By Heather Wolbers, Timothy Cubitt, Sarah Napier, Michael John Cahill, Mariesa Nicholas, Melanie Burton and Katherine Giunta

Sexual extortion is a form of blackmail in which a perpetrator threatens to release intimate material of a victim unless they comply with certain demands. We examine the prevalence and nature of sexual extortion among a sample of 1,953 adolescents residing in Australia.

More than one in 10 adolescents had experienced sexual extortion in their lifetime (11.3%), one in three of whom experienced more than one instance. More than half experienced sexual extortion before the age of 16, and two in five were extorted using digitally manipulated material. Two-thirds of those who experienced sexual extortion had only ever met the perpetrator online, and there were important differences in experiences between genders.

Preventing children from being sexually extorted should be a priority for social media and messaging platforms, and should be a collaborative effort across multiple sectors.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 712.

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2025. 25p.

By Jacob Phelps, Steven Broad, Jennifer Mailley 

  KEY TAKEAWAYS 1. Illegal wildlife trade (IWT) persists in contravention of laws specifically aimed to address negative impacts of over‐exploitation of nature, one of the most critical threats to the world’s biodiversity. 2. By reducing and otherwise negatively impacting populations of wildlife species, IWT undermines the functioning of ecosystems, with significant potential to harm related natural processes – including those affecting climate.    3. The causal chains that demonstrate and explain these links are diverse, complex, and little researched and they are important to long‐term climate stability and mitigation of climate change impacts.    4. Some key pathways linking IWT, ecosystems and climate:

IWT is both a reflection of weak environmental governance, and an exacerbating factor to it. It is often associated with ineffective regulation, 6. Given the importance of climate stability and the long‐term persistence of carbon stocks, adopting broader time horizons and a more holistic view that considers biodiversity is important to climate mitigation and stability. Adopting this type of longer, broader view that recognizes the centrality of biodiversity to many ecosystem processes highlights the clear need for improved governance of wildlife resources and recognizes the need for strong justice system responses to environmental crimes.   7. It is critical to keep in mind that this relationship works in both directions. As climate change impacts take shape, natural resource conflicts will worsen as people and wild species adapt to evolving living conditions. It is very likely that this will lead to new incentives for and patterns of illegal wildlife trade, and in turn new interventions to contain the resulting environmental harm. 8. The links between IWT, biodiversity and climate are still under researched and not well understood. This Research Brief is the first effort to frame these linkages, which are important to understand how policies aimed at addressing IWT, biodiversity and climate can be better integrated.   

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Drime. 2022. 20p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).  UNODC Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific

  This report presents the results of the twenty-second Myanmar opium survey, covering the 2023/2024 opium growing and harvesting season. The last three surveys in Myanmar covering the 2020/2021, 2021/2022, and the 2022/2023 seasons showed an increase at the national level in both areas under opium poppy cultivation and opium production. The 2023 survey reported an 18% increase in the area under cultivation to an estimated 47,100 hectares. For the first time in three years the 2024 survey shows a modest decline in the area under cultivation by 4% to 45,200 hectares, indicating a possible stabilization at recent high levels. Three consecutive years of expanding cultivation followed by a year of limited decline could indicate some degree of saturation in regional heroin markets supplied by Myanmar. Declining prices of fresh opium in Myanmar and declining purity adjusted prices of heroin in regional markets could have dissuaded a further increase of production in Myanmar in 2024. However, information from the field suggests that the stagnation in productivity could also be related to the ongoing internal conflict. While instability and conflict, and their impact on the rule of law have traditionally been seen as a driver of illicit crop cultivation, the expansion of the conflict and shifts in the territorial control of armed actors, especially in the growing areas of Shan and Kachin, have limited the mobility of rural population, and likely prevented farmers from accessing cultivation areas further away from their villages. The dynamics of internal conflict might also explain the uneven development across Myanmar’s states in regions, with some areas showing declines in cultivation and others continued growth. In October 2024, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated that there were some 3 million people internally displaced across the country, with Shan and Kachin in particular seeing escalating tensions and clashes in late 2023 and early 2024. The 2024 survey shows decreases in illicit opium cultivation in half of the geographic areas observed, including South Shan which traditionally experienced the most extensive opium cultivation. Eastern Shan, Chin, and Kayah had modest increases between survey years. Overall, cultivation in Shan State, which continues to be the centre of opium production in Myanmar at 88% of total cultivation area, decreased by 4% to 39,700 ha, with decreases in South and North Shan (-9% and -4% respectively) while East Shan increased by 10%. Cultivation in Kachin saw a moderate decrease of 10%, a change from past trends when above-average increases were observed. Estimates for Chin and Kayah, where the overall area remained small in comparison to other areas, showed an 18% and 8% increase, respectively. Overall potential opium production decreased at greater rates than cultivation due to a decline in opium yield. In 2024, average yield declined by 4% from 22.9 kg per hectare to 22kg per hectare, resulting in an estimated opium production of 995 (700-1,580) metric tons, or 8% less than in 2023. Nevertheless, both yield and production remain at high levels across the last decade. The decrease in cultivation and production coincided with a decrease in farmgate prices of both fresh and dry opium in USD terms, by 4% and 8%, respectively. In 2024, fresh opium traded at just over US$300 per kilogram, down from US$317 the year before, although it remained high compared to the last low point in 2021 when it stood at US$131 per kilogram. In combination with lower production, nationally farmers earned slightly less income than the previous year, between US$230 – US$518 million in 2024 (US$271 - US$613 million in 2023). The farmgate value only represents a small share of the overall opiate economy, with heroin manufacture and export making up a larger share. Wholesale prices of heroin in the region declined even more, contributing to a much larger decrease in the value of the total national opiate economy of about 40%, now ranging between US$589 million and US$1.57 billion, representing between 0.9 – 2.4% of Myanmar’s 2023 GDP  

