Edited by Alan D. Berkowitz

Focus on Men: The document emphasizes the responsibility of men in preventing rape and provides resources for professionals in higher education to work with college men on this issue.

Research and Theory: It reviews empirical research on college men as perpetrators of sexual assault and proposes an integrative theoretical model for rape prevention programs.

Prevention Programs: It describes a model acquaintance rape prevention program for men, including program philosophy, facilitator selection and training, content, and evaluation.

Student Perspectives: Insights from student facilitators who participated in rape prevention programs, highlighting their experiences and the impact of these programs.

Jossey-Bass, 1994, 91 pages

By Diana E. H. Russell

The Politics of Rape: The book begins by discussing the political aspects of rape, emphasizing the victim's perspective.

Author's Background: Diana E. H. Russell, the author, shares her experiences and the motivation behind writing this book.

Rape Definition and Statistics: The book provides a definition of rapeand discusses the statistics and reporting of rape incidents.

Victim's Trauma: A detailed account of a rape victim's experience ispresented, highlighting the psychological impact and societal reactions.

This section sets the stage for a deeper exploration of the subject from various angles, including societal attitudes and the legal system's treatment of rape.

Stein and Day, 1975, 311 pages

By Paige L. Sweet

Survivor Narratives: The book explores how women navigate domestic violence and its aftermath, emphasizing their resilience and the complexities of their experiences[.

Therapeutic Movement: It discusses the development of therapeutic approaches within the domestic violence movement, including the integration of trauma theories.

Institutional Challenges: The text highlights the difficulties survivors face with institutions like courts and social services, which can sometimes perpetuate their trauma.

Gaslighting: The book delves into the psychological manipulation known as gaslighting, showing how it affects survivors' perceptions of reality and their credibility.

Univ of California Press, 2021, 324 pages

By Insight Crime

  At least 117,492 people were murdered in Latin America and the Caribbean during 2023, putting the median homicide rate around 20 per 100,000 people. But homicide data in many countries is missing or unreliable, so the actual number is likely higher. Here, InSight Crime dives into our yearly round-up, analyzing the organized crime dynamics behind the violence in each country of the region.

Washington, DC: Insight Crime, 2024. 52p.  

By Jeanne Batalova, Andriy Shymonyak, and Michelle Mittelstadt

  Although international migrants account for just 3.5 percent of the world’s population, their number—almost 272 million people as of 2019—is far from insubstantial. Current and historical research shows that immigration brings significant and long-lasting benefits to countries of destination and origin and to migrants and their families alike. But it also shows that immigration often comes with tremendous challenges for individuals, communities, and institutions. In the United States, a country with a long and complex immigration history, public and political debates that started well back into the 18th century about the size and type of immigration, as well as its socioeconomic impacts, show no sign of abating. And as other countries around the world become migrant-sending, receiving, or transit places (or frequently a combination), migration—whether voluntary or forced—has arguably earned a prime and enduring spot on national and international policy agendas. It also continues to capture significant public and media attention. What is often missing from these conversations is accurate, complete data about who these immigrants are, why they come and leave, and what places they occupy in the socioeconomic hierarchies of their sending and destination countries. In this edition, Immigration Data Matters, which updates an earlier Population Reference Bureau - Migration Policy Institute guide, we have significantly expanded a list of online resources that provide authoritative migration-related data and statistics to help inform understanding of this phenomenon in the United States and globally. As before, our main guiding principle is to offer data from population censuses and surveys, administrative datasets, and new analyses that can help our audience understand the size of immigrant populations and inflows and outflows, enforcement actions, public opinion, historical trends, citizenship acquisition, and many other aspects. Here we list and describe more than 250 data resources, half U.S., half international. These resources are collected or compiled by a wide range of sources, including government statistical agencies, international organizations such as the World Bank and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and reputable research organizations. We use these resources in our own research, and while the list is by no means exhaustive, our goal is to share the most accurate, relevant, publicly available migration-related data, in one user-friendly and accessible guide. We hope this guide helps bring more knowledge to an issue area where the facts are often missing  

Migration Policy Institute and The   Population Reference Bureau , 2020. 49p.

