By Europol

Europol's spotlight report on online fraud highlights that online fraud schemes represent a major crime threat in the EU and beyond as online fraudsters generate multiple billions in illicit profits every year to the detriment of individuals, companies and public institutions.
Fraud schemes are perpetrated with the intention of defrauding victims of their assets using false and deceitful pretexts, or with the use of cyberattack techniques. This results in the voluntary or involuntary transfer of personal or business information, money or goods to criminals.

From ATM attacks and account takeovers to skimming and shimming, the wide availability of crime-as-a-service has made this criminal activity more accessible. Criminals show great versatility and adaptability in adjusting their modi operandi and modelling their narratives around socio-economic trends as well as current crises, taking advantage of emergency situations to create charity scams.

This report is an accompanying module to Europol’s IOCTA, which aims at providing and understanding of modern cybercrime to equip law enforcement with the knowledge to tackle it and keep people safe. It delves into the complexities of online fraud schemes and sheds light on how different schemes overlap and victimise targets multiple times.

Key findings:

Relay attacks targeting payment card chips (shimming) are increasingly detected.

Charity scams leveraging emergency situations have increased. This was visible during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the earthquake in Türkiye and Syria.

Logical attacks on ATMs still occur in the EU, with criminal networks testing ways to exploit new vulnerabilities at the ATMs they target.

Fraudsters display sophisticated modi operandi, which are usually a combination of different types of fraud. Victims of fraud are often re-victimised within the same criminal scheme.

Social engineering techniques that fraudsters use have been growing in complexity. Criminals adapt their techniques according to the profile of the victim and the typology of fraud.

Spotlight Series Report.

The Hague: EUROPOL, 2023. 20p.

By Kirsty S Lee, Dieter Wolke, Till Bärnighausen, Lucienne Ouermi, Mamadou Bountogo, Guy Harling

Background Sexual victimisation and peer victimisation are pervasive and increase risk for mental illness. Longitudinal studies that compare their unique and cumulative effects are scarce and have been done predominantly in highincome countries. The aims of this study were to examine the prevalence, prospective associations, and gender differences in sexual and peer victimisation and mental health in a low-income, African setting. Methods In this prospective cohort study, data were obtained from the 2017 ARISE Adolescent Health Study, a population-representative, two-wave, prospective study of adolescents (aged 12–20 years) from Burkina Faso. A random sample of adolescents was drawn from ten villages, selected to capture the five main ethnic groups, and from one of the seven sectors of Nouna town, Burkina Faso, at two timepoints: Nov 12 to Dec 27, 2017, and Nov 15 to Dec 20, 2018. Standardised interviews were conducted in French or a local language by trained researchers. We measured victimisation exposure as sexual victimisation, peer victimisation, and polyvictimisation, using lifetime frequency of exposure, and we measured mental health symptoms and disorders using the Kutcher Adolescent Depression Scale, the Primary Care Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder screen IV and 5, and a question on lifetime selfharm and number of incidents in the past year. We calculated prevalence of victimisation and mental health symptoms and disorders at the two timepoints, and we used lifetime victimisation at the first timepoint to predict mental health at the second timepoint using logistic and negative binomial regressions. Gender differences were examined using interaction terms. Findings Of 2544 eligible adolescents, 1644 participated at time 1 and 1291 participated at time 2. The final sample with data at both timepoints included 1160 adolescents aged 12–20 years (mean 15·1, SE 0·2), of whom 469 (40·4%) were girls and 691 (59·6%) were boys. The majority ethnic group was Dafin (626 [39·1%]), followed by Bwaba (327 [20·5%]), Mossi (289 [16·0%]), Samo (206 [13·0%]), Peulh (166 [9·7%]), and other (30 [1·6%]). After survey weight adjustment, sexual victimisation (weighted percentages, time 1, 256 [13·8%] of 1620; time 2, 93 [7·2%] of 1264) and peer victimisation (weighted percentages, time 1, 453 [29·9%] of 1620; time 2, 272 [21·9%] of 1264) were common, whereas polyvictimisation was more rare (weighted percentages, time 1, 116 [6·6%] of 1620; time 2, 76 [5·7%] of 1264). Longitudinally, sexual victimisation was associated with probable clinical disorder (adjusted odds ratio 2·59, 95% CI 1·15–5·84), depressive symptoms (adjusted incidence rate ratio [aIRR] 1·39, 95% CI 1·12–1·72), and symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (aIRR 2·34, 1·31–4·16). Peer victimisation was associated with symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder (aIRR 1·89, 1·13–3·17) and polyvictimisation was associated with depressive symptoms (aIRR 1·34, 1·01–1·77). Girls reported more sexual victimisation (weighted percentages, 130 [17·3%] of 681 vs 126 [11·4%] of 939), boys reported more peer victimisation (weighted percentages, 290 [33·1%] of 939 vs 163 [25·2%] of 681), and there was a significant interaction between lifetime victimisation and gender for probable clinical disorder (F [degrees of freedom 7, sample 376] 2·16; p=0·030). Interpretation Sexual and peer victimisation were common in the study setting and increased risk for mental health problems. Adolescent girls who have been sexually victimised are especially at risk of mental health problems. Interventions targeting sexual and peer violence in low-income settings are needed.  