Thailand: UNODC Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific 2024. 88p.

By The Research and Trend Analysis Branch, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC),

Now entering its second year of enforcement, the ban continues to hold. In 2024, the area under cultivation was estimated at 12,800 ha, or 19% more than in 2023 (10,800 ha) . Despite the increase, opium poppy cultivation is still far below the priorban levels. In 2022 an estimated 232,000 ha were cultivated. The increase in cultivation came with a geographical shift. The South-western provinces of the country were long the center of cultivation up to and including 2023. In 2024, this changed and now 59% of all cultivation took place in the North-east, particularly in Badakhshan. The rapid and currently sustained decline in poppy cultivation and opium production has important and wide-ranging implications for the country and opiate markets long supplied by product from Afghanistan. Questions remain as to how the country will cope with the continued reduction in opiate income and how opiate markets downstream will react. Farmers that lack sustainable alternatives face a more precarious financial and economic situation and need alternative economic opportunities to become resilient against picking up poppy cultivation in the future. Distributors and dealers closer to destination markets, as well as consumers, are likely to experience supply constraints in the coming years, should the ban remain in place. Following a major hike in 2022 and 2023, dry opium prices stabilized slightly in the first half of 2024 to around US$730. These prices are several times higher than the long-running pre-ban average of US$100 per kilogram. Extremely high farmgate prices and questions about dwindling opium stocks may encourage a resumption in poppy cultivation, especially in places outside of traditional cultivation centers, including neighboring countries. 

Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 20p.

By Vasiliki Georgoulas-Sherry & Hanna Hernandez

This report analyzes COVID-19 impacts on criminal justice data. Specifically, it focuses on the differences amongst adult and juvenile arrests, adult sentencing and juvenile dispositions, adult and juvenile carceral admissions between 2020 and previous years. This type of analysis can help support state and federal policymakers in determining potential next steps in addressing the pandemic’s impact on the criminal justice system – both in the short-term and in the long-term. This report will also help future researchers better understand the anomalies and a more accurate assessment of the pandemic that occurred in the criminal justice datasets during the years impacted. The Washington Statistical Analysis Center (SAC) applied for and received the 2021 State Justice Statistics Grant from Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS). Among other projects, the SAC sought the grant to evaluate the impact of COVID-19 on criminal justice data. Main conclusions from this report: 1. Overall, counts of arrests in Washington State, regardless of category, showed mixed findings with increased from 2017 to 2018 and then 2019 to 2020; but decreased from 2018 to 2019 and then again 2020 to 2021. From 2020 to 2021, there was an overall 3% decrease in arrests in Washington State. 2. For adult arrests in Washington State, from 2019 to 2020 and then 2020 to 2021, there was an overall 17.8% and 13.9% decrease, respectively. For juvenile arrests, from 2019 to 2020 and then 2020 to 2021, there was an overall 39.1% and 33.2% decrease, respectively. 3. Superior court filings decreased from 16.2% in 2018-2019, to 21.4% in 2019-2020, to 15.7% in 2020-2021. Additionally, felony jail sentences decreased throughout the years, from 2017 to 2021. Furthermore, while the overall average prison sentences also saw a decrease from 2017 to 2021, in 2019 to 2020, murder, sex crimes, robbery, and drug crimes saw rises. 4. Juvenile dispositions showed substantial decreases from 2019 to 2020 and from 2020 to 2021 by 7.3% and by 28.8%, respectively. 5. Adult prison admissions saw a decline in all admissions (new, re-admit, and other) . from 2019 to 2021 6. From 2019 to 2020,DOC juvenile admissions and new admissions increased by 126.9% and 11.7%, respectively. 2020 to 2021 presented with decreases in all juvenile admissions.

