By Robin S. Engel, Nicholas Corsaro and Tamara D. Herold

One of the most frequently used communication mechanisms associated with focused deterrence strategies are offender notification meetings, also referred to as “call-in” sessions. Typically, these meetings are used to communicate directly to offenders that their future violent behaviors (and those of their affiliated groups/gangs) will be responded to in a swift and predictable manner through a coordinated law enforcement effort to prioritize group violence, share information, and develop comprehensive group-focused responses (Engel, Tillyer & Corsaro, 2013). The purpose of sharing this information is to gain compliance through group pressure (Kennedy, 1997). The group/gang structure is believed to serve both as a communication vehicle, and a potential source of control, as the threat of group-focused enforcement encourages groups to police themselves (Tillyer & Kennedy, 2008). Additional messages regarding the availability of assistance, social services, and job opportunities are often conveyed. Finally, most meetings include some form of community messaging that describes the harm inflicted by violence to individual victims and the larger community, along with a plea to change their behavior. This type of “community moral voice” is designed to send clear messages of non-violence, and rejecting norms that promote violence (Brunson, 2015). Offender notification sessions are designed to alert offenders and alter their decision-making by conveying possible sanctions while offering available services, contingent upon the path that the offender (typically on probation and/or parole) chooses, be it desistence or continued high-risk behavior. Initiatives built on call in sessions ultimately seek to change offender behavior by blending law enforcement, community mobilization, and social service provisions in a targeted and directed fashion. While initiatives such as focused deterrence strategies, which rely heavily on offender notification sessions, have often corresponded with reductions in citywide gun violence and gang homicides, the direct influence of call in sessions on individual-level behavior (for those called-in) is far less understood. The following study examines the impact of offender notification meetings – with messaging heavily focused on compassion, support, and the harm inflicted by violence – on the likelihood of offender recidivism in Las Vegas, Nevada. Officials from the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) and the Nevada Department of Public Safety, Division of Parole and Probation (NPP) worked collaboratively to conduct a series of offender notification meetings. Other components that typically accompany the implementation of focused deterrence strategies (e.g. targeted gang enforcement and social services provision) however, were not systematically implemented. Therefore, the following research represents a test solely of the impact of the offender notification meetings, answering the question of whether this form of communication with offenders has an impact on their individual likelihood of recidivism. In order to better understand the influence of call in sessions on offender recidivism patterns, officials from LVMPD partnered with researchers from the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) / University of Cincinnati (UC) Center for Police Research and Policy, along with academic partners from the University of Nevada Las Vegas (UNLV) to randomize and implement an experimental trial to assess the impact of call in sessions on probationers and parolees in Las Vegas in the Spring and Fall of 2018. Using a randomized controlled trial (RCT) research design, this study addresses the following specific research questions:

1) What impact does attendance of probationers/parolees at offender notification meetings have on individual likelihood of recidivism? 2) Can a simple risk classification be developed using offender criminal histories and associations with violent gangs to assess whether risk classification correlates with offender recidivism patterns? 3) Does the impact of offender notification meetings vary based on probationer/parolees’ risk classification? Within the randomization component, probationers/parolees were first stratified into one of four possible categories dependent upon their prior violent criminal histories and current affiliation with a violent criminal gang in Las Vegas: 1) Low-Risk (neither a violent criminal history nor affiliated with a violent gang), 2) Low/Moderate-Risk (no prior violent criminal history but affiliation with a violent gang), 3) Moderate-Risk (prior violent criminal history but no affiliation with a violent gang), and 4) High-Risk (both violent criminal history and affiliation with a violent gang). A random case-control selection occurred within each risk-level stratum, and various waves of probationers and parolees who were assigned to treatment were called-in to attend notification sessions in May 2018 and October 2018. In total, 216 probationer/parolees were randomly assigned to treatment, and 300 to control groups. Probationer/parolee recidivism is the primary outcome of interest, operationalized in two forms: 1) a re-arrest of any type, and 2) an administrative failure (revocation) of probation/parole supervised by NPP. If either event occurred in the follow-up period (i.e., 12 months for May sessions, 9 months for October sessions) – the probationer/parolee (in either treatment or control condition) is classified as having recidivated. Three analytic strategies are employed for the various strata (as well as overall treatment-tocontrol comparisons) and waves of probation/parolee participants. First, a set of bivariate chisquare analyses on recidivism patterns for each risk group to set the foundation regarding covariation in treatment assignment (and attendance) calibrated with recidivism across the risk groups and waves of participants during the study period. Second, a series of binary logistic regression models for our recidivism outcome (where yes = 1 or no = 0) for each risk group (including culling all strata into a single analysis) and each wave of probationers and parolees in the study are estimated (see Long, 1997). The use of the multivariate regression model on our dichotomous outcome of interest allows, where appropriate, to include control variables in the analyses. While the use of statistical controls in randomized controlled trials is subject to debate, where statistical controls are potentially necessary (e.g., unbalanced covariates of importance between treatment and control probationers/parolees within each strata), the multivariate regression framework (including the logistic regression model) allows for such controls to be included into a single regression estimation. Finally, a series of Cox proportional hazard models are estimated to assess the effect that randomized treatment had on individual recidivism (see Cox, 1972).

