features, and overlaps. The paper also examines a number of recurrent themes, including: ‘radicalisation, recruitment, and reinforcing views’; ‘community building and strengthening’; and ‘extremist online ecosystems’. Thereafter, the responses to (violent) extremism from various platforms will be explored, before reflecting on current challenges and future considerations. Video gaming is considered to be one of the most consistent and fastest-growing sectors. It is estimated that there are around 2.8 billion gamers around the world (Gilbert, n.d.). As part of this, online gaming represents one of the biggest industries globally with over 900 million gamers and an estimated annual revenue of USD 18 billion (Clement, 2021). This growth is not only attributed to the development of online games and communities, but also to the game hosting and adjacent communications platformsthat have been specifically designed for gamers and gaming, including Steam, Stadia, Twitch, Discord, and DLive (ADL, 2019). There are numerous (often overlooked) positive economic, health, social, and psychological benefits of gaming (ADL, 2019; Schrier, 2019). During the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, in which people have been isolated from their social groups for lengthy periods of time, online gaming has brought numerous benefits, with players reporting positive experiences such as making friends, feeling as though they are a part of various communities, finding new interests, and discovering new aspects about themselves (ADL, 2020). However, as technology develops, so do the associated harms, with new challenges constantly presented. VIDEO GAMES AND (VIOLENT) EXTREMISM A growing concern within European Union (and for that matter global) policy, security, and counter-terrorism circles is the increasing intersection between video gaming and (violent) extremism (EU, 2020; RAN, 2021). In a recent Radicalisation Awareness Network paper (RAN, 2021), it was suggested that extremists and terrorists, who are often pioneers in the digital space, are afforded new opportunities through gaming and associated platforms. These individuals ‘have introduced innovations faster than we have been able to respond, and as a result, have grown their digital advantage’ (ibid: 3). There are concerns that video games and associated (adjacent) platforms can be used to disseminate digital propaganda (Lakomy, 2019), and for purposes of radicalisation and recruitment (EU, 2020; Europol, 2021). However, as will be discussed in depth in this paper, the relationship between radicalisation, recruitment, and gaming is often complicated, with current literature challenging whether these outcomes are (violent) extremists’ primary intentions, with, instead, reinforcing beliefs, community building and strengthening, and developing more robust online ecosystems appearing to hold more prominence (Davey, 2021). It is critical to mention, however, that there is a distinct lack of (particularly empirical) research and literature in this area of study (Lakomy, 2019), with work at a nascent stage (Robinson and Whittaker, 2021), something that is particularly evident in relation to online gaming, video game hosting, and adjacent communications platforms (Davey, 2021). Although a varied and complex phenomenon (RAN, 2020), and one with numerous considerations, there have been various (often anecdotal) examples of the intersection between video gaming and (violent) extremism by jihadists, far-right violent extremists, and ethno-nationalist groups. Resultantly, ‘the search for any one narrative being used by such a varied group in such a varied array of circumstances would be an exercise in futility’ (ibid: 4). Saying that, most notably in Europe, there has been particular concern over the digital recruitment tactics of far-right (violent) extremists (RAN, 2021), where it is thought that they are ‘firmly anchored in the online gaming community, while the presence of Islamist terrorists can also be observed, albeit to a lesser extent’ (EU, 2020: 4). According to Europol’s (2021: 90) EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, ‘it can be noted that the use of video games, gaming platforms and forums, as well as gamer channels for spreading right-wing extremist propaganda has been a growing trend.’ Further, ‘(v)ideo games and video game communication applications were increasingly used in 2020 to share right-wing terrorist and extremist propaganda, in particular among young people’ (ibid: 78). This, of course, coincides with the rapid growth of far-right violent extremism and associated attacks, as documented by initiatives like the Global Terrorism Index. With this in mind, the focus of this paper predominantly lies with far-right (violent) extremism, though jihadist involvement is discussed where relevant, and arguably should not be overlooked nor underestimated.   

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2021 24p. 