By María Calderón

 When it comes to an understanding of political violence in Mexico, there is a risk of solely equating it with criminal groups' activities or exclusively attributing it to such groups. However, the political violence phenomenon in Mexico is complex and diverse, with a particular nexus to locally based illicit economies, for which an all-containing approach is insufficient. About half of the political violence that occurred in Mexico during the 2018 elections was directly attributed to organized crime. During such time, political figures were killed at a rate of one per week. These numbers support the growing concern about criminal groups' involvement in Mexican politics. Criminal groups have used political violence in several ways: directly manipulating and influencing elections, protecting incumbent candidates with whom they have struck an agreement, killing candidates who are perceived as a threat to their interests, intimidating poll workers, and attacking and stealing voting booths, among others. The decrease in the profitability of trafficking heroin and cannabis, the legalization of marijuana in many US states, and increased fentanyl usage have forced cartels to recalibrate strategies and markets. Nowadays, criminal groups have partially shifted towards locally based illicit economies, such as oil theft, extortion, kidnapping, and other illegal activities that require control of local territories. All these variables come into play when understanding that criminalized electoral politics is a predominantly local phenomenon in Mexico. Political violence by criminal groups in Mexico is motivated by multiple factors, including economic interests, political objectives, and vendettas. Criminal organizations often avoid open confrontation when attacking politicians or political candidates, opting for other less visible techniques to minimize the impacts on police and law enforcement agencies, such as corruption. Installing or co-opting candidates at the municipal level has afforded criminal groups direct influence over the actions of local and state police. Access to intelligence on pending arrests or other operations has also proven beneficial for criminal organizations. Political influence has allowed criminal groups to employ local security forces as appendages of their organizations to detain or kill targets and to protect the transportation of illicit goods. Moreover, criminal organizations have tapped into state finances by co-opting government employees. 

Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2024. 6p.

By Julie A. Ward, Javier Cepeda, Dylan B. Jackson, Odis Johnson, Daniel W. Webster and Cassandra K. Crifas

Objectives.To describe all-outcome injurious shootings by police and compare characteristics of fatalversus nonfatal injurious shootings nationally.Methods.From July 2021 to April 2023, we manually reviewed publicly available records on all2015–2020 injurious shootings by US police, identified from Gun Violence Archive. We estimated injury frequency, case fatality rates, and relative odds of death by incident and victim characteristics.Results.A total of 1769 people were injured annually in shootings by police, 55% fatally. When a shooting injury occurred, odds of fatality were 46% higher following dispatched responses than police-initiated responses. Injuries associated with physically threatening or threat-making behaviors,behavioral health needs, and well-being checks were most frequently fatal. Relative to White victims,Black victims were overrepresented but had 35% lower odds of fatal injury when shot.Conclusions.This First multi-year, nationwide analysis of injurious shootings by US police suggests that injury disparities are underestimated by fatal shootings alone. Non-policing responses to social needs may prevent future injuries.Public Health Implications.We call for enhanced reporting systems, comprehensive evaluation of emerging reforms, and targeted investment in social services for equitable injury prevention.

American Journal of Public Health, 2024. 11p.

By The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 

In December 2023, the National Academies hosted a public webinar in which medical and human rights experts explored concerns related to harassment, threats, and physical attacks against health care professionals working to provide essential reproductive health care. The event was the fourth in a webinar series designed to consider society-wide effects of limits to reproductive health care access in the U.S. following the 2022 Supreme Court Decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization. This Proceedings of a Workshop-in Brief highlights the presentations and discussions that occurred at the webinar.

Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 2024. 9p.

By The International Crisis Group

What’s new? With its “total peace” policy, the Colombian government aims to engage all the country’s armed groups in talks, but it has no dialogue underway with the largest armed criminal outfit, the Gaitanista Self-Defence Force. This gap is significant, given the Gaitanistas’ deep pockets and their drive to expand. Why does it matter?From their Atlantic coast stronghold, where they run some of the country’s main drug trafficking routes as well as migrant smuggling rackets, the Gaitanistas exercise coercive control of numerous communities. If they remain outside peace talks, they could undermine negotiations with other groups or capitalise on their demobilisation. What should be done?Bogotá should start down a path of progressively more substantive discussions with the Gaitanistas aiming, first, to reduce violence against civilians and, secondly, to discuss legal conditions for laying down arms. In parallel, the police and military should continue operations to protect civilians and press the group toward talks. Latin America Report N°105

Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group 2024. 52p.

