By Philip J. Cook and Jens Ludwig

The National Survey of Private Ownership of Firearms took place during November and December 1994 to gather information on the size, composition, and ownership of the gun stock in the United States; how and why guns are acquired; gun storage and carrying; and the defensive use of firearms against criminal attackers.

This national telephone survey used a list-assisted random-digit-dialing sampling method and produced a response rate of 44 percent or 59 percent, depending on the definition used. Results revealed that an estimated 192 working firearms are in private possession; about one-third of these are handguns. At least 40 percent of all handguns are semi-automatics. Only about 1 in 6 handguns have barrel lengths shorter than 3 inches. About one-fourth of adults personally own a firearm; this finding includes 42 percent of men and 9 percent of women. Gun ownership may be less popular among younger adults than among those ages 51 or older. Gun ownership is also most prevalent among middle-aged, middle-class white people from rural areas. Adults who have been arrested for a non-traffic offense are more likely to own a firearm than are other adults. In addition, about 10 percent of the adults own about 77 percent of the total stock of firearms. Overall, 46 percent of gun owners own some kind of gun primarily for protection against crime. Almost all owners report receiving some kind of instruction in the use of their firearms. About one in five of all gun-owning households keep a loaded and unlocked gun in the home. About one in six handguns are kept on the owner's person or in a motor vehicle. Estimates of defensive use of guns are similar to those of Kleck and Gertz, but survey-based estimates appear to be grossly in error for several reasons.

Washington, DC: Police Foundation, 1996. 112p.

By Abhay Aneja, John J. Donohue III and Alexandria Zhang

For over a decade, there has been a spirited academic debate over the impact on crime of laws that grant citizens the presumptive right to carry concealed handguns in public – so-called right-to-carry (RTC) laws. In 2004, the National Research Council (NRC) offered a critical evaluation of the “More Guns, Less Crime” hypothesis using county-level crime data for the period 1977-2000. 15 of the 16 academic members of the NRC panel essentially concluded that the existing research was inadequate to conclude that RTC laws increased or decreased crime. One member of the panel thought the NRC's panel data regressions showed that RTC laws decreased murder, but the other 15 responded by saying that “the scientific evidence does not support” that position.

We evaluate the NRC evidence, and improve and expand on the report’s county data analysis by analyzing an additional six years of county data as well as state panel data for the period 1979-2010. We also present evidence using both a more plausible version of the Lott and Mustard specification, as well as our own preferred specification (which, unlike the Lott and Mustard model presented in the NRC report, does control for rates of incarceration and police).

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  While we have considerable sympathy with the NRC’s majority view about the difficulty of drawing conclusions from simple panel data models and re-affirm its finding that the conclusion of the dissenting panel member that RTC laws reduce murder has no statistical support, we disagree with the NRC report’s judgment on one methodological point: the NRC report states that cluster adjustments to correct for serial correlation are not needed in these panel data regressions, but our randomization tests show that without such adjustments the Type 1 error soars to 22 - 73 percent.

  Our paper highlights some important questions to consider when using panel data methods to resolve questions of law and policy effectiveness. We buttress the NRC’s cautious conclusion regarding the effects of RTC laws by showing how sensitive the estimated impact of RTC laws is to different data periods, the use of state versus county data, particular specifications (especially the Lott-Mustard inclusion of 36 highly collinear demographic variables), and the decision to control for state trends.

Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2012. 109p.

By Rosanna Smart, Terry L. Schell

There is no standard definition of what constitutes a mass shooting, and different data sources—such as media outlets, academic researchers, and law enforcement agencies—frequently use different definitions when discussing and analyzing mass shootings. For instance, when various organizations measure and report on mass shootings, the criteria they use in counting such events might differ by the minimum threshold for the number of victims, whether the victim count includes those who were not fatally injured, where the shooting occurred, whether the shooting occurred in connection to another crime, and the relationship between the shooter and the victims. These inconsistencies lead to different assessments of how frequently mass shootings occur and whether they are more common now than they were a decade or two ago. Data show that, regardless of how one defines mass shootings, perpetrators are likely to be men. But several other characteristics that are statistically predictive of perpetration are still uncommon among offenders on an absolute level. The rare nature of mass shootings creates challenges for accurately identifying salient predictors of risk and limits statistical power for detecting which policies may be effective in reducing mass shooting incidence or lethality. Implementing broader violence prevention strategies rather than focusing specifically on the most-extreme forms of such violence may be effective at reducing the occurrence and lethality of mass shootings.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021. 32p.

by Mary Allen, Canadian Centre for Justice and Community Safety Statistics

In 2020, consistent with historical trends, violent Criminal Code offences accounted for about one in every five crimes that came to the attention of police. Firearm-related violent crime typically represents less than 3% of police-reported violent crime in Canada; nevertheless, it has a significant emotional and physical impact on victims, families and communities. Additionally, rates of firearm-related violence have seen a general increase over the past several years.

