By  Michael Osman, Monika Roszkowska, Murat Yildiz, Robert Muggah, et al.

Several Caribbean countries are registering an intensification of organized crime and rising incidence of lethal violence. A combination of risk factors including surging drug production in South America, the proliferation and competition of transnational and local gangs, and high availability and use of firearms have contributed to soaring homicide rates. Countries such as Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago currently register among the highest murder rates globally. Faced with exceedingly high levels of collective and interpersonal violence, some Caribbean governments, for example that of Jamaica have declared states of emergencies to fight violent crime while simultaneously ramping up regional efforts to curb the trafficking of firearms and ammunition. There is a growing consensus among the heads of government of CARICOM countries that the crime and violence situation could deteriorate further still. The perpetrators of collective violence in the Caribbean vary, though most are connected to a diverse array of criminal markets across the region. The determination of what constitutes  a “gang ” differs across the Caribbean. The capacity of these groups vary: there is no dominant configuration of criminal groups and criminal relationships across all locations in the region. Highly organized criminal networks and street gangs are involved in multiple transnational criminal markets spanning South and Central America, North America, and Western Europe. Larger, more sophisticated gangs alternately collude and compete with state actors and a host of non-state intermediaries to procure firearms and transport, transship, and traffic in cocaine, cannabis, and to a lesser extent heroin and amphetamines. For the most part, smaller street gangs are more domestically oriented; some are politically connected and secure government contracts to provide resources and services that are historically underserved by the state. In addition to providing social welfare, these organizations often impose protection rackets within the areas they operate. These protection rackets allow these neighborhood gangs to engage in criminal activities ranging from selling drugs, trafficking in firearms, human smuggling, and contract killing to managing lottery scams, extortion, and racketeering. A small number of the region’s gangs are more organized and have expanded their criminal networks to facilitate transnational crimes,   including the transportation and protection of drug shipments as well as firearms trafficking, human smuggling, and cyber-related crimes. In larger countries in the Caribbean such as Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, aggressive state-led anti-gang measures have accelerated the fragmentation or “splintering” of gangs, further heightening inter- and intra-factional violence and demand for firearms and ammunition. While the overall number and membership of Caribbean gangs appears to have expanded, a relatively small number of them are involved in transnational trafficking of drugs, firearms, and other contraband. Only a handful of the hundreds of gangs active in countries such as Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago appear to be directly implicated in cross-border crimes such as the trafficking of cocaine and cannabis or smuggling of weapons. In many cases, well-connected gang leaders, including former inmates of US prisons, facilitate shipments by leveraging their networks from Colombia and Venezuela to North America and Western Europe. Meanwhile, local gang members may be subcontracted for “protecting” transshipment of drugs, sourcing firearms abroad (primarily from the US), and organizing local distribution and retail. However, most gangs in the Caribbean  are inward-facing and connected to local political economies ranging from disrupting elections and securing government contracts to local drug dealing, prostitution, scams, and extortion. Rather than facilitate international drug shipments or human trafficking rings, gangs throughout the region are typically parochial and focused instead on protecting their territory. (continued)

Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 62p.

By The UNODC Global Programme on Criminal Network Disruption and the Global Maritime Crime Programme (Border Management Branch).

The Republic of Yemen has been embroiled in a violent conflict since September 2014 when Houthi forces took military control of the capital city Sana’a and displaced the government of interim President Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Yemen’s protracted conflict has claimed at least 377.000 lives, most of them civilians, and plunged Yemen, already the poorest country of the Arabian Peninsula, into a complex humanitarian catastrophe. The Houthis, who call themselves Ansar Allah (Partisans of God), originally were a revivalist Zaidi Shia religious movement formed in the Sa’dah governorate in the 1990s under the leadership of prominent cleric Hussein al-Houthi. Critical of Yemen’s long-term President Ali Abdullah Saleh (in office from 1990 to 2012), an order for the arrest of their leader led to a low-level insurgency resulting in the killing of Hussein al-Houthi by government forces in September 2004. Following his death, the political leadership of the movement passed on to his brother Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. The Houthis reportedly formed close political and military ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Lebanese movement Hezbollah and continued to challenge Saleh, exploiting the frustration of large parts of the Yemeni population with his government. They succeeded in capturing parts of the mountainous north of the country before a popular uprising linked to the Arab Spring swept the old regime from power in February 2011. In the wake of this regime change, which brought Hadi to power, the Houthis increased their presence in Sana’a and formed alliances with other groups, while simultaneously clashing with tribesmen loyal to other political movements, in particular those of the Sunni Islamist Al-Islah party (“The Yemeni Congregation of Reform Party”), a Yemeni affiliate of the Muslim brotherhood. Following the ouster of President Hadi and his subsequent flight to Aden, the Houthis consolidated their dominance over large parts of northern Yemen and significantly strengthened their military power through absorbing parts of the country’s armed