By Mason Youngblood

Increasing levels of far-right extremist violence have generated public concern about the spread of radicalization in the United States. Previous research suggests that radicalized individuals are destabilized by various environmental (or endemic) factors, exposed to extremist ideology, and subsequently reinforced by members of their community. As such, the spread of radicalization may proceed through a social contagion process, in which extremist ideologies behave like complex contagions that require multiple exposures for adoption. In this study, I applied an epidemiological method called two-component spatiotemporal intensity modeling to data from 416 far-right extremists exposed in the United States between 2005 and 2017. The results indicate that patterns of far-right radicalization in the United States are consistent with a complex contagion process, in which reinforcement is required for transmission. Both social media usage and group membership enhance the spread of extremist ideology, suggesting that online and physical organizing remain primary recruitment tools of the far-right movement. In addition, I identified several endemic factors, such as poverty, that increase the probability of radicalization in particular regions. Future research should investigate how specific interventions, such as online counter-narratives to battle propaganda, may be effectively implemented to mitigate the spread of far-right extremism in the United States.

HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | (2020) 7:49 |

By The Nato Strategi Direction-South Hub & African Centre For The Study and Research on Terrorism

Violent extremism – often intertwined with intercommunal tensions and criminality – has continued to gain ground across the Sahel. Rising instability and the deteriorating security situation in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have generated concerns among neighbouring West African states about the effects of regional spillover. Since 2016, there have been incidents tied to the presence of Terrorist and Violent Extremist Organizations (TVEOs) in some of the border communities of Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo (the main focus of this report), as well as reports of preaching, recruitment and local development initiatives by violent extremists. Given the current deteriorating security situation in the Sahel and the potential spillover effects, this report aims to shed light on the potential vulnerability of West African coastal states to the spread of violent extremism from the Sahel area and to carry out an in-depth investigation into the state of governmental and regional efforts to counter the security and social challenges associated with this growing vulnerability. The report approaches the phenomenon of the contagion of violent extremism by firstly presenting background research carried out by both organizations and, secondly, highlighting the main takeaways of a Subject Matter Expert (SME) Workshop conducted as part of the report methodology. The Workshop was held with the participation of more than 30 (thirty) SMEs drawn from key institutions based in the West African sub-region, including international organizations, state institutions and non-governmental organizations. The report includes research into the current situations regarding violent extremism in the Sahel Region and those factors potentially contributing to its expansion in Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Togo, including in-depth analysis of statistical data and the available literature. The report also provides information on key institutional capacities and state security efforts put in place to prevent and counter that expansion. Analysis of the unfolding situation shows deteriorating security in the Sahel, as evident by the number of terrorist attacks between 2019 and 2021. Despite the multiplicity of both international and regional military deployments, terrorist activities are far from abating. The nature of attacks has grown more sophisticated, and become more synchronized, and the groups are growing in confidence and cohesion. The recent resurgence of coup d’etats has further threatened and worsened an already volatile situation. Multiple factors such as ideological and religion-inspired extremism, governance deficits as violent extremism catalysts, structural socio-economic conditions, and historical grievances and rivalries were identified as vulnerability factors in coastal states. In addition, lack of government presence in some local communities; herder-farmer conflicts; prolonged and unresolved conflicts; unfavourable government policies; inability of the government to provide for the basic needs of local communities; high and rising unemployment levels particularly among energetic youthful population; lack of accountability by political office holders; rampant corruption; impunity of the political elites; and marginalisation and discrimination of minority groups were identified as local-level context specific grievances that have the propensity to drive and sustain violent extremism in coastal West Africa states. Having recognised the devastating effects of violent extremism there have been efforts aimed at preventing the spread of violent extremism. International, regional and state-initiated actions towards preventing violent extremism by presenting the “hard” and “soft” security efforts are present. At the international level, the French-led Takuba forces and the European Union Training Mission in Mali, the US AFRICOM, and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) are some of the efforts to contain the terrorism and violent extremism threats in the Sahel and prevent expansion. The Accra Initiative, which was launched in September 2017 to coordinate and unite interests and capabilities in stopping violent extremists, especially in the border areas was identified a key regional preventative strategy . Other regional initiatives include the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), the G-5 Sahel Joint Task Force and the ECOWAS actions on preventing the finance of violent extremism. In addition to international and regional level efforts countries in coastal areas have implemented new administrative frameworks, regional and broader international cooperation, the development of security forces and other counterterrorism measures. The countries have widely accepted that the spread of violent extremist ideologies cannot be halted by purely legal and armed means. The development of society, embracing communities which have been left behind by economic and social investments have become key. In conclusion, the findings of this report have pointed out that violent extremist activities have been growing in recent years in West Africa and coastal states, radiating there from the Sahel. Although the security situations of the four countries assessed herein are not directly comparable to the very severe situation in the Sahel, the appearance of certain violent extremist groups at the northern border areas of Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo is cause for concern. Equally worrisome is that the spread of violent extremism is multi-directional: TVEOs do not exclusively expand southward, but in any direction where circumstances permit.