Concern about gun crime is long standing and a variety of approaches have been used to address it, including changes in legislation (see Text box 1). In April 2020, 22 people were killed in a mass shooting in Nova Scotia, the deadliest mass shooting in Canada in recent years. In particular, the Nova Scotia shooting led to a ban on assault-style firearms and renewed discussions around gun control and access to illegal weapons.

Mayors Against Illegal Guns

This report provides a comprehensive review of Stand Your Ground laws and how they have affected public safety and the criminal justice system. It explains how Stand Your Ground statutes have dramatically expanded the circumstances under which people are permitted to use deadly force and have created legal hurdles that make it more difficult for law enforcement to hold shooters accountable. The report also shows that Stand Your Ground states have on average experienced a 53% increase in homicides deemed justifiable in the years following passage of the law, compared with a 5% decrease in states without Stand Your Ground statutes during the same period — an increase disproportionately borne by the black community. Finally, the report provides a state-by-state analysis of each of the 22 state Stand Your Ground laws.

New York: National Urban League, 2013. 28p.

By Scott R. Kegler; Deborah M. Stone; James A. Mercy and Linda L. Dahlberg

Firearm homicides and suicides represent an ongoing public health concern in the United States. During 2018–2019, a total of 28,372 firearm homicides (including 3,612 [13%] among youths and young adults aged 10–19 years [youths]) and 48,372 firearm suicides (including 2,463 [5%] among youths) occurred among U.S. residents (1). This report is the fourth in a series* that provides statistics on firearm homicides and suicides in major metropolitan areas. As with earlier reports, this report provides a special focus on youth violence, including suicide, recognizing the magnitude of the problem and the importance of early prevention efforts. Firearm homicide and suicide rates were calculated for the 50 most populous U.S. metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs)† for the periods 2015–2016 and 2018–2019, separated by a transition year (2017), using mortality data from the National Vital Statistics System (NVSS) and population data from the U.S. Census Bureau. Following a period of decreased firearm homicide rates among persons of all ages after 2006–2007 in large metropolitan areas collectively and nationally, by 2015–2016 rates had returned to levels comparable to those observed a decade earlier and remained nearly unchanged as of 2018–2019. Firearm suicide rates among persons aged ≥10 years have continued to increase in large MSAs collectively as well as nationally. Although the youth firearm suicide rate remained much lower than the overall rate, the youth rate nationally also continued to increase, most notably outside of large MSAs. The findings in this report underscore a continued and urgent need for a comprehensive approach to prevention. This includes efforts to prevent firearm homicide and suicide in the first place and support individual persons and communities at increased risk, as well as lessening harms after firearm homicide and suicide have occurred.

Atlanta, GA: Centers for Disease Control, 2022. 7p.

By Everytown for Gun Safety

Analysis from 750 cities of data available for the first times reveals that:

The rate of people who died by gun suicide in cities increased 11 percent over the past decade, and now make up an average of over four in 10 city gun deaths.

Cities in states with the strongest gun violence prevention laws have about half the rate of people who die by gun suicide as those in states with the weakest laws, demonstrating the importance of legislative action in preventing gun violence in cities.

Cities with the most gun shops experience nearly four times higher rates of people who die by gun suicide than those with the fewest gun shops, signaling the importance of expanding cities’ focus beyond illegal guns.

Smaller cities and those with fewer walkable neighborhoods (i.e., distance to local resources) experience higher rates of people who die by gun suicide, underscoring the importance of adequate access to resources and networks of social support that reduce risk factors like social isolation.

Cities with the most parks have about half the rate of people who die by gun suicide as those with the least, suggesting that cleaning and greening efforts may offer benefits in reducing both gun homicides and suicides.

New York: Everytown for Gun Safety, 2022. 25p.

By The Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Violence Solutions; Art Davies, et al.

