By Gabriele Bernardini, Elena Cantatore, Fabio Fatiguso, and Enrico Quagliarini

This open access book outlines the latest results in analysing, assessing, and managing terrorist risk in the urban outdoor built environment. In detail, contents refer to the outdoor Open Areas (such as streets, squares, urban parks and other public spaces in our cities) exposed to such violent events considering the physical elements and properties of the built environment and users. PThe built environment features, including layout, use and management, are combined with terrorist threats issues and user behaviours in emergency conditions, to determine a set of complementary tools for the reduction of risk and increase of urban resilience. The contents hence provide different levels of tool analysis, for risk scenario definition, risk assessment, mitigation strategies design and effectiveness evaluation, considering traditional approaches about the issue along with simulation-based approaches relying on understanding and representing user behaviors. This “behavioural design” approach offers the opportunity to manage the level of risk for specific real urban cases overcoming the normative limitations in Europe that are only referred to a few countries and sometimes deal with the prevention of violent acts by intelligence activities as the exclusive way to face this issue. In addition, the focus on the characters of cultural and historic places and their resilience is increasing by means of introduction of mitigation and compatible solutions providing a complementary chapter for the design of resilient cities in all of their peculiarities (peripheries, consolidated, and historical). In this sense, it is one of the first organized attempts to analyse the main limitations of current solutions in these outdoor Open Areas and, at the same time, to clearly introduce the importance of human behaviours and the various choices in emergency evacuation conditions, thanks to the proposed behavioural-based simulation approach. The attention is focused on a critical aspect for historic spaces, where morphological conditions are fixed values. Thus, this book represents a sort of guidelines about these user-related issues during such violent events and is useful to both professionals and researchers in the areas of security and urban administration.

Singapore: Springer Nature, 2025. 135p.

By Christopher Hernandez-Roy, Henry Ziemer, and Azucena Duarte

Although only 8 percent of the world lives in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), the region accounts for a third of all homicides worldwide. LAC cities consistently top international rankings as some of the most violent locales outside of active conflict zones. Behind this insecurity are powerful and deeply entrenched transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) trafficking drugs and other illegal commodities, who in turn rely on a seemingly endless flow of illicit firearms to carry out their campaigns of violence and intimidation on the Western Hemisphere’s inhabitants. Arms trafficking goes well beyond a law enforcement challenge; the proliferation of semi- and fully automatic rifles, grenade launchers, and various high-caliber weapons are increasingly used by TCOs to hold at risk the very sovereignty of LAC governments. Stories from Mexico, Haiti, Ecuador, and beyond all underscore how the scourge of illicit weapons, and the groups who wield them, can plunge communities, and even whole countries, into violence.

Leveraging new data sources, this report examines the prevalence and patterns of arms trafficking within and between each of the four subregions. Recognizing the nature of the threat arms trafficking presents to the Western Hemisphere at large, the report seeks to define the contours of a new strategy to combat illegal guns, concluding with recommendations for the United States, Mexico, Central America, South America, and the Caribbean to pursue.

Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2024.

By: Erika Harrell, Jennifer L. Truman, Katherine A. Fowler, Kristin Holland, Thomas R. Simon, and Steven A. Sumner

This report examines trends and patterns in firearm violence from 1993 to 2023 using a combination of data sources to provide a broad perspective on fatal and nonfatal firearm violence in the Unites States that could not be achieved through any single source of information. It includes data on firearm type; incident location; victim and offender demographic characteristics and relationship; injury and treatment type; police notification; and victims’ self-protective behaviors.

Estimates in this report are based primarily on data from BJS’s National Crime Victimization Survey and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) National Vital Statistics System death certificate data queried through the Web-based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System. Additional estimates come from the CDC’s National Violent Death Reporting System, National Syndromic Surveillance Program, and Youth Risk Behavior Survey. The report is organized to present findings from each data source in separate sections.

Highlights

• The rate of nonfatal firearm violence for persons age 12 or older declined 72% from 1993 to 2023, dropping from 7.3 to 2.0 victimizations per 1,000 persons, and varied from 1.2 to 2.3 per 1,000 during 2019 to 2023.

• About 64% of nonfatal firearm violence was reported to police during 2018–2022.

• The firearm homicide rate among persons age 12 or older fluctuated between 1993 and 2023, with a decline from 1993 to 2014 (from 8.4 to 4.0 homicides per 100,000 persons age 12 or older) before rising to 7.3 per 100,000 in 2021.

