By Gary LaFree

In recent years, nutrition researchers have found that ice cream may have as many health benefits as low-fat milk or yoghurt for those with diabetes or at risk of diabetes. Nonetheless, they have resisted reporting this finding to the media, the public, or other researchers. This observation got me thinking about how preconceived assumptions and biases affect social science in general and criminology in particular, are affected by the preconceived assumptions and biases of those who produce them. In this essay, I argue that the production of criminology is a cultural enterprise that reflects the attitudes and values of those who produce it. In my address for the Stockholm Prize, I summarize the main thesis of my Losing Legitimacy book and then discuss two recent projects that were influenced by the idea that strong social institutions reduce criminal behavior. The first examines the impact of the death of Freddie Gray in Baltimore in 2015 on crime and arrest rates. The second examines the impact of globalization on national homicide rates. In both cases, the results were unexpected.

Policy Implications

As scientists, it is critical that we evaluate research based on its theoretical soundness and methodological sophistication rather than whether it fits a currently hot topic or politically popular perspective. Science progresses by the constant process of evaluating theoretical propositions with empirical data—regardless of where those data lead us. Openness about crime and reactions to crime is no less important than honesty about the positive benefits of ice-cream consumption.

Criminology and Public Policy, 2025, 19p.

By Alexander Ritzmann With contributions by Jean-Yves Camus, Joshua Fisher-Birch, Bulcsú Hunyadi, Jacek Purski and Jakub Woroncow  

• This report explores the role of antisemitism in mobilizing extremist and terrorist actors to violence, focusing on trends and patterns across France, Germany, Hungary, Poland and the United States. It discusses antisemitic narratives, key antisemitic actors, transnational connections, dissemination strategies, and provides policy recommendations. • Antisemitic narratives serve as tools to justify violence across ideological lines, framing Jewish communities and individuals as threats or scapegoats. Rightwing extremists propagate conspiracy theories like the “Great Replacement,” portraying Jews as orchestrating adverse societal change. Islamist extremists often conflate Jewish identity with global oppression, particularly in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Left-wing extremists link Jews to capitalism or imperialism, using antizionism to mask antisemitism. These narratives are adapted to local and geopolitical contexts, reinforcing the targeting of Jewish communities and individuals. • The report documents a sharp increase in antisemitic incidents following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks and ensuing war. Violent antisemitic rhetoric has spiked in demonstrations and online discourses. Islamist extremist networks, left-wing extremist actors and pro-Palestinian extremist groups have particularly amplified violent antisemitic sentiments under the guise of antizionist rhetoric, sometimes overlapping with traditional right-wing antisemitic themes. • Transnational networks facilitate the spread of antisemitic narratives. Right-wing extremist groups connect online and through events and annual marches, while Islamist extremist groups leverage shared ideological or religious frameworks to justify violence. Left-wing extremist and pro-Palestinian extremist groups maintain operations across Europe and in the U.S., amplifying violent antisemitic narratives. Shared slogans, symbols, and coordinated protests underline their interconnectedness. • In some countries, an increase in violent attacks against Jewish or Israeli targets has been documented. • The report emphasizes that the concept of combatting organized antisemitism should be added to strategies that aim at targeting violence-oriented antisemitic actors. Such professional organized antisemitic actors often operate in (transnational) networks, utilizing online platforms and offline activities to propagate hate and justify or conduct violence. • The report also calls attention to the role of states like the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation in fostering violent antisemitism through proxies and propaganda. • Policy recommendations include focusing on identifying and disrupting key antisemitic actors, enhancing data collection and analysis, and fostering international collaboration. The report also stresses the need for tailored preventative and educational initiatives and stricter online content regulation and enforcement to combat the spread of antisemitism and its violent manifestations. 

Counter Extremism Project, 2025. 153p.

By Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, Bennett Clifford, Lorenzo Vidino

Executive Summary • Antisemitism is pervasive throughout several categories of American extremist movements, both violent and non-violent. American extremists incorporate antisemitic tropes and narratives in every level of their worldviews, using them to help construct “us/them” dichotomies and wide-sweeping conspiracies that are essential to their movements. • During the past several decades, the American extremist movements that have been among the most violent—specifically, far-right and jihadist groups—have used antisemitism to target Jewish people, Jewish houses of worship, Jewish community institutions, and Americans supporting the Jewish state of Israel. • Antisemitism, as a belief and world-structuring theory, can at times serve as a gateway issue for individuals into further radicalization to violent extremism. Nonviolent and violent iterations of the same extremist milieus often share antisemitic views as central elements of their belief system, and thus antisemitism constitutes a linkage between activist and violent extremist segments of the same movement. • Several case studies of violent American extremists, representing far-right and jihadist movements respectively, demonstrate that antisemitism can be an integral part of American extremists’ progression through the radicalization process and in justifying terrorist attacks. • Based on this report’s finding that antisemitism is foundational to multiple violent extremist movements in the United States, counter-extremism practitioners and scholars may consider incorporating antisemitism as a diagnostic factor for extremist radicalization. o While there is no single profile of an American extremist, antisemitism has long been widespread among American extremist movements of multiple persuasions, acting as a least common denominator between extremist groups. o Antisemitic beliefs often serve as a key entry point for individuals to radicalize, join extremist groups, and progress into violent mobilization. o By using promotion of antisemitism as a factor in identifying key influencers and ideologues in extremist movements, Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programming can isolate key nodes in extremist groups and debunk the narratives they promote without engaging in theological debates. o Studying the role of antisemitism in extremist groups can assist scholars in identifying common themes between different types of extremism, as well as between non-violent and violent strands of the same extremist movements. This can improve analysis on the broader relationships between and within extremist groups.

