By Marisol Cruz Cain, Gretta L. Goodwin

Cybercrime, such as hacking and ransomware attacks, is increasing in the United States—leading to billions of dollars in losses and threatening public safety. Several federal agencies work to detect, investigate, and prosecute cybercrimes. Agencies vary in how they collect data on these crimes, and there is no official definition of cybercrime. As a result, this data may not be consistent or complete. In 2022, Congress required the Department of Justice to develop definitions and categories for cybercrimes in its national crime reporting system—which should help law enforcement agencies comprehensively track and monitor these crimes.

Washington DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2023. 40p.

By Anthony Morgan and Isabella Voce

This paper draws on data from a large national survey conducted in 2021 to examine the prevalence of data breaches among Australian computer users and the relationship between data breaches and other forms of cybercrime victimisation. Almost one in 10 respondents (9.3%) said they were notified their information was exposed in a data breach in the 12 months prior to the survey. Nearly one-third of these respondents (28.0%) had also been a victim of identity crime in the same period. Respondents who had been notified of a data breach were 34 percent more likely than other respondents to have been a victim of identity crime in the 12 months prior to the survey. They were also more likely to have been a victim of online scams or fraud and ransomware. Measures to protect individuals whose information has been exposed in a data breach from other potentially related cybercrimes are essential and should be prioritised when data breaches occur.

Statistical Bulletin no. 40. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2022. 16p.

By Merran McAlister, Emily Faulconbridge, Isabella Voce and Samantha Bricknell

This study presents findings from the Australian Cybercrime Survey related to identity crime and misuse. Thirty-one percent of respondents experienced identity crime in their lifetime and 20 percent in the past 12 months. Almost half of identity crime victims reported that suspicious transactions appeared in their bank statements or accounts. The type of personal information most commonly misused was names, followed by credit or debit card information. While one quarter of respondents did not know how their information was obtained, 16 percent believed it to be due to the hacking of a computer or device. Twenty-nine percent of past 12 month victims experienced a financial loss. The median amount initially lost was $300. Nineteen percent of victims had money reimbursed, the median amount being $250.

Statistical Bulletin 42. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2023. 18p.

By Isabella Voce and Anthony Morgan

This is the first report in the Cybercrime in Australia series, which aims to provide a clearer picture of the extent of cybercrime victimisation, help-seeking and harms among Australian computer users. It is based on a survey of 13,887 computer users conducted in early 2023. In the 12 months prior to the survey, 27 percent of respondents had been a victim of online abuse and harassment, 22 percent had been a victim of malware, 20 percent had been a victim of identity crime and misuse, and eight percent had been a victim of fraud and scams. Overall, 47 percent of respondents experienced at least one cybercrime in the 12 months prior to the survey—and nearly half of all victims reported experiencing more than one type of cybercrime. Thirty-four percent of respondents had experienced a data breach. Cybercrime victimisation was not evenly distributed, with certain sections of the community more likely to have been a victim, and certain online activities associated with a higher likelihood of victimisation.

Most cybercrime victimisation went unreported to police or to ReportCyber, meaning official statistics significantly underestimate the size of the problem. Satisfaction with the outcomes of these reports was mixed, and relatively few reports resulted in an offender being apprehended. Rates of help-seeking varied and were influenced by the perceived seriousness of cybercrime and knowledge of how and where to report it.

The financial losses experienced by victims were wide ranging. Some victims reported losing large sums of money, but most victims reported relatively small financial losses. This report measures, for the first time, the harms experienced by individual victims and small businesses that extend beyond these financial costs. Twenty-five percent of respondents were negatively impacted by cybercrime in the 12 months prior to the survey, while 22 percent of respondents who owned or operated a small to medium business said their business was negatively impacted by cybercrime.

Statistical Bulletin, 43. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2023. 113p.