Olympia: Washington State Statistical Analysis Center, 2022. 213p.

By Hanna Hernandez, M.A. & Vasiliki Georgoulas-Sherry

This report analyzes COVID-19 impacts on criminal justice data. Specifically, it focuses on reported National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) offenses and Washington Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs (WASPC) arrests and bookings. This type of analysis supports state and federal policymakers to determine the actions needed to address the pandemic’s impact on the criminal justice system. This will also help future researchers define the anomalies that occurred in the criminal justice datasets, specifically the longitudinal studies that include the years impacted by COVID-19. Researchers can provide a more accurate assessment of the impact that the pandemic may have on the criminal justice system and its associated datasets. The Washington Statistical Analysis Center (SAC) applied for and received the 2021 State Justice Statistics Grant from Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS). Among other projects, the SAC sought the grant to conduct this report to evaluate the impact of COVID-19 on criminal justice data. Main conclusions: 1. There was a decrease in 2018 to 2019 (3.0%) and 2019 to 2020 (9.3%) in NIBRS incidents reported. 2. There was a decrease in 2018 to 2019 (0.5%) and 2019 to 2020 (19.1%) in WASPC arrests. 3. There was a decrease in 2018 to 2019 (24.7%) and 2019 to 2020 (12.4%) in WASPC bookings.

Olympia: Washington State Statistical Analysis Center, 2022. 23p.

By The United Office on Drugs and Crime

  In the Sahel countries and their neighbours, the high prevalence of infectious diseases, including malaria, coupled with challenges in terms of the availability and affordability of and access to healthcare, creates an environment in which the demand for medical products and services is not fully met through formal channels. The disparity between the demand for and supply of regulated pharmaceutical products leaves room for trafficking, provides an incentive for the involvement of organized criminal groups and fuels the ongoing threat to public safety and public health in the Sahel countries. Between January 2017 and December 2021, at least 605 tons of different medical products were seized in West Africa during international operations.  While there are no reliable estimates of the overall quantities of medical products that are trafficked in different ways and forms in the Sahel countries, studies point to a percentage of substandard and falsified medicines in the medical market of between 19 and 50 per cent. Some 40 per cent of the substandard and falsified medical products reported in the Sahel countries between 2013 and 2021 was discovered in the regulated supply chain. Just as regulated medical products can be diverted, illicitly manufactured medical products can find their way into authorized pharmaceutical outlets, which shows how much the regulated (legal) and unregulated (illicit) supply chains are interconnected. The Sahel countries rely heavily on imports of medical products because their pharmaceutical industries are still in the early stages of development. Of total pharmaceutical expenditure in sub-Saharan Africa in 2019, imports represented as much as 70 to 90 per cent (roughly 14 billion United States dollars ($)). Medical products diverted from the legal supply chain often originate in the main exporting countries of medical products to the Sahel countries, in particular Belgium and France, and to a lesser extent China and India. Others are manufactured in neighbouring countries, including in North Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. The seaports in the Gulf of Guinea, Conakry (Guinea), Tema (Ghana), Lomé (Togo), Cotonou (Benin) and Apapa (Nigeria) can be identified as major entry points for medical products destined for the Sahel countries. Trafficking by air, using postal shipments or carried out by commercial air passengers, is employed for smuggling smaller quantities of medical products. Once in West Africa, trafficked medical products reach the Sahel countries through smugglers who follow traditional trafficking routes using buses, trucks and private cars. Investigations have revealed the involvement of a wide range of opportunistic actors in trafficking in medical products in the Sahel countries, from employees of pharmaceutical companies, public officials, law enforcement officers and health agency workers to street vendors, all motivated by potential financial gain. Despite terrorist groups and non-state armed groups being commonly associated with trafficking in medical products in the Sahel, most reported cases in the region show that the involvement of such groups is limited and mainly revolves around consuming medical products or levying "taxes" on them in the areas under their control. In sub-Saharan Africa, as many as 267,000 deaths per year are linked to falsified and substandard antimalarial medicines. In addition, up to 169,271 are linked to falsified and substandard antibiotics used to treat severe pneumonia in children.     

Vienna: UNODC, 2022. 28p.