Lancet Psychiatry 2024; 11: 134–42

By  Felipe Botero Escobar

For years, Ecuador enjoyed a relative degree of peace, as its neighbors, Colombia and Peru, were wrangling with internal conflicts as chief protagonists in the international supply of cocaine. However, things have changed dramatically in recent times. On 9 January 2024, the recently elected president, Daniel Noboa, said that the country was in a state of ‘internal armed conflict’ against 22 criminal groups that he described as ‘narco-terrorists’.

One of the most visible incidents of Ecuador’s growing problem with violence occurred in August 2023 when presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio was assassinated at a campaign rally in Quito just weeks before the elections. Since Villavicencio’s murder, several incidents have occurred, including the arrest of the Colombian hitmen involved in his death and their subsequent murders in a prison, which has deprived the authorities of crucial evidence in the investigation.6 The year 2023 ended as the most violent recorded in the history of Ecuador.

The situation in Ecuador is complex, and more research into the political-economic factors behind how this once stable country descended into violent, crime-driven chaos needs to be undertaken if we are to fully comprehend the situation. Nevertheless, there are some key features of Ecuador’s criminal landscape that we do understand, and which can at least partly explain how the country has arrived at this critical juncture.

The existence of at least three intertwined criminal markets, the presence of transnational organized crime groups as well as local criminal networks, and the country’s poor resilience capacity to respond to and mitigate the effects of organized crime are all pivotal to understanding the complex criminal ecosystem that has emerged in force in recent years. In the last edition of the Global Organized Crime Index, published in September 2023, scores for Ecuador’s criminal markets and criminal actors are revealed.

This analysis provides but an initial understanding of the background. A more comprehensive assessment of how intersecting criminal markets, like arms trafficking and extortion, operate in the country will be essential in formulating sustainable, practicable responses to the crisis.

By the Brookings-AEI Working Group on Criminal Justice Reform

U.S. criminal justice figures continue to make us numb, elected officials and citizens alike. Yes, we know the U.S. incarcerates more people per capita than any other country in the world. Yes, we know that when we rank the per capita rate of incarcerations, the U.S. is followed closely by countries like El Salvador and Turkmenistan. We know that our recidivism rates are too high, and that we police our racial/ethnic minority communities too much and too often with tragic results. We know our fellow citizens, mainly people of color, living in those communities continue to suffer from higher rates of crime and police violence. And, lastly, we know these conditions prevail even though U.S. crime rates have fallen to 50-year lows (even considering the recent COVID-era surge) making America about as safe as it was in the 1950s. It is almost as if over policing, prosecution, and imprisonment are habits that the United States just cannot break. 