Victoria Hayes

Many members of the international community fear that world sporting events, such as the Olympics and the World Cup, create surges in human trafficking for sexual exploitation, causing women and girls to be exploited for commercial sex while the rest of the world celebrates athleticism and sport. These fears have sparked heated debate about the measures hosting countries should take to prevent human trafficking at these events and the role prostitution policies play in combating human trafficking. In the lead-up to the 2010 Olympics in Canada and the 2010 World Cup in South Africa, politicians in both countries proposed legalizing prostitution as a means of combating human trafficking at the events. This Note explores the connection between prostitution laws and sex trafficking, as well as the link between world sporting events and sex trafficking, with specific reference to preparations for the recently completed 2010 Olympics and the upcoming World Cup. Drawing on research about human trafficking at the 2004 Olympics in Athens, the 2006 World Cup in Germany, and the 2008 Olympics in Beijing, this Note argues that specific anti-trafficking efforts are more effective than prostitution policy reform in combating human trafficking. Finally, this Note critiques Canada's anti-trafficking related preparations for the 2010 Olympics and provides general recommendations for strengthening South Africa's anti-trafficking efforts before the 2010 World Cup.

85 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1105 (2010).

By Glenn Farley & Kamryn Brunner

CSI estimates that the costs of the epidemic in Arizona reached an all-time high last year: $58 billion. This staggering figure includes not only hospital, law enforcement, and other public service costs of dealing with this crisis, but also loss of quality of life and productivity amongst those suffering with addiction.

The costs of this crisis have continued rising due to ongoing medical and other price inflation, law enforcement strains, the severity of fentanyl relative to other opioids, and the continued crisis on Arizona’s southern border enabling the primary pathway for fentanyl into America.

While the roots of the opioid crisis go back to the mid-90’s, its severity in terms of both human and social costs didn’t really take off until after 2015. This surge is attributable to the particular severity of fentanyl abuse, its low cost, and its relatively high availability. An unfortunate fact of three independent but concurrent policy changes whose roots can be traced to the late-2010’s – the overprescribing and subsequent crackdown on prescription drugs, the relaxation of criminal enforcement of America’s drug laws, and the collapse in security along the border with Mexico – has been to enable both supply and demand for fentanyl and other illegal opioids. This experiment in hindsight was clearly a failure.

Over the last decade, fatal opioid overdoses in Arizona have more than doubled. Seizures of fentanyl and other opioids inside Arizona remain at record levels. The DEA has identified the greater Phoenix area – whose violent crime is up about 50% over the past decade – as a central distribution hub for fentanyl into the greater United States.

This update to CSI’s  2022 study of what led to this crisis, and how it has continued evolving over the past two years, continues to be about not repeating the mistakes of the past and better-informing policy going forward.

Key Findings

• CSI estimates that the cost of the fentanyl crisis to Arizona’s economy today is $58 billion – for context, the annual GDP of the state of Arizona is $521 billion. In 2017, the CDC estimated the national opioid epidemic cost nearly $1 trillion – or $22 billion in Arizona alone. But since then, the problem has only gotten worse.

• While opioid-related fatal overdoses appear to have peaked, they remain near all-time highs; declines have been modest and it is premature to assume success in dealing with this crisis. In fact, despite opioid-related deaths in Arizona falling last year, CSI estimates the cost of this epidemic reached a new high.

• Total seizures of feal to the current crisis.

• In 2015, Arizona’s Department of Health Services reported 41,400 opioid-related encounters by Arizona hospitals, resulting in $305 million in encounter costs. By 2019, though, encounters had risen to 56,600 (+372019[i] to more than 29,200 pounds today[ii] – a 320% increase. Given that as little as 2 mg of pure fentanyl can be fatal, DEA seizures in Arizona alone lntanyl in the United States by the DEA have increased from approximately 6,800 pounds in ast year were enough to kill every Arizonan 14 times over. Because it is a border state, Arizona is centr%) but encounter costs had increased a staggering 120% (to $676 million).

