By Raffaello Pantucci

The troublesome question of how and whether to consider what are commonly referred to as Lone Wolf terrorists within the broader roster of terrorist groups is something that has regularly confounded security analysts for a variety of reasons. This article attempts to create some sort of typology to start to define the group, with specific reference to the instances of Lone Wolves (or Lone Wolf Packs, an admittedly paradoxical choice of words that is defined in the article as small, isolated groups of individuals involved in terrorism) who claim to adhere to an extremist Islamist ideology. The article offers four subsets to the definition, drawing upon a detailed analysis of a variety of different plots in Europe and North America: Loner, Lone Wolf, Lone Wolf Pack, and Lone Attacker. The purpose of the article is to offer some preliminary thoughts on the issue of Lone Wolves, and start a process towards deeper understanding and closer analysis of the phenomenon. This is of particular salience given the frequency with which security analysts cite the phenomenon as a threat and the increasing way in which Al Qaeda ideologues refer to it.

London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), King's College London, 2011. 63p.

Edited by Beatrice de Graaf and Alex P. Schmid.

A Performative Perspective. “…terrorism trials can be an exceptional opportunity better to understand and, hence, counter terrorism, since they are the only place where most, if not all, of the actors in a terrorist incident meet again: terrorists, state representatives, the judiciary, the audience, surviving victims, terrorist sympathisers, etc. The media will report and broadcast their respective performances. Forming a nexus between terrorist violence, law enforcement and public opinion, terrorism trials thus offer the prospect of showcasing justice in progress, and in so doing of demonstrating to the world how terrorist suspects are dealt with under the laws of the land.”

Leiden University Press (2016) 603p.

By Stephen Reimer and Matthew Redhead.

The potential role that new technologies – from financial technology to social media – can play in terrorist financing (TF) has been a growing subject of anxiety in European policymaking circles. With their focus on speed, efficiency and a positive user experience, new technologies not only have the potential to make life easier for ordinary consumers, but also to reduce the frictions terrorist financiers face when funding attacks and organisational activities. Virtual assets (VAs) – especially cryptocurrencies – have been a major area of concern as a new frontier of TF risks. However, the recent focus on new technologies as an avenue for TF has not led to a consensus about how great the risks are. The debate around the issue has polarised into two broad positions – one which fears the worst, suspecting that innovation will make life easier for terrorist financiers, and another, which sees new technologies as no more or less risky than pre-existing technologies or conventional financial activities. The differences of opinion are deep, and the dialogue between the two positions difficult to resolve, because of the assumptions on which they are based. In the first case, policymakers and the traditional financial services sector tend to see novelty and uncertainty, and assess that the safest approach is to assume theoretical vulnerabilities and inherent risks are real until otherwise proved. In the second, those involved in creating and deploying new technology tend to believe that the risks should not be assumed, and need to be demonstrated. For both sides, understanding the nature and quality of evidence is essential. Amid this debate, this paper investigates whether new technologies pose new, or exacerbate existing, TF risks in Europe. Although there were difficulties in collecting data on sensitive terrorist cases, a clearer picture still emerged: new financial technologies have indeed been used in the procurement and financing of attacks, but only with certainty in a small proportion of cases. Likewise, payment platforms, social media crowdfunding and VAs have become tools for wider organisational financing, but they have been added to, rather than replaced, well-worn and conventional methods such as cash, the use of intermediaries, or money service businesse

Brussels; London: Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 2022. 52p.

By Federal Criminal Police Office, Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, and Hesse Information and Competence Against Extremism.

The present document is the second update of the analysis of the background and process of radicalization among persons who left Germany to travel to Syria or Iraq based on Islamist motivations. Since the first report in 2014, highly dynamic, geopolitical developments have occurred, leading to major changes in travel movements to the conflict region in Syria and Iraq during the four and a half years under observation (January 2012 to June 2016). A high-water mark in 2014 around the time the “caliphate” was declared in Syria/Iraq was immediately followed by a significant decline in the number of departures; this decline was likely related to the increasing military pressure on the so-called Islamic State (IS). As a result, the conflicts in and around Syria, the founding and attempted expansion of the IS and the fight against this terrorist organization are issues which continue to dominate international and national policy. While the U.S.-led alliance, including Turkey, is focused above all on fighting the IS, the forces of the Syrian regime, with massive support from Russia and Iran, are fighting all actual or alleged Islamist opponents of the regime: both “moderate” Islamists such as the Free Syrian Army and clearly jihadist groupings such as the IS and the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (“Front for the Conquest of the Levant”), formerly known as Jabhat al Nusra, or the al-Nusra Front. These efforts have increased in terms of quantity and quality since autumn 2015, with two immediate effects: First, they succeeded in pushing back the IS – the most obviously jihadist opponent of the Assad regime, also perceived internationally as the greatest threat – in both Syria and Iraq, which strengthened the Syrian government. Second, they set off an unprecedented wave of refugees fleeing the conflict region for Europe.