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: African Union: 2022. 47p.   

By William J. Aceves

This Article explores the history of the term “people of color” and its current status in a country struggling to overcome its racist origins. The murders of Trayvon Martin, Michael Brown, George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and so many other victims of state violence have generated profound anger, calls for action, and demands for dialogue. It is undoubtedly simplistic to assert that words matter. But accurate descriptions are essential for honest conversations, and words convey meanings beyond their syntax. In discussions about race and racial identity, the term “people of color” is routinely used as the antipode to the white community. Yet little thought is given to its etymology or meaning. Through the use of historical documents, including many from the colonial era, and recent data compiled from search engine queries and social media activity, this Article reveals that the term “people of color” has a rich yet complicated heritage. For centuries, “people of color” was a term with legal significance. While it no longer defines rights, its use still matters. Today, we should embrace this collective terminology because it reflects a shared history among diverse communities and generates power against hierarchy. Because the white community serves as the antipode to people of color, we must also interrogate this other example of collective terminology. To engage in honest conversations about race, power, and privilege, it is time to separate white(ness) from the white community.   

  17 Harv. L. & Pol'y Rev. 79 (2022). Available at:

By Beatrix Immenkamp

Hate speech and hate crime can destroy lives, harm people and property, threaten individual rights, terrify communities, reduce trust between members of society, create and amplify tensions between social groups, disturb public peace and order, and endanger peaceful coexistence. Hate speech distorts public debate and, at its worst, leads to an abuse of rights that endangers the rule of law. Hate speech and hate crime are incompatible with the EU's common values and fundamental rights, as enshrined in EU Treaties and in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. EU law currently criminalises hate speech and hate crime, but only if it is related to a limited set of characteristics, namely race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin. The European Commission, with the support of the European Parliament, would like to widen the scope of the prohibition to include other protected characteristics, such as gender, sexual orientation, age and disability. In December 2021, the Commission proposed to the Council and the Parliament to extend the list of EU crimes under Article 83(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to hate speech and hate crime. With this initiative, the Commission hopes to address Member States' divergent and fragmented approaches to hate speech and hate crime and to guarantee consistent protection of victims across the EU. In this context, it is important to understand how Member States currently criminalise hate speech and hate crime. This briefing therefore provides an overview of relevant legal provisions in selected EU countries. There are significant differences between Member States, strengthening the argument in favour of harmonising legislation across the EU. This briefing is to be read in conjunction with the briefing 'Hate speech and hate crime: Time to act?', published in September 2024

Brussels: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, 2024. 13p.

By Ioana Sendroiu, Ron Levi & John Hagan

The Roma are Europe’s largest minority group and face extensive discrimination across the continent. Drawing on a survey of Roma and non-Roma households in twelve Central and Eastern European countries, we analyze the extent to which legal cynicism, as a cognitive frame, is connected to the avoidance of helpful social institutions. We thus expand existing research on legal cynicism to focus on individuals’ contacts with potentially helpful institutions that can buffer inequality. We conclude that the interplay of legal cynicism and system avoidance, which have provided deep insights into the reproduction of structural disadvantage in American cities, also provide us with international insights into the causes of inequality and minority disadvantage across hundreds of towns in Central and Eastern Europe. In this way, legal cynicism and system avoidance work to reproduce durable inequality.

