By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

Overall criminalization of activities that harm the environment

• No single international legal instrument comprehensively protects the environment, criminalizes all behaviours that harm the environment, nor defines crimes that affect the environment. The legal protection of the environment is a complicated patchwork of international and regional agreements ratified and transposed to varying degrees into national legislative frameworks. Such complex and unharmonized regulations create a landscape where criminal and/or economic interests can take advantage of loopholes and gaps in legislation and its enforcement as well as a landscape conducive to criminal infiltration of legitimate sectors.

• Today, many countries make use of the law and criminal penalties to protect the environment, although with some differences across environmental areas. In most countries in the world, prison sentences can be imposed for violating laws regulating deforestation and logging, mining, air pollution, noise pollution, soil pollution, water pollution, fishing, waste, and wildlife. A high rate of criminalization of harmful behaviours exists across these nine environmental areas. Wildlife and waste are the areas where most countries have at least one related criminal offence in their national legislation. Soil and noise pollution are the areas where the fewest countries have criminal provisions.

• The level of protection afforded to the environment is related to the conditions of each country. For example, all the countries of Southern Africa regard fences related to air pollution, deforestation and logging, mining, waste and wildlife as criminal acts. In contrast, no countries among the small island states of Micronesia regard violations of deforestation and logging legislation as a crime, perhaps because

Activities that harm the environment considered as serious crime

• At least 85% of United Nations Member States criminalize offences against wildlife and at least 45% punish some of these offences with four years or more in prison, which constitutes a serious crime under the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC). For example, in Eastern Africa, 12 out of 18 countries regard wildlife offences as serious crimes, with the potential for long prison sentences, while illegal fishing is considered most grave in Oceania, where 43% of the countries regard it as a serious crime.

• Waste offences are taken even more seriously, with almost half of the countries regarding these offences as serious crimes, including half the African countries (perhaps due to the Bamako Convention) and 62% of countries in Western Europe. Waste offences is also an area where the liability of legal persons (such as corporations) is recognized in over three-quarters of countries.

• Africa and the Americas have the highest proportions of countries with criminal offences related to all nine environmental areas analysed, while Africa and Asia have the highest average percentage of Member States with penalties meeting the serious crime definition across the nine crimes (30 percent respectively). Where there are no criminal offences, countries typically use the administration of fences (see Figure 1).

• The highest average percentage of Member States with penalties meeting the serious crime definition are in Africa and Asia, indicating not that legislation there may be ‘weak’, as is commonly stated, but that there is a lack of enforcement of the legislation. etc.

Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 41p.

BY Kirsten Eddy, Michael Lipka, Katerina Eva Matsa, Naomi Forman-Katz, Sarah Naseer, Christopher St. Aubin and Elisa Shearer

The more news about crime that Americans receive, the more likely they are to be concerned, angry or feel personally at risk, but large numbers of people are dissatisfied with the local crime news they get and just as many people get information about crime trends from people they know as from local news outlets, a new Pew Research Center report from the Pew-Knight Initiative has found.

The report, based on a survey in January of more than 5,000 randomly selected adults, found there is little difference between Republicans and Democrats in how they consume local crime information and how concerned they are about it, but Republicans are more likely than Democrats to view violent crime as a very big problem for the country as a whole, the study found.

While most respondents expressed interest in learning the details of crimes, tips about how to stay safe, and broader patterns in local crime, few of those who were interested said it is easy to find news and information about each topic

Washington, DC: Pew Research Center 2024, 47p.

By Donald S. Kenkel, Alan D. Mathios, Grace N. Phillips, Revathy Suryanarayana, Hua Wang & Sen Zeng

The Food and Drug Administration has proposed to prohibit menthol cigarettes, which are smoked by almost 19 million people in the U.S. Illegal markets for menthol cigarettes could not only blunt the prohibition’s intended consequence to reduce smoking but could also lead to unintended consequences. We use data from a discrete choice experiment to estimate a mixed logit model which predicts that the prohibition of menthol cigarettes would substantially increase the fraction of menthol smokers who attempt to quit. However, our model also predicts a substantial potential consumer demand for illegal menthol cigarettes. Depending on the impact of illegality on product prices, our model predicts the potential demand-side of an illegal market for menthol cigarettes could be 59-92 percent the size of the status quo market if menthol e-cigarettes are legal, and 69-100 percent the size of the status quo market if menthol e-cigarettes are also illegal. Our mixed logit model estimated in willingness to pay space implies that the mean WTP to avoid an illegal retail market is equivalent to a tax of $8.44 per pack. In our partial cost-benefit analysis, the opportunity costs of prohibition exceed the value of the reduction in mortality risks from secondhand smoke by $15.4 billion annually.