Alexandria, VA: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2020. 49p.

By Jian Wang

The thesis focuses on participants involved in the January 6 insurrection. The major aims of this thesis are to find out who stormed the Capitol on January 6, 2021, and to learn what major factors influenced them to engage in the insurrection that broke the tradition of peaceful transition of power for the first time since Lincoln’s Presidential election. It is also to study the current intertwined relationships between political elites, social media, technology, disinformation and mass audiences, and how they gathered together and organized the 'stop the steal' campaign, causing the violence on the Capitol on January 6, 2021. By studying this, we can learn how to prepare to face other looming and ongoing challenges that disinformation poses to democracy in the near future such as the mid-term election this November and the next Presidential Election in 2024, creating viable solutions. The thesis selected 124 subjects out of 691 on the Capitol Breach Cases' list across all regions of the U.S. It organized their data, including their names, and primary demographics such as gender, race, the geography of residence, and age, and reviewed and examined their attitudes towards the insurrection on January 6, 2021 in response to a belief that the 2020 election was fraudulent. The findings show that majority of participants are white male. 91.13% or 630 (0.9113 x 691 = 630) of whom are employed and 30% of or 207 (0.3 x 691) participants who are university or college educated. A number of defendants had associations with QAnon conspiracy theory and some known DVE (domestic violent extremist) groups such as Proud Boys, the Oath Keepers, and Three Percenters. The most striking finding is that veterans were highly over-represented in the mob (17% or 117), which exceeds the percentage of veterans in the U.S. population as a whole. The thesis suggests that four possible motivations for their participation: extremism in the military, nationalism and patriotism, a belief in Donald Trump's false claims, and social media. It also reveals that there is a strong positive connection between disinformation on social media and participants as they (96% of or 663 participants) were nearly all active on social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Parler and Instagram, sharing and receiving misinformation about the election. More specifically, social media platforms should bear responsibility because social media technology employs popularity-based algorithms that tailor content to maximize user engagement, increasing the level of polarization, partisan animosity and political sectarianism

Cambridge, MA: Master's thesis, Harvard University Division of Continuing Education., 2022. 131p.

By Eric B. Hodges

Ten percent of the Americans arrested for storming the US Capitol on January 6, 2021, are military veterans. These veterans have been charged with federal crimes ranging from Obstruction of an Official Proceeding to Assaulting Capitol Police Officers. This paper seeks to answer three questions related to those veterans’ participation in the Capitol Riots. Were their actions patriotic? What were their motivations? And was there anything about their military experience that made these veterans more likely to riot than non-veterans? A content analysis of 71 remarks made by 40 of the veterans arrested, both before and after the riots, was used to ascertain the motivations of those individuals. Analysis of the veterans’ comments revealed that they believed they were acting patriotically; however, closer examination shows that their motivations were more consistent with nationalism than patriotism. Additionally, the military training and combat exposure of the veterans, along with the “Stop the Steal” rhetoric, particularly comments made by former President Donald Trump, also played an integral role in influencing the veterans. The analysis also indicated that the Capitol Riots should be classified as a form of proto-sectarian violence and should serve as a cautionary tale against the growing divisiveness that sparked this incident.