Social Forces, Volume 101, Issue 1, September 2022, Pages 281–308,

By Thomas Abt and  Richard Hahn

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Community violence happens between unrelated individuals, who may or may not know each other, generally outside the home” (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2022, para. 1). The Department of Justice describes community violence as “generally happening outside the home in public spaces” (Department of Justice, 2022, para. 1). So defined, community violence accounts for the large majority of homicides in the United States each year (Crifasi et al., 2018). The costs of this violence to impacted individuals, families, communities, and the country as a whole are staggering. Frequently cited studies estimate the average total social cost of a single homicide to be 10 million dollars or more (Cohen et al., 2004; DeLisi et al., 2010). The human costs of such violence are unquantifiable. A massive body of social scientific research demonstrates that community violence clusters around small groups of people, places, and behaviors (Abt, 2019). In the United States and elsewhere, fatal and nonfatal shootings concentrate in and among small networks of individuals and groups, leading to cascading effects of retaliatory violence (Papachristos et al., 2015). Crime and violence also converge in and around small numbers of locations (Herold, 2023). Finally, certain risky behaviors such as illegal gun carrying are closely associated with gun violence (Hureau and Wilson, 2021). Strategies identifying and addressing these clusters of community violence have demonstrated success in stopping such violence and saving lives. The effectiveness of people-based strategies like focused deterrence, place-based approaches such as hot spots policing, and behavioral interventions such as cognitive behavioral therapy are all supported by dozens of studies employing multiple methods, many of which are summarized in systematic reviews (Braga et al., 2019; Braga et al., 2019; Lipsey et al., 2007). An emerging body of evidence also supports non-punitive, community‐led strategies known collectively as community violence intervention (CVI) (John Jay Advisory Group on Preventing Community Violence, 2020). CVI programs use a wide range of methodologies, but most seek to engage those at the highest risk for violence and provide some form of treatment, support, or services to interrupt ongoing cycles of violence. Identifying the key people, places, and behaviors most likely to be involved in violence in a certain jurisdiction is an essential first step for implementing many of these anti-violence approaches. Identifying them also helps local leaders better understand how community violence operates in their jurisdictions and improves their ability to decide strategy, allocate resources, coordinate efforts, manage performance, facilitate evaluation, and other important functions. Unfortunately, there are numerous obstacles to gathering such information. While community violence is concentrated, knowledge about such violence is diffuse, spread among many. Technological limitations often impair law enforcement’s ability to gather crucial data. Political agendas, mistrust, and administrative regulations can limit the sharing of information once collected. Community stakeholders often possess a wealth of knowledge concerning violence but may be unwilling to share such information due to gaps in the perceived legitimacy of governmental officials. In any city suffering from high levels of community violence, a critically needed capacity is the ability to overcome these obstacles and “identify people and networks involved in recent violence and at the highest risk of future violence, the context and motives behind those incidents, and the micro-places where violence is most likely to occur” (CPSC, 2024). For decades, local governments have engaged researchers and technical assistance organizations to help them better understand their crime and violence challenges. Expertise has come largely from the fields of criminal justice and public health. Since the 1980s, problem-oriented policing strategies have utilized the SARA (scanning, analysis, response, assessment) framework to better identify, understand, and address crime problems. (Goldstein, 1990; Eck and Spelman, 1987). At approximately the same time, violence emerged as a legitimate issue in public health, ultimately resulting in a similar 4-step “public health approach” to violence (monitor the problem, identify risk and protective factors, test strategies, and promote effective ones) (Dalhberg & Mercy, 2009). In the field of community violence reduction, these efforts have evolved to include shooting reviews, homicide reviews, group audits, social network analysis, and various forms of crime mapping, among others. Sometimes called “problem analyses,” these efforts are instrumental in directing local attention, energy, and resources towards the anti-violence strategies with the strongest likelihood of success. Importantly, they can assist law enforcement agencies in narrowing their focus to the individuals most likely to become involved in violence, thereby reducing reliance on aggressive, unfocused enforcement tactics that generate little public safety benefit but cause significant community harm (Bitran et al., 2024). Here, we refer to these efforts as “community violence problem analyses” (CVPAs) to distinguish them from analyses of other crime and violence challenges. Examples of such analyses can be found in Appendix A. Despite their value, only a relatively small number of jurisdictions have used CVPAs to inform their anti-violence efforts. CVPAs and other forms of problem analyses are the “weakest and most overlooked phase of the action research cycle” (Ross & Arsenault, 2017).  (continued)  

