By Public Safety Canada

Overall crime rates in Canada have been decreasing over the past several decades. Despite this, there has been a marked increase in recent crime trends involving gun and gang violence (GGV). For example, between 2013 and 2020, Canada experienced a 91% increase in firearm-related homicides. At Canada’s borders, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) has reported an overall increase in firearms seizures over the last five years. GGV-related issues are complex, cross-jurisdictional and multi-sectoral. Given the nature of gang violence and the knowledge that organized crime groups are involved in a variety of criminal activities and illegal commodities, interventions must be comprehensive and include activities across the spectrum of prevention, intervention, and enforcement. While provinces and territories (PTs) are responsible for the administration of justice, including policing, in their jurisdictions, there is also a federal role for supporting a multi-faceted coordinated approach to address GGV. To respond to these increased crime trends, the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada was mandated to work with provincial, territorial and municipal counterparts to develop a strategy for the federal government to best support communities and law enforcement in their ongoing efforts to make it tougher for criminals to secure and use handguns and assault weapons and to reduce GGV in communities across Canada. From this, Budget 2018 committed funding over five years to establish the Initiative to Take Action Against Gun and Gang Violence (ITAAGGV). This horizontal initiative supports Public Safety Canada (PS) (as the lead agency), the CBSA, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) with investments across three themes.

Ottawa: His Majesty the King in Right of Canada, as represented by the Ministers of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, 2023. 40p.

By André Desmarais

Forensic science institutions have a key role to play—not only in criminal investigations, but also in the broader fight against illicit arms proliferation. However, their ability to play this role depends on their capacities, which are not well understood. A new Briefing Paper on the forensic services in Guinea aims to fill this gap.

Building on previous case studies on forensic services in Chad, Mauritania, and Niger, Arms Monitoring in Guinea: A Survey of National Forensic Services by ballistics specialist André Desmarais—co-published by INTERPOL and the Small Arms Survey’s Security Assessment in North Africa (SANA) project—examines capabilities, limitations, and needs of Guinea’s forensic services. It finds that information on calibres, models, and ammunition types of seized weapons is limited, and that the country lacks a central firearms database. Based on this analysis, the study provides tailored suggestions for areas of improvement, as a way to support Guinea in significantly reducing illicit arms flows.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2020. 12p.

ByHugh Griffiths and Matt Schroeder

For more than a decade the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), in defiance of UN sanctions, has found ways to systematically smuggle arms and other illicit goods in and out of the country. This Briefing Paper from the Small Arms Survey provides a detailed overview of how the DPRK evades sanctions by employing its diplomatic resources and exploiting key loopholes relating to transport, logistics, and proliferation finance.

Covert Carriers: Evolving Methods and Techniques of North Korean Sanctions Evasion emphasizes the importance for UN member states, logistics companies, and global banks to adequately screen and monitor North Korean activities and transactions. The study also highlights how new information-sharing mechanisms would strengthen the ability of states, private industry, and the UN Panel of Experts to better detect ongoing North Korean violations and dismantle existing sanctions evasion networks.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2020. 20p.

ByGergely Hideg and Anna Alvazzi del Frate

The year 2018 was characterized by a decrease in lethal violence in several of the world’s hotspots, primarily due to a significant de-escalation of the armed conflicts in Iraq, Myanmar, South Sudan, and Syria. The homicide rate also decreased marginally due to population growth outpacing the nominal increase in killings between 2017 and 2018. These two trends jointly resulted in a modest positive change in the rate of violent deaths globally in 2018 which, at 7.8 violent deaths per 100,000 population, is at its lowest since 2012.

Still Not There: Global Violent Deaths Scenarios, 2019–30, a Briefing Paper by the Survey’s Security Assessment in North Africa (SANA) project provides an updated trend analysis of global violent deaths and develops global-level scenarios for the years leading to 2030. Based on 2018 figures from the Small Arms Survey’s Global Violent Deaths (GVD) database, the paper also includes a specific analysis of developments in Northern Africa and the five nations of the G5 Sahel region. It finds that under a business-as-usual scenario, Northern Africa’s violent death rate would remain relatively stable by 2030. By contrast, under the same scenario, the fatality rate in the G5 Sahel region would increase significantly. The paper also looks at how, for the first time, the GVD database now permits the analysis of disaggregated data for female victims of firearm killings for the period 2004–18, further increasing its gender relevance.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2021. 16p.