By Vasiliki Georgoulas-Sherry. & Hanna Hernandez

The global 2020 coronavirus pandemic has had an unprecedented impact on the operations and actions of local, state, and national governments across all areas of criminal justice. The unique characteristics of this pandemic trend toward short- and long-term consequences as significant changes to criminal justice and legal outcomes. To respond to these impacts, the Washington Statistical Analysis Center (SAC) applied for and received the 2022 State Justice Statistics (SJS) grant from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS). The SAC sought the grant to increase access to statistical data and create new metrics and indicators to enhance the integrated criminal justice database — the Justice Data Warehouse (JDW) — in efforts to strategically and analytically evaluate the pandemic’s impacts in criminal justice. Through this grant, the Washington SAC leveraged and built upon the JDW to expand the data variables by creating COVID-19 metrics and indicators to help assess and account for COVID-19 impacts in the criminal justice and legal system.

Olympia: Washington State Statistical Analysis Center. 2024. 49p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

The ratio of registered vehicles to people in the Sahel countries is low and per capita daily gasoline consumption is estimated to be among the lowest in the world. Nevertheless, an average at-pump price of $1 per litre would result in a combined annual total market value of at least 5 billion United States dollars ($) for both legal and illegal fuel in the region. Despite some of them producing oil, the Sahel countries rely on fuel imports from Algeria, Libya and Nigeria, where fuel is heavily subsidized. It appears that the low fuel prices in Algeria, Libya and Nigeria are among the most significant drivers of fuel trafficking in the Sahel. In addition to fuel trafficking, cheap gasoline and diesel also fuel the activities of illegal non-state armed groups, including groups deemed “terrorist” by the international community. Moreover, there are some indications that there may be deeper linkages to other forms of smuggling, such as trafficking in medical products, drugs and firearms. There are four major fuel trafficking flows into the Sahel countries: from Nigeria via Benin to Burkina Faso and Mali; from Nigeria via the Niger to Mali; from Algeria to Mali; and from Libya to the Niger and Chad. A large portion of the market for trafficked fuel in the Sahel countries appears to be informally organized. However, recent investigations have revealed the involvement of structured groups with links to prominent individuals with interests in retail fuel companies, financial institutions and corrupt law enforcement officials. This highlights the importance of the formal trade in laundering smuggled fuel. Companies associated with individuals under United Nations Security Council sanctions are also reported to be involved in fuel smuggling from the Niger to Mali. The introduction of fuel subsidies and licensing policies has led to the emergence of powerful business elites in the Sahel countries with sufficient political influence to protect fuel smuggling activities. Opportunities to earn illegal revenue indirectly from fuel trafficking through bribery and other forms of corruption compromise the level of repression that the Sahel countries can exercise on the illicit fuel trade. Issues with, and gaps in, the rule of law in some areas, owing to a combination of a high level of insecurity and vast, porous borders, constitute a key enabling

factor for fuel trafficking in the Sahel. The lack of state presence in remote areas gives room for the proliferation of criminal activities.

Vienna: UNODC, 2022. 24p.

By Natascha Eichinger, Ekaterina Spassova, Murat Yildiz, et al.

The continued global demand for opiates, and the conditions that sustain opiate production in Afghanistan, pose a threat to public health, governance, and security at regional and global

level. This is likely to continue following the change of regime in Afghanistan in August 2021. Afghan opiates are trafficked to almost every continent worldwide. In 2021, the income from opiates in Afghanistan amounted to some USD 1.8–2.7 billion: however, much larger sums are accrued by international Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) along illicit drug supply chains outside Afghanistan. While most opiates trafficked from Afghanistan are trafficked by land methods, a proportion of the opiates produced in South-West Asia are also trafficked by maritime methods to global destinations.