College Park, MD: Center for the Study and Practice of Violence Reduction. University of Maryland, 2024. 25p.

By Arno Tausch

This open-access book describes how the world’s increasingly multicultural societies face the problem that more and more diverse lifestyles (LGBTQIA+ communities) are not universally accepted and that today, in addition to xenophobia, racism, and anti-Semitism, there is substantial homonegativity. This book explores this issue, reviews the empirical literature on the subject, and provides new empirically based evidence on a global and European scale. Based on an analysis of The World Values Survey using the statistical software SPSS, it provides a scientifically sound answer to the question of which social groups in Europe and around the globe are more homophobic and which are less, together with insights into the multivariate relationships between homonegativity and religiously motivated political extremism. The extensive and representative statistical samples allow cautious conclusions to be drawn for smaller religious groups in the European Union and other countries around the world.

Cham: Springer Nature,   2025. 114p.

By Mario Peucker

In September 2016, one of the leading figures of Australia’s far-right movement – a man who had publicly expressed admiration for Adolf Hitler and was later dubbed ‘emperor’ by the extreme right-wing terrorist who murdered 51 Muslims in Christchurch in 2019 – appeared on ABC Triple J television to talk about ‘Aussie Patriotism’. Unsurprisingly, he used this opportunity to make ideological claims around an allegedly corrupt political system, white victimhood, and ‘national pride’ that makes people ‘want to fight’ in a war that is
supposedly being waged against them. The TV guest was well-known for his views at the time, and he would later become the first person ever convicted of serious religious vilification under Victoria’s Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 for staging a public mock beheading in Bendigo in 2015. Since then he – and other white nationalists and supremacists – have been given opportunities to share their views in mainstream media until almost two years later. In August 2018, he was invited to a live on-air interview on Sky News where he was asked about his views on Donald Trump and immigration issues. Again, he used this public platform to share his stance on national pride, identity and white victimhood. Although his nationalist and “white pride” dog-whistle statements were arguably less inciting and explicit compared to his appearance on ABC
Triple J in 2016, this time there was a broad public outcry, even from within Sky News. The broadcaster admitted the interview was a mistake and removed it from its online services, although the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) later ruled it did not constitute a breach of the respective code of practice. The critical public awareness around issues of platforming far-right extremists and their ideological messages has clearly increased over the years, and many editors and journalists have come to recognise the potential risks and problems of doing so. As a result, prominent white supremacists are no longer treated by Australia mainstream media as legitimate voices that deserve to be heard in broader public
debates. This does not mean, however, that they are no longer given any airtime and media attention. Some media outlets continue to offer them an opportunity to present their views, and many other media report about them and their far-right actions. Incidents involving far-right actors, both overseas and domestically, and their actions –from small-scale public stunts and online mobilisation to violent assaults and even in some instances acts of terrorism – have become frequent occurrences. This poses challenges for the media, and news reporting in particular, around ethical and practical questions of newsworthiness and public interest, the risks of amplifying hateful ideological propaganda or unintentionally helping with far-right extremists’ recruitment efforts, but also considerations of personal safety for journalists. The comprehensive report Inquiry into extremism in Victoria, tabled by the Legislative Council Legal and Social Issues Committee of
the Victorian state parliament in August 2022, dedicates significant attention to the role of mainstream media within the chapter ‘Risk factors for far‐right extremism in Victoria’. Acknowledging that ‘newsworthiness and public interest are primary drivers of the media’s coverage of violent extremism’, the report highlights several ‘ethical concerns consequently arise around responsible reporting by the media’. These include, according to the report: ‘dilemmas around what to report or ignore; the moral and legal quandaries of relating with, or amplifying the ideology of, an extremist group; the difficulties 

Melbourne: Centre for Resilient and Inclusive Societies. May 2023. 15p.