By Peter Tinti

Despite 8 years of violent insurgency in northern Mali, the region continues to be a transit zone for regional and global drug-trafficking networks. The networks have endured by ingratiating themselves with a rotating cast of actors whose tactics are based on pragmatic local conditions rather than ideology. For example, an implicit nonaggression pact among key elements of the CMA, Plateforme, and jihadist groups enables traffickers to continue unmolested. International partners should help regional governments better understand and dismantle these networks.

ENACT-- Africa, 2020. 24p.

By David Soud, Ian Ralby and Rohini Ralby: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

Gold flows within Venezuela can be categorized under two broad headings: centralised and dispersed. The centralised flows carry a portion of production from the country’s myriad small mining operations to the government-monitored trading hubs. Centralised flows reportedly include gold transfers from the Venezuelan Central Bank to foreign governments and other entities in Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Iran and elsewhere. While these flows of gold out of Venezuela might be considered legal, companies are still expected to carry out enhanced due diligence to ascertain whether conditions of extraction and trade are associated with actual or potential risks of severe human rights abuses, conflict financing and other financial crimes as per the OECD Guidance, as well as environmental harm.

In contrast, dispersed flows are those that leave the country from mining areas by various other routes. The Venezuelan military and political elites, Colombian militant groups, and domestic gangs are reported to be key actors in both categories of domestic gold flows. Gold from dispersed flows departing Venezuela appears to be laundered primarily within the Latin America and Caribbean region, mainly in one or more key regional transit hubs. Laundering networks can, however, extend across the globe and actors connected in other continents. Since many of the high-risk gold flows out of Venezuela involve regional transit hubs as well as distant transit countries and destination markets, any approach to mitigating the risks tied to Venezuelan gold should include regional and international coordination among both government and industry actors. This consideration is heightened by the evident involvement of transnational criminal organisations and designated terrorist groups in exploiting mining communities, extracting gold and laundering it into the legitimate supply chain. The resulting picture is preliminary but also revealing. The role of the maritime space in high-risk gold flows needs more attention; so does the role played by Free Trade Zones (FTZs) in facilitating gold flows and related financial crimes. A few recommendations on how best to address the risks that characterise Venezuelan gold flows conclude the report.

Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2021. 68p.

By Marcena Hunter

Exploitation and criminal capture of the ASGM sector is multifaceted and complex.

The development potential of the African artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM) sector is undermined by criminal consortia across the continent who exploit it for economic and political ends at the expense of vulnerable populations. Yet, much of the discourse around ASGM in Africa has not directly addressed criminality, instead being framed within development or conflict frameworks. In an effort to fill this gap, this report seeks to unpack how criminal consortia manipulate ASGM and associated gold flows to secure illicit rents and capture the sector. The findings highlight the need for nuance, especially regarding the role of informal and traditional actors in the sector. Through a more holistic understanding of the challenge, policymakers will better be able to identify and combat criminal consortia in ASGM.

ENACT - Africa, 2019. 44p.

By Prem Mahadevan

India’s socio-economic realities have evolved significantly over the past four decades, particularly as far as attitudes to wealth accumulation are concerned. Gold is today no longer negatively associated with crooked businessmen, but rather positively with the consumerist aspirations of middle-class India. It is used to project enhanced family status at events such as the ‘great Indian wedding’, and is perceived as a high-return investment and a hedge against inflation. Demand for gold has consistently risen 14% annually since 2001, with prices altogether increasing eight-fold. The Indian love affair with gold continues even as the economy strains under the weight of gold imports that degrade the fiscal balance. Gold is metaphorically to many Indians what opium was to the Chinese in the 19th century: an addictive escape from institutional decay and social stagnation. But hoarding gold pits the individual and their family against the government and its need to keep liquidity flowing in order to grow the economy.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2020. 49p.

By Olwethu Majola and Darren Brookbanks

This paper uses data and analysis to assess the UNTOC's effectiveness in addressing transnational organised crime on the continent. The international community prescribed the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) as the treatment to slow the global spread of TOC. However, current diagnoses suggest that this has not been as effective as anticipated. This paper assesses the efficacy of the UNTOC and recommends some changes to the treatment that are likely to yield more successful results.