� Some of the opiates produced in Afghanistan and South-West Asia are trafficked via the southern route by maritime means. Seizures of opiates – and methamphetamine – have been increasing in the Indian Ocean, the result of sustained interdictions by national authorities and international maritime coalitions including the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and the EU Naval Force – Somalia (EUNAVFOR). � Drug packages seized in the Indian Ocean are marked with a wide range of stamps including hand pressed and hand-written markings. These stamps are made up of several elements consisting of sequential and non-sequential numbers, names, locations, and different objects. The stamps can provide some detail on the manufacturers and traffickers involved in the production and transport of drugs to international markets. � Stamps can often be used for branding purposes in a similar way to brand logos used with legitimate goods or can be used to identify or alternatively conceal the producers of a batch of heroin. The number of different stamps marked on a package of heroin can be an indicator of how many producers or traffickers were involved with that package. � Stamps are chosen by individual Drug Trafficking Organisations (DTOs). They appear to be well known amongst DTOs and usually can not be copied by other traffickers. However, in some cases a “franchising” process is possible, with smaller traffickers purchasing the right to use stamps associated with larger DTOs. � Dates printed on heroin packages generally indicate the production year. However, there is less clarity when two dates are stamped on a package. In some cases, the second year may indicate when heroin manufacture continued by the same lab, or alternatively can be the expiry date of the heroin or the date when the package was distributed to international markets. Printed dates can also be updated by hand-written markings. � Sequential and non-sequential numbers stamped on heroin packages are generally seen as being coded communications between heroin manufacturers and traffickers, although the specific messages are not known. Sequential numbers (for example 555 or 777) have been found in both the Indian Ocean between 2017 and 2021, and in Central Asia and the Russian Federation in 2012. By comparison, nonsequential numbers (for example 355 or 787) seized in the Indian Ocean are not seen in Central Asia and are only infrequently seized in the Indian Ocean. It is possible that sequential numbers may be associated with relative purity of the heroin contained in the packages stamped with these numbers. � Words stamped on heroin packages appear to be an indicator of where the heroin was produced. Heroin produced in southern Afghanistan is reportedly stamped with Pashto words, while heroin produced in northern Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran is more likely to be stamped with Farsi words. Heroin produced in eastern and western Afghanistan often has words in English, Farsi and Pashto, while heroin produced in Pakistan is labelled with words in English and Urdu. � Heroin and methamphetamine manufactured and trafficked by the same DTO may be stamped with the same or very similar stamps. In some cases, heroin packages are stamped with images of

animals which may be an indicator of relative purity of the heroin or an indicator of the location of the manufacturer. � Although some conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of heroin stamps seized in the Indian Ocean, there is still a lack of clarity on the meaning and purpose of some stamps – even among the drug traffickers interviewed in Afghanistan. Further analysis is required, including the analysis of drug stamps seized in locations outside of the Indian Ocean. It would be advantageous to develop a database of the different markings of heroin stamps to aid such analysis.

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2022. 36p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Key findings • Hawala is a Money or Value Transfer Service (MVTS) that has been used for centuries, originating in the Middle East and South Asia. It is overwhelmingly used for legitimate purposes, including personal and business financial transactions and for the sending of remittances by migrants and refugees to family members. Cultural preferences, convenience, low-threshold accessibility, low processing fees, reliability, and faster value transfer services are some of the reasons for using hawala, and customers using the service come from all walks of life. • Despite being widely used for legitimate purposes, some attributes of the hawala system also make it vulnerable to use by organised crime for the purposes of transferring illicit funds and values. This includes financial transfers by drug traffickers, migrant smugglers and other criminal actors and organisations, as well as safekeeping of funds obtained from illegal activity. The 113 hawaladars interviewed for this study do not commonly ask about the source of money or the reason for sending and receiving money. Additionally, when they did have doubts about the source of the funds, over half of the interviewed hawaladars reported that they had never refused a hawala transaction. • There is no single global regulatory framework for the hawala system. However, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has produced international standards and recommendations for countries to take measures to regulate the hawala system and ensure regular monitoring and compliance. Specific regulations and monitoring regimes vary by country, but FATF recommends countries take a risk-based approach to regulating the hawala system. Of the 18 countries covered by this study, the hawala system was regulated in most of them. However, in four countries it was not regulated, and in Afghanistan – following the events of August 2021 – the current regulatory status of the hawala system is unclear as of the time of writing. • Of the 113 hawaladars interviewed for this report, 43 per cent of hawaladars declared they had a license to operate. In jurisdictions where it is a requirement, 25 per cent operated without a license and 31 per cent preferred not to respond. 36 per cent of the interviewed hawaladars stated that they provided reports to the Central Bank or other relevant financial authorities about their hawala activities, while 64 per cent either had never reported or preferred not to answer the question. Licensed hawaladars collected more personal information from their customers and require identification documents, while for unlicensed hawaladars a name and contact number is sufficient to process a transaction. • Of the hawaladars interviewed in this

