By Andrew Willinger

On October 4, 2024, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos. The case involves claims brought by the government of Mexico against a group of U.S. gun manufacturers seeking to recover for the costs of gun violence in Mexico that the Mexican government alleges are caused by the gunmakers’ sales and distribution practices that facilitate cross-border gun trafficking.

If the Supreme Court holds that Mexico failed to allege the type of violation contemplated in the predicate exception, that could narrow the scope of predicate-exception litigation substantially to instances where the gun manufacturer itself engages in illegal conduct (rather than aiding and abetting downstream illegal conduct). And such a decision would have major consequences for domestic PLCAA litigation because the new wave of state public nuisance statutes often specifically contemplate that a gunmaker’s distribution practices can give rise to liability even after the point of sale. Another avenue by which the Court could reverse is to focus on the unique causal chain in the case that includes cross-border gun trafficking and harm caused by foreign cartels with American-manufactured firearms. This route seems less likely to broadly unsettle things at the state level, as it is at least possible for the Court to write an opinion that emphasizes how unique the facts of this case are. In most domestic litigation, there simply will not be the same number of intervening actions because the harm caused will be closer to home. That said, it will be important to watch whether the Court seems receptive to the gunmakers’ argument that Mexico’s damages are merely derivative of the harm suffered by individual people harmed by gun violence in the country. That line of argument would presumably hamstring efforts by state attorneys general to pursue predicate-exception litigation against gunmakers based on harm to the public.

64 South Texas Law Review 97 (2025), 5p.

U.S.Court of Appeals 5th Circuit. No. 23-30033

700 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2012) (“NRA I”), this court upheld those provisions. But that decision, which was criticized at the time, see National Rifle Ass’n, Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 714 F.3d 334, 341 (5th Cir. 2013) (“NRA II”) (Jones, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), preceded two recent clarifying Supreme Court opinions on the methodology by which we construe gun regulations under the Second Amendment. We are now compelled to focus intently on the evidence of firearm access and ownership by eighteen-to-twenty-year-olds near and at the founding, and we conclude that (1) NRA I is incompatible with the Bruen and Rahimi decisions of the Supreme Court, and (2) these provisions are inconsistent with the Second Amendment. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s contrary judgment and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion..

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana USDC No. 6:20-CV-1438. 29p.

UNITED STATES. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE. OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL

From the document: "A recent nationally representative survey (n=1,271) found that the majority of U.S. adults or their family members (54%) have experienced a firearm-related incident. Among all respondents, 21% have personally been threatened with a firearm, 19% have a family member who was killed by a firearm (including by suicide), 17% have witnessed someone being shot, 4% have shot a firearm in self-defense, and 4% have been injured by a firearm (Figure 2). 'Nearly 6 in 10 U.S. adults say that they worry 'sometimes,' 'almost every day,' or 'every day,' about a loved one being a victim of firearm violence.' Such high levels of exposure to firearm violence for both children and adults give rise to a cycle of trauma and fear within our communities, contributing to the nation's mental health crisis. This Advisory describes the public health crisis of firearm violence in America and describes strategies for firearm injury and violence prevention, with a focus on the health and well-being of children, families, and communities."

United States. Public Health Service. Office of the Surgeon Genera. . 2024. 49p.

By Hillel Y. Levin & Timothy D. Lytton

In 2005, Congress passed the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), granting the firearms industry sweeping immunity from civil lawsuits. However, PLCAA immunity is not absolute. This Article demonstrates that both state and federal courts have fundamentally misread PLCAA when adjudicating cases involving the scope of gun industry immunity. Properly understood, PLCAA permits lawsuits against the gun industry so long as they are based on statutory causes of action rather than common law. While broadly preempting state common law claims, PLCAA affords state legislatures autonomy in deciding how to regulate the gun industry within their borders.