For two decades now, there has been a bipartisan effort to tackle these systemic problems. Action by President George W. Bush in the mid-2000s to foster improved reentry pathways for men and women returning from prison opened the door to the passage of the bipartisan Second Chance Act and hundreds of millions of dollars in investment in programs designed to reform numerous aspects of the criminal justice system including mandatory minimum sentences and felony hiring initiatives. President Barack Obama expanded and accelerated these initiatives adding his own programs including  Banning the Box, presidential commissions on 21st century policing and mass incarceration, as well as pilot programs to reinstitute access to Pell Grants for prisoners. Just last year, President Trump signed the First Step Act beginning the process of reforming sentencing practices and providing funding for training and vocational education for incarcerated people to be more prepared for the labor market after prison. And now President Joe Biden has promised to accelerate criminal justice policy with an eye toward reforming the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, of which he was a principle author, to reduce crime and incarceration. By slow and steady steps, we are moving away from “tough on crime” policies that created the world’s largest prison population and one of its costliest and, from the perspective of rehabilitation and recidivism, most ineffective criminal justice systems. George Floyd’s death at the hands of police last spring and the frequent, though less-noticed, events like it in other American cities, towns, and rural areas, has added new urgency and momentum to the drive to reform our criminal justice system. Unfortunately, the debate has too often collapsed into an unhelpful binary: “support the blue” or “abolish the police.” Either of these poles would tend to have a negative impact on the very communities who have suffered disproportionately under our current criminal justice and law enforcement policies. Excessive policing and use of force, on one hand, and less public safety and social service resources on the other, can both be detrimental to communities that are exposed to high levels of criminal activity and violence. We must find a path of genuine reform, even transformation, that fosters safer, more peaceful, and more resilient communities.   

This volume is a “down payment” on the policy debate America needs right now to continue moving toward a criminal justice system—police, courts, prison, reentry, community supervision—that is focused on the safety, health, and well-being of communities rather than on maintaining a harsh, semi-militarized revolving door system from which, for too many, there is often no escape. The essays in this volume are intended to provide policymakers in Congress and the Biden Administration with research-grounded guidance and insight on core issues and strategies that can sustain bipartisan support for critically needed criminal justice reforms. Our authors come from a broad spectrum of domains and policy perspectives. In fact, most chapters paired scholars, practitioners, and thought leaders from different disciplines and political ideologies. In this regard, each of their chapters concisely summarize the state of research on a given topic and offer bipartisan recommendations for short-, medium- and long-term reforms that will move each of the key sectors of the criminal justice system toward a more humane and effective footing.

Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2021. 95p.

By Ryan C. Berg

Key Points

• Much of Brazil’s deadly urban violence is the direct result of territorial battles involving the country’s powerful transnational organized crime groups, many of which trace their origins to the country’s dangerous and overcrowded prisons.

• The Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), or First Capital Command, took shape in São Paulo during the early 1990s, as inmates organized against poor prison conditions to impose order and preserve lives. Eventually, the PCC developed an ability to project its influence and control well beyond prison walls and into Brazil’s sprawling urban slums.

• The PCC has vanquished many of its domestic rivals, enjoys a footprint in every state in Brazil, runs operations in almost every country of South America, and is now more globally minded than ever before, recruiting guerrillas from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and Venezuelan refugees and partnering with European mafia groups and Lebanese Hezbollah.

• Law-and-order strategies that “stuff” Brazil’s crowded prisons with new inmates may actually exacerbate the problem, given that the PCC has effectively converted the country’s prisons into logistical hubs and training centers of illicit activity. To fight the PCC, the US should designate it as a transnational organized crime group to confer the benefits of multiple pieces of legislation and seek extradition of key PCC leaders.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2020. 36p.

By Thomas Hofmarcher, Anne Leppänen, Anna Månsdotter, Joakim Strandberg, Anders Håkansson

Background: Illegal drug use is a public health concern with far-reaching consequences for people who use them and for society. In Sweden, the reported use of illegal drugs has been growing and the number of drug-induced deaths is among the highest in Europe. The aim of this study was to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date estimation of the societal costs of illegal drug use in Sweden, relying as much as possible on registry and administrative data. Methods: A prevalence-based cost-of-illness study of illegal drug use in Sweden in 2020 was conducted. A societal approach was chosen and included direct costs (such as costs of health care, social services, and the criminal justice system), indirect costs (such as lost productivity due to unemployment and drug-induced death), and intangible costs (such as reduced quality of life among people who use drugs and their family members). Costs were estimated by combining registry, administrative, and survey data with unit cost data. Results: The estimated societal costs of illegal drug use were 3.7 billion euros in 2020. This corresponded to 355 euros per capita and 0.78 % of the gross domestic product. The direct and intangible costs were of similar sizes, each contributing to approximately 40 % of total costs, whereas indirect costs contributed to approximately 20 %. The largest individual cost components were reduced quality of life among people who use drugs and costs of the criminal justice system. Conclusion: Illegal drug use has a negative impact on the societal aim to create good and equitable health in Sweden. The findings call for evidence-based prevention of drug use and treatment for those addicted. It is important to address the co-morbidity of mental ill-health and drug dependence, to develop low-threshold services and measures for early prevention among children and young adults, as well as to evaluate laws and regulations connected to illegal drug use.

