By Eric Hershberg, Edward Maguire, Steven Dudley

In October 2012, the U.S. government designated MS-13 as a transnational criminal organization (TCO), raising serious questions about the breadth of the gang’s criminal capacity. Some analysts have pointed to a steady growth and professionalization of this criminal organization, but insufficient data has hindered the formulation and implementation of policies aimed at countering this trend. Our multiyear project proposed to fill gaps in the extant literature by conducting qualitative and quantitative research designed to assess MS-13’s transnational criminal capacity. More specifically, our objectives were to: 1) conduct extensive interviews with local stakeholders, gang experts, and MS-13 members in three major metropolitan areas, including two in the U.S. and one in El Salvador; 2) analyze qualitative and quantitative data gathered through tested survey and interview instruments and from official sources, with particular attention to the following factors: type of criminal activities, organizational structure, inter- and intra-gang relationships, level of community penetration, accumulation of social capital, development and migration patterns, and recruitment strategies; 3) utilize social network analysis techniques to quantify the social reach of gang member respondents; and 4) disseminate project findings to relevant constituencies in law enforcement, policymaking circles, academe, and the general public. The purpose of our research was to provide policymakers and law enforcement officials with a comprehensive understanding of MS-13 by measuring the extent and range of the organization’s criminal activity and mapping its social networks. Our goal was to generate empirical data that could serve as a foundation upon which to shape new policies and practices. Specifically, our hope was that the data would provide insights regarding the optimal allocation of law enforcement resources, the likely movements of MS-13, and the design of intervention and suppression strategies. 

Washington DC: U..S. Department of Justice,  2019. 11p.

By The International Crisis Group

  Principal Findings : What’s new? In President Nayib Bukele’s first year in office, El Salvador has seen a sharp drop in what long were sky-high murder rates. While the public celebrates his well-known “iron fist” policies, the reasons for success might lie in quiet, informal understandings between gangs and the government. Why does it matter? It is a major feat to reduce killings by the three main gangs in one of the world’s most violent countries. But the precise causes of the decline are complex and often unclear. Recent outbreaks of gang violence and political mudslinging underline the fragility and reversibility of this achievement. What should be done? Sustaining violence reduction is key. The government should prioritise community-focused development, rehabilitation of jailed gang members and more sophisticated policing efforts, including internal checks on security forces. Should gangs keep violence down and cooperate with authorities during the pandemic, Bukele should consider opening channels for local dialogue with them.   

  After decades of harrowing gang crime, homicides have plunged in El Salvador on the watch of the new president, Nayib Bukele. Faced with the growth of the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs, previous governments resorted to “iron fist” policies to crush them, only to find these fuelled a backlash. Since his 2019 election, President Bukele, a self-styled outsider, has won huge public support by presiding over a 60 per cent fall in murders. Yet prospects that this achievement will endure are in doubt. The collapsing homicide rate may stem not only from the government’s public security policies, but also from the gangs’ own decision to curb bloodshed, possibly due to a fragile non-aggression deal with authorities. In addition, Bukele’s confrontational style, which has been exacerbated during the COVID-19 pandemic, risks entangling his security reforms in political battles. Broadly backed efforts to support affected communities, assist members wishing to leave gangs and encourage local peacebuilding are more likely to end definitively El Salvador’s cycle of violence. The Bukele administration argues that the plummeting murder rate – with daily killings now standing at their lowest rate since the end of the country’s civil war (1980- 1992) – represents the crowning achievement of a new security strategy. In theory, the government’s Territorial Control Plan couples robust law enforcement with violence prevention schemes. It has reinforced joint police and military patrols in 22 municipalities suffering high rates of crime, while toughening confinement measures in jails in a bid to sever communications between inmates and the outside world. At the same time, the government’s goal of building dozens of “cubes” – glass-walled recreational and education centres – represents the flagship effort to brighten the lives of young people growing up under gang dominion and prevent recruitment into their ranks. The precise reasons for the nationwide drop in homicides are hard to pin down. Statistical studies show that the Territorial Control Plan is most likely not the sole cause; specific local falls in murder rates do not correspond precisely to those areas where the plan has been implemented. Instead, in large part, gangs appear to have themselves decided to scale back their use of lethal violence. Unassailable control over communities, declining gang rivalry and increasingly autonomous gang leadership outside jails may explain this decision more than the Territorial Control Plan. Yet other government policies might have played a role: numerous analysts and local activists ascribe the gangs’ move to an informal understanding between them and the authorities, who have allegedly ordered security forces to dial back their clashes with these groups. A sudden killing spree attributed to MS-13 in April illustrated just how precarious the gangs’ commitment to reducing violence can be. Bukele’s reaction to the attacks, which left over 80 dead in a five-day span, reaffirmed his inclination to adopt punitive measures to force gangs into submission. Images shared around the world from inside El Salvador’s high-security jails revealed inmates huddled together or forced into shared cells without any access to daylight. Although murder rates have since fallen again, the risk remains that gangs, now short of extortion income due to lockdown measures and indignant at the government’s crackdown, will once again resort to extreme violence.  

  Crisis Group Latin America Report N°81, 8 July 2020  

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2020. 46p.