NBER Working Paper No. 32148 February 2024

Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2024.

By Shawn D. Bushway, Justin T. Pickett

Although society benefits when people with criminal records are employed, employers are reluctant to hire them. Can we diminish this reluctance with direct incentives that reduce the cost of employing record-holders or that compensate for the associated risk? If so, will the beneficial effects of incentives emerge under traditional hiring, where job applicants disclose criminal history information at the application stage, and under Ban-the-Box, where they do not? To answer these questions, we conducted two preregistered experiments with a national sample of hiring decision-makers (n = 1,000). The first was a conjoint analysis where participants chose between applicants who randomly varied on eight attributes, including criminal record (n = 13,998 choices). It corresponded to traditional hiring, where applicants’ criminal records are available at the outset. The second experiment involved a series of picture-based factorial vignettes depicting tentatively hired employees later discovered to have records (n = 3,989 decisions). It approximated Ban-the-Box. In both experiments, a $2,400 tax credit and $25,000 insurance against losses from employee dishonesty reduced participants’ reluctance to hire record-holders. Rehabilitation certificates also had beneficial effects under Ban-the-Box.

Policy implications

Across two experiments, we found that a $2,400 tax credit and $25,000 insurance both reduced participants’ reluctance to hire record-holders; they did so under traditional hiring and Ban-the-Box, and they did so regardless of whether applicants had misdemeanor or felony convictions. The clear policy implication is that employers should receive both incentives. Two federal programs, the Work Opportunity Tax Credit and the Federal Bonding Program, currently offer similar incentives, but neither program is used widely. Our findings indicate that steps should be taken to increase their use and to expand them. Because rehabilitation certificates were also helpful for getting record-holders hired, steps should be taken to increase their use as well.

Criminology & Public Policy, 1–28. 2024. https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12681

By Barrett Wallace Montgomery, Arnie Aldridge, Dara Drawbridge, Ira Packer, Gina M Vincent, Rosa Rodriguez-Monguio

Individuals within the criminal justice system are at greater risk of substance use–related morbidity and mor tality and have substantial healthcare needs. In this quasi-experimental study, we assessed utilization patterns of Massachusetts Medicaid Program (MassHealth) services and associated expenditures among drug court probationers compared to a propensity score–matched sample of traditional court probationers. Risk of reoffending, employment status, age, and living arrangement data were used to calculate propensity scores and match probationers between the two court types, producing a final sample of 271 in each court (N=542). Utilization of services and associated expenditures were analyzed using a two-part model to address the skewed distribution of the data and to control for residual differences after matching from the perspective of the payer (i.e., MassHealth). The largest categories of MassHealth spending were prescription pharmaceuticals, hospital inpatient visits, and physician visits. In the unadjusted analysis, drug court probationers exhibited greater MassHealth services utilization and expenditures than traditional court probationers. However, drug courts enrolled more females, more people at higher risk of reoffending, and more people with opioid use disorders. After controlling for differences between the two court types, the difference in MassHealth services utilization and associated expenditures did not reach statistical significance. Drug court probationers were more likely to engage with healthcare services but did not incur significantly greater expenditures than traditional court probationers after controlling for differences between the samples.  