International Journal of Drug Policy, Volume 123, January 2024, 104259

By Letizia Paoli, Luke Thomas Joseph Cox

Background: Like many other goods and services, performance and image enhancing drugs (PIEDs), and particularly androgenic anabolic steroids (AAS), are increasingly discussed and promoted by social media influencers. Little, however, is known about the influencers specialized in PIEDs and which drugs and services they promote and sell. Aims: Against this background, the study has been intended to identify prominent influencers specialized in PIEDs, examine the market activities they engage in, and assess the latter’s legality. Methods: We first searched the clean internet to identify prominent PIED influencers. Second, we conducted a sixmonth-long, non-reactive digital ethnography of the social media accounts of 20 influencers and, via a content analysis, identified the market activities they engage in. Third, we assessed the latter’s legality, primarily using the EU legislation as a benchmark. Findings: The selected influencers are all current or former bodybuilders, predominantly male and from the United States. Many of them have developed a considerable number of followers, in three cases exceeding one million. They engage in various market activities that span the whole spectrum of legality, from legal to illegal, with many activities having an uncertain, but often dubious, legal status. Conclusions: Though they may promote harm reduction for some users, PIED influencers also promote the public acceptance of PIED use beyond the bodybuilding community and enhance access to PIEDs for millions of people. Multifaceted policy interventions are required, aiming at preventing influencers from becoming a major source of information on, and route of access to, PIEDs.

International Journal of Drug Policy, Volume 123, January 2024, 104246

By Coleman Bazelon, Alberto Vargas, Rohan Janakiraman, Mary Olson

The harm caused by transatlantic chattel slavery was vast, and its repercussions resonate in the lives of descendants of the enslaved to this day. Each enslaved person experienced overwhelming harm, beginning with the loss of their liberty and often ending with a premature death after a life marked by personal injury and other forms of violence, if they survived the Middle Passage. By our estimates, these harms were inflicted on 19 million people over the span of four centuries. These 19 million include those Africans kidnapped and transported to the Americas and Caribbean and those born into slavery. Given the depth, breadth, and duration of the harm, quantifying the associated reparations is a daunting task. Yet, many scholars in multiple disciplines across different countries have documented and studied these harms for decades. In this paper, we bring economic analysis to build on this vast body of work and quantify in a novel—but far from definitive—manner elements of reparations for transatlantic chattel slavery.24 To meet this challenge, we begin by separating the harm into two broad temporal categories. First for harm during the period when chattel slavery was carried out and, second, for continuing harm thereafter. During each of these periods, harm was multidimensional, and it is important to recognize each of the distinct forms of harm experienced by the enslaved and their descendants. We quantify only a subset of these harms, since the economic tools available are not appropriate to measure some categories of harm or because of data limitations.

For the period of enslavement, including any post-emancipation period of ‘apprenticeship’ where the formerly enslaved were ‘earning’ their freedom, we estimate US$77 trillion to US$108 trillion in reparations. This range provides a lower-bound estimate reflecting conservative assumptions, such as the interest rate to compensate for the time value of money when we bring the value of stolen labor forward to today. If, as other scholars have done, we used interest rates closer to the market rates over the relevant centuries, our estimates would be considerably higher. The lower bound estimate of US$77 trillion in reparation for the period of enslavement uses an alternative approach to bring the value of stolen labor forward to today using an interest rate that is based on the appreciation in the value of labor, instead of an interest rate based on the appreciation of the value of money. Prior work presenting similar calculations has noted that the resulting magnitudes are close to or exceed the current GDP of the enslaving countries. While striking, that is not surprising. These calculations measure a harm inflicted on millions of persons, and sometimes entire nations, for hundreds of years, and therefore one year’s GDP, which measures the annual economic output of a country, is perhaps not the best yardstick to put the results in context. Instead, we compare the magnitude of our estimates with national wealth and the cumulative GDP over the past several decades.   

Boston: Brattle Group, 2023. 115p.