• From 2018 to 2022, on average, 80% of homicides were committed with a firearm

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2024. 41p.

By JASON BLAZAKIS & MEGAN RENNEBAUM

This paper seeks to examine the array of terrorist designations undertaken by “Five-Eye” (FVEY) countries (i.e. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States) against violent far-right terrorists, often also referred as racially and ethnically motivated violent extremist (REMVE) actors. While not a focus of the papers, non-FVEY countries, most notably Germany, have also implemented measures to restrict the activities of violent far-right actors. Thus, this paper will evaluate whether non-FVEY measures can help inform broader policy determinations related to violent far-right terrorism designations. What lessons learned, if any, can the FVEY countries draw from other national experiences? Furthermore, are there multilateral regimes, such as the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1267 counterterrorism sanctions regime (henceforth, 1267 regime), that can inform FVEY policies within the field of terrorist designations?

Issue Brief, New York: Soufan Center, 2022. 22p.

By Michele Ubaldi Matteo Picchio

We study the effect of mass shooting exposure on individuals’ mental health by using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Our identification strategy relies on the quasi-randomness of mass shootings in a staggered difference-in-differences design. We compare changes in mental health outcomes of individuals living in affected cities with changes of matched individuals living in non-proximal and not affected cities. We find that mass shootings have a substantial adverse impact on mental health, which persists for up to six years. This impact is not statistically significant for Black individuals, whereas it is slightly more pronounced among women and older cohorts

Bonn, Garmany: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics 2024. 45p.

By National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

Domestic and foreign violent extremist organizations, or terrorist groups, have caused a greater amount of harm with chemical agents than with biological or radiological weapons. The United States capacity and capability to identify, prevent, counter, and respond adequately to chemical threats is established by the strategies, policies, and laws enacted across multiple levels of government. While the number of chemical terrorism incidents has risen and fallen over time, there is no empirical or analytical indication that the threat is disappearing. This report comes at a time when the nation's highest-level strategies have shifted from focusing primarily on violent extremist organizations to focusing more on Great Power Competition. This shift in relative perceived threat and consequent prioritization will impact efforts against chemical terrorism, and in turn, affect funding priorities. Revised risk assessments are needed to reprioritize risks guided by new strategies, so that strategy-aligned budgets can be created. The report recommends weapons of mass destruction budgets be aligned with evolving priorities and incentivize activities that transition promising research to operations.

Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.2024, 186p. https://doi.org/10.17226/27159.

By Michael A. Jensen, Elizabeth Yates , Sheehan Kane

This project expands the Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) database with information on the nexus of criminal extremism and U.S. military service. The expanded database includes 461 individuals with U.S. military backgrounds who committed criminal acts in the United States from 1990 through 2021 that were motivated by their political, economic, social, or religious goals. Findings from these data are detailed in three results sections of a report that can be accessed here.

The first section explores the scope and nature of criminal extremism in the ranks, detailing the rates of military service among criminal extremists and analyzing their military branch, ideological, and extremist group affiliations. This section also provides a closer look at the individuals with military backgrounds who have been charged with criminal offenses related to the Capitol breach of January 6, 2021.

Section two provides a closer look at risk factors for radicalization, comparing subjects with military backgrounds to those without records of military service. This section explores the rates of substance use disorders, anti-social relationships, and social mobility challenges among past U.S. service members who committed extremist crimes and situates these radicalization risk factors within the larger extremist context in the United States.

The final section of results examines the risk factors and vulnerabilities for radicalization that are unique to subgroups of criminal extremists with U.S. military backgrounds. Using hierarchical clustering methods, the results in this section show how the radicalization pathways of extremists with military backgrounds are likely to differ depending on whether individuals are active in the military at the time of their involvement in extremism or if they have military-specific risk factors for radicalization, such as previous deployments to combat zones or diagnoses of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). This report concludes with recommendations for policy and future research, paying particular attention to the potential benefits of applying a public health model to countering the spread of extremism in the U.S. military.

College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2022. 45p.

By Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

Trafficking in persons is a global challenge that transcends borders, and the advent of AI technologies has the potential to amplify both its reach and complexity. It is precisely this global nature of both trafficking and AI that necessitates coordinated, regional, and international responses. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Regional Support Office of the Bali Process (RSO) have jointly developed this brief on the emerging nexus of artificial intelligence (AI), trafficking in persons, and transnational crime with a clear objective: to equip policymakers, law enforcement agencies, and the technology sector with the insights needed to anticipate and pre-emptively address the potential implications of AI on trafficking in persons.

Vienna: OSCE, 2024. 33p.

By Joana Cook, Eva Herschinger, Seran de Leede, and Anna-Maria Andreeva

The literature focusing on gender and radicalisation has steadily increased over the last ten years. This has reflected the rise of extremism across the globe, and has been particularly triggered by researchers seeking to better understand the experiences of individuals throughout all stages of the radicalisation process. However, research on the topic has also largely focused on the experiences of women, especially those associated with Islamist forms of extremism. Such narrow focus has resulted in several gaps in the literature, which in turn has translated into gaps in practice. This report seeks to identify the key trends in research between 2014 and 2024 concerning literature on gender and radicalisation, as well as make explicit the areas that remain underexplored. Focusing on tangible recommendations, which align with the needs of practitioners, the report seeks to bring forward the state of the art of research on gender and radicalisation.

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) 2024. 21p.

By Anna-Maria Andreeva, Annika von Berg, Bibi van Ginkel, Elisabeth Hell, Shams Jouve, Alexandra Korn, Bàrbara Molas, Maximilian Ruf, and Sophie Scheuble

Despite the fact that research indicates that it is important to integrate a gender-based approach for effective risk assessment and implementation of counter-terrorism (CT) and preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) practices, such as rehabilitation and reintegration, our assessment of academic and grey literature on gender perspectives in CT and P/CVE practices shows that most of these practices remain gender-blind and tend to reproduce gender norms and stereotypes, while ignoring the complexity of women’s and men’s involvement in extremism. In this report, the authors did a thorough literature review of academic and grey literature published between 2014 and 2024, and conducted ten interviews to reflect on gender perspectives in CT and P/CVE practices. After a reflection on persisting gender construction, biases, and other problematic perspectives, the report focuses on the gender perspectives in analytical frameworks and toolkits used, for instance, for risk assessments. Next, the report elaborates on the gender perspectives in the implementation of the intervention phases, namely from law enforcement interventions, to exit processes. In the general conclusion, the authors argue that gender constructs, roles, and norms, and the way these are taken into consideration in the various P/CVE interventions, heavily impact the effectiveness of these efforts. They also conclude that there is a potential of an aggravating sequence of gender (mis)conceptions, since the gender constructs used in the risk assessments inform following interventions, such as disengagement, deradicalisation, and rehabilitation processes. The report ends with a set of recommendations tailored to different target groups.

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), 2024. 25p.