By U.S. Department of Homeland Security,  he Office of Intelligence and Analysis

Executive Summary - The Homeland faces a complex set of threats to our public safety, border security, critical infrastructure, and economy from violent extremists, transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), adversarial nation-states, and malicious cyber actors. These threats, while varied in scope and intended purpose, at times compound one another in unexpected ways, harming our communities and generating costly disruptions to the US economy. Meanwhile, technological advances, climate change, and natural disasters have the potential to exacerbate many of the aforementioned threats. PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY: Over the next year, the terrorism threat environment in the Homeland will remain high. We are particularly concerned about a confluence of factors this year, including violent extremist responses to domestic sociopolitical developments—especially the 2024 election cycle—and international events that domestic and foreign violent extremists likely will use to justify or encourage attacks in the Homeland. Lone offenders and small groups continue to pose the greatest threat of carrying out attacks with little to no warning. Meanwhile, foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) and their supporters will maintain their enduring intent to conduct or inspire attacks in the Homeland. In addition, the production, trafficking, and sale of illegal drugs by transnational and domestic criminal actors will continue to pose the most lethal threat to communities in the United States. Fentanyl and other synthetic opioids remain the most lethal of drugs trafficked into the country, but small increases in overdoses linked to cocaine and methamphetamine highlight the danger from other drug types. 

We expect the Homeland also will face threats to public safety from state actors using subversive tactics in an effort to influence and divide the American public and undermine confidence in our institutions. Many of these actors—in particular, the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—also target ethnic and religious minorities, political dissidents, and journalists in the United States to silence and harass critical voices, violating our sovereignty and the rule of law. The 2024 election cycle will be an attractive target for many adversaries. Some domestic violent extremists (DVEs) likely view a wide range of targets indirectly and directly associated with elections as viable targets for violence with the intent of instilling fear among voters, candidates, and election workers, as well as disrupting election processes leading up to and after the November election. Nation-state-aligned foreign malign influence actors almost certainly will continue to target democratic processes with the aims of affecting US voter preferences, exacerbating social tensions, and undermining confidence in our democratic institutions and the integrity of the electoral process. BORDER AND IMMIGRATION SECURITY: Migrant encounters at our border have declined over the last year, but migrants are still arriving in high numbers, complicating border and immigration security. As overall encounters have declined, so too have encounters with individuals in the Terrorist Screening Data Set, also known as the “terrorism watchlist,” which includes individuals associated with information indicating they may be directly engaged in or supporting terrorist activities as well as known associates of watchlisted individuals, such as family members. For several years prior to this year's decline, terrorism watchlist encounters had increased, a trend consistent with the overall increase in migrant encounters at the southwest border. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY: Domestic and foreign adversaries almost certainly will continue to threaten the integrity of our critical infrastructure with disruptive and destructive cyber and physical attacks, in part, because they perceive targeting these sectors will have cascading impacts on US industries and our standard of living. The PRC, Russia, and Iran will remain the most pressing foreign threats to our critical infrastructure. Most concerningly, we expect the PRC to continue its efforts to pre-position on US networks for potential cyber-attacks in the event of a conflict with the United States. Nation-states, criminal hacktivists, and financially motivated criminals will likely hone their techniques to disrupt US services or to conduct espionage focused on gaining access to US networks, including critical infrastructure entities. We assess that domestic and foreign violent extremists will continue to call for physical attacks on critical infrastructure in furtherance of their ideological goals and, at times, in response to international conflicts and crises. ECONOMIC SECURITY: Multifaceted and diverse economic threats—primarily from the PRC—will likely continue to harm US producers and consumers and degrade the competitiveness and future health of US companies and industries. The PRC likely will remain our greatest economic security threat because of its aggressive use of anticompetitive, coercive policies and theft of US intellectual property, technology, and trade secrets. Lastly, we expect our supply chains will remain vulnerable to foreign manipulation abroad, which could harm global productivity and consumer demand.    