By Roger Bate

With the stated aim of increasing revenue and discouraging smoking, Pakistan raised tobacco duties over the past five years. The result empowered illicit actors, with a flourishing of illicit production and smuggling of cigarettes. Revenue rose initially, only to fall back as untaxed products proliferated. While organized crime and local production interests were the big winners, smoking rates have remained largely unchanged. Pakistan’s authorities have tried to resolve the problem through better enforcement and lowering of duties for certain products, but overall the lesson learned is that rapid duty increases have significant negative effects that are difficult to reverse when illegal supply cannot be controlled.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2018. 10p.

By Anine Kriegler

Cannabis legalization has the potential to weaken organized crime, but it can just as easily strengthen it unless a balance is found between restriction and liberalization, coordinated across both the supply and demand sides of the market. South Africa’s current cannabis policy lacks coherence, with reforms driven more by legal challenges than by strategic policymaking, posing challenges in effectively countering organized crime.

This paper summarizes the history and status of cannabis decriminalization in South Africa and draws on a review of literature to identify a key set of variables that determine the impact of legalization on organized crime: the type and degree of restrictiveness of the new regulations; various cultural, socio-economic, and political factors; features of the criminal justice system; and the structure and nature of criminal organization in the illegal cannabis market.

Reflections are provided on what these suggest about the likely impact of South African cannabis legalization on organized crime, and potential lessons and recommendations are proposed for effective policy reform in South Africa, as well as guidance for similar decision-making in other contexts.

Effective reform requires integrating marginalized communities and black-market participants into the legal market, along with considerations for managing legal supply, strategic enforcement against criminal gangs, and public health education to ensure a comprehensive approach to reducing organized crime. A phased implementation of regulatory frameworks, ongoing monitoring, and investment in data collection are essential to assess and optimize the impact of legalization on organized crime. Geneva: SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , 2024. 29p.

By Pascal Tanguay

Elections in 2023 have brought a new government to power, headed by Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin, who declared in late September that his government intends to achieve in the next six months a partial reversal of the reforms, recriminalizing recreational use and leaving the medical market as the sole legal arena.

Through a methodical data collection process involving key informant interviews and literature reviews, this report sheds light on the substantial impacts of such policy changes, especially on the illicit markets and organized crime networks. Informed by these insights, the GI-TOC has formulated preliminary policy recommendations to secure a resilient Thai cannabis market that is as balanced as it is sustainable.

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC),  2024. 34p.

By Andres Martinez-Fernandez

Key Points

• Corruption is an urgent challenge in Mexico that undermines political stability, economic development, the rule of law, efforts to combat organized crime, and the effectiveness of public services.

• Corruption in Mexico’s security forces is a key contributor to the sharp rise of organized criminal violence and severely handicaps US-Mexico security cooperation against drug cartels.

• President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s emphasis on combating money laundering and his empowerment of Mexico’s Financial Intelligence Unit are positive developments for the government’s anti-corruption efforts. However, an increasingly hostile stance to US-Mexico security cooperation, the politicization of investigations, neglect of independent institutions, and inattention to cartel corruption are all concerning.

• The US should use a combination of diplomatic engagement, expanded cooperation against money laundering, and unilateral enforcement actions to restore trust and the effectiveness of bilateral security and anti-corruption cooperation while pushing Mexico to address its anti-corruption blind spots.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2021. 32p.

By Andres Martinez-Fernandez

Key Points

• National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrillas remain a potent challenge for regional security and development. The ELN is growing in Colombia and Venezuela, thanks to its involvement in illegal mining, now the most important revenue source for the guerrilla group.

• The ELN’s illegal mining remains virtually unrestricted in Venezuela, thanks to the Nicolás Maduro regime’s complicity. At the same time, despite the Colombian government’s recent efforts, illegal mining continues to take place throughout Colombia, benefiting armed groups like the ELN.

• To cut off the ELN from this vital revenue source, the United States and Colombia must work to expand the presence of the state in areas affected by illegal mining, formalize artisanal miners, strengthen the state’s enforcement and investigatory capacities, and isolate Venezuela from global gold markets.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2019. 12p.

By Katharina Kru¨sselmannI, Pauline Aarten, Marieke Liem

Background

Higher availability of firearms has been connected to higher rates of interpersonal violence in previous studies. Yet, those studies have focused mainly on the United States, or used aggregated international data to study firearm violence. Whether those aggregated findings are applicable to understanding the phenomenon in continental Europe specifically remains unclear. The aim of this systematic review is to bring together all studies that exclusively use European data.