Drug and Alcohol Dependence Reports 12 (2024) 100258

By U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs

The First Step Act of 2018 (FSA) mandated the development and implementation of a risk and needs assessment system in the Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP). The FSA also required that the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) review, validate, and publicly release the risk and needs assessment system on an annual basis. The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) contracted with Dr. Rhys Hester and Dr. Ryan Labrecque as consultants for the annual review and revalidation of the Prisoner Assessment Tool Targeting Estimated Risk and Needs (PATTERN). This document is the fourth review and revalidation report, following USDOJ (2021a), USDOJ (2021b), and USDOJ (2023). The previous review and revalidation reports included FBOP release cohorts from fiscal year (FY) 2009 through FY 2018. The current report analyzes a subsequent cohort of FY 2019 FBOP releasees and evaluates PATTERN for its predictive accuracy, dynamic validity, and racial and ethnic neutrality, as mandated by the FSA. This study analyzes one-, two-, and three-year recidivism outcomes, assesses what proportions of change in risk scores and levels are influenced by the current age item, and provides additional descriptive information on individual items, risk scores and levels, and outcomes by race and ethnic group. Finally, this report provides updates on the actions taken by NIJ and DOJ in the past year and the ongoing efforts to review and improve PATTERN. The FY 2019 cohort study finds that PATTERN remains a strong and valid predictor of general and violent recidivism at the one-, two-, and three-year follow-up periods, with Area Under the Curve (AUC) statistics ranging from .745 to .776. Comparisons of recidivism rates by risk level category (RLC) and predictive value analyses by risk level grouping also continue to indicate that such risk level designations provide meaningful distinctions of recidivism risk. In addition, individuals can change their risk scores and levels during confinement beyond mere age effects. Those who reduced their RLC from first to last assessment were shown to have the lowest recidivism rates, followed by those who maintained the same risk level and those with a higher risk level, respectively. While the findings continue to indicate PATTERN’s accuracy across the five racial and ethnic groups analyzed, there remains evidence that the instruments predict differently across those groups, including overprediction of risk of Black, Hispanic, and Asian males and females, relative to White individuals, on the general recidivism tools.

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs 2024. 36p.

By Olivia Mercier, Sarah Yu Fu, Rachel Filler, Alexie Leclerc, Kari Sampsel, Karine Fournier, Mark Walker, Shi Wu Wen, Katherine Muldoon

Background: Intimate partner violence (IPV) is a prevalent global health problem. IPV that occurs before pregnancy often continues during the perinatal period, resulting in ongoing violence and many adverse maternal, obstetrical, and neonatal outcomes.

Objectives: This scoping review is designed to broadly capture all potential interventions for perinatal IPV and describe their core components and measured outcomes.

Search Methods: We conducted a search for empirical studies describing IPV interventions in the perinatal population in June 2022. The search was conducted in MEDLINE, EMBASE, PsycInfo, CINAHL, Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials, Web of Science, Applied Social Sciences Index & Abstracts, ClinicalTrials.gov and MedRxiv. Hand-searching of references from select articles was also performed.

Selection Criteria: Included studies described an intervention for those experiencing IPV during the perinatal period, including 12 months before pregnancy, while pregnant or in the 12 months post-partum. The search encompassed January 2000 to June 2022 and only peer-reviewed studies written in either English or French were included. Included interventions focused on the survivor exposed to IPV, rather than healthcare professionals administering the intervention. Interventions designed to reduce IPV revictimization or any adverse maternal, obstetrical, or neonatal health outcomes as well as social outcomes related to IPV victimization were included.

Data Collections and Analysis: We used standard methodological procedures expected by The Campbell Collaboration.

Main Results: In total, 10,079 titles and abstracts were screened and 226 proceeded to full text screening. A total of 67 studies included perinatal IPV interventions and were included in the final sample. These studies included a total of 27,327 participants. Included studies originated from 19 countries, and the majority were randomized controlled trials (n = 43). Most studies were of moderate or low quality. Interventions included home visitation, educational modules, counseling, and cash transfer programs and occurred primarily in community obstetrician and gynecologist clinics, hospitals, or in participants' homes. Most interventions focused on reducing the revictimization of IPV (n = 38), improving survivor knowledge or acceptance of violence, knowledge of community resources, and actions to reduce violence (n = 28), and improving maternal mental health outcomes (n = 26). Few studies evaluated the effect of perinatal IPV interventions on obstetrical, neonatal, or child health outcomes.

Authors' Conclusion(s): The majority of intervention studies for perinatal IPV focus on reducing revictimization and improving mental health outcomes, very few included obstetrical, neonatal, and other physical health outcomes. Future interventions should place a larger emphasis on targeting maternal and neonatal outcomes to have the largest possible impact on the lives and families of IPV survivors and their infants.