Additionally, this Article addresses unresolved questions concerning constitutional limits on gun industry regulation. PLCAA explicitly strikes a balance between three constitutional principles. It safeguards the individual right to keep and bear arms by protecting the gun industry from civil litigation that would unduly curtail civilian access to firearms. It insists that the separation of powers requires that gun industry regulation should derive from legislation not common law adjudication. It affords state governments autonomy in deciding how to regulate the gun industry, recognizing that there are regional differences in attitudes about how to best reduce firearms-related violence. We counsel against interpretations of the Second Amendment’s application to gun industry regulation that would expand the right to keep and bear arms at the expense of other important constitutional principles such as the separation of powers and federalism

75 Florida Law Review 833 (2023),

By Brady United Against Gun Violence

Understanding the source of America’s gun violence epidemic is essential to building effective solutions to prevent it. For decades, laws passed at the behest of the gun industry have shielded important information from public view, making it nearly impossible to understand how, and from where, guns are funneled into the criminal market. Brady has used Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to uncover information in an attempt to better understand how guns make their way from the legal marketplace to ultimately being used in crime. This report examines federal records that identify gun dealers subject to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ (ATF) Demand Letter 2 program — a program created to identify firearms dealers that sell the most crime guns and to aid law enforcement investigations. Only 2% of gun dealers nationwide are subject to this program, which includes dealers who have sold at least 25 guns that were recovered in crime during the past year that were found to have taken less than three years to make it from point of sale to being recovered in that crime. The ATF had identified that this low “time-to-crime” is a strong indicator of gun trafficking. This report, and its underlying national data, are the clearest look we’ve had in two decades as to which gun dealers sell the most crime guns. Absent complete transparency into the gun industry’s role in supplying firearms that fuel our nation’s gun violence epidemic, this data is the best indicator we have as to which gun dealers are fueling crime.

Washington, DC: Brady Campaign, 2024. 20p

By Elizabeth S. Haile

As ATF developed its database of more than two million crime guns, it released to law enforcement agencies, scholars, the press, local and state governments, and the public, numerous reports analyzing the patterns of crime gun sales, as well as portions of the trace database itself. Reports on crime gun trace data revolutionized our understanding of the illegal gun market and how it is supplied – establishing that strong gun laws have a profound impact on access to guns by criminals in the illegal market, and identifying the gun manufacturers, distributors, and dealers most responsible for supplying crime guns. Crime gun trace data has provided powerful evidence of the gun industry’s complicity in fueling the illegal market, showing that thousands of guns move quickly from a relatively small number of licensed gun dealers into the illegal market. Indeed, almost 60% of the crime guns traced in a given year were sold by only 1% of the licensed firearms dealers, while about 85% of gun dealers had no traces at all. The gun industry knows who the high-trace dealers are, but has refused to stop selling them guns or force them to reform. As a result, felons and other prohibited purchasers have been supplied the tools of violence – aided and abetted by careless or corrupt dealers. Our nation suffers from the violent gun crime that ensues. The gun industry has argued that ATF trace data is meaningless or insignificant. For example, gun industry spokespeople continuously claim that the concentration of crime guns originating from a relatively few dealers may indicate only that they sell a lot of guns. ATF’s own investigations have disproved this argument, however, as have academic studies.

Washington, DC: Brady Center for Prevent Gun Violence, 2006. 56p.

By Topher L. McDougal, Daniel Montolio and Jurgen Brauer

This study represents an attempt to understand the U.S. firearms market – the largest in the world – in economic terms. A model of the underlying interplay of legal firearms supply and demand is a prerequisite for reliably evaluating the effectiveness of pertinent existing state and federal firearms policies, and to amend them as necessary. The stakes are high: compared to other nation-states, per capita firearms-related harm in the United States (including suicides and homicides) is exceptionally high and, within constitutional strictures, state and federal firearms policymakers increasingly view it as a major and pressing society-wide problem. Virtually all firearms in the U.S. are initially manufactured and sold legally. Solving a simultaneous equation model using the instrumental variable of natural disasters and employing a unique dataset of U.S. firearms prices and quantities, this paper models – we believe for the first time in the literature – the U.S. market supply of, and demand for, firearms. Encouragingly, we find that this market operates as any other would be expected to, with the notable exception that lagged nonmilitary firearms stocks generate new market demand in a positive feedback loop. We test as predictors of market performance federal firearms legislation as instances of policy, as well as of extraterritorial armed conflict, firearms industry concentration, crime, and technology gaps between U.S. and imported firearms. Except for the time-limited Federal Assault Weapons Ban (1994-2004), we find (restrictive) firearms legislation not to influence sales. We also find that acute external violent conflict and certain levels of violent crime, including homicides and mass shootings, drive up unit sales, and that higher industry concentrations in certain submarkets boost quantity supplied, suggesting economies of scale. Taken together, this study’s findings may provide some empirical support for firearms stock reduction programs to reduce the total volumes of civilian arms.

San Diego: Small Arms Data Observatory, 2020. 35p