By EUDA and the Regional Intelligence Liaison Office Western Europe (RILO-WE) of the World Customs Organization (WCO)

This report was prepared jointly by the European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA) and the Regional Intelligence Liaison Office Western Europe (RILO-WE) of the World Customs Organization (WCO), in order to support the European Ports Alliance Public Private Partnership (European Ports Alliance). To this end it provides an overview of seizures of drugs in or destined for EU seaports in the period from January 2019 to June 2024. As the report notes, there are significant gaps in the available data, which is a major barrier to developing a better understanding of the current situation and trends. As a result, the report’s findings need to be interpreted with a degree of caution. • Based on data provided by WCO RILO-WE, a total of 1 826 tonnes of drugs were seized at or in transit to EU seaports in the period between January 2019 and June 2024, out of which more than 1 244 tonnes were seized at EU ports (about 68 %). The data available indicates that the majority of the total quantity was seized from container ships (at least 1 507 tonnes, 82.6 % of the total). However, this is likely to be a significant underestimate of all drugs seized in or destined for EU ports during this period, due to the absence of data and gaps in reporting from several EU Member States. • Eighteen EU countries reported to the WCO on seizures carried out at a total of 96 EU ports (of which 40 are in Spain). However, the data submitted by these countries is not comprehensive, as some countries only reported a limited number of cases. For example, two key Member States only reported two cases each to the WCO during the five-and-a-half-year period in question, while the actual number of seizures in these countries during this time was much higher. • Among the 33 seaports that belong to the European Ports Alliance, nine appear not to report drug seizures to the WCO. The analysis also indicates that some seaports that are currently not members of the European Ports Alliance are significant targets for maritime drug trafficking. • Seventeen EU ports seized over 10 tonnes of drugs in this period, with Antwerp (BE) seizing the largest quantity (483 tonnes). • Cocaine appears to be the drug trafficked in the largest quantity to EU ports, with about 1 487 tonnes seized, representing 81.7 % of the total quantity of drugs in the dataset. Cannabis resin appears to be the second most trafficked drug, with about 260 tonnes seized, or 14.2 % of the total. For some drug types, only small numbers of seizures were reported (e.g. only 35 seizures of herbal cannabis were recorded). • The ports of Antwerp (BE) and Rotterdam (NL) seized the largest quantities of cocaine (about 443 tonnes and 181 tonnes respectively) and heroin (8.1 tonnes and 5 tonnes respectively). • The ports of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (ES) and Huelva (ES) seized the largest quantities of cannabis resin (42 tonnes and 30 tonnes respectively). • The available data indicate that at least 21.7 tonnes of captagon were seized at EU seaports during this period. The majority came from one seizure in Salerno (IT) in 2020 (14.2 tonnes). It is noteworthy that no captagon seizures were reported to the WCO in EU ports after 2020. • The large quantities of drugs seized on average per shipment — more than 500 kilograms of cocaine and more than 1.3 tonnes of cannabis resin — and in total during the period, confirm that criminal networks are still able to use EU ports to smuggle wholesale amounts of various drugs, especially cocaine. This in turn indicates that EU ports are infiltrated by organised criminal networks to a significant degree, implying the likely corruption among port staff including port workers and law enforcement officials. In addition, violence has been observed in connection with drug smuggling in many EU ports. 

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2025 2025. 32p

Sergi, Anna

This article will present the results of a qualitative research into organised crime in the port of Genoa, Italy’s largest port, by looking at the challenges of policing the port space. Through the case of Genoa, the paper reflects on how organised crime manifests across three trajectories in seaports: trafficking through the port, infiltration in the port economy and governance of the port management. This paper argues that the space and geography of the port-city relationship are key to understand how and to what extent different organised criminal groups act in and around the port and within global drives. An integrated approach between urban criminology and organised crime studies is needed to better map the very complex picture of organised criminality in the port within the city.

Policing the port, watching the city. Manifestations of organised crime in the port of Genoa. Policing and Society, 31 (6). (2021) pp. 639-655.

By Anna Sergi

This article presents findings from a qualitative research project into organized crime, policing and security across five major seaports (‘Portvilles’): Genoa (Italy); Melbourne (Australia); Montreal (Canada); New York (USA); and Liverpool (UK). Through content analysis of confidential judicial files, the article will construct the offenders’ scenarios and options for importing drugs in Portville. Through also interviews with law enforcement agencies, police forces and security staff in these seaports, the article presents the policing and security struggles to disrupt importations. The main finding is that importation roles and security techniques change constantly and quickly, as in a game of Pac-Man. Security and policing in seaports lead to the dilution and fragmentation of drug importation, and only distribution tends to remain organized in Portville. In this chaotic environment, it is the rules of trade that affect the success of drug importations the most, rather than the failures of effective security and policing.

European Journal of Criminology. 19 (4), 674-691, 2022.

By OECD/  EUIPO

Illicit trade in fake goods is a significant and growing threat in a globalised and innovation-driven economy, undermining good governance, the rule of law and citizens’ trust in government. It not only has a negative impact on the sales and profits of affected firms and on the economy in general, but also poses major health and safety threats to consumers. To provide policy makers with solid empirical evidence about this threat, the OECD and the EU Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) joined forces to carry out a series of analytical studies that deepen our understanding of the scale and magnitude of the problem. The results have been published in a set of reports starting with Trade in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods: Mapping the Economic Impact (2016), and including the most recent ones Trends in Trade in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods (2019), and Illicit Trade in Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals (2020). The results are worrying. Trade in counterfeit and pirated goods amounted to up to 3.3 % of world trade in 2016; when considering only imports into the EU, fake goods amounted to up to 6.8 % of imports. Counterfeiters operate swiftly in the globalised economy, misusing modern logistical solutions and legitimate trade facilitation mechanisms and thrive in economies lacking good governance standards. Evidence shows that, while criminals continue to use all available modes of transport for illicit trade, seizures from commercial maritime container shipping continue to dominate in terms of volume and value of goods seized. The COVID-19 pandemic has intensified the problem: criminal networks have reacted very quickly to the crisis and adapted their strategies to take advantage of the shifting landscape. This study provides a detailed analysis of economy- and industry-specific patterns in the misuse of containerised maritime transport by counterfeiters. Such information is crucially needed, not only for better understanding this threat, but also for developing effective governance responses to support post-COVID recovery. This study was carried out under the auspices of the OECD’s Task Force on Countering Illicit Trade, which focuses on evidence-based research and advanced analytics to assist policy makers in mapping and understanding the vulnerabilities exploited and created by illicit trade  

Paris: OECD, 2021. 81p.

By Anna Sergi

Abstract In large commercial seaports policing and security efforts to counter the drug trade, especially cocaine, do not appear to be effective beyond a mere displacement effect. In the port of Piraeus, Greece, (perceived) rising quantities of cocaine have led to calls for further securitisation of the port to curb illicit trafficking. This article will present the current trends of countering and disrupting cocaine at the port of Piraeus and question how these efforts, together with the growth of the port, are affecting the overall territory of and around the port. This article will first argue that the (perceived) increase in cocaine trade towards/in the port of Piraeus has activated a ‘utopia of security’ in the policing and security responses at the port. This utopia of security leads to paradoxes when it comes to being effective against organised crime in the port. The article will conclude by discussing the possibility of a different approach, one of displacement of countering efforts rather than of cocaine flows. This different approach can also rebalance the focus of policing and security authorities on the relationship between the port and its territory. 

European Journal of Criminology 1–21 © The Author(s) 2023