Methods

Nine databases were searched, resulting in more than 1900 individual studies. These studies were assessed on relevance and eligibility for this study, based on their title, abstract and full text. Information on study characteristics, operationalizations of main concepts and study results were extracted from the six eligible studies.

Results

Four studies assessed the impact of firearm restrictive regulations on the rate of firearm homicides. Two other studies correlated rates of firearm availability and -violence. Results vary: some studies show a clear decline once availability of firearms is restricted, while others indicate a limited effect on only a very specific subgroup, such as female victims, or national guards with weapons at home. Moreover, studies used various operationalizations for firearm availability, thereby decreasing the comparability of findings.

Conclusion

Empirical research exclusively using European data is still lacking. To increase comparability of future studies, methodological inconsistencies and regional gaps need to be overcome. Assessing how firearm availability can be measured with reliable and valid proxies across countries will be a crucial first step to improve future research on the link between firearms and firearm violence.

PLoS One. 2021 Apr 14;16(4):e0248955. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0248955. PMID: 33852590; PMCID: PMC8046231.

By Astrid De Schutter and Nils Duquet

This report discusses the connection between drug trafficking and firearms trafficking, focusing on systemic drug-related gun violence. It also examines the societal impact of this violence within the EU. For those interested in understanding the complex nexus between firearms trafficking, drug trafficking, and the resulting violence, this report provides valuable insights and analysis.

The analysis responds to a need for further research into the issue, at a time of rising drug-related violence in Europe. On average, over a quarter (28%) of the firearms seizures in Europe are estimated to have occurred in the context of drug trafficking, with this figure close to a half (44%) in some EU Member States (UNODC). The UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs has emphasised the need to address the links between the illicit trafficking in drugs and firearms. In Resolution 65/2, it encouraged states to take appropriate measures to prevent and combat these links, by enhancing border control management, information exchange and international operational cooperation.

The report identifies the Balkan route as a key transit route for firearms and drugs into the EU. Weapons and drugs are often smuggled along this route as part of multi-commodity transfers, or hidden in vehicles. The Western Balkans are an important source region of firearms trafficking into the EU. The arms moved from this region are often 'conflict legacy weapons' (e.g. from conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the Albanian civil war). Firearms are often smuggled together with drugs by the same criminal networks or, at least, along well-established drug-trafficking routes.

The analysis shows how firearm traffickers have significantly exploited legal loopholes over the past 20 years to legally acquire weapons unable to fire live ammunition (e,g. alarm weapons, deactivated acoustic expansion weapons, small-calibre firearms) and convert them into live-firing weapons. The ease with which these weapons can be legally purchased and converted has strongly impacted the criminal availability of firearms in several EU countries. In various Member States, a higher availability of trafficked firearms on the illicit market has triggered drug-related gun violence.

In 2019, the EMCDDA and Europol noted that the criminal use of firearms by organised crime groups (OCGs) involved in European drug markets appeared to be increasing. Europol found that the use of drug-related violence has escalated in recent years, particularly linked to the cannabis and cocaine trade (SOCTA, 2021).

The report takes an in-depth look at the use of gun violence at the wholesale level of the drug distribution chain and the local consumer market. Violence appears generally less evident at the production and wholesale level than the consumer level of the drug market. Most of the drug-related gun violence at wholesale level in Europe is connected to cocaine. The recent shift from a few large networks dominating the cocaine market to a larger number of smaller competing networks may explain the upsurge in violence.

The local consumer market accounts for most of the visible drug-related gun violence. Many actors involved in this violence are young adults using guns as a means to advance their criminal career. Open drug markets — where buyers can purchase products without prior introduction to the seller — are more prone to violence than closed markets, which are built on relationships of trust between buyer and seller.

Finally, the report looks at the broader impact of firearms trafficking and associated violence in the drug trade on society as a whole. Residents or individuals working in the community may be threatened or extorted. Drug criminals may target innocent victims through cases of mistaken identity. And there may be spill-over effects, when violence moves beyond the criminal milieu (e.g. to Ministers, journalists).