study, over one-third reported that they ran multiple branches within the same country and more than half of them reported having offices in other countries. Regular hawala customers are likely to receive a discount on commission charges by hawaladars. • People engaging in regular and irregular migration constitute one customer base of the hawaladars interviewed in this study. Over half of reported that they had migrants as customers. The findings of this study suggest that hawaladars – knowingly and unknowingly - facilitate irregular migration and migrant smuggling by providing multiple financial services including, but not limited to, money or value transfer, safekeeping of funds and introducing migrants and refugees to migrant smugglers. • There are multiple reasons why migrants and refugees would use hawala before, during and after traveling, and these are broadly linked to the features of the system, and, for some, lack of access to any other financial system, such as banks or mobile money services. Migrants and refugees may be directed to a hawaladar by a friend or relative, smuggler, fellow traveller, shopkeeper or accommodation provider. • The interviewed hawaladars identified the following services they provided to migrants and refugees during their journeys: guiding migrants on their journey; helping with finding work upon arrival; referring migrants to support organizations; providing temporary accommodation or referring migrants to an individual who provides temporary accommodation; and finding local medical aid, as undocumented migrants may not be able to or may be reluctant to access hospitals. • Some hawaladars also assist migrants and refugees by finding, recommending or introducing them to a smuggler; and finding or directly renting out boats and trucks for transportation. • The majority of customers using the services of the 113 hawaladars interviewed for this study sent funds to countries located in the Near and Middle East/ South-West Asia sub region, followed by Western and Central Europe and South-Eastern Europe subregions. Customers in the Near and Middle Eastern sub-regions frequently sent funds to hawaladars in most of the eighteen countries where interviews were conducted. Customers of the interviewed hawaladars in the countries of the North American sub-region only sent funds to hawaladars interviewed in Afghanistan, Denmark, Nigeria, Somalia, and the United Republic of Tanzania. • Hawala is widely associated with transferring money or value - this was the most common type of service provided by the sample group in this study. However, sending and receiving money is just one among several financial services hawaladars provide. Cash savings, currency exchange, short-term lending, safekeeping of funds, and trade guarantees were other services the interviewed hawaladars provided to their customers to varying degrees. Some of them safekeep customers’ funds. The amount of funds kept for safekeeping with the interviewed hawaladars ranged from US$ 20,000 to US$ 500,000. • Hawaladars often operate additional businesses alongside their hawala business. Some of the side businesses mentioned by interviewed hawaladars were grocery store, travel agency, selling mobile top-up cards, construction company and electronics shops. • A hawala transaction does not always proceed directly from country A to country B. Depending on the source and destination, sometimes a transaction is carried out through one or more intermediary hawaladars located in at least one other country. Hawaladars interviewed for this study reported that there are multiple hawala hubs located in several regions of the world where such intermediary hawaladars operate. • Hawaladars interviewed in this study reported processing both domestic and international transactions, however, nearly three out of four processed mostly international transactions. The amount of a single hawala transaction varies substantially. Transactions handled by the interviewed hawaladars ranged from as low as US$50 and as high

as US$200,000. To keep a record of these transactions, most hawaladars interviewed in this research reported that they keep a paper (ledger book) as well as an electronic (digital) record of hawala transactions and other services provided. • Hawaladars use a variety of methods to settle their accounts including through cash, reverse transaction, bank transfer or trading in goods and services. Reverse transaction was the most often used method of account settlement among the hawaladars interviewed in this study, followed by settlement through bank transfer. Misuse of the hawala service • In addition to its widespread legitimate use, hawala is vulnerable to misuse by organized crime groups and other criminal actors. More than one-third of the interviewed hawaladars judged the hawala system to be more vulnerable to illegal transactions compared to the formal banking system, while some perceived an equal vulnerability in both systems. A lack of proper oversight by national authorities, a lack of reporting by hawaladars, a lack of regulation, policy, or guidelines for hawaladars to follow, the operation of unlicensed hawaladars, and the closed nature of the hawala system are all potential reasons for vulnerability. • There are no exact estimates as to the extent to which hawaladars, knowingly or unknowingly, facilitate the misuse of their financial services for criminal purposes. Some hawaladars interviewed for this research reported the direct involvement of other hawaladars in transferring funds associated with illegal activities. Additionally, some criminal groups have hawaladars, who may be relatives, working specifically for them for the purposes of transferring funds linked to organised crime. • Several of the interviewed hawaladars reported that they do not ask the purpose of transactions from their customers. As a result, it is possible that hawaladars involved in handling transactions of illicit proceeds are not aware of the nature and source of the money they are transferring or safekeeping. This is particularly the case with hawaladars who are dealing with smaller transactions which usually do not arouse suspicions. However, some hawaladars reported that they could not refuse a transaction from customers connected with Organized Crime Groups (OCGs) due to the risk of negative consequences for themselves and their businesses. • It remains a challenge to precisely document the degree to which hawaladars are transferring illicit funds; it is also difficult to trace illicit financial flows, to separate them from licit flows, and to establish concrete financial links to criminal activities. Law enforcement agencies face challenges in investigating crimes linked to hawala systems, because of the closed nature of the business and, in some cases, the kinship ties of the actors.