forces. In March 2015, fearing a further deterioration of the security situation, a group of nine Arab countries led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia deployed military forces as part of Operation “Decisive Storm” with the aim to restore the authority of Yemen’s internationally recognized government. Meanwhile in the coastal province of Hadramawt, militants of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) exploited the political vacuum and seized control of the local capital of Mukalla in April 2015, which they held for more than one year before being forced out by military forces backed by the United Arab Emirates.4 While the Coalition reversed some of the Houthi advances, the Houthis managed to consolidate their positions in the mountainous north of the country. The period from 2016/2017 onwards, saw a significant increase in the military capabilities of the Houthis, which included the launch of ballistic missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs)5 against targets in Saudi Arabia, as well as the deployment of anti-ship missiles and waterborne improvised explosive devices (WBIED)6 against ships flying the flag of Coalition states in the Red Sea. While these attacks have done relatively little material damage, they allowed the Houthis to some extent to counterbalance the superiority of the Coalition forces and to project power beyond the immediate battlefield. (continued)

Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 30p.

By Amy D. Lauger. Danielle Kaeble and Mark Motivans, etc.

The Combat Human Trafficking Act of 2015 (CHTA) (34 U.S.C. § 20709(e)) requires the director of the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) to prepare an annual report on human trafficking. The report must include information on the following: „ arrests by state law enforcement officers for human trafficking offenses „ prosecutions of individuals in state courts for human trafficking offenses „ convictions of individuals in state courts for human trafficking offenses „ sentences imposed on individuals convicted in state courts for human trafficking offenses. BJS obtains information on human trafficking through several data collections, including those on victim service providers, law enforcement, prosecution and adjudication, and corrections. For each collection, these data are available for some combination of the federal, state, local, and tribal levels. The information in each data collection contributes to a general profile of human trafficking in the United States. Some differences exist across collections due to varying definitions of human trafficking, data availability, and other factors. At the federal level, human trafficking offenses are defined according to federal statutes that include peonage, slavery, forced labor, sex trafficking, sexual exploitation and other abuse of children, and transportation for illegal sexual activity and related crimes. The classification of human trafficking offenses varies among state and local jurisdictions. This report describes the BJS data collections and activities across various jurisdictional levels that include various offenses that may be categorized as human trafficking, and it presents the most recent statistical findings.

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics , 2024. 7p.

By Graham Farrell and Toby Davies

Knife crime has become a prominent and seemingly intractable problem in England & Wales. Theory and evidence indicate that reducing crime opportunities is an effective means of crime control, including restrictions on lethal weapons. While public debate has centred on zombie and other ‘status’ knives, the most prevalent homicide weapon is a kitchen knife. Here we argue that replacing lethal pointed-tip kitchen knives with safer round-tip knives would reduce knife crime with little or no displacement. Drawing on the approach to remove fossil-fuel vehicles from roads, we propose a phased removal of lethal kitchen knives that we estimate will cut knife-related homicide in half, reduce other knife crime and criminality, and prevent thousands of non-criminal knife-related injuries

Crime Science (2024) 13:44

By John J. Donohue

Substantial evidence has documented a powerful “instrumentality” effect: the more lethal the weaponry employed, the greater the likelihood that death will result from any given assault. This finding provides the foundation for the subsequent findings that a variety of measures that restrict the prevalence or limit the permissible types of lethal weaponry can lower the costs of gun violence. The literature has advanced to the point that there is a sufficient empirical basis to call for the elimination of right-to-carry laws, to reestablish bans on assault weapons and high-capacity magazines, to maintain restrictions on youthful access to guns, and to repeal stand-your-ground laws. The Supreme Court’s recent decision expanding the scope of the Second Amendment in New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v. Bruen shows a concerning disinterest in the importance of these empirical findings.

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social ScienceVolume 704, Issue 1, November 2022, Pages 92-117

By Kerri M. Raissian, Jennifer Necci dineen, and Cassandra Crifasi

America has both the highest gun death rate (12 per 100,000 persons) and the highest gun circulation rate (about 121 firearms in circulation for every 100 persons) of any developed country. Taken together, these statistics might lead one to assume that high gun death rates in America are all but a certain outcome. However, gun death rates vary substantially across America suggesting that a range of solutions to reduce gun death and injury exist. This transdisciplinary volume contains a novel collection of articles that overview the evolution of American gun policy, presents evidence on the efficacy of both policy and non-policy interventions, and provides insight on where we go from here given American culture, norms, and legal structures.