By Everytown for Gun Safety 

 Deaths due to firearm violence occur in alarming numbers in the United States (U.S.) each year. In 2023, over 43,000 people died from a firearm-related injury, and the majority (55%) of these deaths were from suicide (Gun Violence Archive, 2024). Young people are at heightened risk, with firearms being the leading cause of death for youth ages 13-24, and the cause of half of all suicide deaths in this age group as well (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2024; National Violent Death Reporting System, 2024). Only in the last five years did Congress allocate federal resources for firearm violence research, and the prior decades-long ban on this research has stymied information that could have been used to prevent these deaths (Hellman, 2019). This lack of research has had wide-reaching effects, including the limited understanding of how firearm violence impacts specific vulnerable populations, such as LGBTQ+ individuals. Although much progress has been made, systematic data collection efforts that assess LGBTQ+ identity and experiences have long been a challenge in the U.S., similarly limiting available research on LGBTQ+ health and wellness (Healthy People 2030, 2023). One of the most consistent findings we do know from available research, however, is that LGBTQ+ young people experience higher rates of considering and attempting suicide compared to their peers. The Trevor Project’s 2024 U.S. National Survey on the Mental Health of LGBTQ+ Young People found that 39% of all LGBTQ+ young people seriously considered attempting suicide in the past year. This finding is important in the context of what we know about firearms: they are the most lethal means used in suicide attempts; nearly 9 in 10 (89.6%) suicide attempts with a firearm result in death (Conner, Azrael, & Miller, 2019). Furthermore, though mass shootings constitute a small fraction (1.5%) of firearm deaths in the U.S., the public nature of this violence, often targeted toward members of oppressed groups, still have noteworthy impact. Mass shootings are defined by The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as any incident in which four or more people are shot and wounded or killed, excluding the shooter. Many LGBTQ+ people across the country identified with the victims of two widely publicized mass shootings that occurred at LGBTQ+ nightclubs in recent years: the Pulse shooting in 2016, and the shooting at Club Q in 2022. The mental health of survivors and directly impacted geographic communities are adversely affected by mass shootings (Lowe & Galea, 2017), and individuals not directly affected by mass shooting events can  also experience post-traumatic stress through media exposure (Thompson et al., 2019). In the instance of the Pulse shooting, those who identified as LGBTQ+ responded more strongly to media coverage and, in turn, experienced more post-traumatic stress (First et al., 2023). Everytown for Gun Safety states that not only is addressing firearms essential to any strategy to reduce suicide, but also that the effect of mass shootings extends to survivors, families, and communities. Despite the elevated risk of suicide attempts among LGBTQ+ young people, the fact that the majority of firearm deaths in the U.S. are suicides, and the high lethality of suicide attempts involving firearms, little is known about how many LGBTQ+ young people own or have access to firearms, or how experiences of mass shooting events impact suicide risk. Using data from the 2024 U.S. National Survey on the Mental Health of LGBTQ+ Young people, this brief examines relationships between access to firearms, the impact of mass shootings, and suicide risk among LGBTQ+ young people. Results Access to Firearms Overall, 40% of LGBTQ+ young people reported that there was a firearm in their home. The majority (92%) of those with a firearm in the home reported that it was not theirs. Additionally, of those who reported the presence of a firearm in their home, 63% reported that the firearm was kept in a locked place, 22% reported that it was not kept in a locked place, and 15% reported that they did not know whether it was kept in a locked place. Demographics LGBTQ+ young people ages 13-17 reported higher rates of having a firearm in their home (44%), compared to their LGBTQ+ young people ages 18-24 (36%). LGBTQ+ young people living in the South reported the highest rates of having a firearm in their home (48%), followed by LGBTQ+ young people living in the Midwest (43%), West (37%), and Northeast (25%). Cisgender boys and men reported the highest rates of living in a home with a firearm (46%), followed by transgender girls and women (43%), transgender boys and men (42%), nonbinary youth (38%), youth questioning their gender identity (38%), and cisgender girls and women (36%). Native and Indigenous LGBTQ+ young people reported the highest rates of living in a home with a firearm (58%), followed by White LGBTQ+ young people (45%), Multiracial LGBTQ+ young people (38%), Black LGBTQ+ young people (31%), Latinx LGBTQ+ young people (29%), Middle Eastern and North African LGBTQ+ young people (22%), and Asian American and Pacific Islander LGBTQ+ young people (21%). No significant differences were found in rates of having a firearm in the home when comparing LGBTQ+ youth based on their socioeconomic status  LGBTQ+ young people who reported the presence of a firearm in their home reported higher rates of having seriously considered suicide in the past year (43%), compared to their LGBTQ+ peers who did not report a firearm in their home (37%). Reporting the presence of a firearm in the home was associated with 19% higher odds of seriously considering suicide in the past year (adjusted odds ratio [aOR] = 1.19, 95% Confidence Interval [CI] = 1.11-1.28, p < 0.001), compared to LGBTQ+ young people who did not report the presence of a firearm in the home. LGBTQ+ young people who reported having a firearm in their home had higher rates of attempting suicide in the past year (13%), compared to their LGBTQ+ peers who did not report having a firearm in their home (11%). The presence of a firearm in the home was associated with 17% higher odds of reporting a suicide attempt in the past year (aOR = 1.17, 95% CI = 1.05-1.30, p < 0.01), Among LGBTQ+ young people who reported having a firearm in their home, 48% of those who did not keep it in a locked place and 46% of those who did not know if it was kept in a locked place seriously considered suicide in the last year, compared to the 40% who said the firearms were kept in a locked place (p<.001). Similarly, among those LGBTQ+ young people who reported the presence of a firearm in their home, 14% of those who did not keep it in a locked place and 15% of those who did not know if it was kept in a locked place attempted suicide in the last year, compared to the 12% who said the firearms were kept in a locked place (p<.001).

New York: Everytown for Gun Safety, 2024. 11p.

