By The International Alliance for Responsible Drinking (IARD)  

Alcohol production and trade exist both within and outside of government regulation; the relative size of each depends on the region of the world and social, cultural, and economic factors. Both segments are well established and people often – knowingly and unknowingly – interact fluidly with both of them. The regulated alcohol market is recorded in government statistics; unregulated alcohol, which is largely illegal, is more difficult to assess and falls into the “unrecorded” sphere (see Taxonomy of Unregulated and Unrecorded Alcohol). This segment is complex and diverse and includes everything from high-quality artisanal homebrew to illicit drinks that may contain methanol or other toxic ingredients. In 2014, the World Health Organization (WHO) issued its Global Status Report on Alcohol and Health and estimated, based on 2010 figures, that unrecorded alcohol made up an average 25% of all alcohol consumed worldwide [2]. Alcohol produced and sold illegally outside of government regulation is the most problematic part of unrecorded alcohol; it is untaxed, circumvents restrictions around availability, is of inconsistent quality, and, depending on the ingredients used to make it, is even potentially toxic. This report considers these wide-reaching implications and brings together recent data on the illicit market, compiled by the global market research firm Euromonitor International. While illicit alcohol is also widespread across Asia and parts of Europe, this report focuses on data from Africa and Latin America. Unregulated alcohol is more widespread in lower-income countries than in more affluent ones. Yet, whether in mature or emerging economies, it is largely consumed in some of the world’s poorest communities and, because it lacks quality and production standards, may contribute to an already significant problem of ill health. While home-produced artisanal alcohol may be part of cultural heritage and largely unproblematic, the illicit sector is not only large but also comes at a significant cost. HUMAN COST: The deaths in early 2018 of almost 150 people in Indonesia from poisoning by adulterated alcohol serve as a reminder that unregulated alcohol can cost lives   

Washington, DC: The International Alliance for Responsible Drinking (IARD),  2018. 16p.  

By Andrés Ham, Darío Maldonado, Michael Weintraub, Andres Felipe Camacho, Daniela Gualtero

This paper studies whether bartenders that adopt standardized practices can promote responsible alcohol consumption and subsequently reduce alcohol-attributable violence. We conducted a randomized experiment in four localities of Bogotá in cooperation with Colombia's largest brewery and Bogotá's Secretariat of Security, Coexistence, and Justice. Our design allows estimating direct and spillover effects on reported incidents within and around bars. Results show that bartenders in treatment locations sell more water and food, thus contributing to more responsible alcohol consumption by patrons. We find no direct or spillover effects of these changes in consumption on brawls, but some improvement on other alcohol-related incidents.

Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad de los Andes, 2019. 61p.

By Ria Ivandić, Tom Kirchmaier and Neus Torres-Blas 

 We study the role of alcohol and emotions in explaining the dynamics in domestic abuse following major football games. We match confidential and uniquely detailed individual call data from Greater Manchester with the timing of football matches over a period of eight years to estimate the effect on domestic abuse. We first observe a 5% decrease in incidents during the 2-hour duration of the game suggesting a substitution effect of football and domestic abuse. However, following the initial decrease, after the game, domestic abuse starts increasing and peaks about ten hours after the game, leading to a positive cumulative effect. We find that all increases are driven by perpetrators that had consumed alcohol, and when games were played before 7pm. Unexpected game results are not found to have a significant effect.  

London: Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics, 2021. 66p.

By Tomáš Diviák, Jan Kornelis Dijkstra and Tom A.B. Snijders

Using data on 32 actors and ties among them drawn from available court files, we combine analytical sociology with statistical models for networks in order to analyse a case of a counterfeit alcohol distribution network from the Czech Republic. We formulate a theory of action and identify relational mechanisms which could explain how the structure of the network emerged and describe. We use the exponential random graph model to test these mechanisms. The analysis reveals that the two actors capable of manufacturing the poisonous mixture were considerably though not optimally proximate to others enabling fast distribution of the mixture. Our model results that the structure was formed by mechanisms of triadic closure, negative tendency to concentrate ties, and tie translation of pre-existing ties into operational ties. We conclude with the discussion of the implications of our approach for the study of criminal networks.