Phoenix: Common Sense Institute Arizona, 2024. 18p.

 By Maya Szilak

The rise in homicide rates that began in 2020 continues to be a major source of public concern. Law enforcement agencies need effective strategies to deal with this issue without unduly burdening taxpayers or asking more of already cash-strapped state and local governments. Issuing citations to non-violent offenders who commit low-level crimes and present low flight risk is one method by which law enforcement agencies can address increased homicides. For instance, officers may summon offenders to appear in court at a later date and release them at the scene, in lieu of placing them under custodial arrest or jailing offenders. The use of citations in lieu of arrest enhances law enforcement capacity to address violent crime by reducing time and energy spent on low-level arrests. Reducing low-level arrests through citations can also lessen risk of harm to officers and citizens in street encounters, improve community relations and reduce overall recidivism. While the use of citations in lieu of arrest presents potential drawbacks, largely centered around increased rates of failure to appear and net widening effects, negative impacts can be minimized through data collection by law enforcement agencies to identify problems in citation programs and facilitate the development of practices to address these issues.

Policy Study No 251

Washington, DC: R Street, 2022. 8p.

By Christi Smith

Driving is a privilege, not a right, in the United States. It is also a privilege that is revoked from millions of Americans, not due to dangerous driving or criminal conduct but because of their failure to pay court-ordered fines, fees and other costs. In fact, every state in the United States imposes debt-based license suspension. While the practice was designed to incentivize people to pay their debts and have their licenses restored, lack of transportation only exacerbates an individual’s inability to maintain stable employment and fulfill financial obligations. Further, the practice of debt-based suspension disproportionately impacts low-income individuals and people of color. Without access to reliable and affordable transportation, people are forced to choose between driving on a suspended license or failing to secure or maintain the work they need to pay fines. Minor debts become major financial obligations when left unaddressed, which ensnares well-meaning people in a cycle of poverty, joblessness or legal violations due to a suspended license.

The practice is particularly burdensome for individuals who are facing legal proceedings and for those on probation or parole supervision who face the threat of punishment for driving to court-ordered appointments on a suspended license or for failing to appear in court for probation/parole check-ins or employment/rehabilitative programming due to a suspended license. This is especially common in rural areas that lack robust public transportation systems. Because criminal penalties fall disproportionately on racial and ethnic minorities, as well people in lower socioeconomic groups, the burden of debt-based license suspensions presents yet another barrier to success for individuals attempting to resolve their court-ordered responsibilities.

Debt-based license suspensions are simply another tool in the judicial system’s arsenal of policies that disproportionately punish poor people and people of color. The policy encourages rather than discourages noncompliance because of the sheer impossibility of existing in a modern world without access to dependable and affordable transportation. The inefficiency of the policy’s ability to recoup court costs and the negative impact on public safety has prompted lawmakers, advocacy organizations, law enforcement groups and researchers on both sides of the aisle to push for an end to debt-based driver’s license suspensions with S. 998, the Driving for Opportunity Act of 2021.

Given the disproportionate burden license-for-payment systems place on indigent individuals, racial minorities and justice-involved persons, it is the purpose of this policy paper to evaluate the extent to which these systems are used; the degree to which the practice unduly harms individuals, families and communities; and the impact of enforcement on incarceration and recidivism rates. This assessment will also include the identification of alternative methods of transportation and existing programs designed to overcome the challenge of transportation with a suspended license. This paper suggests improved policies for debt collection and for providing more effective methods of transportation to individuals subjected to a license suspension.

R STREET POLICY STUDY NO. 254   

Washington, DC: R Street, 2022. 6p.

By Christi Smith and Jillian Snider  

After 115 years of prohibition, the legal status of cannabis in the United States is at a tipping point. Significant advances in state-level cannabis legalization have been made in the past decade, and decriminalization efforts have increased in cities across the nation. More than 90 percent of Americans—on both sides of the political aisle—support legal adult use of medical or recreational cannabis. Legalization is also increasingly supported by law enforcement, with two-thirds of police supporting medical or recreational cannabis. Yet cannabis remains illegal at the federal level, and its possession and use are subject to the most severe criminal penalties under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).