By Rin Ushiyama,

Aum Shinrikyō’s sarin attack on the Tokyo subway in March 1995 left an indelible mark on Japanese society. This book is the first comprehensive study of the competing memories of Aum Shinrikyō’s religious terrorism. Developing a sociological framework for how uneven distributions of power and resources shape commemorative processes, this book explores how the Aum Affair developed as a ‘cultural trauma’ in Japanese collective memory following the Tokyo attack. The book shows how numerous stakeholders, including the state, the mass media, public intellectuals, victims, and perpetrators offered competing narratives about the causes and consequences of Aum’s violence. Combining multiple methods including media content analysis, participant observation, and original interviews with victims and ex-members, this book reveals various flashpoints of contention such as the state regulation of religion, ‘brainwashing’ and ‘mind control’ controversies, and the morality of capital punishment. It shows that although cultural trauma construction requires the use of moral binaries such as ‘good vs.. evil’ and ‘sacred vs.. profane’, the entrenchment of such binary codes in commemorative processes can ultimately hinder social repair and reconciliation.

Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2022. 231p.

May Contain Mark-Ups

Edited by Mustafa Ozguler, Ph.D., Ali Ozdogan, Ph.D., Ekrem Mus, Halim Iltas, & A. Sait Yayla, Ph.D.

The book“Terrorism: A Global Perspective,”edited by Mustafa Ozguler, Ali Ozdogan, A. SaitYayla, Ekrem Mus, and Halim Iltas, is a comprehensive compilation of presentations from the 2nd Istanbul Conference on Democracy and Global Security held in June 2007. The book is divided into three parts:“Terrorism: A Global Problem,” “Terrorism and CivilSociety,”and“Issues in Terrorism.”Each section addresses different aspects of terrorismand global security, ranging from the global and local dimensions of terrorism, the role of civil society in counter-terrorism efforts, to specific issues such as the use of biometrics incounter-terrorism and the financing of terrorist organizations through cigarette smuggling.The book emphasizes the importance of international cooperation, understanding local factors, and addressing core issues to effectively combat terrorism and enhance global security.Key topics include the framing of terrorist threats by different countries, the impact of globalization on terrorism, the fundamental causes of terrorism such as social injustice and political conflicts, and the role of media in counter-terrorism. The book also exploresthe psychological profiles of suicide bombers, the evolution of right-wing violence in Japan,and the strategic use of small-scale terrorist attacks. Additionally, it proposes new community protection initiatives, such as “Building Terrorism Resistant Communities,”to enhance local resilience against terrorism. Overall, the book provides a multifaceted analysis of terrorism, combining theoretical insights with practical recommendations for policymakers, law enforcement, and civil society

The Turkish Institute for Security and Democracy, 2009, 357 pages

By Alice Marwick, Benjamin Clancy, Katherine Furl

This literature review examines cross-disciplinary work on radicalization to situate, historicize, frame, and better understand the present concerns around online radicalization and far-right extremist and fringe movements. We find that research on radicalization is inextricably linked to the post-9/11 context in which it emerged, and as a result is overly focused on studying the other. Applying this research to the spread of far-right ideas online does not account for the ways in which the far-right’s endorsement of white supremacy and racism holds historical, normative precedent in the United States. Further, radicalization research is rife with uncertainties, ranging from definitional ambiguity to an inability to identify any simplistic, causal models capable of fully explaining the conditions under which radicalization occurs. Instead, there are multiple possible pathways to radicalization, and while the internet does not cause individuals to adopt far-right extremist or fringe beliefs, some technological affordances may aid adoption of these beliefs through gradual processes of socialization. We conclude that the term “radicalization” does not serve as a useful analytical frame for studying the spread of far-right and fringe ideas online. Instead, potential analytical frameworks better suited to studying these phenomena include theories prominent in the study of online communities, conversion, mainstreaming, and sociotechnical theories of media effects.

A summary of key take-aways includes:

The adoption of extremist, far-right, and fringe beliefs is often referred to as “radicalization,” a term formulated post-9/11 to understand jihadi terrorism, a very different context from the far-right.

Radicalization research is full of uncertainty.

• No specific type of person is vulnerable to radicalization, and most people who commit political violence are not mentally ill or alienated from society.

• Radicalization is not caused by poverty, oppression, or marginalization.

• There is no one way in which people are “radicalized.”