The report underlines the need for sound intelligence on these security phenomena, including better ballistics data, law enforcement information and intelligence on firearms trafficking and criminal shootings. Such data and information are crucial to adequately inform evidence-based initiatives, support targeted law enforcement actions and evaluate policies. The study contributes towards a better understanding of drug-related gun violence in the EU and supports appropriate policy responses to prevent this type of violence.

Lisbon: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction. 2023. 57p.

By Zenobia Ismail and Robin Richards

State capture occurs when a small number of elites in the public and private sectors collude to modify rules, policies and legislation for their own benefit at the expense of the public interest. The term emerged in the 1990s to describe relations between the state and the private sector in Eastern European states that were transitioning away from communism. In South Africa, state capture became a prominent topic in the media in 2016 following widespread allegations that several state-owned enterprises and other agencies, including South African Airways, Electricity Supply Commission of South Africa (ESKOM), South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), Denel (arms manufacturer), South African Revenue Service (SARS) and the State Security Agency, were “captured” by individuals with close ties to the then president of South Africa, Jacob Zuma.

The literature on state capture tends to focus on the close relations and exchange of favours among key actors in the public and private sectors. It does not provide detailed accounts of how institutions are captured or the consequences of this for the functioning of the institution. In order to deepen the evidence on state capture, this study provides a detailed account of the impact of state capture on the capacity of one state agency, SARS. The research examines the capacity of SARS to detect, investigate and prevent tax and financial crime and how this changed as a result of state capture.

There were three key components of the so-called capture of SARS:

• Infiltration of the organisation by new employees aligned to politicians associated with state capture. This included Tom Moyane, appointed by Zuma as the new Commissioner of SARS in 2014;

• Allegations in the media which cast doubt on the integrity of the institution and its leaders. These included aspersions regarding an alleged ‘rogue unit’ in SARS which exceeded its legislative authority to investigate tax and financial crimes. These accusations undermined the integrity of some senior managers at SARS and enabled them to be suspended pending investigation;

• Organisational change and staff purges that further weakened the institution. Moyane, with the help of the local office of the consulting firm Bain International, introduced a sweeping restructuring of SARS. During the restructuring process, key units that were responsible for detecting and investigating financial crimes pertaining to the illicit economy were disbanded. There were staff purges and an organisational climate of intimidation, which contributed to widespread resignations. Consequently, SARS lost much of its human capacity to detect and investigate tax and financial crimes. Likewise, information technology systems that were used to detect or investigate tax or financial crimes were dismantled or altered under the guise of improvement.

This study contributes to the literature on state capture by providing evidence of the detrimental impact of state capture on institutions and the public interest. It suggests that the lack of similar detailed case studies may lead to an underestimation of the negative impact of state capture for institutions in the public sphere. The study illuminates the unintended consequences of state capture on institutions. The integrity of SARS as the receiver of revenue has been tarnished; this is expected to lead to taxpayer apathy and a decline in direct and indirect tax revenue. This prediction does not bode well for national development which is a critical function of the South African state. The study suggests that state capture will undermine economic development in South Africa.

SOC ACE Research Paper No. 12. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2023. 42p.

By Tena Prelec

In recent years, concerns have grown regarding information manipulation, particularly in relation to the disinformation tactics employed by authoritarian regimes. Our research delves into the intriguing, lesser-explored realm of organised crime (OC) groups' involvement in shaping information landscapes. Drawing from Nicholas Barnes' 'political criminality' concept, we investigate how OC crime groups manipulate information in Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, Russia, Moldova (Transnistria), and Albania.

We explore the impact of evolving technology on OC groups' narrative-shaping abilities, their media ownership, and their role in the global political economy of offshore finance. This research offers a deeper understanding of the threats associated with information manipulation by non-state actors. It also presents an analytical framework for future studies. Dive into the full report to uncover the hidden facets of this intriguing topic in today's world.

SOC ACE Research Paper 22. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2023. 44p.

By Liam O’Shea, Gonzalo Saiz & Alexia Anna Hack (RUSI); and Olivia Allison (Independent).

The research highlights the correlation between a third country’s support for or opposition to sanctions and the extent of its geopolitical alignment with senders or targets. It finds that SEA is more likely when a third country is economically reliant on the target country, has interests in engaging in SEA and has the trade and commercial capacities to do so – particularly in professional advisory, financial services, shipping and logistics sectors. In these cases, there is likely to be a significant role for a range of private commercial actors within these sectors with economic interests in engaging in SEA. This suggests that policymakers combatting SEA should prioritise economies reliant on these sectors and promote improved sector regulation and enforcement measures.