Campbell Systematic Reviews, Volume 20, Issue 3, September 2024

By Sally M. Evans, Bethany A. Jones, Daragh T. McDermott

Literature regarding trans and gender diverse (TGD) prisoners’ experiences of prison custody is limited. Reviewing international literature enables a better understanding of these experiences and how effectively TGD policies are implemented. This systematic review employed PRISMA and ENTREQ guidelines to enhance transparency in reporting the synthesis of qualitative and mixed-methods research. Seventeen papers were included and through meta-ethnographic synthesis three overarching themes emerged: structural, interpersonal and intrapersonal. Recommendations include reducing reliance on survival strategies by TGD prisoners through implementation of policies which meet TGD prisoners’ needs and to enabling better informed decision making regarding housing. Further research into lived experiences would allow for a better understanding of what currently works, how services could be improved, and identify potential training needs

Howard Journal of Crime and Justice, Volume63, Issue3, September 2024, Pages 321-349

By Harry Annison and Kate Paradine

In this article we sketch a vision that might guide academic and third sector collaboration. We do so by drawing on a project that involved collaboration with a range of stakeholders, in order to stimulate ongoing discussion about how academics and the third sector might work together to seek positive change. Our findings show that there are keenly felt challenges, but also a sense of resilient optimism. A key finding among our stakeholders was a sense that there is an absence of an overarching shared vision, which was experienced by many of our respondents as consequential. Therefore, in the spirit of constructive provocation we set out such a vision, which was collaboratively developed with our respondents: opening a dialogue, rather than providing a conclusive position

Howard Journal of Crime and Justice, Volume63, Issue3, September 2024, Pages 286-303

By U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Deepfakes, an emergent type of threat falling under the greater and more pervasive umbrella of synthetic media, utilize a form of artificial intelligence/machine learning (AI/ML) to create believable, realistic videos, pictures, audio, and text of events that never happened. Many applications of synthetic media represent innocent forms of entertainment, but others carry risk. The threat of Deepfakes and synthetic media comes not from the technology used to create it, but from people’s natural inclination to believe what they see, and as a result, deepfakes and synthetic media do not need to be particularly advanced or believable in order to be effective in spreading mis/disinformation. Based on numerous interviews conducted with experts in the field, it is apparent that the severity and urgency of the current threat from synthetic media depends on the exposure, perspective, and position of who you ask. The spectrum of concerns ranged from “an urgent threat” to “don’t panic, just be prepared.” To help customers understand how a potential threat might arise, and what that threat might look like, we considered a number of scenarios specific to the arenas of commerce, society, and national security. The likelihood of any one of these scenarios occurring and succeeding will undoubtedly increase as the cost and other resources needed to produce usable deepfakes simultaneously decreases - just as synthetic media became easier to create as non-AI/ML techniques became more readily available. In line with the multifaceted nature of the problem, there is no one single or universal solution, though elements of technological innovation, education, and regulation must comprise part of any detection and mitigation measures. In order to have success there will have to be significant cooperation among stakeholders in the private and public sectors to overcome current obstacles such as “stovepiping” and to ultimately protect ourselves from these emerging threats while protecting civil liberties.

Washington, DC: DHS, 2021.  47p.

By Thomas D. Akoensi, Justice Tankebe

Using an experimental vignette design, the study investigates the effects of criminal records on the hiring decisions of a convenience sample of 221 human resource (HR) managers in Ghana. The HR managers were randomly assigned to read one of four vignettes depicting job seekers of different genders and criminal records: male with and without criminal record, female with and without criminal record. The evidence shows that a criminal record reduces employment opportunities for female offenders but not for their male counterparts. Additionally, HR managers are willing to offer interviews to job applicants, irrespective of their criminal records, if they expect other managers to hire ex-convicts. The implications of these findings are discussed.