Journal of Veteran Studies, 2021.

By Daniel Milton and Andrew Mines

The issue of extremism in the military community has posed challenges for a long time. From the role of combat veterans in driving the rise of the militia movement after Vietnam and beyond, the U.S. military has contended with all manner of extremist movements and ideologies. Historically, extremist activities manifested in a number of ways, including attacks andor hate crimes against fellow service members and civilians, theft of military equipment, security breaches, and broader harm to morale, unit cohesion, personnel retention, recruiting efforts, and mission success. Although the vast majority of U.S. Department of Defense DoD personnel 5and veterans uphold our nations highest values during and well after their service, the worlds largest employer has struggled at times to confront a problem that affects all corners of American society. In the past decade, various organizations have raised serious red flags to both the DoD and Congressional oversight bodies regarding this looming threat. More recent reporting has pointed to growing evidence of white supremacy and racist ideologies in the military these last few years. Additionally, the siege on the U.S. Capitol and the surrounding focus on the involvement of individuals with military experience has highlighted the pressing need to take meaningful steps to understand and confront the problem at hand. To be clear, the Capitol Hill siege does not provide an all-encompassing view of modern day extremism in the military. However, an examination of the individuals charged in connection with that event can offer some perspective as to the diversity and scale of the connection between extremism and those with military experience.

Washington DC: Program on Extremism, George Washington University, West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, New York: 2021. 44p.

By Piotr Bąkowski

n recent years, the United States (US) has witnessed a growing number of terrorist attacks by domestic violent extremists. Many incidents at large-scale demonstrations across the country have increased the visibility of the problem and provoked strong reactions among civilians, law enforcement and policy-makers alike. When on 6 January 2021 a crowd of supporters of the then US President, Donald Trump, broke into the US Capitol while Congress was certifying the results of the 2020 presidential election, the issue of domestic violent extremism was thrust beyond US borders and into the international spotlight. Various US government agencies have consistently assessed domestic violent extremism as a significant threat. Although for counter-terrorism purposes extremists fall under a number of categories of a general nature, the threat they pose has become more decentralised and diverse over time. That said, racially and ethnically motivated violent extremists have been responsible for the most lethal acts of violence. After 11 September 2001, the focus of US counter-terrorism efforts shifted to international from domestic terrorism. US law does define domestic terrorism but does not qualify it as a criminal offence entailing indictment. Domestic extremist groups cannot be designated as terrorist organisations, and getting clearance to conduct investigations against them is more complicated than for their foreign counterparts. The assault on the Capitol led to a significant shift in counter-terrorism priorities, however, triggering the largest-scale investigation in US law enforcement history thus far, but also a comprehensive overhaul of government policies. Consequently, 2021 saw the adoption of the first national strategy specifically dedicated to domestic terrorism. The mutual commitment of the US and the European Union (EU) to combating violent extremism has resulted in fruitful exchanges among policy-makers, researchers and frontline practitioners. Nonetheless, efforts to establish a unified regulatory framework for addressing online extremist content have faced challenges due to differing perspectives on key issues such as the limits of free speech and government intervention.

Brussels, Belgium: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, 2023. 12p.

By Elizabeth Yates and Erin E. Wilson

This report examines how the QAnon movement exploits the U.S. military’s credibility in society to further its aim of undermining American democracy. It shows how 25 U.S. military veterans – all of whom have been engaged in the QAnon movement since the failed insurrection on January 6, 2021 – spread disinformation and build support for the movement. Analysis of their social media, along with a broader review of QAnon content, reveals how Q influencers portray the U.S. military as a heroic protagonist in their conspiratorial propaganda, and how they exploit military veterans to legitimate such claims and even recruit. It concludes with policy recommendations that focus on protecting members of the armed services, those who have served and their families, and communities the movement targets with its conspiracies