• Viewing extremist media does not necessarily lead to adopting extremist beliefs or committing political violence.

In contrast to the “red pill” model, radicalization is gradual. Recruits slowly adopt the identities, emotions, and interpretations shared by a community. They conceptualize their problems as injustices caused by others, and justify using political violence against them.

The internet does not cause radicalization, but it helps spread extremist ideas, enables people interested in these ideas to form communities, and mainstreams conspiracy theories and distrust in institutions.

"Radicalization” is not a useful frame for understanding the spread of far-right and fringe ideas online.

• It is analytically imprecise and morally judgmentalIt doesn’t help us understand the role of media and digital technologies.

• It is inextricably tied to a global security infrastructure targeting Islam.

• It doesn’t account for the fact that fringe or far-right beliefs may change what people think is “true” and “false,” making it hard to find common ground.

• The focus on violence ignores other worrying effects of mainstreaming far-right and fringe ideas.

Publisher: Bulletin of Technology & Public Life, 2022. 83p.

By Silvia Villarreal, Rose Kim, Elizabeth Wagner, Nandita Somayaji, Ari Davis, M Cassandra Crifasi

This report outlines gun death data from 2022, the most recent year of finalized data available. All data were accessed using the Centers for Disease Control’s Underlying Cause of Death database, part of the Wide-ranging Online Data for Epidemiologic Research (WONDER) database. The Underlying Cause of Death database contains data based on death certificates for U.S. residents and is the most reliable national source of gun death data available in the U.S. The gun death data used from this database depicts injury mortality by intent using the following categories: homicide, suicide, unintentional, legal intervention, and undetermined. Rates are calculated by the residence listed of decedent, not where the shooting actually took place. For simplification purposes, we created the following age categories to examine gun violence centered on youth: children (ages 1–9) and teens (10–17). For smaller, specific age ranges, we created the following categories: older teens (15–17) and emerging adults (17–19).

Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Violence Solutions. Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. 2024. 23p.

By Colin Murphy

Precise figures about the numbers of illegal firearms in the European Union (EU) are lacking, but several indicators point to their widespread availability and accessibility. According to the Small Arms Survey, over half of the estimated total number of firearms held by civilians in the EU in 2017 were unlicensed. While most of these citizens had no criminal intentions, their illicit firearms could be used for self-harm or domestic violence, or end up in the hands of criminals or terrorists. Most criminals and terrorists have more sophisticated ways to get hold of illicit firearms. They can be trafficked from source countries, diverted from legal supply chains, illegally manufactured or assembled in the EU, converted from legally available weapons, or sourced on the internet. Firearms seizures suggest that the EU illicit firearms market is made up mostly of shotguns, pistols and rifles, with converted or convertible weapons also appearing frequently. Illicit firearms trafficking is driven by criminal demand, with organised crime groups that engage in firearms trafficking also involved in other forms of criminality. The EU considers illicit firearms a key crime threat precisely because they are used in many crimes and terrorist attacks. Even people who lack extensive criminal connections can access illicit firearms due to increased online trafficking and the availability of easy-to-convert weapons. The EU is actively involved in addressing the threat posed by illegal firearms by means of legislative and policy measures, and provides operational assistance to the Member States in the fight against firearms trafficking. The EU is also active in the international fight against firearms trafficking, working closely with the United Nations (UN) in its work to combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and engaging in the UN's global firearms programme. Although the export of arms remains a national competence, the EU has defined common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment and works actively with third countries that are viewed as source or transit countries for illicit firearms. This is an update of a briefing by Ann Neville, published in 2022.

Briefing 23-10-2024 Brussels: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service , 2024. 12p.

By Evan D. Gumas, Munira Z. Gunja, and Reginald D. Williams II,

Firearm mortality in the United States has been well documented, and for good reason: far more Americans die of firearm-related causes than do residents of any other high-income country. Firearms are the leading cause of death for children in the U.S. and the weapon used most in interpersonal violence against women. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that nearly 49,000 Americans died from firearm-related causes in 2021, up from about 45,000 in 2020.1 In 2019, firearms accounted for 10.4 deaths for every 100,000 people in the U.S., around five times greater than in the countries with the second-and third-highest death rates, France (2.2) and Switzerland (2.1). Less publicized, however, is how gun violence burdens the healthcare system. Each year in the U.S., firearm-related injuries lead to roughly 30,000 inpatient hospital stays and 50,000 emergency room visits, generating more than $1 billion in initial medical costs. In 2020 alone, deaths from these injuries cost $290 million, an average of $6,400 per patient. Medicaid and other public insurance programs absorbed most of these costs. But the impact of gun violence reaches far beyond the hospital room. Firearm injuries leave victims with hefty medical bills. Medical spending increases an average of $2,495 per person per month in the year following the injury. Survivors are also more likely to develop mental health conditions and substance use disorders, areas in which the U.S. has poor outcomes.