Wiesbaden: Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), 2016. 56p.

By Modupe I Akinleye.

The issue of terrorism has become one of the topmost concerns of US-Nigerian Foreign policy in connection with the GWOT. As a result of the ‘shift’ of the GWOT into Nigeria, Boko Haram was proscribed as a terrorist organisation in 2013. Extant research on Boko Haram’s terrorism in Nigeria and other parts of Africa is however premised on/driven by some essentialist thoughts and thus remains normative. Yet the proscription of Boko Haram reveals both continuities and change in relation to earlier constructs of the Nigerian state and non-state actors since the Cold War. These continuities in identity constructs therefore highlight the need for a post structural thought in understanding terrorism in Nigeria particularly and Africa generally. In particular, this thesis suggests that the labelling of Boko Haram as a terrorist organisation in Nigeria reveals the continuities of Othering of actors through the signification of ‘crises’ in policy discourse. The thesis uses Bhabha’s concept of Otherness as well as Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory to understand the construction of the ‘terrorist threat’, and the ‘United States Self’, ‘the counter terrorist state’, and the ‘terrorist other’. As no known study has undertaken to show how the labelling of Boko Haram works through discursive power and politics as well as the function of silence in meta-narratives, this research is therefore significant as the focus on policy and its implementers in Nigeria helps to unveil the silence in the discursive construction of the ‘strong’ state as the state which counters ‘evil’ terrorists. However, unlike TTS which highlights the state as a possible user of terrorism, the thesis adds to the CTS by examining how the production of the discourses within which the labelling of acts and actors of ‘terrorism’ have evolved and how practices like counter-terrorism enabled by these discourses become justified and normalized.

Bristol, UK: University of Bristol, 2019. 364p.

By Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou.

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria has been the subject of intense scrutiny in the West. Considered by many to be the most dangerous terrorist organisation in the world, it has become shrouded in numerous myths and narratives, many emanating from the US, which often fail to grasp its true nature. Against these narratives, Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou presents a bold new theory of ISIS. By tracing its genealogy and documenting its evolution in Iraq and Syria, he argues that ISIS has transcended Osama Bin Laden’s original project of Al Qaeda, mutating into an unprecedented hybrid form that distils postcolonial violence, postmodernity and the emerging post-globalisation international order. This book analyses ISIS from a social sciences perspective and unpacks its dynamics by looking beyond superficial questions such as its terrorist nature and religious rhetoric. It transforms our understanding of ISIS and its profound impact on the very nature of contemporary political violence.

London: Pluto Press, 2017. 279p.

By Ammar Shamaileh.

Why do some individuals choose to protest political grievances via nonviolent means, while others take up arms? What role does whom we trust play in how we collectively act? This book explores these questions by delving into the relationship between interpersonal trust and the nature of the political movements that individuals choose to join. Utilizing the examples of the Arab Spring uprisings in Egypt, Libya, and Syria, a novel theoretical model that links the literature on social capital and interpersonal trust to violent collective action is developed and extended. Beyond simply bringing together two lines of literature, this theoretical model can serve as a prism through which the decision to join terrorist organizations or violent movements may be analyzed. The implications of the theory are then examined more closely through an in-depth look at the behavior of members of political movements at the outset of the Arab Spring, as well as statistical tests of the relationship between interpersonal trust and terrorism in the Middle East and globally.

London; New York: Routledge, 2017. 160p.

By F.P.S.M Ragazzi, F. Davidshofer, S. Perret, and A. Tawfik.

What effect do counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation policies have on Muslim populations in France? Do French Muslims perceive these policies as discriminatory? Although a number of qualitative studies, civil society organisations, and political groups have raised these questions before, there are currently no figures available to serve as a basis for a real debate on this issue in France. This study aims to fill that gap.