The mainstreaming of the QAnon extremist movement presents a growing threat to the American system of government. QAnon’s effort to create the perception that they are allied with the U.S. military has particularly alarming implications for our democracy:  It strengthens the QAnon movement by facilitating recruitment from both military and civilian communities and encourages active participation among adherents;  It lends legitimacy to discriminatory and anti-democratic conspiracies that are integrated into the Q movement, such as antisemitism and election denial;  It distorts the public’s understanding of the primary responsibilities of the military, and, importantly, the legal boundaries of domestic military intervention;  It undermines public faith in democratic institutions by regularly encouraging the acceptance of authoritarian actions; and  It threatens the communities the movement targets with its conspiracies and maligns the reputation of U.S. servicemembers, veterans, and their families.

New York: Human Rights First, 2022. 20p.

by Heather J. Williams, Luke J. Matthews, Pauline Moore, Matthew A. DeNardo, James V. Marrone, Brian A. Jackson, William Marcellino, Todd C. Helmus

Racially and Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism: The Basics

Racially and ethnically motivated violent extremism (REMVE) refers to a loosely organized movement of individuals and groups that espouse some combination of racist, anti-Semitic, xenophobic, Islamophobic, misogynistic, and homophobic ideology. REMVE actors see their race or ethnicity under threat and promote the use of or engage in violence against a given population group. The majority of REMVE actors are motivated by cultural nationalism or White supremacy—beliefs that Caucasian or "Aryan" peoples represent superior races, and that "White culture" is superior to other cultures. Many REMVE actors also are motivated by White nationalism, which overlaps with White supremacy: Adherents espouse the belief that the White race is superior to others, and White nationalism emphasizes defining a country or region by White racial identity and promoting the interests of White people exclusively and at the expense of non-White populations.

More-common terms related to REMVE include far-right extremism, right-wing terrorism, radical right, or extreme right, which are used more frequently in literature and by other countries. Although these terms are not synonymous, they are used somewhat interchangeably and often without precise definitions. These terms also can be applied to political parties and movements that participate in political systems and do not engage in violence directly, particularly in Europe, where many parliamentary systems have formal far-right parties that participate in elections.

The U.S. State Department commissioned the RAND Corporation to produce a comprehensive network analysis of the White Identity Terrorist Movement (WITM) and REMVE in response to a congressional requirement from the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act.[2] The analysis—which sought to identify key actors, organizations, and supporting infrastructure and the relationships and interactions between them—is intended to inform a U.S. government strategy to counter REMVE.

Rand. 2022. 8p.

by Heather J. Williams, Alexandra T. Evans, Jamie Ryan, Erik E. Mueller, Bryce Downing

n this Perspective, the authors introduce a framework for internet users to categorize the virtual platforms they use and to understand the likelihood that they may encounter extreme content online.

The authors first provide a landscape of the online extremist "ecosystem," describing how the proliferation of messaging forums, social media networks, and other virtual community platforms has coincided with an increase in extremist online activity. Next, they present a framework to describe and categorize the platforms that host varying amounts of extreme content as mainstream, fringe, or niche. Mainstream platforms are those for which only a small portion of the content would be considered inappropriate or extreme speech. Fringe platforms are those that host a mix of mainstream and extreme content—and where a user might readily come across extreme content that is coded or obscured to disguise its violent or racist underpinning. Niche platforms are those that openly and purposefully cater to an extreme audience.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021. 44p.

by Heather J. Williams, Luke J. Matthews, Pauline Moore, Matthew A. DeNardo, James V. Marrone, Brian A. Jackson, William Marcellino, Todd C. Helmus

Racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism (REMVE) and extremists (REMVEs) present some of the most pressing threats to the United States. REMVE also has been identified as the White identity terrorist movement (WITM). REMVEs are among the most lethal domestic violent extremists, and they are the most likely to commit mass-casualty attacks. These movements are characterized by a broad ideological orientation toward xenophobic, anti-Semitic, racist, and misogynistic sentiment.