Washington, DC: DHS, 2024. 46p.

By Sunder Katwala, Jill Rutter, and Steve Ballinger

The asylum system is failing. In 2022 a total of 45,756 people made the perilous journey across the Channel, up from 1,900 in 2019. At least 50 people have drowned or are missing, including 32 people who died when a boat capsized in November 2021. Criminal gangs are profiting from people’s desperation. Those who arrive in the UK face lengthy delays in processing their asylum applications. At the end of September 2022, just 7% of asylum applicants were processed within six months and 120,300 people were waiting for a decision on their initial application1. Unable to work while their decisions are processed, asylum seekers are left in unsuitable and expensive accommodation for months or sometimes years. This is unfair to asylum-seekers and costly to the taxpayer, with the bill for emergency hotel accommodation currently amounting to £5.6 million per day2. Moreover, the Home Office is failing to remove people whose asylum claims are refused, with just 816 voluntary and enforced removals in 2021, compared with 10,489 ten years previously3. Politicians must now prioritize reforms to build an asylum system that is controlled, well-managed and fair. The UK-Rwanda scheme is not the answer. It is wrong in principle, as it removes people without hearing their cases. It is also costly to the taxpayer and will not achieve its aims in practice. We believe, however, that there are constructive alternatives for asylum reform – measures that can secure broad consensus across parties, with civil society, and among most of the public. We propose an orderly, workable, and humane alternative reform agenda, comprised of the following elements: 1. Asylum policy should uphold Britain’s values, traditions, and international obligations to protect refugees. This means we reject proposals which violate the principles of a fair hearing for every case; or which break with the spirit and letter of our international commitments under the Refugee Convention. 2. Put in place a streamlined process to make fairer and faster asylum decisions. The Home Office should invest sufficient resources in a reformed asylum system, with a new strategy to triage initial applicants, simplify country guidance, and meet targets to make most decisions in six months. A fast-track process to refugee status for the strongest cases should also be introduced, together with a streamlined appeals procedure. 3. Hire a task force to tackle backlogs. With an individual target of processing four asylum cases each week or 100 asylum claims in six months, 1,000 temporary Home Office posts would be needed to eliminate the asylum backlog in six months, at an approximate cost of £60 million. With emergency hotel accommodation costing the Home Office £5.6 million each day in October 2022, this move would pay for itself within a fortnight, eliminating the need for hotels by freeing up dispersal accommodation. 4. Safer arrivals through a new humanitarian visa to come to the UK. This should be made available to people who have family or other close links to this country and issued in a select number of UK consulates in countries of transit. Parliament should set an annual quota for people admitted through this route, which would run alongside the UK Resettlement Scheme and community sponsorship, as well as refugee family reunion visas. 5. Adopt a policy of ‘comprehensive cooperation’ with our allies to tackle smuggling and irregular migration. The Government should seek enhanced cooperation with countries of transit and safe countries of origin. It should seek new and more comprehensive UK-France and UK-Belgium agreements, covering security, police cooperation, returns, and systems to share responsibility for people who do not qualify for asylum. The Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office should also support refugees in countries of transit such as Lebanon and Turkey, enabling them to support themselves there rather than travel across Europe. The UK Government should build on the agreement it signed with Albania in 2021 to allow the return of people who are not authorized to remain in the UK. It should also seek further return agreements with safe countries of return such as Bangladesh, Georgia, India, Nepal, and Nigeria. Safe countries of return should also be supported through the British overseas aid budget to enact programs to reduce irregular migration flows. 6. Ensure more and safer returns. The government should significantly increase the number of voluntary returns, reintroducing independent advice for those refused asylum, along with faster removals for irregular entrants whose asylum claims are refused. 7. Promote integration through ‘welcoming hubs’ that increase social contact between newcomers and receiving communities and help refugees to rebuild their lives and flourish. There is a public appetite to play a part in welcoming refugees. Faith and civil society organizations should harness this and set up local welcoming projects for asylum-seekers and refugees. More volunteers could be involved in activities such as English language conversation clubs and sports, offering advice and mentoring. Welcoming hubs should offer such community contact activities to asylum-seekers, refugees, and those on humanitarian visas, as part of a proactive approach to civic contact, integration, and citizenship. 8. Help more refugees to work. English language classes should be accessible in all parts of the UK so that refugees have the skills they need for work. Employment support should be better tailored to meet refugees’ needs and practical partnerships with employers should be strengthened. This will help more refugees to find work and enable them to make their contribution to our economy. 9. Sufficient and fairer funding to enable Home Office targets to be met rather than forgotten, through investment in an effective asylum system, reducing backlogs, and providing access to affordable English language classes in colleges. The dispersal of refugees across the UK should be based on a clear set of principles, with a fairer distribution of people and funding across regions and nations of the UK. Local authorities (and communities) should be consulted about new arrivals. 10. Stronger democratic accountability and public voice in asylum. An annual Immigration Review should be presented to Parliament, which should include a transparent review of asylum, refugee, and resettlement policy. The public should be involved in this review, through a well-organised engagement exercise that reaches people whose voices are not usually heard in consultations. Past experiences show that where communities are consulted about asylum dispersal accommodation and can ask questions, this process often unlocks public consent. The views of local communities should also contribute to this annual review and to plans to house asylum-seekers in their neighborhoods.   