GLOBAL CRIME, 2020, VOL. 21, NO. 1, 51–73

By Euromonitor International

Alcoholic beverages are deeply ingrained in most societies worldwide, with global consumption in 2017 generating US$1.6 trillion in legally registered sales of 222.8 million hectolitres of pure alcohol (“hectolitres of alcohol equivalent”, or hl lae). However, despite the efforts of policy-makers, law enforcement officials, and legitimate alcohol manufacturers, illicit alcoholic beverages still account for a significant share of the total volume of alcohol consumed in many countries. This white paper explores critical issues affecting the problem of illicit alcohol in today’s global alcohol industry. To this end, the paper analyses research conducted in 24 countries in Latin America, Africa, and Eastern Europe, and examines the major factors shaping their illicit alcohol markets. Illicit alcohol is prevalent in these countries: Of the 42.3 million hl lae of total alcohol consumed each year, approximately 25.8% is illicit. In other words, nearly 10.9 million hl lae of illicit alcohol is consumed annually in these 24 countries alone. This suggests they represent an effective sample for exploring this important topic. Illicit alcoholic beverages are defined as those not complying with the regulations and taxes in the countries where they are consumed, resulting in serious health risks to consumers, revenue loss, and brand degradation for legitimate manufacturers, as well as reduced tax revenue for governments. These products are responsible for hundreds of cases of death and illness due to accidental methanol intoxication, millions of dollars used to fund other criminal activities, and the fiscal loss of billions of dollars in unpaid taxes. Health risks affect the poorest and most vulnerable consumers by contributing to widening health inequalities. The most significant risks and costs for each country depend on the characteristics of the local market for illicit alcohol. The landscape of illicit alcohol is varied and complex, ranging from homemade artisanal beverages sold without the proper sanitary permits to legitimately branded bottles of alcohol smuggled illegally into a country. However, although market characteristics differ across countries, the problem of illicit alcohol exists in every region, in developed and developing countries, urban and rural areas, and higher-income and lower-income neighbourhoods alike.

New York: Transnational Alliance to Combat Illicit Trade (Tracit),     42p.

By Alabama Appleseed

Every year from 2012-2020, Alabama ranked first in the nation for opioid prescriptions per capita. Since 2014, the opioid addiction has claimed the lives of nearly 7,000 Alabama residents who died by overdose, and disrupted the lives of countless more.

Since 2017, many state agencies have collaborated successfully via the Alabama Opioid Overdose and Addiction Council to chart a better path. The state has invested in treatment and peer specialists and reframed addiction as a public health issue, not a moral failing. For people who manage to steer clear of jails and prisons, things are starting to look up. 

But the combination of harsh criminal laws, the nation’s highest opioid prescription rate, and Alabama’s under-resourced jails and violent and dysfunctional prisons mean that many of the people who need treatment most are not getting it. Instead, they are dying preventable deaths in record numbers. Something must change.

Montgomery, AL: Alabama Appleseed Center for Law and Justice, 2022. 58p.

By Timothy W. Ryback.

From the cover: “Ryback’s account is gripping—and thoroughly chilling—as it provides a snapshot of a moment when the Nazis still required a veil of legality. . . . Diligently researched works such as this are as necessary now as they were decades ago, to keep both memory and vigilance alive." —The Telegraph (London). "Has all the makings of a legal thriller ” —The Boston Globe. "Valuable. . . . Turns the spotlight on the rapid erosion of state power in the early months of Nazi rule. . . . Ryback’s vivid narrative of an ordinary German lawyer's experience makes this feel much more immediate, bringing home the terrible realities of early Nazification.” —The Times Higher Education (London)

NY. Vintage Random House. 2014. 290p.

By Scott M. Deitche

From Chapter 1: To trace the start of traditional organized crime (the mob, the syndicate, the Mafia) in New Jersey, you could begin in a few cities around the state where new immigrant groups at the turn of the twentieth century fell victim to extortion gangs and police indifference. It was in these tight-knit immigrant neighborhoods where the strands and threads of organized-crime groups began. But if there was one focal point, one birthplace where originated the larger, more influential crime figures who would shape both the underworld and overall history of the state through much of the twentieth century, it would be Newark.