By Fiona Langloisa, Damien Rhumorbarbea, Denis Wernera, Nicolas Florquinb, Stefano Caneppelea and Quentin Rossy

Using a crime script analysis, this research aims to document how smugglers operate when they traffic arms from the US to foreign countries. Our study is based on an analysis of 66 cases that have been judged by US courts (2008–2017). The criminal activities involved are detailed in a series of distinct scenes, according to Cornish’s theory. Five scripts have been developed, based on the means of transport used by the traffickers: road transport, commer-cial airlines, postal services, freight transport and crossing the border on foot. Results suggest that most criminals prefer to operate according to an established modus operandi. This commonality suggests that the potential exists for the professionalisation of this criminal activity. Indeed, offenders are likely to maintain it to reduce effort and risk. Complementary sources of information would help to enrich the approach proposed in this study and to address the challenges posed by complex cases.

Global Crime, 2022, VOL. 23, NO. 3, 284–305

ByAnne-Séverine Fabre, Nicolas Florquin, Aaron Karp, and Matt Schroeder

The Caribbean region suffers from some of the world’s highest rates of violent deaths, at almost three times the global average, as well as one of the world’s highest rates of violent deaths among women. Firearms are used in more than half of all homicides, with this proportion reaching 90 per cent in some countries. While much emphasis has been placed on firearms control at both the political and operational levels, illicit firearms, and the dynamics of illicit arms markets in this region have received little research attention. The multiple impacts of these realities on the region can be seen via human consequences, socio-economic implications, and security challenges.

Weapons Compass: The Caribbean Firearms Study—a joint report from the Small Arms Survey and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS)—examines firearm holdings, illicit arms and ammunition, trafficking patterns and methods, and the socio-economic costs of firearm-related violence in the region. This Report examines these issues by drawing on data and information collected from 13 of the 15 CARICOM member states and from 22 Caribbean states in total. The study also incorporates the results of original fieldwork undertaken by regional partners, including interviews with prison inmates serving firearm-related sentences, and research in selected hospitals related to gunshot wounds and the associated medical costs and productivity losses for patients.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, and Trinidad and Tobago:CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security, 2023. 178p.

By Small Arms Survey

The Small Arms Survey's annual report provides an overview of the Survey's work from the previous year. It highlights the main activities undertaken by our projects and units, the publications that were released, the Survey's outreach work, as well as important institutional and financial developments.

Geneva, Small Arms Survey, 2023. 15p.

By Justine Fleischner

Since the collapse of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in August 2021, the Taliban have sought to tighten their control over arms possession among their provincial commanders, the men under them, as well as civilians, and to rein in smuggling activity. Despite these efforts, however, smuggling continues, influenced by local dynamics in the provinces and long-standing clandestine arms trafficking networks.

Smuggling Dynamics under Taliban rule a new Situation Update co-authored by the Small Arms Survey and Afghan Peace Watch - reports on the recent field investigations in the country, and the risks for arms proliferation under the Taliban.

KEY FINDINGS • Fieldwork in Afghanistan under the Taliban confirms the presence of weapons markets in key border areas, significantly increasing the risks of arms proliferation in the region. Of particular concern is smuggling in border areas with Pakistan, where the state faces the growing threat posed by the Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, TTP).1 • Weapon trafficking dynamics under the Taliban appear to be highly localized owing to internal Taliban dynamics; commercial, political, and security interests; and longstanding cross-border ties between armed groups, fighters, and for-profit smuggling networks. • While weapon seized weapons among rank-and-file Taliban fighters. Weapon prices have since regained most of their value, as the Taliban have consolidated their control over former Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) stockpiles. • The Taliban have taken steps to formalize the process of buying, selling, and transporting weapons internally. Taliban officials in each province issue weapon permits and licences for a tax or fee, which generates additional revenue for, and enhances the governance authority of, local officials. The Taliban’s intelligence apparatus, the General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI), has also seized hundreds of weapons following door-to-door searches of civilian and former ANDSF homes, as well as from weapons smugglers operating without the authorization of the Taliban. • Anecdotal reporting suggests that the Taliban have been particularly careful to assert control over remaining stockpiles of US-manufactured M4 and M16 assault rifles, night vision and thermal sights, and other high-value items not normally in circulation in the region. M4s and M16s are valued at roughly two to three times the price of an AK-pattern assault rifle. Nevertheless, groups allied with the Taliban, including the TTP, continue to gain access to US weaponry. These supply patterns indicate an inability or unwillingness to block these transfers, further complicating relations with Pakistan.

Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, 2023. 8p.

By Moonshot

Over a one year period from April 2021 - March 2022, Moonshot partnered with three violence prevention organizations to deliver an online interventions pilot in two Canadian provinces. The pilot advertised psychosocial support services to individuals engaging with extremist content online. Access to these services was voluntary, confidential, and anonymous by design. Our goal was to offer a secure pathway for at-risk individuals to contact a trained therapist or social worker. We built this approach around offering integrated care. Together with our intervention partners, we crafted our advertising messages and service websites to emphasize the confidential, non-judgemental support that callers would receive. Individuals who reached out were connected to an interdisciplinary team, which included a therapist, youth engagement workers, a psychiatrist, and other intervention staff who could offer services like counseling, employment support, addiction support, or simply a space to talk. Our partners were the Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) team in Ontario, and Recherche et Action sur les Polarisations Sociales (RAPS) in Quebec. The Canadian Practitioners Network for the Prevention of Radicalization and Extremist Violence (CPNPREV) acted as a convening and best practice provider, and supported our pilot evaluation. A description of each organization is at the end of this report. Moonshot’s intervention campaigns ran for a total of six months, and reached individuals consuming incel and violent far-right extremist content on Google Search and YouTube. Our online interventions focused on meeting individuals’ psychosocial needs, and appealed to vulnerabilities and grievances, such as anger, frustration, exhaustion, and isolation. Executive summary Key outcomes Moonshot redirected 786 at-risk individuals to our intervention partners’ websites. 22 initiated a conversation with a counselor. Four individuals formally registered and engaged with a service provider for several months, in addition to those who accessed virtual counselling without going through the registration process. At least one person who initially shared violent impulses has been able to find positive, hopeful alternatives for the future. Moonshot’s ads reached users engaging with harmful content on Google and YouTube 44,508 times. Among the hundreds of users redirected to ETA and RAPS’ websites, 26 were watching influential incel YouTube channels and 39 had searched Google for high-risk keywords related to incel and violent far-right ideology (“looksmax org”; “1488 tattoos”). Moonshot, ETA, RAPS, and CPN-PREV established an effective multi-sectoral partnership. During our pilot program, we co-designed support pathways and risk escalation procedures for each service area, built teams’ capacity to deliver online interventions safely and effectively, and engaged at-risk audiences online. This pilot provides a blueprint for future interventions to reach and engage at-risk internet users. New iterations of this work can reach larger audiences by expanding advertising beyond the pilot platforms, strengthening and expanding cross-sectoral partnerships, and testing new ways to reach often-isolated internet users.

Washington, DC: Moonshot, 2023. 13p.

By The McCain Institute , Moonshot and Ketchum

In September 2022, the McCain Institute, in collaboration with Moonshot and Ketchum, launched SCREEN Hate, an initiative that provides caregivers and concerned adults with the knowledge, tools, and resources needed to keep youth safe from online messages that could incite acts of hate-based violence. SCREEN Hate is the first nationwide campaign aimed at equipping bystanders to prevent acts of hate-based violence perpetrated by youth. SCREEN Hate was created as part of a two-year project for the Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships (CP3) at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), funded through the 2021 Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention Grant Program.1 The SCREEN Hate resource hub and accompanying online campaigns launched on 15 September 2022, having been announced at the “United We Stand Summit” at the White House. The campaigns—designed and implemented by Moonshot, the McCain Institute, and Ketchum—included behavior-based bystander engagement campaigns on Google Search and YouTube, as well as wider community outreach campaigns on Reddit, Facebook, and Instagram. This report details the national findings from the SCREEN Hate online campaigns, conducted between September 2022 and July 2023. It includes geographic and behavioral insights into user engagement, as well as the results of comparative testing on user engagement with our YouTube campaign ads. The final section includes recommendations for future programming for practitioners working to engage with concerned bystanders through online campaigns.

Washington, DC: Moonshot, 2023, 28p.