For this report, the authors reviewed the relevant literature on REMVE networks and collected and analyzed social media data from six social networks (Twitter, Reddit, Gab, Ruqqus, Telegram, and Stormfront) to produce a global network map of the digital REMVE space. That network map evaluates each network's construction, connectivity, geographic location, references to prominent organizations, and proclivity to violence. The authors also reviewed ten countries' experiences with REMVE to sketch out an understanding of the REMVE space in these countries and how REMVEs in those countries relate to those in the United States.

Key Findings

The WITM/REMVE global network on social media is largely created and fueled by users in the United States

• WITM/REMVE is fueled by U.S. domestic drivers, and this movement is less of an issue in other countries.

• Programs to counter violent extremism are generally most productive when they are local.

• The primary need is for robust national strategies to counter WITM/REMVE, specifically in the United States.

An organization- or actor-focused counter-WITM/REMVE strategy likely will not work because of the diffuse nature of REMVE movements

• REMVE is a post-organizational movement; many REMVEs are radicalized outside an organized group and groups are loosely organized, meaning that U.S. strategy to counter REMVE should not be centered around key organizations and actors.

Intervention strategies should be multifaceted because of the complex nature of the problem and its intersections with protected civil rights

• The scale of REMVE and the depth of its ideological roots in the United States suggest that targeting and ostracizing sympathizers would not be a successful intervention strategy.

There are structural differences in how REMVE manifests and is countered in Europe versus in the United States

• The parliamentary system in many European countries gives those on the far right a presence in the political system, which provides a nonviolent outlet for fringe-movement adherents. Many European countries also have active intervention and counter-REMVE programs underway.

Racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism (REMVE) and extremists (REMVEs) present some of the most pressing threats to the United States. REMVE also has been identified as the White identity terrorist movement (WITM). REMVEs are among the most lethal domestic violent extremists, and they are the most likely to commit mass-casualty attacks. These movements are characterized by a broad ideological orientation toward xenophobic, anti-Semitic, racist, and misogynistic sentiment.

For this report, the authors reviewed the relevant literature on REMVE networks and collected and analyzed social media data from six social networks (Twitter, Reddit, Gab, Ruqqus, Telegram, and Stormfront) to produce a global network map of the digital REMVE space. That network map evaluates each network's construction, connectivity, geographic location, references to prominent organizations, and proclivity to violence. The authors also reviewed ten countries' experiences with REMVE to sketch out an understanding of the REMVE space in these countries and how REMVEs in those countries relate to those in the United States.

Key Findings

The WITM/REMVE global network on social media is largely created and fueled by users in the United States

• WITM/REMVE is fueled by U.S. domestic drivers, and this movement is less of an issue in other countries.

• Programs to counter violent extremism are generally most productive when they are local.

• The primary need is for robust national strategies to counter WITM/REMVE, specifically in the United States.

An organization- or actor-focused counter-WITM/REMVE strategy likely will not work because of the diffuse nature of REMVE movements

• REMVE is a post-organizational movement; many REMVEs are radicalized outside an organized group and groups are loosely organized, meaning that U.S. strategy to counter REMVE should not be centered around key organizations and actors.

Intervention strategies should be multifaceted because of the complex nature of the problem and its intersections with protected civil rights

• The scale of REMVE and the depth of its ideological roots in the United States suggest that targeting and ostracizing sympathizers would not be a successful intervention strategy.

There are structural differences in how REMVE manifests and is countered in Europe versus in the United States

• The parliamentary system in many European countries gives those on the far right a presence in the political system, which provides a nonviolent outlet for fringe-movement adherents. Many European countries also have active intervention and counter-REMVE programs underway.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2022. 184p.

By Sherry F. Colb

Most debates over gun rights are either interpretive, about the meaning of the Second Amendment, or empirical, about whether guns enhance or undermine safety. My goal in this essay is to introduce a third factor into the debate: the “imaginary narrative.” When I say “imaginary,” I mean to suggest a narrative that does not reflect typical or common experience. I use the context of guns and domestic violence to illustrate the phenomenon. The pro-gun imaginary narrative, when it comes to domestic violence, involves a victim confronting her abuser. Because she has a firearm, she is able to protect herself from him. But that fantasy does not comport with the reality of intimate partner abuse. I propose here that we acknowledge and interrogate imaginary narratives lest our laws and policies become disconnected from the true needs of our society.