London. Rowman & Littlefield. 2018. 299p.

By Reynolds, John, active 1621-1650

The triumphs of Gods revenge against the crying and execrable sinne of (wilful and premeditated) murther : with his miraculous discoveries, and severe punishment thereof : in thirty several tragical histories, (digested into six books) committed in divers countreys beyond the seas : never published or imprinted in any other language.

London : Printed by A.M. for William Lee, and are to be sold by George Sawbridg, Francis Tyton, John Martin ... [and 9 others]. 1670. 508p.

By Eric Hobsbawm

“Two brief methodological notes. First, it will be clear that I have tried to explain why social banditry is so remarkably uniform a pheno­menon throughout the ages and continents. Can this explanation be tested? Yes, insofar as it predicts, broadly speaking, how bandits will act and what stories people will tell about them in areas hitherto un­studied. The present essay elaborates the ‘model’ originally sketched out in my Primitive Rebels, which was based exclusively on European - mostly Spanish and Italian - material, but does not, I hope, conflict with it. Still, the wider the generalization, the more likely it is that individual peculiarities are neglected. Second, I have relied largely on a rather tricky historical source namely poems and ballads. So far as the facts of banditry are concerned, these records of public memory and myth are of course quite unreliable, however remotely based on real events, though they give much inci­dental information about the social environment of banditry, at least insofar as there is no reason why this should be distorted. But there is a more serious difficulty. How far does the ‘myth' of banditry throw light on the real pattern of bandit behaviour? In other words, how far do bandits live up to the social role they have been assigned in the drama of peasant life ? There is plainly some connection. I hope that in formulating it I have not gone beyond the bounds of common sense.”

London. George Wedenfield & Nicolson Ltd. 1969. 157p.

By Rachel Delafave

This Article empirically illustrates that red flag laws—laws which permit removal of firearms from a person who presents a risk to themselves or others—contribute to a statistically significant decrease in suicide rates, but do not influence homicide rates. I exploit state-level variation across time in the existence of red flag laws between 1990 and 2018 and find that the existence of a risk-based law reduces firearm-related suicides by 6.4% and overall suicides by 3.7%, with no substitution to non-firearm suicides. Red flag laws are not associated with a statistically significant change in homicides rates. Policymakers should consider red flag laws an effective tool to prevent firearm-related suicide, one of the most prevalent preventable causes of death in the United States. In light of this evidence, red flag laws should be more politically successful in the current partisan environment than other forms of gun control legislation because of their targeted nature and potential to balance the interests of gun owners against the negative externalities of gun violence.

52 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 867 (2021)

By Yvon Dandurand

This policy brief focuses on a small but especially vulnerable type of transportation business that has been prone to infiltration by organized crime groups through violence, intimidation and corruption: the vehicle-towing services industry. This type of criminal infiltration has been observed in different countries and it involves violent confrontation and competition for a share of the market. As such, this brief provides an opportunity for a comparison between patterns of infiltration and the use of violence by criminal organizations, as well as a review of law enforcement and policy responses  

Geneva: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2021. 26p.

By Yvon Dandurand and Jessica Jahn

Success in addressing transnational organized crime hinges on multilateral cooperation. However, existing cooperation regimes are ineffective at countering the rapid changes in the organized crime landscape and countries increasingly tend to turn to national solutions. The diminishing support for multilateral cooperation means the international criminal justice system has become disjointed, insufficient and reactive. This paper sets out five possible scenarios that could affect the future of international criminal justice cooperation, and raises thought-provoking questions about possible outcomes and impacts on transnational organized crime. To be useful as planning tools, any scenario or vision of the future must be connectable to decisions in the present, and therefore the scenarios described here are presented in the framework of current challenges. It is hoped that civil society organizations will take the lead in formulating a comprehensive international criminal justice cooperation strategy, built on what works. Such a strategy should also supplemented with new ideas to address shortcomings and to facilitate effective reforms of the multilateral institutions needed to implement such a strategy.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2021. 18p.