By Moonshot and the Anti-Defamation League

Moonshot partnered with the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) to analyze US search traffic in July 2020 in response to the threats posed by white supremacist narratives and ideology in the US this past year. The dominant socio-political events of 2020-2021—the COVID-19 pandemic, the widespread BLM protests and counter-protests, and the presidential election—coalesced to create fertile ground for white supremacists and other violent extremist movements to mobilize and recruit. In 2020, racism and systemic racial inequality took center stage in the American public eye, with nationwide mass protests against recent police killings of Black people and historic evidence of racial injustice.1 In a nationwide reactionary mobilization, members of armed extremist groups made frequent appearances at BLM protests as self-appointed “protection” for property and counter-protesters.2 This high-profile direct action, combined with tacit and explicit support from local and national political figures, contributed to an increased interest in white supremacist and racist ideas by segments of the country.3 Protests and opposition to state lockdowns and other measures introduced in response to COVID-19 also provided opportunities for extremist movements to mobilize and engage with wider swathes of the public around shared grievances. While anti-lockdown protests were not related to white supremacy on the surface, these movements began to overlap in their joint opposition to the BLM movement, the defense of Confederate monuments, and general opposition to perceived government tyranny.4 Similarly, national protests alleging election rigging in the wake of Joe Biden’s presidential election victory were repeatedly co-opted and reinforced by white supremacist groups, culminating in the 6 January siege on the US Capitol. Extremist groups and individuals expressing support for white supremacist ideas were well-documented participants in the insurrection. White supremacist groups and other extremist organizations seized on the tensions and uncertainty in American life to promote racist beliefs and anti-Semitic conspiracy theories in order to increase their recruitment. Extremist narratives related to the pandemic promoted the conspiracy theory alleging that COVID-19 is a hoax created by a Jewish-led cabal. This and related anti-Semitic tropes and conspiracies are mainstays of many QAnon narratives.5 Other groups, such as the Patriot Front, have used the past year’s societal upheavals to recruit new members by promoting an impending race war and the perceived persecution of white people—as indicated by conspiracy theories such as “white genocide” and “the great replacement”.6 Extremist groups also exploited wider tensions, perceived grievances and disinformation against the BLM movement, as well as popular disinformation alleging the election was rigged. The findings from this project provide valuable insights on the types of harmful narratives and content that appeal to individuals potentially at-risk of radicalization, including those first searching for extremist slogans and conspiracies out of curiosity. This report presents an overview of the search traffic data collected during the project, between 17 July 2020 - 7 March 2021, and our main findings on online white supremacist narrative trends during this time.

Washington, DC: Moonshot, 2021. 21p.

By John Jenkins, Dmon L. Perry and Paul Stott

The Prevent counter-terrorism strategy is perhaps the most controversial government policy most people have never heard of. Public recognition of it is generally low, but opposition from Britain’s raucous Islamist scene, near total. From there, opposition has spread to sections of the far-left, and those parts of academia where Islamism and the revolutionary left intersect. This report, written by three experts on Islamism, outlines the campaign against Prevent, and argues that this is not an exceptional campaign against a uniquely flawed policy – the groups opposing Prevent have tended to criticise pretty much any counter-terrorism policy, in sine cases for a generation. The same names and campaign groups appear time after time regardless of the colour of the government of the day.

Disappointingly, ministers and officials have tended to shy away from some of these debates, allowing misinformation, and even conspiracy theory, to flourish. The forthcoming Prevent review by William Shawcross risks being dead on arrival if this continues. The authors call for a Centre for the Study of Extremism to give Ministers the tools to properly push back against campaigners, with a separate communications unit to disseminate rebuttal, and a due diligence unit. The latter is needed to ensure that government departments and the public sector are choosing their friends wisely. Too often anti-Prevent campaigners are able to grandstand against government counter-terrorism policies, whilst at the same time receiving government patronage and engagement. It should no longer be possible to run with the fox, and hunt with the hounds.

London: Policy Exchange, 2022.' 89p,

By The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence

Within the world of 3D-printed guns, one pseudonymous figure has emerged as a symbol for the cause of universal access to firearms: “JStark1809”. He created the world’s most popular 3D-printed gun and established an influential network of 3D-printed gun designers. Since his death in July 2021, he has been memorialised as a martyr for the right to bear arms. In this report, ICSR Senior Research Fellow Dr Rajan Basra identifies “JStark1809” as Jacob Duygu, a German national born to Kurdish parents who arrived as refugees from Southeast Turkey in the 1990s. Using a combination of authorship attribution techniques, JStark can be identified as the author of over 700 seemingly “anonymous” comments on 4chan’s /pol/ board. He disclosed hitherto unknown details about his life, broader political views, and extremist attitudes.

Chapter one lays out the findings and structure of the report. Chapter two details the open-source methodology used in finding JStark’s digital footprint, including how he was identified as the author of “anonymous” comments. It also summarises JStark’s biographical details.