New York: Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, 2021. 10p.

By Saul Cornell

A proper understanding of the founding era concept of police is essential to the future of Second Amendment jurisprudence. District of Columbia v. Heller never addresses the police power and its centrality to early American rights theory or antebellum jurisprudence. The omission is striking because Heller does devote considerable attention to antebellum southern cases addressing the issue of public carry, and this body of law was strongly influenced by police power jurisprudence. A genuinely historical treatment of founding era rights theory — including the right to keep and bear arms — provides scant support for Heller’s dismissal of the right of the people to regulate their internal police in the case of firearms. Nor does the antebellum southern case law that Heller highlights as the key to unlocking the meaning of the Second Amendment support such a claim. Reconstruction did not change these basic facts. If one applies Heller’s professed originalist methodology neutrally, and Justice Scalia is correct that rights are entrenched with the scope that they had when constitutionalized, then the right of the people to regulate their own police, including firearms, must be treated with the same originalist reverence. Judges, including originalist judges, must recognize the awesome power of the people: including the right to regulate arms.

New York: Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, 2021. 17p.

By Matthew J. Lacombe

The tumultuous year of 2020 may mark an important turning point in the political development of the National Rifle Association (NRA) and, as a result, the broader gun rights movement. This essay explores how the year’s events — and the role of guns and gun rights supporters in them — were in numerous ways a culmination of the NRA’s approach to politics over the course of several prior decades. This approach involves linking guns to a broader, right-wing populist worldview; mobilizing political action among gun rights supporters by portraying that worldview as deeply threatened by government and media elites; and building alliances with like-minded politicians, most notably Donald Trump. The essay then explores how the aftermath of the events of 2020 leaves the NRA in a difficult position. With Trump (the NRA’s close ally) out of office, some within the GOP looking to move on from his approach to politics following the failed January 6 insurrection, and Democrats more supportive of gun control than at any other point in recent history, the NRA may find itself somewhat politically alienated. Moreover, given its current organizational challenges and its position on the right wing of the GOP, the NRA may also struggle to recruit the many Americans who bought guns for the first time in 2020 — a group that could potentially diversify the gun owning community and renegotiate the sociopolitical meaning of guns in important ways. Only time will tell the NRA’s future, but what is clear now is that the tumultuous events of 2020 can be traced to the organization’s past and will surely impact both its future and the future of the gun debate.

New York: Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, 2011. 8p.

By Darrell A. H. Miller

To an external observer, the moral and historical foundations of the insurrectionary Second Amendment must look bizarre. Instead of building an insurrectionist theory around the one group — enslaved Africans — who, by the framers’ own measure, had the most right to resist tyranny, we have a Second Amendment theory of righteous revolution built on the grievances of slave owners. But the peculiarity does not stop there. It must seem equally odd to outsiders that insurrectionist theory never adequately accounts for the fact that this one group, African Americans — with centuries of moral justification behind them — decided in the middle of the 20th century to reject violent political dynamism in favor of nonviolence. In short, what would Second Amendment insurrectionism look like if it started with the enslaved African and ended with the march across Edmund Pettus Bridge? This essay attempts to reckon with these twin paradoxes and reorient our thinking about the credibility of the insurrectionary Second Amendment.

New York: Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, 2021. 11p.

By John J. Donohue

The January 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol has important lessons for much of the widespread, current Second Amendment litigation designed to eradicate beneficial gun safety regulation across the country. First, the value of Washington, DC, laws in constraining the gun carrying of the riotous crowd was evident and likely saved many lives. Second, flirtations with the idea that armed citizens should be ready to fight the federal government were shown to be absurd: there is no circumstance in which private citizens in modern America could promote democracy by using assault weapons to kill government employees to show their disapproval of what they perceive to be “tyrannical” government. Third, the idea that gun owners can be expected to oppose rather than support a tyrant was dealt a fatal blow by the violence at the U.S. Capitol. The time has come to earnestly acknowledge and embrace the wise restraints on firearms that make the American public free and to reject the specious mask of zeal for unlimited gun rights that has become a mainstay of too many American politicians.