By Global Financial Integrity and the Cyrus R. Vance Center for International Justice

On September 7, 2021, El Salvador became the first country in the world to adopt Bitcoin as legal tender. Two years later, the country has undergone technological change and growth, faced operational and regulatory challenges, and learned a tremendous amount in the process. This joint publication by the Vance Center and Global Financial Integrity (GFI) analyzes virtual assets (VAs) in El Salvador, first from a legal and regulatory perspective, as well as from an anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorism financing (CFT) perspective The first half of the report analyzes the current regulatory landscape in El Salvador regarding Bitcoin and VAs. El Salvador has taken a major leap in embracing technological innovation, specifically in the digitalization of the financial system, through adopting bitcoin, cryptocurrencies, and digital assets. The country has established a regulatory framework encompassing the Bitcoin Law, the Digital Assets Issuance Law, and the Innovation and Manufacture of Technologies Promotion Law. These laws aim to provide a supportive environment for individuals and businesses engaging in transactions involving digital currencies while fostering innovation and technology manufacturing within the nation.

As a result, El Salvador is poised to become a leading proponent of emerging technologies across various sectors of its economy. Due to the dynamic nature of the subject matter and the ongoing efforts to standardize these frameworks internationally, the report identifies additional areas that may still require regulation.

The second half of the report analyzes VAs in El Salvador from an AML/CFT perspective. The report approaches these issues from the perspective of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which states that “the cornerstone (…) is the risk-based approach which emphasizes the need for countries to identify and understand the money laundering (ML) and terrorism financing (TF) risks they are exposed to.”

Understanding risks enables countries such as El Salvador to take mitigating measures and to deploy limited resources effectively. In this regard, the report analyzes financial crime risks for the most common predicate offenses for ML in El Salvador, considering drug trafficking, extortion, migrant smuggling, and misappropriation of public funds (peculado). The report also assesses financial crime risks related to specific operational features or developments within El Salvador’s VA ecosystem.

The report concludes with policy recommendations that can help El Salvador to maximize the benefits and minimize the risks associated with financial innovation. Key recommendations include:

Policymakers in El Salvador should urgently adopt reforms strengthening AML/CFT as well as ensuring robust oversight over VAs. These reforms are particularly important in light of El Salvador’s upcoming Mutual Evaluation.

The Government of El Salvador, and specifically the Central Reserve Bank (BCR) and the National Commission of Digital Assets (NCDA), should engage with the legal and business community in developing regulations and technical standards according to need and practice for the Bitcoin Law and Digital Assets Issuance Law, following international best practices.

Lawyers and law firms advising companies wanting to operate in El Salvador should enhance compliance mechanisms to verify client backgrounds to prevent criminal actors from entering the national financial system.

All relevant government agencies should ensure transparency and access to public information, including contractual and operational processes, fraud and mismanagement investigations, and the use of public funds, per domestic laws and international standards.

The BCR should incorporate information on government Bitcoin purchases into the Balance of Payments and other similar documents.

The Superintendence of the Financial System (SSF) should require that Chivo Wallet collect information on legal persons opening Chivo Wallet accounts in line with the requirements for legal persons to open other types of financial accounts. In addition, Chivo Wallet should maintain beneficial ownership information for legal persons using Chivo Wallet, in line with FATF Recommendation 15’s interpretive guidance and similar to the requirements for financial institutions.

Considering that financial institutions and other obligated entities submit suspicious transaction reports (STRs) for crypto transactions, the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) of El Salvador and other government authorities should provide education and training opportunities to the financial sector and other obligated entities regarding identification of red flag indicators in crypto transactions. This will help to ensure that STRs contain relevant information and reflect an informed understanding of the risks.

Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity 2023. 63p,

By Alex Papadovassilakis, et al

El Salvador’s gangs are in disarray.

For decades, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS13) and two factions of the 18th Street (Barrio 18) dominated the small Central American nation’s criminal landscape. The gangs embedded themselves in poor communities, terrorizing urban dwellers with extortion and murders. Successive governments tried and failed to dismantle the gangs with aggressive security policies, known as mano dura (iron fist).

In March 2022, the government of El Salvador President Nayib Bukele enacted a state of emergency (régimen de excepción) in response to a brutal gang massacre that left 87 dead. Buoyed by emergency powers, security forces tore through the gangs, arresting tens of thousands of suspected gang members and collaborators. Those who escaped arrest went underground or into exile. In a flash, the MS13 and Barrio 18 all but vanished from the streets of El Salvador.

But though battered and bruised, a surprising number of gang members remain at large. The country’s prisons, once incubators for the gangs, have never been so full.

This six-part investigation looks at how the Bukele government’s crackdown succeeded in overpowering the MS13 and Barrio 18. We assess what remains of the gangs in El Salvador, and contemplate whether these structures could one day return or mutate.

Washington, DC; Medellin, Columbia: InSight Crime, 2023.56p.

The International Crisis Group

What’s the issue? After fifteen years of failed security policies, the government of El Salvador is in the middle of an open confrontation. Efforts aimed at fighting gangs’ deep social roots have not produced desired results due to a lack of political commitment and social divisions that gangs use to their advantage. Why does it matter? Born in the wake of U.S. deportation policies in the late 90s, gang violence in El Salvador has developed into a national security problem that accounts for the country’s sky-high murder rate. The combination of mano dura (iron fist) policies and the U.S. administration’s approach to migration could worsen El Salvador’s already critical security situation. What should be done? All political actors should honour the government’s holistic violence prevention strategies by fully implementing them and reframing anti-gang policies. Specific police and justice reforms, as well as a legal framework for rehabilitating

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2017. 46p,