The subsequent chapters analyse JStark’s life according to three themes: (1) his journey to designing 3D-printed firearms; (2) his political beliefs, including his xenophobic online behaviour and threats of violence as expressed on 4chan’s /pol/; and (3) his life as a self-identified incel, attitudes to misogynistic violence, and his related suicidal ideation. The report concludes with implications for the broader 3D-printed gun movement.

London: ICSR, Department of War Studies, King’s College London, 2023. 52p.

By Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD)

This report aims to provide a first look into Irish far-right activity on the messaging app, Telegram, where the movement is operating both as identifiable groups and influencers, and anonymously-run channels and groups. The report looks at the activity across 34 such Telegram channels through the lens of a series of case studies where content posted on these channels resulted in real life consequences. Using both quantitative and qualitative methods, the report examines the tactics, language and trends within these channels, providing much-needed detail on the activity of the Irish far-right online. This report was produced in conjunction with TheJournal.ie and its investigative platform Noteworthy.ie as part of their Eyes Right series, examining the growth of far-right ideology on Irish online networks, and its influence on wider public opinion.

Beirut; London; etc.: Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2021). ,30p.

By The Digital Citizens Alliance

Digital platforms enabled the disturbing rise of domestic extremism, culminating with the January 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol. Militia groups use social media networks to plan operations, recruit new members and spread anti-democracy propaganda, a new Digital Citizens Alliance (Digital Citizens) and Coalition for a Safer Web (CSW) investigation has found.

Taking a page from Jihadists, these extremist groups operate along the fringes of where platforms such as YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram will let them. Federal prosecutors investigating the Capitol riot revealed how militia groups used social media platforms to coordinate and prepare for possible conflict with Antifa. But the joint Digital Citizens / CSW investigation found the use of platforms goes well beyond tactical planning. Militias rely on the platforms to share their beliefs and ideology and recruit new members. The militias get a boost from their ideological simpatico with mis/disinformation groups like QAnon, which provides oxygen that militias use to fan the flames.

The anti-government militia movement first emerged after the 1992 Ruby Ridge standoff, the 1993 Waco siege, and the Oklahoma City Bombing on April 19, 1995. After Oklahoma City, U.S. law enforcement cracked down on domestic terrorism and the militia movement. In 1996, the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) reported 858 militia groups with up to 50,000 active members. The 9/11 terrorist attacks shifted focus to global threats and led to a dormant period for militias. But domestic extremists such as the Proud Boys, the Boogaloo Bois, the Three Percenters, and the Oath Keepers have reinvigorated the movement – aided in large part by digital platforms. In 2020, according to research by The Washington Post, the number of domestic terrorism incidents in the United States had doubled from what it was in 1995. But the joint Digital Citizens / CSW investigation found the use of platforms goes well beyond tactical planning. Militias rely on the platforms to share their beliefs and ideology and recruit new members. The militias get a boost from their ideological simpatico with mis/disinformation groups like QAnon, which provides oxygen that militias use to fan the flames.

The anti-government militia movement first emerged after the 1992 Ruby Ridge standoff, the 1993 Waco siege, and the Oklahoma City Bombing on April 19, 1995. After Oklahoma City, U.S. law enforcement cracked down on domestic terrorism and the militia movement. In 1996, the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) reported 858 militia groups with up to 50,000 active members. The 9/11 terrorist attacks shifted focus to global threats and led to a dormant period for militias. But domestic extremists such as the Proud Boys, the Boogaloo Bois, the Three Percenters, and the Oath Keepers have reinvigorated the movement – aided in large part by digital platforms. In 2020, according to research by The Washington Post, the number of domestic terrorism incidents in the United States had doubled from what it was in 1995.

Washington, DC: Digital Citizens Alliance, 2021. 56p.

By Hanny Purnama Sari and Muhammad Syauqillah

This research aims to compile data and information that will contribute to understanding the online radicalization phenomenon through translation. There are many studies on using the internet and propaganda in a terrorism context. However, only a handful studied the correlation between translation and terrorism propaganda, especially in Indonesia. There was little discussion on the role of translation in bridging communication between different nations, cultures, and languages and using it to propagate radical/propaganda narratives worldwide and amplify those messages to its target audience. The research method is descriptive qualitative using primary and secondary data; the sample is taken from the book of Nadharat Fi Al Ijma' Al Qath'i and previous findings and news. This research revealed at least ten roles of translation in the online radicalization phenomenon; among others, translation in the target language can be used to identify the target audience of the propagandist, and many terrorist sympathizers were willing to volunteer to translate the propaganda. However, although the translation is used to leverage the spread of propaganda, it can also assist law enforcement officers in combating terrorist/propaganda narratives. Indonesian law enforcement officers may use translation to counter-terrorism as Indonesia has hundreds of vernacular languages that can be used to 'encrypt' and disseminate their extremist narratives.