New York: Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, 2021. 11p.

By Eric Ruben

What is an “arm” under the Second Amendment? The Supreme Court has signaled that arms encompass more than just guns, including less lethal alternatives to guns. But for many Americans, the term signifies guns alone. This essay explores the role of the gun rights movement in equating arms and guns, describes how it reflects neither law nor weapons practices, and contends that it could contribute to unduly expansive gun rights. On the eve of the next big Second Amendment case at the Supreme Court, New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v. Corlett, the time is now to put guns and gun rights into a broader perspective.

New York: Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, 2021. 9p.

By Susan P. Liebell

Understanding the persistence of public gun violence and resistance to restrictions on firearms requires unmasking a pernicious armed rebellion narrative that masquerades as the “original intent” of the American framers. Promoted by the National Rifle Association (NRA), constitutional scholars of the Second Amendment, public officials, and the conservative press, the narrative insists that guns uphold freedom and rights, maintain order, and prevent tyranny. Wrapped in symbols of the American Revolution, this narrative has been used to justify the January 6 U.S. Capitol insurrection, private-citizen policing during the #BLM protests of 2020, and calls to kidnap or assassinate public officials as tyrants. This article uses John Locke (the 17th-century thinker who inspired American revolutionaries and the Constitution’s writers) to demonstrate how the armed rebellion narrative disrespects “original” understandings and distorts the meaning of the Second Amendment. First, Locke, the founders, and the original understanding of the Constitution do not justify radical individual gun rights, private-citizen policing, or subversion of the government by individual citizens. Our foundational documents insist on redress through institutions like courts and legislatures and create high bars for armed insurrection (based on the views of the majority rather than small groups of individuals). The armed rebellion narrative replaces a collective decision with the views of the individual. Second, this dangerous and distorted lens should not be used to justify false equivalences between #BLM (a mass call for social change with some violence) and January 6 (an armed insurrection with violence at its core). Locke’s ideas about individuals, the public, and the social contract — claimed by both violent insurrectionists and #BLM protesters — clarify the big lie that perpetuates our gun-saturated politics.

New York: Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, 2021. 8p.

By Bertrall Ross

On January 6, 2021, men and women, some of them armed, stormed the U.S. Capitol to try to undo a fair and legitimate presidential election. For the insurrectionists, the election results meant something more than one candidate winning and another one losing. It represented a tyrannical threat to their racialized conception of American republicanism, one that President Donald Trump promoted and sought to legitimate. For those Americans, guns reemerged as an instrument of self-defense against tyranny, just as guns have throughout U.S. history. Yet those individuals’ actions — ones that they understood as resisting tyranny — in fact threatened to destabilize American democracy through violence.

The racialized conception of American republicanism has historically served as psychological ballast for many poor and working-class Americans, including many of those involved in the insurrection. Underlying that conception is an extreme economic inequality that has left many of the insurrectionists marginalized and alienated — and that itself represents the real tyranny that threatens all poor and working-class people’s ability to participate fully in democratic processes.

This essay explores the economic inequality that lies at the foundational core of American republicanism. It then argues that violent threats to the stability and sustainability of the American republic will persist until we confront economic inequality. Otherwise, extreme economic inequality will lead to a future in which the marginalized increasingly resort to guns and violence, and the government is forced to turn to repression to ensure the republic’s survival.

New York: Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, 2021. 8p.

By Aziz Z. Huq

This essay identifies and explores the intellectual roots of the Second Amendment as they have been imagined and deployed not just by the U.S. Supreme Court but also by contemporary insurrectionary movements of the right. The Court has recognized but sidelined a political understanding of the Second Amendment in its two main encounters with the amendment’s operative clause. That understanding, however, was on ample display during the January 6, 2021, U.S. Capitol insurrection, where it was featured on banners and performed through the actual possession and threat to use arms. The idea of the armed citizen as a cornerstone of the republic can be traced back to the work of the Florentine scholar-diplomat Niccolò di Bernardo dei Machiavelli. This essay shows that across his three main book-length works, Machiavelli developed a concept of citizenship that was closely tied to the political, and potentially insurrectionary, possession and use of arms. “Good laws” and “good arms” on his account could not be separated. This vision of a politically active populace, one seemingly at odds with its elites and leaders, can be traced forward to the January 6 insurrection. But it also has a left-of-center genealogy that today yields various forms of radically democratizing proposals for institutional reform. The intellectual past, in short, is not just still alive but surprisingly fertile.