New York: Commonwealth Fund, Apr. 2023. https://doi.org/10.26099/a2at-gy62

By Alice M. Ellyson, Avanti Adhia, Sandra Shanahan, Aisha Alsinai, Lisa DiMascolo, Maxmilliaan Reygers, Deirdre Bowen, Ali Rowhani-Rahbar

We quantified the implementation of WA state's domestic violence (DV)-related firearm prohibitions (RCW9.41.800) by the courts and the Regional Domestic Violence Firearms Enforcement Unit (RDVFEU), a regional approach to compliance promotion. We measured implementation, vetting, compliance, and enforcement of firearm prohibitions before (2014–2016) and after (2018–2020) the RDVFEU was implemented using a 55% random sample of granted domestic violence protection orders (DVPOs) in King County, WA (n = 3543). We evaluated differences in judicial orders to surrender firearms and other dangerous weapons (OTSWs), respondent documented compliance, and respondent weapon and/or firearm relinquishment before and after implementation. Compared to DVPOs granted prior to RDVFEU implementation, granted DVPOs after RDVFEU implementation were at least 4.5 times more likely to include an OTSW. RDVFEU implementation was also associated with at least 3.4 times the odds of respondent documented compliance and at least 3.3 times the odds of respondent relinquishment of at least one firearm and/or other dangerous weapon. These findings demonstrate RDVFEU implementation was associated with benefits at each stage of the protection order process with improvements in both judicial enforcement and respondent compliance. Overall, RDVFEU implementation was associated with improvements in granted orders to surrender weapons, respondent compliance, and relinquishment.

Policy Implications

DV-related firearm prohibitions can be supported by interdisciplinary teams within the legal system to promote respondent compliance and enhance safety planning for DV victim–survivors.

Criminology & Public Policy Volume 23, Issue 4 Nov 2024 Pages 801-1017

By Brady: United Against Gun Violence.

Every gun on our streets starts somewhere, and the overwhelming majority have their origins in the legal marketplace. Understanding how guns — particularly those that have been diverted from legal commerce to the underground market — make their way to crime scenes is essential to crafting evidence-based and life-saving solutions to the American gun violence epidemic. There is — or should be — nothing controversial about this tracing approach. Epidemiologists and other scientists routinely study the origins of public health challenges in order to develop effective solutions, treatments, and preventative measures. It is a key component of the scientific method. Unfortunately, the best national data on the sources and paths of crime guns has been hidden from researchers, journalists, and the general public for nearly two decades. The gun industry successfully pushed the federal government to restrict public access to this critical gun trace data, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) has aided the industry’s efforts by adopting an overly broad interpretation of those regulatory restrictions. Although some state and local law enforcement agencies have released gun UNDERSTANDING HOW GUNS — PARTICULARLY THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN DIVERTED FROM LEGAL COMMERCE TO THE UNDERGROUND MARKET — MAKE THEIR WAY TO CRIME SCENES IS ESSENTIAL TO CRAFTING EVIDENCE-BASED AND LIFE-SAVING SOLUTIONS TO THE AMERICAN GUN VIOLENCE EPIDEMIC. trace data in the last 20 years, the amount has been insufficient to develop the comprehensive, life-saving solutions that we need. In this report you will find an analysis of the most important gun trace dataset to be publicly available in decades. Attorney General Josh Shapiro of Pennsylvania has released trace data for 186,000 crime guns from over 150 law enforcement agencies in his state, allowing the public to identify, for the first time in decades, which gun dealers appear to supply the most guns to the illegal market. This data is publicly available on the Pennsylvania Gun Tracing Analytics Platform. It is very important to note that the gun tracing dataset, while extensive, is not comprehensive. It does not include crime guns recovered by local Pennsylvania law enforcement agencies that have opted against sharing trace data. For that reason, the findings in this report are not the definitive picture of crime guns in the state. However, this dataset should nonetheless enable the public, policymakers, and law enforcement to hold the gun industry accountable for its role in supplying crime guns — and, in doing so, ultimately save lives. By focusing on the small number of gun dealers now known to be contributing to the problem, Pennsylvanians and their leaders will be able to put political, legal, and economic pressure on the irresponsible actors of the gun industry and bring about needed reforms to ensure that firearms are transferred responsibly and safely. Like all data, gun trace data has its limits; its insights, while key to understanding gun trafficking, are just one part of that process. Earlier this year, Brady unveiled an extensive — and ever-growing — database containing another piece to the puzzle: ATF compliance inspection reports detailing federal firearms licensees (FFLs) who have been issued a warning letter or more severe remedy for cited violations of gun laws. We encourage readers to also view that resource, the Gun Store Transparency Project, at www.gunstoretransparency.org. As you read through these findings, keep in mind that many of the 186,000 crime guns in the database are likely associated with one or more crime victim(s) and their families. If this were not staggering enough, the devastating ripple effects gun violence inflicts on families, neighborhoods, and communities are not captured in these numbers. Brady invites you to join us in advocating for solutions that address the supply side of gun violence. We invite researchers to study this data and build on our analysis; we implore journalists to report on not just the tragic results of gun violence incidents, but how crime guns end up in our communities; we urge lawmakers and law enforcement to adopt life-saving, supply-side solutions to gun violence; and we call on federal, state, and local authorities to be more transparent by releasing more trace data to the public. It is long past time for the gun industry as a whole to adopt meaningful supply-side solutions ensuring firearms are transferred safely and responsibility, as it is neither fair nor just to ask the communities suffering the immense harms of gun violence to also bear the burden of providing all the solutions.