International Journal of Science and Society, 4(4), 319-336.

By Moustafa Ayad, Nadeem Khan and Aymenn al-Tamimi

his report highlights the networks, supporters, and the platforms of Islamic State disinformation disseminators, focusing on popular social media platforms as well as encrypted messaging applications. These disinformation networks are creating self-branded media outlets with followers in the tens of thousands, and often with innocuous names like “Global Happenings,” “DRIL” and “Media Center,” to evade moderation and takedowns. These same networks use coded language and a codebook of emojis to spread Islamic State “news” to other networks of supporters, who similarly evade moderation. These ‘alternative news outlets’ are trying to outcompete narratives publicized by government officials as well as independent mainstream media and individual journalists – groups that were also heavily targeted by Islamic State.

London: IDS - Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2022. 22p.

by Oluwole Ojewale

This study explores the complex relationships between urbanisation and transnational organised crime, focusing on how illicit arms shape urban violence and are leveraged by criminal groups. It maps the nexus between arms trafficking actors and criminal groups operating in other organised markets in urban contexts and proposes interventions that engage with diverse layers of urban governance and stakeholders in the cities. The study focuses on Bamako and Lagos as urban centres in which arms trafficking and urbanisation intersect. Key points l There are multiple drivers and enablers of arms trafficking. l Armoury theft is a major source of illicit weapons and ammunition. l Arms trafficking is highly segmented and spatially concentrated. l Illicit firearms enter cities through various entry points. l Organised crime groups operate across multiple illicit businesses. l Elite support to ethnic militias drives private armament outside of state control. l The centralised governance framework on security forecloses potential collaboration from subnational governments to address urban arms trafficking.

OCWAR-T Research Report 2 . ECOWAS Commission, 2023. 38p,

By Nelson Alusala

This policy brief reviews the state of physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) in Central and Southern Africa as at 2022. Africa’s most progressive legally binding instruments for controlling small arms and light weapons can be found in these regions. The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Convention became legal in 2017 and the Southern African Development Community Protocol was revised in 2020. However, compliance with these instruments requires commitment from all stakeholders, including civil society. Key findings ∙ The region’s long-term stability depends on good principles of physical security and stockpile management (PSSM). Until ECCAS members enforce policy and implement steps to improve the PSSM of arms and ammunition in government possession, leakage and diversion to non-state actors will continue undeterred. ∙ Implementation should be next. The Kinshasa Convention, like the Arms Trade Treaty and UN Agenda 2030, are considered some of the latest instruments on disarmament, human security and development. The review of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Firearms Protocol in 2020 aligned the SADC region with the latest developments, and the African Union (AU) vision for silencing the guns by 2030. ∙ A review of other regional instruments is required. This is vital, especially for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and other Related Materials, and the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States.

ENACT Africa, 2022. 11p.

By Nelson Alusala

Without effective security and stockpile management systems, the wave of political instability in the two regions is likely to endure.

This policy brief reviews the state of the physical state of security and stockpile management (PSSM) in West Africa and the Sahel as at 2022. Through desk research and policymaker interviews, it explores key policies and practices. It questions whether governments struggle to maintain their arms and ammunition because they bite off too much, encounter unforeseen consequences that lead to the exposure and diversion of weaponry, or are just negligent. Regardless, loss of life and the destruction of property continue unabated as criminals, violent extremists and other non-state actors take advantage of the armouries’ sub-standard security.

Key findings ∙ The region (West Africa and the Sahel) implemented several PSSM measures from 2011 to 2020; and the African Union (AU) decided in December 2020 to extend the Silencing the Guns initiative until 2030. ∙ Interventions in the region were not harmonised and were short-lived, making their impact difficult to quantify. Most initiatives were programmes and capacity-building training rather than disarmament and/or practical steps to secure the safety and security of national stockpiles. ∙ The movement of people between countries oblivious of borders is a tradition linked to pastoralism and transhumance. However, the corridor proclaimed for this purpose has been subsumed by human settlement, leading to herder-farmer conflicts that have exacerbated the demand for illegal arms. These have put excess pressure on national stockpiles.

ENACT Africa, 2020. 12p,