The federal government has an opportunity to end America’s longest war, the war on drugs. As evidenced by our experience with alcohol, national prohibition produces disastrous outcomes, including rising crime and violence, underground markets, unregulated products and continued demand for the substance. The general consensus among criminologists, criminal justice scholars and drug policy experts is that the war on drugs—described as a war on marijuana—has been a “resounding failure.” Further, the harms associated with marijuana prohibition far exceed the benefits in nearly all ways that can be measured.

Rather than continue the prohibition policies that have contributed to mass incarceration and the destruction of police-community relationships, we need smart federal legislation to legalize and properly regulate cannabis. This approach would significantly disrupt illegal drug markets, as marijuana is the most widely cultivated, trafficked and used illegal substance in the world. Better legislation is also critical for reducing violence and enhancing public safety, as such efforts could contribute to fewer negative police-citizen interactions, improvements in police legitimacy, the restoration of police-community partnerships, and a reallocation of resources to help stem the recent surge in homicides. Regardless of personal or moral perspectives, the federal prohibition of cannabis is bad public policy.

R Street Policy Study No. 261

Washington DC: R Street, 2022. 18p.

 By Susan L. Stewart a, Rose M.C. Kagawa b, Shani A.L. Buggs b, Mona A. Wright b, Garen J. Wintemute 

  Background: There is evidence linking use of controlled substances with perpetration of interpersonal violence. While the United States constitution protects the right to own a firearm, federal law prohibits firearm purchase and possession by persons believed to be at high risk for violence, including those who use controlled substances unlawfully. Methods: We report here the results of a 13-year prospective observational study on the risk of violent crime associated with a history of criminal drug charges in a cohort of 79,678 legal purchasers of handguns in Cali fornia in 2001. The main outcomes were post-purchase charges for any violent crime, violent Crime Index crimes (murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault), and firearm-related violent crimes. The main exposure of interest was a history of pre-purchase charge(s) for drug-related offenses; we examined as a secondary exposure a history of marijuana-related charges. We estimated adjusted hazard ratios (aHR) with 95 % confidence intervals (CI) using Cox proportional hazards multiple events models. Results: We found that legal handgun purchasers in California with a history of drug-related charges, even those with marijuana charges only, had triple the risk of a post-purchase violent crime charge compared to purchasers with no criminal charges (drug charges only: aHR=2.9, 95 % CI 2.2–3.8; marijuana charges only: aHR=3.3, 95 % CI 1.8–6.0). In addition, a criminal history of drug charges only vs. no criminal history was associated with increased risk of one or more violent crime charges after the first post-purchase arrest event (aHR=1.6, 95 % CI 1.2–2.3). Conclusion: It is incumbent on researchers and policy makers to understand the nature and causes of this risk in order to take effective steps towards mitigation.

International Journal of Drug Policy 127 (2024) 104413 

By Kennedy Kipkoech Mutai , Jack Stone , Andrew Scheibe , Hannah Fraser , Leigh F. Johnson , Peter Vickerman 

  Background: Illicit drug use results in considerable global morbidity, but there is little data on its trends and factors associated with it in sub-Saharan Africa. We consider these questions using national data from South Africa for 2002–2017. Methods: We analysed data among individuals aged 15 years or older from five national population-based household surveys in South Africa (2002–2017; n = 89,113). Recent drug use was defined as the last three- months use of illicit drugs, i.e., any use of cannabis, cocaine, amphetamine, inhalants, sedatives, hallucinogens, opioids, and/or other illicit drugs. Time trends in recent drug use were assessed using logistic regression. Multivariable logistic regression assessed the association between recent drug use and socio-demographic factors and between drug use and sexual risk behaviours, HIV-related and other well-being variables. Results: The prevalence of recent drug use increased from 1⋅5% to 10⋅0% from 2002 to 2017, driven by increases in cannabis use (1⋅5% to 7⋅8%) and use of opioids (0⋅01% to 1⋅6%), cocaine (0⋅02% to 1⋅8%), or amphetamines (0⋅1% to 1⋅5%). In adjusted analyses, male gender, younger age, living in urban areas, mixed-ancestry or white ethnicity (compared to black-African), and unemployment were positively associated with recent drug use. Recent drug use was associated with: multiple sexual partners (adjusted odds ratio [aOR] 2⋅13, 95% confidence interval [CI]: 1⋅80–2⋅51); sexual debut before 15 years old (aOR 1⋅70, 95%CI: 1⋅29–2⋅23); hazardous/harmful alcohol use (aOR 2⋅50, 95%CI: 2⋅14–2⋅93) or alcohol dependence (aOR 3⋅33, 95%CI 2⋅92–3⋅80); ever experiencing intimate partner violence (aOR 1⋅56, 95%CI 1⋅12–2⋅17); psychological distress (aOR 1⋅53, 95%CI: 1⋅28–1⋅82); and lower chance of ever testing for HIV (aOR 0⋅89, 95%CI 0⋅80–1⋅00). Recent drug use was not associated with HIV positivity, condom use or being on antiretroviral therapy. Conclusion: Illicit drug use has increased substantially in South Africa and is associated with numerous socio- demographic characteristics, higher sexual risk behaviours and other well-being variables.