By Mark Freeman and Vanda Felbab-Brown

Negotiations with violent criminal groups – such as mafias, cartels, gangs and pirates – occur more often than imagined. This publication, grounded in more than three years of in-depth IFIT research and dozens of first-person interviews conducted with actual negotiators, offers key lessons drawn from the most diverse set of negotiations with violent criminal groups ever examined in one place. One of the prominent discoveries of this study – which centres on negotiations intended to reduce or end violence – is how the best of theory and practice regarding peace talks with militant groups (and associated areas such as transitional justice) appears largely absent from consideration or application in talks with violent criminal groups. The gap is striking and counterproductive, but also heralds an opportunity to achieve greater results in future. Another key discovery relates to the endgame of the negotiation. With militant groups, the point of negotiations is typically to end the use of organised political violence, by exchanging disarmament (and/or incorporation into the army) for some form of political empowerment and rehabilitation. With violent criminal groups, the endgame is harder to pin down, because their motivations are understood to be mainly pecuniary, leaving it unclear what they could transform into. However, the examined cases suggest that the challenge is surmountable – and under a surprising variety of conditions.

Barcelona, Spain: Institute for Integrated Transitions (IFIT), 2021. 34p.

By Anna Sergi and Alice Rizzuti

By using open data and primary resources, previous and ongoing research, and the privileged partnerships with Eurojust Italian Desk and Operations and Europol, the Mafiaround-Europe report - stemming from the CRIME (Countering Regional Italian Mafia Expansion) project presents the first analysis of the presence of Italian mafias in 7 European countries in addition to Italy and the challenges of cross border policing of mafia-type organised crime. Production of the report, Mafiaround Europe, was enabled by funding from the ESRC Impact Acceleration Account, block awards made to research organisations to accelerate the impact of research. The report highlights how mafia-type activities have adapted to individual countries, their economy, culture, infrastructure and logistics networks.

Colchester, UK:  University of Essex, 2021. 258p.  

By  Colombian Organized Crime Observatory, Arlene B. Tickner, et al.

In Latin America, the participation of women in organized crime has been in the shadow of academic and public policy debate due to the male dominance in the different criminal economies and the tendency to see criminal activities as a “man’s activity”. However, a more detailed analysis of drug trafficking, human trafficking, and migrant smuggling, based on the application of a gender lens, allows the appreciation of the different roles that women play. After examining a series of documents, data and information collected through fieldwork, this investigation by the InSight Crime and Universidad del Rosario’s Colombian Observatory of Organized Crime, increases the complexity of female roles inside organized crime and questions the tendency to present women only as victims, or in some cases, as victimizers. From cooks and coca harvesters to owners of their drug empires or trafficking and smuggling networks, women operate in a versatile manner and move in a broad spectrum of roles, challenging the existent division of labor based on gender while at the same time coexisting with criminal organizations that continue to impose a patriarchal system. Through the description of these roles, the development of two case studies – one regarding women and gangs in El Salvador, and another tackling human trafficking and migrant smuggling in the Colombia-Venezuela border town of Cúcuta- and the construction of profiles of some of the greatest protagonists of organized crime in recent times, the investigation takes the shape of a woman. The document also analyses…..

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  the use of violence by women, a characteristic that is usually attributed to men and masculine behavior. However, violence is a tool often used by women in some organized crime structures. Based on this, as well as the examination of the main factors that push women to organized crime activities, a series of public policy recommendations are set forth for governments and local authorities. These are aimed at understanding a phenomenon that, aside from being under-analyzed, is continuously growing.   

Washington, DC: Washington, DC: InSight Crime, 2020.   41p.

By Jenny Pearce

While Latin America’s high levels of chronic violence are mostly carried out by poor young men and mostly cost the lives of poor young men, the conditions for its reproduction are generated by logics of elite power and wealth accumulation. Drawing on more than 70 interviews with oligarchic elites from Colombia and Mexico, the paper offers propositions for further empirical research into these logics. It discusses why it makes sense to use the term “oligarchic elites” to analyse both the failure to invest in the rule of law and also the elite preference for a fragmented security state whose permeability facilitates influence trafficking. It studies the direct and indirect relationships between elites and varied forms of violence, exploring how they have affected the nature of the state in Latin America, the diffusion of criminal violences, and the emergence of micro criminal orders in many parts of the region. Latin America’s history of social action against violences – not least disappearances, feminicide, forced displacement, and state torture – should extend to de-sanctioning violence as a phenomenon. This could open up spaces for social and political participation to create the conditions of social justice which reduce violence.   