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social ScienceVolume 704, Issue 1, November 2022, Pages 7-17

By Mitchell L Doucette, Julie A Ward, Alex D McCourt, Daniel Webster, Cassandra K Crifasi

About 1,000 civilians are killed every year by a law enforcement officer in the USA, more than 90% by firearms. Most civilians who are shot are armed with firearms. Higher rates of officer involved shootings (OIS) are positively associated with state-level firearm ownership. Laws relaxing restrictions on civilians carrying concealed firearms (CCW) have been associated with increased violent crime. This study examines associations between CCW laws and OIS. We accessed counts of fatal and nonfatal OIS from the Gun Violence Archive (GVA) from 2014–2020 and calculated rates using population estimates. We conducted legal research to identify passage years of CCW laws. We used augmented synthetic control models with fixed effects to estimate the effect of Permitless CCW law adoption on OIS over fourteen biannual semesters. We calculated an inverse variance weighted average of the overall effect. On average, Permitless CCW adopting states saw a 12.9% increase in the OIS victimization rate or an additional 4 OIS victimizations per year, compared to what would have happened had law  adoption not occurred. Lax laws regulating civilian carrying of concealed firearms were associated with higher incidence of OIS. The increase in concealed gun carrying frequency associated with these laws may influence the perceived threat of danger faced by law enforcement. This could contribute to higher rates of OIS. 

J Urban Health (2022) 99:373 384

By Alysson Gatens

Illinois’ firearm restraining orders, known in other states as “red flag laws” or “extreme risk protection orders,” are civil orders that temporarily remove firearms from individuals who are a potential danger to themselves or others. These laws aim to prevent firearm injury through a removal of means from persons experiencing a temporary crisis. Data suggest firearm restraining orders have been infrequently employed in Illinois since the law’s enactment in 2019. Nationally, initial research suggests that these types of laws are associated with reductions in firearm suicide. However, national findings have not conclusively shown a significant reduction in firearm assaults attributable to these laws. As the majority of these laws have been passed relatively recently, more research is needed as data become available on their usage and outcomes.

Chicago: Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, 2022. 14p.

By Julien Joly and Aline Shaban

The sources of illicit small arms in West Africa are multiple and evolving, and not limited to the diversion of international transfers. In terms of local sources, the unlicensed artisanal production of firearms has been a recurrent challenge for member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). To support governments in addressing this challenge, the Survey conducted a general assessment of artisanal arms production in the ECOWAS region and the main regulatory approaches adopted by states to address their proliferation. This paper aims to stimulate discussion and the exchange of information on good practices among stakeholders to counter the proliferation and illicit use of small arms in West Africa. Key findings - Craft firearm production has deep cultural and economic roots in West Africa and serves different societal needs— and different uses—than industrial firearm production. Demand for craft-produced weapons is dependent on local dynamics. Craft firearms are no longer exclusively rudimentary items. In some instances, their sophistication is comparable to industrially made weapons equipped with automatic and semi-automatic mechanisms. The current regulatory framework for firearm production in West Africa, mandated by the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials, does not distinguish between industrial and craft production, contributing to poor enforcement by the authorities, as well as low awareness and regulation avoidance among craft producers. In addition, the legal provisions often fail to take into account the firing mechanism, which is essential for determining a firearm’s lethality and type of use. Despite the unclear regulatory environment, artisanal producers in West Africa have shown a willingness to professionalize and regularize their work. If national authorities can refine legislative frameworks to reflect actual craft production practices and products, this willingness could serve as a basis for improved cooperation, record-keeping, and marking practices that closely resemble factory-made firearms. Today, craft weapons in the region range from rudimentary hunting weapons to sophisticated copies of self-loading rifles (Assanvo, 2017; Nowak and Gsell, 2018, p. 3). In light of this, craft firearms can offer criminals, insurgent groups, and private citizens a viable alternative to industrial weapons (Hays and Jenzen-Jones, 2018, p. 36). Due to the clandestine—and lucrative—nature of their production, however, regulating the sector presents considerable challenges. Although the ECOWAS Convention provides a basis for the control of local firearm production in West Africa, it does not determine whether the manufacture of craft firearms should be considered separately or together with the manufacture of indus trial weapons. In practice, most national legislation suggests that legal provisions relating to licensing, marking, and record-keeping apply to all manufacturers indiscriminately. Nevertheless, due to technical and financial limitations, craft producers often fail to comply with these provisions, and may be pushed further into the covert side of the arms trade. With a view to informing artisanal firearms control policy, this Briefing Paper provides an overview of craft production dynamics in West Africa and explores the different approaches taken by ECOWAS member states to regulate their production

Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, 2023. 16p.

By Antonio Fuentes Díaz

The article compares two important experiences of the emergence and consolidation of armed non-state actors in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and Michoacán, Mexico, noting the rise of the groups, their functioning, relationship with the state and involvement in new forms of governance in territorial control, population regulation and profit-making. These phenomena are part of a broader transformation related to political mutations that decentralize the state and generate specific subjective forms that modify the relationships between the individual, the social, the state, and the market

2022, Dilemas, Revista de Estudos de Conflito Controle Social, June 2022, Dilemas 1(4):179-204