ENACT-Africa, 2023. 32p,

By Pathfinders for Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies,

Most countries have actually experienced sustained declines in homicidal violence across several decades. Notwithstanding the disruptive effects of COVID-19 and associated economic stresses in 2020, these trends are expected to continue in several parts of the world. For most people, the world is a much safer place than it was at the beginning of the twenty-first century. This does not guarantee that the future will be more secure, but it does suggest whatever the causes, progress has been made.

A new report from Pathfinders – Future Trends in Homicide – finds that these positive trends could be undermined within the next decade unless more investment in violence prevention is undertaken. Specifically, the total number of homicides could rise by 28 percent over the next ten years – three times the expected rate of global population growth with increases most acute in the Americas and Africa. The cumulative total homicide count would reach 4.3 million by 2030. Similar trends are also evident in relation to terrorist killings, with increases across all regions especially Africa and Asia.

New York: Center on International Cooperation, 2020. 28p

By Kylie Murdock and Jim Kessler

Takeaways: The murder rate in the 25 states that voted for Donald Trump has exceeded the murder rate in the 25 states that voted for Joe Biden in every year from 2000 to 2020. Over this 21-year span, this Red State murder gap has steadily widened from a low of 9% more per capita red state murders in 2003 and 2004 to 44% more per capita red state murders in 2019, before settling back to 43% in 2020. Altogether, the per capita Red State murder rate was 23% higher than the Blue State murder rate when all 21 years were combined. If Blue State murder rates were as high as Red State murder rates, Biden-voting states would have sued over 45,000 more murders between 2000 and 2020. Even when murders in the largest cities in red states are removed, overall murder rates in Trump-voting states were 12% higher than Biden-voting states across this 21-year period and were higher in 18 of the 21 years observed.

Washington, DC: Third Way, 2023. 10p

By Uglješa Ugi Zvekić, Sunčana Roksandić and Bojan Dobovšek,

This report uses the term ‘organized corruption’ to explain how corruption is embedded in the political economy of many countries in the region. Organized corruption is a ‘a symbiosis of organized crime, criminal methods and high-level corruption, which creates a crooked ecosystem that enriches and protects those with access to power’. Organized corruption is not only about systemic illicit financial gains and undue influence in decision-making, but also the systemic buying and influencing of social support to gain or maintain political and economic power.

Organized corruption is particularly evident in the political context of transitions towards democracy, when key parts of the economy are in the public domain, as is the case in the Western Balkans. In this context, control of politics and control of the economy are interlinked. Being in power means controlling the strings of the public purse. Political parties utilize political power to acquire economic influence through the control of public finances and public officials. Political victory enables the use of state funds and enterprises for patronage and to gain financial, political and social benefits. In such an environment, elections are often a winner-take-all contest, not only for the political parties but also for those who benefit from patronage. It therefore follows that those who profit from power have an interest in financing political parties and elections.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), 2023. 72p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