Paris: Centre d'Etude Sur les Conflits, Liberté, Sécurité (CCLS) 2018. 107p.

By Pérouse de Montclos.

This book is the first attempt to understand Boko Haram in a comprehensive and consistent way. It examines the early history of the sect and its transformation into a radical armed group. It analyses the causes of the uprising against the Nigerian state and evaluates the consequences of the on-going conflict from a religious, social and political point of view. The book gives priority to authors conducting fieldwork in Nigeria and tackles the following issues: the extent to which Boko Haram can be considered the product of deprivation and marginalisation; the relationship of the sect with almajirai, Islamic schools, Sufi brotherhoods, Izala, and Christian churches; the role of security forces and political parties in the radicalisation of the sect; the competing discourses in international and domestic media coverage of the crisis; and the consequences of the militarisation of the conflict for the Nigerian government and the civilian population, Christian and Muslim.

Leiden: Leiden University, 2014. 285p.

By Bart Schuurman.

A Multilevel Analysis of Involvement in the Dutch Hofstad group, 2002-2005. How and why do people become involved in European homegrown jihadism? This book addresses this question through an in-depth study of the Dutch Hofstadgroup, infamous for containing the murderer of filmmaker Theo van Gogh, who was killed in November 2004 in Amsterdam, and for plotting numerous other terrorist attacks. The Hofstadgroup offers a window into the broader phenomenon of homegrown jihadism that arose in Europe in 2004 and is still with us today. Utilizing interviews with former Hofstadgroup participants and the extensive police files on the group, Becoming a European Homegrown Jihadist overcomes the scarcity of high-quality data that has hampered the study of terrorism for decades. The book advances a multicausal and multilevel understanding of involvement in European homegrown jihadism that is critical of the currently prevalent 'radicalization'-based explanatory frameworks. It stresses that the factors that initiate involvement are separate from those that sustain it, which in turn are again likely to differ from those that bring some individuals to actual acts of terrorism. This is a key resource for scholars of terrorism and all those interested in understanding the pathways that can lead to involvement in European homegrown jihadism.

Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2-18. 267p.

By Anna Sroka, Fanny Castro-Rial Garrone, Kumbrián Torres , and Darío Rubén.

This book addresses the issues of radicalism and terrorism, which are of exceptional importance and relevance in contemporary society. Each of the two phenomena are analyzed from a multidisciplinary perspective. The book contains articles which explore legal, political, psychological, economic and social aspects of radicalism and terrorism. A portion of the contributions are of a theoretical nature, they constitute an attempt at constructing analytical frameworks for studies on the two phenomena. There are also studies of particular cases, such as radicalism in Poland and in Spain, as well as within the European Union as a whole. This collective work is a response to the need for analyses of two issues which are increasingly responsible for determining the level of security which characterizes the contemporary world.

Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Edition, 2016. 324p.

Edited by: Georg Meggle, Andreas Kemmerling and Mark Textor.

We are supposed to wage war against Terrorism - but exactly what we are fighting against in this war, there is nearly no consensus about. And, much worse, nearly nobody cares about this conceptual disaster - the main thing being, whether or not you are taking sides with the good guys. This volume is an analytical attempt to end this disaster. What is Terrorism? Are terrorist acts to be defined exclusively on the basis of the characteristics of the respective actions? Or should we restrict such actions to acts performed by non-state organisations? And, most important, is terrorism already by its very nature to be morally condemned?  But, having a clear idea of what Terrorism is, would be only the beginning. Rational moral assessment still needs two further components: The relevant facts; and the relevant values and norms. Now, in a field where systematic disinformation has been even proclaimed to be the official policy, facts are obviously very hard to get at. This volume is mainly interested in Ethics: What's wrong with Terrorism? And what is morally right or morally wrong, respectively, with all the different means of Counter-Terrorism? What are the moral boundaries for waging war agains terrorism? What are the right ways of dealing with terrorists? And what about the alleged anti-terrorism wars on Afghanistan and Iraq?

Berlin: De Gruyter, 2004. 345p.

By Peter Neumann.

