By Leah Ouellet, Daphne M. Brydon, Laura S. Abrams, Jeffrey T. Ward, Dylan B. Jackson, Rebecca Turner, J. Z. Bennett, Reese Howard, Ashley Xu

Miller v. Alabama and Montgomery v. Louisiana restricted states’ ability to impose life without parole for youth under age 18 (henceforth JLWOP). Since Miller, 46 pieces of legislation across 34 states and the District of Columbia have altered JLWOP sentencing policies. The current study provides the first comprehensive and scientific review of this legislation. Using policy surveillance as a methodological guide, we found that a majority of statutes (N = 28) ban JLWOP sentencing, above and beyond the Supreme Court's requirement. Many statutes also extended sentencing reforms and post-conviction relief eligibility to other types of sentencing beyond JLWOP. However, all but one statute still allows either JLWOP or life with parole as a sentencing option for minors convicted of homicide crimes and requires between 15 and 40 years, at minimum, to be served before being eligible for release. Grounding our analysis in institutional theory, we argue that the relative punitivity of the JLWOP reforms enacted was associated with measures of JLWOP institutionalization across states (i.e., pre-Miller JLWOP population and pre-Miller sentencing schema), suggesting that states where JLWOP was more routinely used were more resistant to policy reform.

Policy Implications

The current study provides implications for future decarceration efforts. Findings suggest that state legislatures are willing to enact post-conviction relief measures (e.g., judicial review or “second look” measures) for individuals convicted of violent crimes to address over-incarceration, deviating from previous decarceration efforts focused on non-violent, low-level offenses. In spite of the promising window for juvenile justice reform that Miller provided, however, these reforms have taken a relatively modest, incremental approach toward altering extreme youth sentencing practices in the United States. Policy makers and advocates seeking to promote sentencing reform efforts should factor in how highly institutionalized a sentencing practice is in each state, as this might inform effective strategies for policy change.

By Ian Ayres, Joseph Bankman, & Daniel J. Hemel

The negative moral emotions of guilt and shame impose real social costs but also create opportunities for policymakers to engender compliance with legal rules in a cost-effective manner. We present a unified model of guilt and shame that demonstrates how legal policymakers can harness negative moral emotions to increase social welfare. The prospect of guilt and shame can deter individuals from violating moral norms and legal rules, thereby substituting for the expense of state enforcement. But when legal rules and law enforcement fail to induce total compliance, guilt and shame experienced by noncompliers can increase the law’s social costs. We identify specific circumstances in which rescinding a legal rule will improve social welfare because eliminating the rule reduces the moral costs of noncompliance with the law’s command. We also identify other instances in which moral costs strengthen the case for enacting legal rules and investing additional resources in enforcement because deterrence reduces the negative emotions experienced by noncompliers. We end by exploring the implications of our framework for legal policy across “guilt cultures” and “shame cultures,” for the debate over shaming sanctions, and for other moral emotions such as resentment and virtue.

University of Chicago Law Review (forthcoming), Yale Law & Economics Research Paper, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 601,