London: British Future, 2023. 48p.

By Keri Richardson, Rodney Monroe, Benjamin Carleton, and Tammy Felix 

A homicide is a traumatic event that leaves family members and close friends of the victim (also known as co-victims, homicide survivors, and secondary victims) in a state of shock and uncertainty over the violent and unexpected loss. Secondary victims may experience a range of short-term and long-term psychological effects in the aftermath of a homicide, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, and anxiety. These effects are in addition to their grieving and other emotional states (e.g., rage, guilt, isolation), as well as the negative impacts a homicide can have on their productivity (e.g., academic, vocational, social). Despite the impact that a homicide has on secondary victims, the needs of this group are often neglected, as the focus of the police investigation is on apprehending the individual responsible for the crime. As the procedural requirements of the investigation take over, many secondary victims find themselves trying to cope with the loss of their loved one while navigating the unfamiliar processes of the criminal justice system. In the aftermath of a homicide, secondary victims want answers from police officials and help understanding the forthcoming legal process. However, this information can be hard for them to access, which only leads to increased frustration and trauma. Existing research has established that effective law enforcement requires engagement with and cooperation from the communities they serve. Voluntary support and cooperation from the community is essential for law enforcement agencies to maintain order and solve crimes. Studies on what affects community members’ willingness to come forward with information to support an investigation are less prevalent. Research is also limited on evaluating how community policing strategies increase community cooperation and the quality of investigations that may lead to an increase in cases cleared. Little is known about how support from homicide detectives can affect the level of cooperation received during an investigation. This work by CNA will serve as the first step by building the foundational knowledge for further evaluations of this topic. Given the profound impacts that a homicide has on secondary victims and their communities and the need to improve how these survivors are incorporated into the investigatory process, the Richmond (Virginia) Police Department implemented the first Homicide Support Group (HSG) in 2006. This is not to say that support for secondary victims did not exist before. Prior to the implementation of the HSG, secondary victims received support through U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, District/Commonwealth Attorneys’ Offices, victim advocates, courts, nonprofit organizations, and their own communities. However, law enforcement agencies lacked formalized internal policies, procedures, and services to specifically support secondary victims. Since the start of the Richmond HSG, a growing number of police departments (Fayetteville, North Carolina; Boston, Massachusetts; Charlotte- Mecklenburg, North Carolina; and Louisville, Kentucky) have adopted similar approaches to supporting secondary victims. 

Arlington VA: CNA, 2020. 30.