The World Drug Report 2023 comes as countries are struggling at the halfway point to revive stalled progress towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Crises and conflict continue to inflict untold suffering and deprivation, with the number of people forcibly displaced globally hitting a new record high of 110 million. Peace, justice and human rights, which should be the birthright of all, remain out of reach for far too many. The harms caused by drug trafficking and illicit drug economies are contributing to and compounding many of these threats, from instability and violence to environmental devastation. Illicit drug markets continue to expand in terms of harm as well as scope, from the growing cocaine supply and drug sales on social media platforms to the relentless spread of synthetic drugs – cheap and easy to manufacture anywhere in the world, and in the case of fentanyl, deadly in the smallest of doses. Drug use disorders are harming health, including mental health, safety and well-being. Stigma and discrimination make it less likely that people who use drugs will get the help they need. Fewer than 20 per cent of people with drug use disorders are in treatment, and access is highly unequal. Women account for almost half the people who use amphetamine-type stimulants, but only 27 per cent of those receiving treatment. Controlled drugs needed for palliative care and pain relief, namely pharmaceutical opioids, are denied to those who desperately need them, with too little access in many countries – mainly low- and middle-income countries, where some 86 per cent of the world’s population lives. Drug challenges pose difficult policy dilemmas that cannot be addressed by any one country or region alone. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime publishes the World Drug Report every year to provide a global perspective and overview of the world drug problem, offering impartial evidence with the aim of supporting dialogue and shared responses. This edition of the World Drug Report highlights the growing complexity of evolving drug threats. A special chapter explores how illicit drug economies intersect with crimes that affect the environment and insecurity in the Amazon Basin, with impoverished rural populations and Indigenous groups paying the price. Other sections of the report explore urgent challenges, including drug use in humanitarian settings, drugs in conflict situations and the changing dynamics of synthetic drug markets. The report also delves into new clinical trials involving psychedelics, medical use of cannabis and innovations in drug treatment and other services.   

New York: United Nations, 2023. 70p.

By Joseph Friedman , George Karandinos, Laurie Kain Hart, Fernando Montero Castrillo, Nicholas Graetz, and Philippe Bourgois

Background. The United States is experiencing a continuing crisis of gun violence, and economically marginalized and racially segregated inner-city areas are among the most affected. To decrease this violence, public health interventions must engage with the complex social factors and structural drivers—especially with regard to the clandestine sale of narcotics—that have turned the neighborhood streets of specific vulnerable subgroups into concrete killing fields. Here we present a mixed-methods ethnographic and epidemiological assessment of narcotics-driven firearm violence in Philadelphia’s impoverished, majority Puerto Rican neighborhoods….Findings. Even controlling for poverty levels, impoverished majority-Puerto Rican areas in Philadelphia are exposed to significantly higher levels of gun violence than majority-white or black neighborhoods. Our mixed methods data suggest that this reflects the unique social position of these neighborhoods as a racial meeting ground in deeply segregated Philadelphia, which has converted them into a retail endpoint for the sale of astronomical levels of narcotics.

PLOS One:  November 21, 2019

By Jose Antonio Sanchez , Scott H. Decker and David C. Pyrooz

Gang research has spanned nearly a century. In that time, we have learned that gang membership increases the chances of involvement in homicide as a victim or offender. The violence that embroils gang life, both instrumental and symbolic, often has consequences. In this paper we review the gang homicide literature covering topics such as definitional issues, available data, correlates and characteristics, and theoretical explanations. The review examines individual, group, and structural contexts for gang homicide. We conclude with a discussion of future needs in theory, data, and methods, to improve our understanding of gang homicide.

Homicide StudiesVolume 26, Issue 1, February 2022, Pages 68-90

By InSight Crime

In the suffocating heat of summer in El Salvador, José Elvis Herrera Reinoso, alias “Elvis,” is gathered with the family of an elderly woman inside her small home. The woman, who suffers from diabetes, had been close to death just a few days beforehand, but made a seemingly inexplicable recovery. With just a few simple tools, including a Bible and loudspeaker, Elvis guides the family members in a religious celebration of this “miracle.” His well-practiced preaching and passionate reading from the holy book tell anyone listening that he is a dedicated pastor. And the tattoos that cover his face let them know he was a member of the Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS13), one of the most feared gangs in the world.   

Washington, DC: InSight Crime, 2022. 23p.

By Christopher Blattman, et al.

Urban armed groups, especially criminal gangs, are a growing threat to peace and economic growth in cities across the world. These groups often exert state-like powers, enforcing contracts, policing, and taxing businesses in the areas they informally govern. The conventional wisdom suggests that criminal organizations provide governance when states do not, and that increasing state services could crowd gangs out.  In partnership with the City of Medellín, researchers randomly introduced a program that intensified government outreach to gang-controlled neighborhoods. The study found no evidence that the city’s intervention reduced gang rule.