Two leading organizations dedicated to gun violence prevention—the Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Violence Prevention and Policy and the Educational Fund to Stop Gun Violence—have merged to form a new center at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, the Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Violence Solutions. The Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Violence Solutions combines the expertise of highly respected gun violence researchers with the skills of deeply experienced gun violence prevention advocates. We use a public health approach to conduct rigorous scientific research to identify a range of innovative solutions to gun violence. Because gun violence disproportionately impacts communities of color, we ground our work in equity and seek insights from those most impacted on appropriate solutions. Using the best available science, our Center works toward expanding evidence-based advocacy and policy-making efforts. This combination of expertise creates a unique opportunity to turn public health research into action that reduces deaths and injuries from gun violence.

Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins Center for Gun Violence Solutions. 2022. 40p.

By Everytown for Gun Safety

In California, a 16-year-old boy shot and killed two of his classmates and shot and wounded three others with a handgun. In Washington D.C., ghost guns were used in four recent fatal shootings. In Arizona, a neo-Nazi sex offender bragged on Facebook about his arsenal of firearms and homemade assault-style rifles. All of these people were legally prohibited from buying guns. But due to a dangerous wrong turn by ATF these individuals were able to access a haunting new source of firepower: ghost guns. Ghost guns are the thread connecting a horrific series of recent shootings. These do-it-yourself (DIY) firearms are made from parts available without a background check and are predictably emerging as a weapon of choice for violent criminals, gun traffickers, dangerous extremists, and, generally, people legally prohibited from buying firearms. Because it has no serial number, a ghost gun cannot be traced back to where it came from, which frustrates police investigations and robs victims and survivors of justice. The rise of ghost guns is the fastest-growing gun safety problem facing our country. But disturbingly little is known about who sells ghost guns, who buys them, and how much they are used in crime. The scant data available is disjointed and barely scratches the surface of the issue. To remedy this problem, Everytown for Gun Safety examined available data, including a sample of 80 online ghost gun part sellers and more than 100 federal prosecutions involving ghost guns, to find out who is selling and using these deadly weapons and what can be done about it.

New York: Everytown for Gun Safety, 2020. 28p.

By Nicholas Simons, Jaclyn Schildkraut and Julianna Caruso. Regional Gun Violence Research Consortium

On April 11, 2022, the Biden administration announced the submission of new rules issued by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), more specifically the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), addressing the proliferation of ghost guns across the nation….

What exactly are ghost guns, and what challenges do they pose? Moreover, what do these new rules do to contribute to a solution to such challenges? Privately made firearms (PMFs), which have become informally known as “ghost guns” due to their virtually untraceable nature, function similar to firearms wholly constructed by licensed firearm manufacturers but have a fraction of the regulations. In 2021, law enforcement in New York State recovered 637 PMFs (135 percent more than the year prior), reflecting continued annual increases from 44 in 2018 (the first year of reporting), 100 in 2019 (up 117 percent over the year prior), and 2020 (an increase of 171 percent). Other law enforcement agencies across the country, particularly those located in larger cities, have reported similar jumps in recoveries: Law enforcement in Boston has seen a nearly three-fold increase in the city since 2019; Philadelphia reported a five-fold increase since that year. Data from the ATF mirrors these trends: the recorded number of suspected PMF recoveries nationally increased more than 90 percent between 2020 and 2021 and more than ten-fold between 2016 and 2021. Such increases, however, must be interpreted with caution as they may be an artifact of increased reporting by jurisdictions.

While these increases represent a relatively low percentage of total gun recoveries, they illustrate that ghost guns pose a unique and rapidly growing challenge. Law enforcement agencies are unable to trace the origins of ghost guns used in crime and ultimately curb their flow at the source. While the federal government has taken first steps to regulate these weapons, state and local lawmakers have for several years been exploring and enacting policies designed to monitor and prevent ghost guns from falling into the hands of individuals who are prohibited from purchasing or possessing firearms.

Albany, NY: Rockefeller Institute of Government, 2022. 20p.

By Carlos Solar

While the effects of militarism and militarization toward security are evident in the Americas, most notably transmitted via images of soldiers complementing and replacing law enforcement agencies at times of social crisis, this report seeks potential answers to what this means in theory and practice. The author does this in two ways. First, it unpacks an up-to-date understanding of militarism and militarization aiming to feed academic and policy debates with a perspective on what citizens in Latin America and the Caribbean think. Second, it expands knowledge of militarism and militarization informing security and defense planners, specifically those preparing tailored policies toward conflict and peace in the region.