Washington, DC: Brady: United Against Gun Violence, 2022. 43p.

By Brady: United Against Gun Violence.

In January 2020, Brady advocates planned to take part in an annual Martin Luther King Jr. gun violence prevention advocacy event at the Virginia State Capitol, but state officials cautioned would-be participants that 2020 would be different: Second Amendment extremists were planning to turn out. Out of caution, Brady cancelled its official participation in the event because an estimated 20,000 individuals from across the country, armed with assault-style rifles and wearing tactical gear, descended on the State Capitol in Richmond, VA. It was a deeply troubling moment for members of the gun violence prevention movement, who saw their First Amendment right to speak and assemble quashed by gun-toting extremists. We did not know then that the events of that day were only a dress rehearsal for far worse to come. On January 6, 2021, Congress was set to certify the results of the 2020 election. But extremists, many of them armed, mounted an insurrection with violent force that resulted in death and injury and nearly derailed Congress’ capacity to confirm a president duly elected by the citizens of the United States. For Brady supporters and gun violence prevention advocates, it was both a sickening gut punch and deja vu. Although only one of the four people killed on January 6 was shot, the 2021 attack had the same roots as the 2020 Virginia State Capitol unrest: Second Amendment extremism. Second Amendment extremism arises from what’s commonly known as the “insurrectionist” construction of the Second Amendment: a false interpretation fomented by extremists, marketed by the gun lobby, and adopted by some mainstream politicians, including the 45th President of the United States. Second Amendment extremism lays the foundation for much domestic unrest and weaponized terror throughout American history, including but not limited to the Oklahoma City Bombing, the armed agitation at the Michigan State Capitol, and yes — January 6, 2021. Indeed, investigations and firsthand accounts of January 6 show that many of its agitators were armed, ready, and willing to harm lawmakers. Accordingly, officers on duty at the U.S. Capitol that day had credible reasons to fear that many rioters were armed; a number of these officers have since testified before Congress that those fears hindered their ability to control the insurrectionist mob. Yet the common narrative around January 6 often omits the role of Second Amendment extremism. Ignoring the ways in which guns, and gun mythology, fuel domestic extremism in America has been — and will continue to be — a deadly error. For these reasons, this report sets out to examine the role U.S. gun culture and policy played in laying the foundation for January 6. If we do not spend time reflecting upon our past, we are doomed to repeat it — and that we cannot do, because human lives and bedrock civic principles hang in the balance of this understanding and reckoning. At Brady, we have confronted extremism before, and we know that unless we take action, we will face it again.

Washington, DC: Brady: United Against Gun Violence. 2022. 16p.