London:  LSE Latin America and Caribbean Centre, 2018. 30p.

By Christopher Blattman, Gustavo Duncan, Benjamin Lessing and Santiago Tobón

Organised criminal activities, by their nature, are hard to measure. Administrative data are often missing, problematic, or misleading. Moreover, organised criminal activities are under-reported, and under-reporting rates may be greatest where gangs are strongest. Researchers hoping to quantify organised crime systematically face daunting challenges. Collecting information on organised crime is inherently a slow process of cautious trial and error. It will vary from city to city, and typically within a city as well. Dozens of qualitative and quantitative researchers have shown that this can be done with care, ethically, and with adequate protection for human subjects. What they all have in common is that they commit themselves to a place, and they all take their time. While there are risks, the benefits can be enormous. The information these investigators collect is often rare and invaluable. Officials and policymakers commonly have little insight into criminal organisations, with terrible consequences for policy, be it inaction, mediocrity, or adverse and unintended consequences. Here we draw on our experience in Colombia, Brazil, and Liberia of collecting systematic data on illicit activities and armed groups, in order to share our learning with other researchers or organisations that fund research in this area, who may find this useful for their own research. We address: first steps before asking questions, common challenges and solutions, and alternative sources. Our work thus far emphasises the relevance of deep qualitative work to identify local partners; the need for intense piloting of…..

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  survey instruments and a close oversight of survey firms, ranging from how they hire enumerators to how they plan and implement field work; the power of using survey experiments to mitigate and measure measurement error; and the relevance of cross-validating findings with complementary data sources.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2022. 13p.

By INTERPOL and ENACT Africa

With the increase in Internet coverage, online trade of illicit goods is likely increasing on the African continent. In recent years, cyber-enabled crimes have increased on the African continent. This has been a result of a combination of factors, including, the improvement of Internet coverage, the wide availability of cyber-tools and the growing flexibility of cybercriminals. As a consequence, online crime nowadays represents a bigger security issue for law enforcement in African member countries than ever before. In this framework, INTERPOL, under the European Union funded ENACT Project, examines through this assessment the issue of cyber and cyber-enabled crimes in Africa in order to help drive a more strategic law enforcement response.

Lyon, France: INTERPOL; ENACT AFRICA, 2020. 79p.

By Masayuki Sakamoto

Africaʼ s elephants continue to be poached for their ivory tusks. To combat the poaching crisis, and to support the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)ʼ s 1990 ban on international commercial ivory trade, nations and jurisdictions around the world have taken steps to close their domestic markets for ivory. By closing the market for ivory, governments send a strong signal that the trade in ivory and killing of elephants is unacceptable, streamline enforcement efforts by eliminating legal cover for illegal ivory, and support ivory demand reduction efforts. Nevertheless, one major consumer market remains open ‒ Japan. With an ivory stockpile of 244 tonnes, Japanʼ s domestic market is the worldʼ s largest and most significant legalized ivory market. Evidence indicates its ivory trade controls are porous, enabling the trade in illegal ivory and illegal ivory exports. At least 76 seizures of ivory from Japan were made between 2018 and 2020, mostly in China by Chinese authorities. To further examine illegal ivory export from Japan to China, the Japan Tiger and Elephant Fund (JTEF) turned to court cases in China, which could include more details than seizure data. JTEF identified court cases on illegal export of ivory from Japan into China, and analyzed them in order to contribute to evidence-based decision-making, constructive dialogue, and decisive outcomes from the Parties at the 19th Conference of the Parties (CoP19) to CITES,. In all, 49 public court decisions on 45 different cases between 2010 and 2019, published by the Government of China, were…..

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  identified and analyzed. Fifteen out of 45 cases occurred in 2018 and 2019, after Chinaʼ s domestic ivory market closure went into effect. In addition to summarizing basic information about each case, any information pertaining to the role of Japanʼ s legal market in illegal ivory export and information regarding the defining characteristics of transnational organized crime was assessed.  

Tokyo: Japan Tiger and Elephant Fund (JTEF) 2022. 88p.