Washington DC: Program on Extremism, George Washington University, 2020. 27p.

By Mohamed Bin Ali and Ahmad Saiful Rijal Bin Hassan

Far-right extremism based on racial and extremist ideologies is finding resonance among some Singaporean youth, posing a challenge to the country’s counterradicalisation strategies, which had been based on religiously motivated extremism. The Singapore authorities need to review their counter-radicalisation frameworks as they grapple with this emerging threat.

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU 2025. 4p.

By Mathias Bak, Kristoffer Nilaus Tarp, and Christina Schori Liang

During the last few decades, the concept of violent extremism (VE) has played an increasingly prominent role in policies and development programming on a global level. Having gone through several incarnations, the current focus for most actors deals with preventing and countering violent extremism. This terminology was constructed in an effort to repackage the Global War on Terror (GWOT) in a manner that shifted the focus away from the over-militarised responses of the 90s and early 2000s, to methods linked to social support and prevention. Where counterterrorism focuses on countering terrorists through physical means, the Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) approach aims to prevent the rise of violent extremist organisations (VEOs) through less militarised methods. P/CVE programs therefore aim at developing resilience among communities that may be prone to violent extremism.

According to the 2015 UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, such interventions aim to address the root causes and drivers of violent extremism, which often include: socio-economic issues; discrimination; marginalization; poor governance; human rights violations; remnants of violent conflict; collective grievances; and other psychological factors. The concept of violent extremism has also become increasingly mainstream in the international community, with both the UN Security Council (UNSC 2014)2 and the UN General Assembly3 (UNGA 2015) calling for member states to address VE.

Geneva Paper 24/19, Geneva, SWIT: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2019. 40p.

By Zoe Marchment, Caitlin Clemmow, Paul Gill

This is the protocol for a Campbell systematic review. The objectives are as follows. The EGM has three main objectives: (1) Identify the strength (in terms of evidence quality) and depth (in terms of volume of evidence) of evidence base on the efficacy of situational crime prevention measures in preventing terrorist attacks against soft targets and crowded places. (2) Identify the heterogeneity in the effects of situational crime prevention measures against terrorist attacks and link this to issues related to context and implementation. (3) Identify the mechanisms through which situational crime prevention measures have an effect on terrorist attacks. To achieve these objectives, an EGM will seek out reliable quantitative evidence on effect and qualitative evidence on mechanisms, moderators, implementation and economics. Resultingly, it will be possible to identify research gaps and evidence imbalances to facilitate research investment, identify gaps and topics for new research, and provide a foundation for systematic reviews by showing where sufficient evidence exists for aggregation. The underpinning programme of work will result in the presentation of rigorous empirical research on this topic to help researchers and decision-makers understand the available evidence.

Campbell Systematic Reviews, Volume21, Issue2, June 2025, 12p.

By Triana McNeil

  A hate crime occurs nearly every hour in the U.S., based on data reported to the FBI. Investigations of recent hate crimes have suggested that exposure to hate speech on the internet may have contributed to the attackers’ biases against their victims. In 2021, the FBI placed hate crimes at the same national threat priority level as preventing domestic violent extremism. GAO was asked to review information on hate crimes and hate speech on the internet. This report examines (1) the extent to which DOJ collects data on hate crimes that occur on the internet, (2) what company data indicate about steps selected companies have taken to remove hate speech and violent extremist speech from their internet platforms, and (3) what is known about users’ experience with, or expression of, hate speech on the internet, and its relationship to hate crimes and domestic violent extremism. GAO analyzed U.S. hate crime data and interviewed DOJ officials. GAO analyzed data and interviewed officials from six selected companies operating internet platforms with publicly available policies prohibiting hate and violent extremist speech. GAO assessed peer reviewed and nonprofit studies that described hate speech on the internet, hate crimes, and domestic violent extremist incidents. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that BJS explore options to measure bias-related criminal victimization that occurs on the internet through the National Crime Victimization Survey or in a supplemental survey, as appropriate. BJS agreed with this recommendation.

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2024. 87p.