www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0955395924000379  

  International Journal of Drug Policy 125 (2024) 104352

By Sarh Clifford, Cassandra J.C. Wright, Peter G. Miller, Kerri Coomberd, Kalinda E. Griffiths, James A. Smitha, Michael Livingston

Background: - During 2017-18, the Northern Territory (NT) introduced a Banned Drinker Register (BDR) and Minimum Unit Price (MUP) NT-wide; Police Auxiliary Liquor Inspectors (PALIs) in three regional towns; and restrictions on daily purchases/opening hours (DPOH) in one regional town. The BDR is an individual-level alcohol ban; MUP is a pricing policy; and PALIs enforce bans on restricted areas at takeaway outlets. This study examines the impact of these policies on adult domestic and family violence (DFV). Methods: We examined DFV assaults and breaches of violence orders from January 2014 – February 2020 using interrupted time series models for NT, Greater Darwin, Katherine, Tennant Creek, and Alice Springs. To account for increasing numbers of individuals on the BDR we tested two timepoints (Sept 2017, March 2018). Findings: Following DPOH, assaults (78 %) and alcohol-involved assaults (92 %) decreased in Tennant Creek. After PALIs, assaults (79 %) in Tennant Creek, and breaches (39 %) and alcohol-involved breaches (58 %) in Katherine decreased. After MUP, assaults (11 %), alcohol-involved assaults (21 %) and alcohol-involved breaches (21%) decreased NT wide. After MUP/PALIs in Alice Springs, alcohol-involved assaults (33 %), breaches (42 %), and alcohol-involved breaches (57 %) decreased. BDR (Sept 2017) found increases in assaults (44 %) and alcohol-involved assaults (39 %) in Katherine and assaults (10%) and alcohol-involved assaults NT-wide (17 %). There were increases of 21 %-45 % in breaches NT-wide, in Darwin, Katherine, and Alice Springs. Following March 2018 found increases in assaults (33 %) and alcohol-involved assaults (48 %) in Katherine. There were increases - from 20 % to 56 % - in breaches in NT-wide, Katherine, and Alice Springs. Conclusion: PALIs and DPOH were associated with some reductions in DFV; the BDR was associated with some increases. The upward trend commences prior to the BDR, so it is also plausible that the BDR had no effect on DFV outcomes. Although MUP was associated with reductions in the NT-wide model, there were no changes in sites without cooccurring PALIs. 

International Journal of Drug Policy

Volume 127, May 2024, 104426

By Jacopo Bellasio, Erik Silfversten, Eireann Leverett, Anna Knack, Fiona Quimbre, Emma Louise Blondes, Marina Favaro, Giacomo Persi Paoli

The government of Estonia requested support from the European Commission under Regulation (EU) 2017/825 to analyse new and emerging technological developments and identify their potential application in cybercrime. In May 2019, RAND Europe was commissioned by the European Commission Structural Reform Support Service to conduct a study (ref: SRSS/C2018/092) aimed at:Conducting an analysis of future technologies and how these could be used to commit or prevent cybercrimes.Proposing possible ways to prevent future technologies from being exploited for criminal purposes.