New York: Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, 2021. 10p.

By Mary B. McCord

The insurrection at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, culminated a year of increasing private militia engagement with the public — sometimes in forcible opposition to government policies or, in the case of January 6, in an attempt to “stop the steal,” and sometimes in supposed augmentation of law enforcement’s role to provide protection for persons and property against what the militias deemed “violent anarchists.” These groups, often dressed in military uniforms, armed with semi-automatic assault rifles, and bearing a full accoutrement of military gear, pose a threat to public safety, stifle the constitutional rights of others, and undermine our democracy.

Why have such private paramilitary organizations gone largely unchallenged? The answer lies in part in the widespread mythology that they are protected by the Second Amendment, a mythology promoted by those who attempt to rewrite history to support an insurrectionist view of the Second Amendment. But this view is not supported by history, the text of the Second Amendment, or its interpretation by the Supreme Court. Far from enabling private militias to be a check on a tyrannical government, as modern private militia members would have us believe, the founders intended the militia — all able-bodied men available to be called forth by the governor in defense of the state — to be subordinate to and governed by the state. Indeed, as this essay explains, private militias are not authorized under federal or state law, are not protected by the Second Amendment, and are unlawful in every state.

New York: Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law. 2021. 10p.

By Jennifer Carlson

The summer of 2020 was a summer of mass unrest. Protesting the thousand-plus, disproportionately Black and Indigenous lives taken every year by police violence, millions of Americans mobilized for racial justice and police accountability under the banner of Black Lives Matter. Their message was not new — the Black Lives Matter movement was founded years earlier in the aftermath of George Zimmerman’s acquittal for the murder of Trayvon Martin — but its urgency felt renewed amid egregious cases of anti-Black racism, police violence, growing political polarization, and white supremacist extremism. The killings of Ahmaud Arbery, George Floyd, Dion Johnson, and Breonna Taylor — a handful among thousands — yet again spotlighted police complicity with and perpetuation of anti-Black violence, invigorating months of protests and calls for police accountability, police demilitarization, police defunding, and even police abolition. The demands themselves differed in substance; some focused on closing down police departments altogether, while others emphasized the fiscal necessity of redirecting public funding from police to other agencies.1 But the gist of these calls was unanimous: they insist that to transform rather than merely reform the institutions within American society that perpetuate anti-Black racism, police must be decentered as the go-to institution for solving not just problems of crime but social problems more generally. Anti-Black racism within policing is one slice of the entrenched tendency in 20th- and 21st-century America to treat a wide panoply of social problems as problems of crime and bloat the criminal justice system as the catchall state apparatus to address those problems — a dynamic that legal scholar Jonathan Simon describes as “governing through crime.”2 The protests, the demands, and the community organizing of 2020 may have been immediately focused on the criminal justice system, but because that system has so thoroughly penetrated vast realms of American society as a core vector of anti-Black racism, the message carried by the protesters reached far and wide — including gun politics. Often buttressing the well-worn terms of the gun debate, those in favor of increased gun regulations declared that “police violence is gun violence,” while others promoted gun ownership as a way to put the message to “defund the police” into practice. But the challenge that the summer 2020 Black Lives Matter protests have posed to American gun politics goes far beyond rehashing the usual sides of the gun debate in the key of anti-Black police violence. Rather, this challenge invites those invested in the gun debate to consider their own complicity with the criminal justice system and how, by decentering crime and criminalization within the gun debate, that debate might be transformed. In short, the summer 2020 protests challenge us to imagine anti-racist gun politics.

New York: Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, 2021. 10p.