More broadly, the research suggests that focusing on the role of third countries in SEA by industry sector, rather than just by country, may help to identify more tailored countermeasures. This approach, and the specific nuances and features of particular types of SEA, enables more focused follow-on analysis and potentially more targeted policy responses.

The report examines thirteen third countries (Armenia, Cyprus, Czechia, Georgia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malta, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Türkiye and the UAE), involved in SEA relating to sanctions imposed on Russia since the Ukraine invasion. It draws from literature, data analysis of media reports, blogs, forums and other open-source information as well as trade and shipping data, spanning from February 2022 to February 2023.

Sanctions are an important tool for exerting influence internationally yet understanding of the impact of sanctions evasion or avoidance (SEA) and third-country involvement remains limited. In this study, third countries are defined as distinct from ‘senders’ and ‘targets’ of sanctions regimes and aims to shed light on their role in SEA.

SOC ACE Research Paper No 21. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2023. 35p.

By: Dr Erica Marat (NDU) and Dr Alexander Kupatadze (KCL).

This paper examines the practices used to evade sanctions imposed on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, focusing on the import–export operations of Russia, Belarus, Georgia, and Kazakhstan. The research finds that sanctions have not cut supplies to Russia but have instead empowered informal trade networks and intermediaries. Georgia and Kazakhstan have indirectly benefited from the increased transiting trade; however, the impact on the shadow economy and traditional organised crime has been minimal because sanctions-busting is not illegal in these countries. In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion in Ukraine, a conspicuous surge in trade anomalies and import- and export-related red flags has been observed. In many instances, these irregularities can be definitively attributed to strategies employed to circumvent sanctions. The Western focus has been on restricting the re-exports of sanctioned goods to undermine Russia’s military apparatus. However, third-party states, such as Georgia and Kazakhstan, play a significant role in enabling Russia to sustain its international trade activities, yielding substantial financial gains for the country’s military expenditure.

Our research underscores the complexity and challenges of enforcing international sanctions and preventing sanctions evasion. It shows that the sanctions have not been as effective as hoped in cutting off Russia from the global economy, and that Russia has been able to find ways to circumvent them. The paper highlights the need for more concerted efforts and cooperation among Western states, private companies based in the West, and third-party states, to mitigate and prevent sanctions-busting activities.

Future research could expand to include more countries and examine the broader implications of sanctions. It could also examine the extent to which organized crime, such as cybercrime and trade-based money laundering, are linked to sanctions evasion. This research would build on the recommendations of this paper by developing more specific strategies for detecting and preventing sanctions evasion, including the use of new technologies and data analysis techniques.

Research Paper No. 18 University of Birmingham. 2023. 47p.

By David Lewis and Tena Prelec

This paper provides an analytical overview of how Russian actors and proxies are using illicit financial flows (IFF) to support Russian foreign policy goals. It shows how Russia has used illicit finance to fund political interference campaigns, promote disinformation, and support military operations outside Russia, including the international activities of the Wagner network.

IFF includes a wide range of illicit and illegal cross-border financial activities, including high-level corruption, money-laundering, and sanctions evasion. Illicit finance played a significant role in Russian foreign policy pre-2022 invasion of Ukraine. Subsequent international sanctions against Russia have further amplified Moscow's reliance on illicit business and financial practices.

Russia has become increasingly reliant on IFF in three important areas:

• First, IFF facilitates sanctions evasion and is central to Russia’s efforts to source weapons and dual-use technology.

• Second, IFF is used to fund political interference and information operations globally, with an increasing trend towards activities in the Global South.

• Third, IFF supports Russia's involvement in armed conflicts, through the funding of paramilitary forces such as Wagner and commercial deals that accompany Russian military activities in the Middle East and in Africa.

Unless effectively countered, Russia's growing use of illicit financial and economic tools will give it an advantage in its war against Ukraine. The Wagner network demonstrates how illicit financial networks can support military proxies in ways that pose a serious threat to international security.

An effective response to illicit finance requires a holistic approach, combining effective sanctions with systematic efforts to tackle money-laundering and illicit finance in key financial and logistical hubs, including in the UK and other Western countries.

SOC ACE Research Paper No 17. University of Birmingham. 2022. 43p.