To meet the objectives of the study, RAND Europe (i) took stock of current knowledge of and policy on cybercrime as well as of completed and ongoing research on future trends in cybercrime; (ii) conducted horizon scanning activities to identify new and emerging technologies that may have an impact on cybercrime; (iii) engaged with stakeholders and experts to elicit their views on current and future cybercrime and technology trends; and (iv) designed and delivered a table-top exercise to help identify possible policy and legislative measures and initiatives to be adopted in order to prevent new and emerging technologies from being exploited for cybercrime purposes. This document presents an overview of results emerging from activities conducted under the study.

Key Findings

The next decade will likely see an increase in the speed and coverage of connectivity which will contribute to an overall increase in the volume and speed at which different types of cybercrime are conducted.The proliferation of Information Technology-enabled devices, systems, and services will result in an increase in the attack surface and vulnerabilities that could be leveraged by malicious actors.Developments in the fields of computing and data storage technologies, paired with a proliferation of devices, are expected to result in an increased ability to record, generate, store, access and manipulate data.Advances in computing power, accompanied by developments in the fields of artificial intelligence and machine learning, are expected to contribute to a growing ability to process and analyse data, allowing to infer from these new insights and results which are beyond the reach of current analytical capabilities.Technological advances are expected to result in increasing complexity as regards the tracking and attribution of criminal and malicious activities.The consolidation of the internet economy around a limited number of key players, and an increasing societal reliance on their products and services, may raise challenges such as contributing to the widespread emembedding of vulnerabilities with the potential to yield large-scale systemic effects when leveraged.While this study focuses on the impact that technology may have on cybercrime, a wide variety of other non-technical drivers and factors are also expected to influence this phenomenon over the coming decade.

Recommendations

Pursue broad cybercrime capacity building in light of technological development.

Strengthen the overall cybersecurity resilience of Estonia through awareness, education and capacity building.

Seek legal, regulatory and organisational agility.

Prepare the Estonian legal, regulatory and organisational environment to adequately respond to cybercrime challenges resulting from technological change.

Invest in technologies relevant to the Estonian context.

Ensure that Estonia has sufficient technological expertise, skills and research in relation to high-priority emerging technologies.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020. 13p.

By the UK Ministry of Justice and HM Courts & Tribunals Service

  1 The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) is headed by the Lord Chancellor and is accountable to Parliament for the efficient and effective functioning of the courts. Its three priorities are: to protect the public from serious offenders and improve the safety and security of our prisons; reduce reoffending; and deliver swift access to justice. HM Courts & Tribunals Service (HMCTS), an executive agency of the MoJ, reports jointly to the Lord Chancellor, Lord Chief Justice and to the Senior President of Tribunals. It is responsible for supporting the independent judiciary in the administration of criminal courts, civil courts, family courts and tribunals in England and Wales, and non-devolved tribunals in Scotland and Northern Ireland. The judiciary, headed by the Lady Chief Justice, is constitutionally independent from the government. 2 Criminal cases are heard in magistrates’ courts and the Crown Court. Cases enter the criminal justice system when a defendant is charged with an offence. The case is allocated a court date through the judicial process of listing. Cases generally go to magistrates’ courts first, where over 90% of criminal cases are dealt with. The remaining cases, usually more serious and complex offences, transfer to the Crown Court. 3 The MoJ and HMCTS measure and report on the outstanding caseload in the Crown Court, including the number of cases awaiting trial and being tried, and those awaiting sentencing. The caseload is determined by the respective rates of cases coming to the Crown Court (receipts) and completed cases (disposals). When the rate of receipts exceeds the rate of disposals, the outstanding caseload increases. The MoJ and HMCTS do not specify a minimum or optimal caseload at which the Crown Court functions most efficiently – below which there is a risk that judges and courtrooms are available but do not have enough cases to try, and above which cases on average take longer from listing to completion – because the optimal level is dependent on the nature of cases and the capacity available to hear them, both of which vary. Therefore, the MoJ does not distinguish between cases that form part of the expected caseload and additional cases that constitute a backlog. Because the MoJ has not quantified its expected caseload, we cannot quantify the backlog separately. When we are presenting data, we refer to the total number of cases as the ‘outstanding caseload’. Otherwise, we refer to it as the ‘backlog’.