There is practically no country in the OSCE that has not been affected by violent extremism. In 2016, terrorist attacks in OSCE participating States caused more than one thousand deaths. They destroyed billions of Euros worth of property and infrastructure, undermined people’s confidence in government and institutions, and created fear and suspicion between members of different ethnic and religious communities. Violent extremists not only cause death and destruction, they poison societies with hateful ideologies, and hinder peaceful development, dialogue, and cooperation. OSCE participating States have long recognised this challenge. • It was in this context that the Austrian Chairmanship asked me to serve as Special Representative on Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalisation. My task was to sharpen the organisation’s focus, highlight existing activities, and offer practical suggestions for enhanced collaboration. The aim was to enable the OSCE to make the strongest possible contribution to what it calls Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalisation that Lead to Terrorism (VERLT), and fulfil the mandate it was given in the 2012 Consolidated Framework as well as Ministerial Declarations from 2015 and 2016. • This report provides a summary of my findings. It seeks to (1) define key concepts and major dynamics; (2) evaluate the OSCE’s current and future role; and (3) identify areas of good practice, with particular emphasis on preventing and countering processes of violent radicalisation.

London: ICSR, King's College London, 2017. 68p.

By Inge Versteegt Vanja Ljujic, Fatima El Bouk, Frank Weerman and Floor van Maaren

In the last two decades, interest in terrorism and extremism has increased tremendously, in particular after the events of 9/11, the rise of Al Qaeda and I.S. Several countries in Europe were recently confronted with large scale attacks. This is only part of a worldwide variety in attacks from different backgrounds and conflicts. Jihadist extremism and terrorism is at the fore of the public debate and attention, but there have also been many attacks from other religious and political backgrounds, for example right-wing extremist attacks on mosques, synagogues and migrants. Due to the increased public and political concern for terrorism since the beginning of the 21st century, there has been a growing research interest into this theme (e.g., De Graaf, 2017, Sageman 2008; Horgan, 2012). This has improved our knowledge and insights on the subject. However, many studies on terrorism are based on similar, limited sources that are often reused. As a result the theoretical debate on terrorism is not always at par with the availability of reliable empirical research material (Borum, 2011). Although various insights about the underlying mechanisms of needs and motivations for involvement in terrorism have been discovered (Horgan, 2012), much is still unclear. What we lack in particular is an understanding of the factors that increase the likelihood of resorting to violent extremism in people who have the same backgrounds and encounter similar experiences as people who do not become involved in terrorism.

Amsterdam: Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime and Law Enforcement, 2018. 155p.

Edited by Adam Henschke, Alastair Reed, Scott Robbins, Seumas Miller. This open access book brings together a range of contributions that seek to explore the ethical issues arising from the overlap between counter-terrorism, ethics, and technologies. Terrorism and our responses pose some of the most significant ethical challenges to states and people. At the same time, we are becoming increasingly aware of the ethical implications of new and emerging technologies. Whether it is the use of remote weapons like drones as part of counter-terrorism strategies, the application of surveillance technologies to monitor and respond to terrorist activities, or counterintelligence agencies use of machine learning to detect suspicious behavior and hacking computers to gain access to encrypted data, technologies play a significant role in modern counter-terrorism. However, each of these technologies carries with them a range of ethical issues and challenges. How we use these technologies and the policies that govern them have broader impact beyond just the identification and response to terrorist activities. As we are seeing with China, the need to respond to domestic terrorism is one of the justifications for their rollout of the “social credit system.” Counter-terrorism technologies can easily succumb to mission creep, where a technology’s exceptional application becomes normalized and rolled out to society more generally. This collection is not just timely but an important contribution to understand the ethics of counter-terrorism and technology and has far wider implications for societies and nations around the world. Cham: Springer, 2021. 231p.

“Americans hold a wide array of beliefs” Joseph R. Biden Jr. Executive office of the President (ca. 2021) 32 pages.

By Graeme R. Newman and Ronald V. Clarke. This manual is intended to help police executives and other senior executives meet the new challenges involved in countering the threat of terrorism by summarizing writings on the essential components of a counterterrorism plan. It does not deal with the specifics of such matters as (1) conducting surveillance of suspected terrorists; (2) protecting different types of vulnerable targets, such as ports and chemical plants; or (3) achieving interoperability in wireless communications among different disaster-response agencies, such as fire, police, and emergency medical personnel. Although junior officers need this type of detail, chiefs require more general information about a broad range of issues that can help them develop plans and policies to counter the terrorist threat. This manual seeks to meet the needs of chiefs and other senior personnel by summarizing information about 50 key topics in the form of advice to the chief.

Read more at the Center for Problem Oriented Policing