Miami: Florida International University, 2021. 27p.

By Unidad de investigación de Venezuela

For twenty years, Venezuela was a refuge for Colombia’s Marxist guerrillas, a place where they could hide out from the military, run criminal economies, and carry out political work with impunity thanks to their friendly relationship with the government of President Hugo Chávez. But today, it is so much more. Guerrillas such as the ELN have spread deep into Venezuelan territory, they are filling their ranks with recruits, taking control of communities, and interfering in politics. Today, they are binational guerrilla groups. The product of five years of fieldwork along the Colombia-Venezuela border and beyond, this investigation reveals the Venezuelan operations of Colombia’s guerrillas and explores the far-reaching implications for both countries of their evolution into Colombo-Venezuelan groups.

Washington, DC: InsightCrime, 2022. 53p.

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By Canada. House of Commons. Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security

Ideologically motivated violent extremism (IMVE) is on the rise in Canada and its affects are being experienced throughout Canadian society, including by elected officials…. A number of Canadian influencers and proselytizers have emerged within IMVE movements. These IMVE influencers promote misinformation and action, including violence. It is against this background that, on 10 February 2022, the committee adopted the following motion: That pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), the committee undertake a study of the rise of Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism (IMVE) in Canada; … Drawing on evidence heard by the committee, this report describes what is meant by IMVE, examines the targets of IMVE attacks, recent IMVE trends, Canada’s current response to IMVE threats, and presents the committee’s findings and recommendations to tackle this important issue. The committee recognizes that several areas aimed at combatting IMVE are matters of shared jurisdiction and that collaboration between all levels of government and civil society is required to address this issue.

Ottawa: House of Commons, 2022. 54p.

By Public Safety Canada

Canada faces the threat of violence by a small number of individuals who have become radicalized for political, religious or other ideological reasons. The Government of Canada is concerned with all forms of violent extremism, not associating this phenomenon with any particular religious, political, national, ethnic, or cultural group. While Canada has faced a variety of threats stemming from violent extremism in recent decades, the main terrorist threat to Canada continues to be violent extremists inspired by terrorist groups such as Daesh and al-Qaeda. However, individuals espousing and engaging in violence can be inspired by any extremist group promoting such behaviour. For example, some individuals within the far-right movement have espoused, glorified, promoted, and even engaged in violence. As well, historically, some far-left extremists have taken part in violent acts such as pipeline bombings. The Government of Canada is also alerted to the dangers of lesser-known forms of violent extremism. In its ongoing efforts to keep Canadians safe, the Government of Canada is expanding how it responds to violent extremism. Specifically, the federal government is investing in the prevention of radicalization to violence as articulated through the National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence. Prevention aims to thwart violent radicalization from happening in the first place and to intervene as early as possible when it is occurring. Preventing and countering violent extremism is an effective complement to security agencies’ traditional methods of safeguarding national security.

Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2018. 46p.

By Michele St-Amant, David Jones, Michael King, and John McCoy

There have been significant changes in the three years since the Organization for the Prevention of Violence (OPV) published its first report about hatemotivated violence, extremism and terrorism in Alberta, Building Awareness, Seeking Solutions. The Covid-19 pandemic, protests against public health measures, tense elections in the United States, and the backlash to racial justice movements, among other events, have had broad social repercussions. Some of which have changed the composition and scale of the threat of extremism and terrorism – which has become more diffuse and comprised of a broader set of grievances and ideologies. This report is organized using the nomenclature developed by the Government of Canada to categorize different forms of extremist ideologies. As such, the findings related to ideologically motivated violent extremism and religiously motivated violent extremism are summarized first.i Next, we summarize our findings about conspiracy theories and hate incidents, including crimes, within Alberta and across Canada.

Edmonton, Alberta: Organization for the Prevention of Violence, 2022. 115p.

By Daniel Koehler

This book is the first comprehensive academic study of German right-wing terrorism since the early 1960s available in the English language. It offers a unique in-depth analysis of German violent, extremist right-wing movements, terrorist events, groups, networks and individuals. In addition, the book discusses the so-called ‘National Socialist Underground’ (NSU) terror cell, which was uncovered in late 2011 by the authorities. The NSU had been active for over a decade and had killed at least ten people, as well as executing numerous bombings and bank robberies. With an examination of the group’s support network and the reasons behind the failure of the German authorities, this book sheds light on right-wing terrorist group structures, tactics and target groups in Germany. The book also contains a complete list of all the German right-wing terrorist groups and incidents since the Second World War. Based on the most detailed dataset of right-wing terrorism in Germany, this book offers highly valuable insights into this specific form of political violence and terrorism, which has been widely neglected in international terrorism research.