By Alex Goldenberg, Joel Finkelstein,

In the predawn hours of September 12, 2001, on board a helicopter heading from Liberty State Park to State Police Headquarters, I had my first opportunity since the terrorist attacks the previous morning to wonder, “how the hell did they pull this off?” It was inconceivable to me, with the trillions of dollars our nation had spent on a global early warning system to prevent another Pearl Harbor surprise attack, that we were unable to prevent the 9/11 attacks or, with the exception of the heroism of the passengers and crew of United 93, to stop them in progress. The question haunted me for the remainder of my term as New Jersey’s Attorney General and beyond until, as Senior Counsel to the 9/11 Commission, I was able to help piece together precisely how the terrorists managed to succeed. At every turn, they hid in plain sight. They traveled openly and freely among the Americans they despised, then disappeared when circumstances warranted. Specifically, on the day of 9/11 itself, the first thing the hijackers did once they secured the cockpits was to turn off the transponders that identified the aircraft to military and civilian controllers. This had the effect of making the planes’ radar signals disappear into the clutter of raw radar data, making it extremely difficult to track the planes. A lot has changed in the years since the 9/11 attacks happened and the 9/11 Commission Report was issued. There were no smart phones then, no Twitter or Instagram, no Google or Snapchat. The revolution in communication technology since has transformed both the way we live and the tactics employed by the extremists who want to kill us. What has remained constant, however, is the extremists’ strategy of using the instrumentalities of freedom recursively in order to destroy it, and the challenge to governments to anticipate the new generations of tactics in order to frustrate their employment. The Report you are about to read, “Cyber Swarming: Memetic Warfare and Viral Insurgency,” represents a breakthrough case study in the capacity to identify cyber swarms and viral insurgencies in nearly real time as they are developing in plain sight. The result of an analysis of over 100 million social media comments, the authors demonstrate how the “boogaloo meme,” “a joke for some, acts as a violent meme that circulates instructions for a violent, viral insurgency for others.” Using it, like turning off the transponders on 9/11, enables the extremists to hide in plain sight, disappearing into the clutter of innocent messages, other data points. It should be of particular concern, the authors note, for the military, for whom “the meme’s emphasis on military language and culture poses a special risk.” Because most of law enforcement and the military remain ignorant of “memetic warfare,” the authors demonstrate, extremists who employ it “possess a distinct advantage over government officials and law enforcement.” As with the 9/11 terrorists, “they already realize that they are at war. Public servants cannot afford to remain ignorant of this subject because as sites, followers, and activists grow in number, memes can reach a critical threshold and tipping point, beyond which they can suddenly saturate and mainstream across entire cultures.” This Report is at once an urgent call to recognize an emerging threat and a prescription for how to counter it. As such, it offers that rarest of opportunities: the chance to stop history from repeating itself.

The Network Contagion Research Institute , 2021. 11p.

Edited by Giray SADIK  

According to Strategic Concept 2022, terrorism, which poses the immediate asymmetric and transnational threat, is one of two main threats to NATO. Even though NATO’s focus is currently directed to the other main threat, Russia, particularly after its war against Ukraine, terrorism has remained a major threat across the NATO territory and periphery. Besides, the adaptations of terrorist organizations in response to current wars such as the one in Ukraine are likely to exacerbate terrorist threats for NATO Allies and partners. Therefore, there is an ongoing need for research and learning around global terrorism landscape and its implications for NATO. To this end, this research aims to identify the lessons learned for NATO from the RussiaUkraine war for countering terrorism effectively. Russia’s war on Ukraine since February 2022 has led to dramatic changes in global geopolitics and the all-encompassing domains of security, connectivity, and modern warfare. Although significant and widespread, the effects of this ongoing war on global terrorism have yet to be comprehensively analyzed. To address this gap in a timely manner, this project aims to examine the effects of the Russia-Ukraine war on terrorism through expert discussions on the contemporary trends and lessons learned for global counter-terrorism efforts, and NATO Allies and Partners. To this end, we organized a workshop in hybrid format (in-person and online) with the contributing authors of the edited book. Workshop participants include academics, practitioners, and subject matter experts from various NATO Allies and Partners.   

Ankara, Turkey: Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT) , 2025.   138p.

By Shai Farber

  This systematic review unveils significant convergence between cybercriminals and terrorists over the past decade, characterized by substantial overlap in tactics, capabilities, and infrastructure exploitation. Key findings illuminate the adoption of cybercriminal methods by terrorist organizations, the engagement of cybercriminal groups in terrorist activities, the proliferation of enabling technologies such as cryptocurrencies and the dark web, and the role of social media in facilitating knowledge exchange between diverse threat actors. While direct terrorist involvement in proftdriven cybercrime appears limited, the escalating convergence underscores urgent imperatives for enhanced cooperation, legal refinement, the establishment of flexible counter-threat authorities, and collaboration with the private sector. Continuous monitoring of this rapidly evolving landscape is crucial to inform effective policies and interventions in an increasingly interconnected digital world.

Security Journal (2025), 23p.

By Nina Wilén and Kwesi Aning

Over the past decade, Western and multilateral security interventions in the Sahel have failed to stabilize the region, while national and local efforts, particularly in Mali and Burkina Faso, have remained largely militarized. These approaches have proven ineffective in addressing the underlying causes of instability, such as food insecurity, lack of basic services, and limited economic opportunities. The key lesson learned is that military action alone cannot resolve the Sahel’s security crisis—political engagement from local, national, and regional actors is crucial.

Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. 2 COUNTER EXTREMISM PROJECT, 2025// 28p.