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2023. 91p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Sahel countries are some of the largest gold producers in Africa. While gold production data can be unreliable, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania and the Niger are estimated to have produced 228 tons of gold in 2021, worth over 12.6 billion United States dollars ($). The gold sector is a major economic driver in the Sahel countries. Artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM) production is estimated at 108 tons per year in Sahel countries, although official ASGM production data is largely unreliable due to the informal nature of the sector. ASGM provides a livelihood to over 1.8 million people in areas where income-generating activities are limited. The sector is characterized by high levels of informality because it often takes place on unlicensed and undeclared mining sites. Gold mining without licenses is illegal in all Sahel countries, although Member States have taken measures to formalize ASGM. Barriers to accessing mining licences often push communities involved in ASGM into a vicious cycle of illegality. Without protection of the law, they depend on a local economy often controlled by transnational organized crime (TOC) groups to fund their operations and to sell their gold production, with limited opportunities for structural investments. These communities are potentially susceptible to

recruitment by armed groups, including violent extremist groups. Porous borders enable gold to be easily moved within the Sahel countries and smuggled out of the region, including to the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Vienna: UNODC, 2023. 36p.

By Ayumi Takano, Kunihiko Takahashi, Tatsuhiko Anzai, Takashi Usami, Shiori Tsutsumi, Yuka Kanazawa, Yousuke Kumakura, Toshihiko Matsumoto

Background: Methamphetamine use is related to severe health, social, and criminal challenges. However, there is limited evidence regarding the factors associated with the recurrence of drug use among individuals who have used methamphetamine, particularly within populations involved in the criminal justice system. This study aimed to identify predictors of illicit drug use at a one-year follow-up among males in Japan who have used methamphetamine and are involved in the criminal justice system. Methods: The study participants were adult males on probation due to methamphetamine use or possession and were involved in a community-based program. The participants were recruited early in their probation period and participated in telephone-based surveys conducted by mental health center staff. We analyzed one-year follow-up data to investigate the recurrence rate of illicit drug use and associated risk factors using multiple logistic regression. Results: Out of 234 participants, 27 (11.5%) used illicit drugs during the one-year follow-up period. After adjusting for demographic characteristics, severity of drug use, type of probation, and use of treatment for substance use disorders, the use of social welfare services (OR = 2.78) and a lack of trustworthy relationships (OR = 3.17) were significantly associated with recurrence of illicit drug use. Conclusions: This study suggested that individuals facing challenges in maintaining stable living conditions and building trustworthy relationships were more likely to return to drug use early in their probation period. Comprehensive and tailored support focused on social stabilization and relationship-building is required to prompt recovery in males who have experienced methamphetamine use.

Drug and Alcohol Dependence Reports, (2024)

By Ulla D. Berg, and Sebastian K. León

Each year the United States government detains and deports hundreds of thousands of people who prior to their removal are held in confinement for an average of 55 days. The short and long-term effects of the coronavirus pandemic on migrant detention and deportation continue to be evaluated in real time, including how we can best study it. This paper provides a timely analysis on the relationship between immigration enforcement and confinement, public health emergencies, and ethnographic methods. It makes two contributions. The first is methodological and focuses on the challenges and opportunities of ethnographic methods in carceral settings when pandemic-related protocols have raised additional challenges to conventional in-person prison ethnography. The second contribution is empirical and documents how we adapted ethnographic methods to an interdisciplinary research design and to the exigencies of the pandemic to study the spread of the coronavirus in four immigrant detention facilities in New Jersey, USA.

EthnographyVolume 25, Issue 3, September 2024, Pages 314-334

By Elena Marushiakova, and Vesselin Popov

In their centuries-old history, the Roma (formerly known as Gypsies) experienced many difficult moments and cruel trials from their arrival in Europe until now. The history of the Roma in the USSR is no exception in this respect. Along with affirmative state policy towards them (at least until the end of the 1930s), they also fell victim to the massive political repressions of that time. In this book, the Roma victims of these repressions are made visible and the scale of the repressions against them is discussed. The authors describe the political repression of Roma not as an isolated historical phenomenon explicitly aimed at the Roma as a separate ethnic community but understand the events as a component of the mass terror and brutal against all Soviet citizens. In this way, the history of the Roma is inscribed in the general history of the USSR.

Leiden; Boston: Brill: 2024.

By Alexander Huezo

Focusing on the lived experiences of Afro-Colombians processing and resisting violence against their ecological communities, Visions of Global Environmental Justice employs accounts of the supernatural narratively and analytically to frame a contemporary struggle for environmental justice. The book applies Achille Mbembe’s theorization of necropolitics to the environmental racism of the US War on Drugs in Colombia, specifically the aerial eradication of coca in the comunidades negras of the Pacific Coast. Through critical examination and deconstruction of transnational mythmaking and local oral tradition, Visions of Global Environmental Justice illustrates that non/humans rendered expendable by US-driven drug (necro)politics are indispensable to both the conceptualization and the realization of environmental justice globally. Far from being a study singularly focused on the symptoms of environmental issues, this book creatively guides us toward a broader understanding of environmental racism and justice across geographic scales and non/human agencies.

Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2025.

Edited by Nutmeg Hallett, Richard Whittington, Dirk Richter, Emachi Eneje

This book aims to provide a state-of-the-art overview of the contexts, causes and treatments that relate to the reduction of coercion and the prevention of violence in mental health settings. The objective of this new edition in Open Access is to integrate theoretical explanations, empirical findings and practical solutions on the topic from many countries and diverse professional contexts.

A large proportion of the text is concerned with practical and applied guidance for practitioners and others based on a clear understanding of conceptual and theoretical issues. Significantly enriched by the contributions of lived experience editors and co-authors, this edition brings authentic, new perspectives that deepen its relevance and impact.

There is extensive use of case studies drawn from practice and the media to enliven the discussion. The scope of the book is intended to go beyond a reductionist medical/biological orientation on coercion and violence in mental health by integrating this within broader psychological and social frameworks. It includes new relevant contributions from nursing, psychology, psychiatry and sociology. The language of the book is clear and understandable to a broad audience whilst offering new knowledge for researchers and other specialists.

Cham Springer Nature, 436p.

By Sabine E. M. van Sleeuwen, Wouter Steenbeek, Stijn Ruiter

Objectives: Building on Hägerstrand’s time geography, we expect temporal consistency in individual offending behavior. We hypothesize that repeat offenders commit offenses at similar times of day and week. In addition, we expect stronger temporal consistency for crimes of the same type and for crimes committed within a shorter time span. Method: We use police-recorded crime data on 28,274 repeat offenders who committed 152,180 offenses between 1996 and 2009 in the greater The Hague area in the Netherlands. We use a Monte Carlo permutation procedure to compare the overall level of temporal consistency observed in the data to the temporal consistency that is to be expected given the overall temporal distribution of crime. Results: Repeat offenders show strong temporal consistency: they commit their crimes at more similar hours of day and week than expected. Moreover, the observed temporal consistency patterns are indeed stronger for offenses of the same type of crime and when less time has elapsed between the offenses, especially for offenses committed within a month after the prior offense. Discussion: The results are consistent with offenders having recurring rhythms that shape their temporal crime pattern. These findings might prove valuable for improving predictive policing methods and crime linkage analysis as well as interventions to reduce recidivism.

Journal of Quantitative Criminology (2021) 37:863–889

By Sabine E. M. van Sleeuwen, Stijn Ruiter, Wouter Steenbeek

Objectives: Crime pattern theory and the related empirical research have remained rather a-temporal, as if the timing of routine activities and crime plays no role. Building on previous geography of crime research, we extend crime pattern theory and propose that an offender’s spatial knowledge acquired during daily routine activities is not equally applicable to all times of day. Methods: We put this extended theory to a first empirical test by applying a discrete spatial choice model to detailed information from the Netherlands on 71 offences committed by 30 offenders collected through a unique online survey instrument. The offenders reported on their most important activity nodes and offence locations over the past year, as well as the specific times they regularly visited these locations. Results: The results show that almost 40% of the offences are committed within the neighbourhoods of offenders’ activity nodes, increasing to 85% when including first-, second- and third-order neighbourhoods. Though not statistically significant in our small sample, the results further suggest that offenders are more likely to commit crime in neighbourhoods they have regularly visited at the same time of day than in neighbourhoods they have regularly visited at different times of day. Conclusion: Our extension of crime pattern theory is only tentatively supported. We argue for replication research with larger samples before any firm conclusions are warranted.

Crime Science volume 10, Article number: 2, 2021, 10p.

By Marleen Gorissen, Chantal JW van den Berg, Stijn Ruiter, Catrien CJH Bijleveld

Online disclosure of sexual violence victimisation is a relatively new phenomenon. While prior research has mainly relied on analysis of Twitter data from the #MeToo period, this study compares such disclosures across platforms over two years. Using machine learning, 2927 disclosures were identified for quantitative content analysis and multiple correspondence analysis. Online platforms differed in timing of the posts, information shared, information density, co-occurrence of information and the length of the disclosure message. Most disclosures were found on the platform Twitter, and during the #MeToo movement. These posts differ from disclosures on other platforms and outside the viral movement. Regarding the content, across all platforms and periods, clustering was found around offender-oriented information, making the offender an explicit part of the experience. This study shows that an exclusive focus on online disclosures on Twitter and during viral movements gives a biased and incomplete picture of what online disclosure of sexual victimisation entails. Our cross-platform analysis over time allows for more universal statements about the content and context of online disclosures of sexual victimisation.

Computers in Human Behavior, Volume 144, July 2023, 107724