4 In April 2021, the MoJ produced the Criminal Justice Action Plan that recognised a need for a whole-system approach to responding to systemic issues within the criminal justice system. It brought together work already underway across the system, focusing on three priority areas: improving timeliness, improving victim engagement and reducing backlogs. In the October 2021 Spending Review, the MoJ was provided with £477 million over 2022-23 to 2024-25 for the criminal justice system’s recovery from COVID-19, including reducing court backlogs, and a total budget settlement of £34.5 billion over the same period. 5 In October 2021, we published Reducing the backlog in criminal courts, which examined the reasons for the growth in the backlog in magistrates’ courts and the Crown Court, both before and during the early phases of the COVID-19 pandemic.1 We reported that HMCTS had responded quickly to the impact of the pandemic, launching a recovery programme in May 2020, and successfully increasing court capacity. We concluded that, while the backlog in magistrates’ courts was expected to return to pre-pandemic levels swiftly, significant risks to reducing the backlog in the Crown Court remained, which were likely to persist beyond 2024. Scope of this work 6 We undertook this investigation in response to the Crown Court backlog reaching its highest ever level. This report describes what action the MoJ, HMCTS and other parts of the criminal justice system have taken to address the backlog of cases in the Crown Court. It examines: • the scale, nature and impact of the Crown Court backlog; • the MoJ’s and HMCTS’s understanding of the impact of actions to reduce the Crown Court backlog; and • how the MoJ and HMCTS are attempting to manage the Crown Court backlog. 7 We refer to, but did not examine in detail, the work of other parts of the criminal justice system, such as the judiciary, police, magistrates’ courts and HM Prison and Probation Service, that are relevant to managing the Crown Court backlog. We do not comment on the wider reform programmes in the system such as the court reform programme, which is the focus of our 2023 report Progress on the courts and tribunals reform programme. 2 We do not comment on other major projects unless directly relevant to the Crown Court backlog. We do not seek to examine and report on value for money of the MoJ’s and HMCTS’s work to date to reduce the backlog.   

London: The National Audit Office (NAO) , 2024. 54p.

By Virginia Comolli | Martin Thorley

  Pacific island countries (PICs) and territories increasingly play host to transnational criminal activities, with direct and indirect implications for Pacific communities and beyond. Ignoring these issues in favour of other diplomatic priorities or economic agendas risks exacerbating local fragility and creating safe havens from which foreign criminals can operate unhindered. The cocaine, synthetic drugs and heroin trades are what draws organized criminals to the Pacific (for the most part). Traditionally, the Pacific islands have been used as transit points for narcotics originating in Asia and Latin America and destined for high-value consumer markets in Australia and New Zealand. PICs, however, are now also developing their own domestic markets. In terms of provenance, three groups stand out: Triads and Asian syndicates: Compared to the other organized crime groups active in the Pacific, Asian syndicates have a wider portfolio of activities, which straddle the licit and illicit. In fact, alongside their engagement in drugs and human trafficking, cyber scams and various financial crimes, some Asian groups, and Chinese triads such as 14K in particular, enjoy connections with senior establishment figures, which they may be able to leverage for political influence. Central and South American cartels: Mexican and Colombian groups are key actors in the drug trade, especially cocaine and methamphetamines. The Sinaloa cartel in Mexico appears to be the most prominent in the arena, even though it lacks any permanent bases in the Pacific islands. Trafficking methods include the use of planes, yachts, bodily concealment and dropping drugs in the ocean for later retrieval. These groups are also able to rely on North American connections to facilitate illicit flows. Outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMCGs): OMCGs from Australia and New Zealand are involved in several criminal activities in the region, especially drug trafficking. They have established chapters in the Pacific islands and are able to exploit the presence of criminal deportees there to facilitate the trafficking of narcotics, as well as money laundering, extortion and other illicit activities. Minor actors: The Pacific has also attracted a diverse range of criminal actors from eastern and south-eastern Europe, the Middle East and other regions. They have been involved in various criminal activities, such as ATM scams and drug shipments. Opportunists from different countries have also collaborated with established criminal groups in the region.  

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , 2024. 23p.