Washington, DC: Innovations for Poverty Action, 2019. 6p.

By Timothy Brezina & MariTere Molinet

The unique scholarship of Carlo Morselli fuelled interest in criminal networks, entrepreneurship, and achievement. In this paper, we summarise Morselli’s contributions to the scholarship on criminal achievement, with special attention to the subjective aspects of such achievement. We show how Morselli’s work ignited interest in the novel concept of criminal self-efficacy and we offer a number of suggestions for continuing and extending this important line of work. In particular, we (1) discuss reasons why the subjective aspects of criminal achievement have been largely neglected by others, but why they are important to explore; (2) review the possible sources of criminal self-efficacy; (3) discuss gender differ-ences in this area; and (4) highlight the overall balance between criminal and conventional self-efficacy as an important considera-tion. Further research in this area may help us better understand the attraction to crime, the limited effectiveness of punishment, and reasons for the persistence of criminal careers.

GLOBAL CRIME                                               2022, VOL. 23, NO. 1, 81–100 

By Philipp Schulz

Although wartime sexual violence against men occurs more frequently than is commonly assumed, its dynamics are remarkably underexplored, and male survivors’ experiences remain particularly overlooked. This reality is poignant in northern Uganda, where sexual violence against men during the early stages of the conflict was geographically widespread, yet now accounts of those incidents are not just silenced and neglected locally but also widely absent from analyses of the war. Based on rare empirical data, this book seeks to remedy this marginalization and to illuminate the seldom-heard voices of male sexual violence survivors in northern Uganda, bringing to light their experiences of gendered harms, agency, and justice.

Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2020. 214p.

By Thomas Hogan  

History drives prosecutors and police. It may be time for prosecutors and police to drive history. There are four pillars of violent crime prevention that criminal justice actors can rely on to halt the current spike in homicides in America.Prosecutors and police are shaped by their times. After the discipline imposed by fighting in World War II and the orderliness of the 1950s, the American criminal justice system became less punitive in the 1960s, fueled by notions of flower power and the opinions of the Warren Supreme Court.[1] A great American crime wave followed, cresting with the extreme violence of the crack epidemic in the 1980s and early 1990s. American prosecutors, police, and politicians responded by pulling every lever available to them, desperate to restore order to increasingly dangerous cities. Prosecutors sought strict sentences. More police officers were deployed to the streets. Sophisticated computer programs were used to track crime. Mandatory minimum sentences and sentencing guidelines were imposed to constrain the discretion of judges. The strategies eventually worked—although nobody is sure exactly which responses worked and to what extent—leading to what became known as the great American crime decline. Crime rates fell for decades and even once-violent cities like New York became relatively safe, accompanied by persistent arguments that the U.S. incarcerated too many people to ensure this safety.In reaction to the illusion of a permanent victory over violent crime and the perception of over-incarceration, a new breed of prosecutors arrived on the American political scene in the 2010s, elected in liberal-leaning big cities. Called “progressive prosecutors,” these law-enforcement officials began to pull every lever in the opposite direction from that of their 1990s colleagues. They refused to prosecute entire categories of crimes, sought lesser sentences even for violent offenders, and viewed the police with open suspicion. ….Not surprisingly, violent crime began to rise again. The U.S. saw almost a 30% rise in homicides across the nation in 2020, a record for a one-year increase.[3] In 2021, homicides continued to climb, and many cities experienced the largest number of homicides in their history.[4] And even after courts reopened following the Covid era, cities as different as Portland, Milwaukee, and Albuquerque set new homicide records in 2022.There are vigorous debates about what caused this spike in homicides. Progressive prosecutors, de-policing, the Covid-19 pandemic, increased gun sales, violent protests, weakened pretrial detention and sentencing, and numerous other theories have been proposed by academics and law-enforcement professionals.

New York: The Manhattan Institute, 2023. 20p.