London: Routledge, 2017. 288p.

By Noam Chomsky

Preface to the 2015 Edition As noted in the original preface, this book was originally intended as a postscript to my book Turning the Tide, but it took on a life of its own. Rereading this book is not easy. I like to think that I’ve been able to live without too many illusions about the nature of policy and the ways the intellectual classes conform to state doctrine, no matter how ludicrous it is. But it is a constant shock to be reminded of the record. The basic facts were very clear at the time of writing, and by now have been verified beyond serious dispute. In brief, the Reagan administration came into office declaring that a primary focus of policy would be state-directed international terrorism, “the plague of the modern age,” “a return to barbarism in our time,” in the fevered rhetoric of Shultz, Reagan, and the rest. They proceeded at once to launch murderous terrorist wars in Central America, while supporting terrorism throughout much of the world. Perhaps the most notorious case is Southern Africa, where Reagan was the last significant political figure to support the Apartheid regime and to deny its atrocious crimes, and continued to support the brutal terrorist forces in Angola even after their South African backers had withdrawn their support. The same was true in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, but nothing compared with their vicious atrocities in Central America, the primary focus of this book.

London: Pluto Press, 2015. 304p.

By M.R. Haberfeld, Joseph F. King and Charles A. Lieberman

The introductory chapter of this book presents the concepts of the benefits inherent in the study of comparative approach for an effective counterterrorism response on the local law enforcement level and overviews the inception of the project. Throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century, especially after the events of September 11, 2001, the legitimacy of law enforcement practices has been cited as a major concern for international criminal justice. As policing practitioners and scholars throughout the world shifted focus from a traditional reactive, crime control stance to the need for accountability mechanisms to ensure the s- port of citizenry in combating crime and terrorism, the democratization of policing was seen as the best mechanism for achieving long-term gains in public order at the same time as protecting human rights. While the need to maintain human rights remains an important issue, balancing these concerns with the important public safety interests of societies is paramount.

Cham: Springer, 2009. 190p.

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By Ramon Spaaij

What drives the lone wolf terrorist to commit mass violence? What are their ideologies and motivations? How do they plan and carry out their attacks, and who do they target? How can lone wolf terrorism be effectively countered? One of the first in-depth analyses of lone wolf terrorism, this publication sets out to answer these questions. Drawing on extensive international data and qualitative case studies, it examines the global patterns in and key features of lone wolf terrorism over the past four decades. This engaging text will be essential reading for students and researchers on terrorism and violent conflict and offers unique and invaluable insights to those working to prevent or minimize the effects of terrorism and political violence.

Cham: Springer, 2012. 124p.

By Phillip Jenkins

Images of Terror provides a critical consumer’s guide to the images of terrorism that we are offered daily in the mass media. All too often, scholars and journalists accept uncritically the interpretations of terrorism they receive from governments and official agencies. Our perceptions of terrorism are formed by the interaction of bureaucratic agencies, academics and private experts, and the mass media: The images and stereotypes that we are offered do not necessarily reflect objective reality. Jenkins, whose earlier books have dispelled prevailing myths about mass hysteria, serial murder, and priestly pederasty, here argues that terrorism, like any other problem, is socially constructed. He does not suggest that terrorism is not a real problem, an authentic menace, or that society should not respond promptly and effectively to terrorist threats. Rather than being something understood identically by people in different societies and different eras, the concept of terrorism is shaped by social and political processes, by bureaucratic needs and media structures. This process of construction applies both to the overall concept, and to specific movements, to groups and their actions. We must understand how we form our stereotypes of terrorism and how we come to see certain terrorists or militants as demon figures, while giving a virtual free pass to other groups or states that are just as dangerous. We must therefore also understand the rhetorical processes by which certain interest groups and bureaucratic agencies present their particular views of terrorism, and try to establish these as the ones that come to be accepted as obviously correct. For the foreseeable future, terrorism is likely to remain a dominant issue in the political life of the United States, and indeed of much of the world. Philip Jenkins’s new book raises important questions about how we form our notions of the enemy to be confronted, and how, when we make statements about terrorism, we know what we think we know.

New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 2003. 238p.