The Howard Journal of Crime and Justice, Volume 63, Issue 3, Pages: 272-285 | Oct.2024

José Carlos Hernández-Gutiérrez

The phenomenon of organized crime in Mexico is not new. However, it is no less true that, for a few years now, violence caused by or related to criminal organizations has been registering higher levels than ever. This has caused, from different spheres, to wonder if indeed the problem facing the country can still be called organized crime. Can non-state armed actors in Mexico qualify as terrorists? Have they evolved into some form of insurgency? The author of these pages, after conducting a bibliographic review on the variants of terrorism and insurgency used by some authors to refer to the Mexican case, affirms that Mexican criminal organizations are not terrorists or insurgents, but rather profit-making organizations that make a tactical use of terrorism and / or insurgency to achieve economic benefits or the goals of their organizations.

2021, Los desafíos de la globalización: respuestas desde América Latina y la Unión Europea

By Andres Ham Gonzalez, Juanita Ruiz

We estimate the effects of drug-related violence on individual labor market outcomes in a transit country. Transit countries do not have enough market power to determine the global supply or demand of drugs yet must deal with the consequences of drug trafficking activities. We implement a Bartik-type instrumental variables strategy which assumes that violence in Honduran municipalities located along drug transport routes changes when coca production in Colombia grows or contracts. Our results show that drug-related violence has negative effects on extensive and intensive margin labor market outcomes for transit country workers and has greater effects on women than men.

IZA Working Paper 17126, Bonn: Institute of Labor Economics - IZA, 2024. 

By Sanna Bergvall, Núria Rodríguez-Planas:

Most empirical studies indicate that becoming a mother is an augmenting factor for the perpetration of intimate partner violence (IPV). Using rich population-wide hospital records data from Sweden, we conduct a stacked DiD analysis comparing the paths of women two years before and after the birth of their first child with same-age women who are several quarters older when giving birth to their first child and find that, in contrast to the consensus view, violence sharply decreases with pregnancy and motherhood. This decline has both a short-term and longer-term component, with the temporary decline in IPV covering most of the pregnancy until the child is 6 months old, mimicking a temporary decrease in hospital visits for alcohol abuse by the children's fathers. The more persistent decline is driven by women who leave the relationship after the birth of the child. Our evidence is not supportive of alternative mechanisms including suspicious hospitalizations, an overall reduction in hospital visits or selection in in seeking medical care, mothers’ added value as the main nurturer, or mothers’ drop in relative earnings within the household. Our findings suggest the need to push for public health awareness campaigns underscoring the risk of victimization associated with substance abuse and to also provide women with more support to identify and leave a violent relationship

Bonn: Institute of Labor Economics - IZA, 2024

By Michael McLaggan

The South African public transport sector is facing a critical crisis, marked by escalating violence and extortion within the taxi industry. This report delves into the dynamics behind these troubling incidents, shedding light on the severe impact they have on bus companies and the broader public transport ecosystem.

Since 2015, the Intercape Ferreira Mainliner bus company has experienced over 176 attacks, highlighting the pervasive nature of violence linked to the taxi industry. These attacks include stonings, shootings, and acts of intimidation, creating a climate of fear and insecurity for passengers and operators alike. The violence is not isolated, but part of a broader campaign of economic coercion and extortion aimed at controlling the transport market.

The taxi industry’s aggression towards long-distance bus companies stems from intense competition over routes and pricing. Taxi operators argue that bus companies, with their extensive networks and competitive pricing, are undermining their business. In response, some actors within the taxi industry resort to violent tactics to enforce their demands, including dictating where buses can stop and what prices they can charge. This extortion threatens economic freedom and disrupts the stability of the public transport system.

The report reiterates that the violence and extortion tactics employed by the taxi industry amount to organized crime. Despite numerous court orders and high-profile cases, the state’s response has been inadequate. Law enforcement and political bodies often show reluctance to intervene, partly due to complex relationships with the taxi industry. This lack of decisive action perpetuates the cycle of violence and undermines the rule of law.

To combat this crisis, the report recommends several critical actions:

Prosecution of Coordinated Attacks: Treating violent incidents as organized crime under the Prevention of Organized Crime Act (POCA).

Comprehensive Investigations: Multi-organizational task forces should investigate extortion in the public transport sector.

Engagement and Dialogue: Convening high-level panels involving all stakeholders to find peaceful resolutions to disputes.

The report underscores the urgent need for a coordinated, robust response to the violence and extortion plaguing South Africa’s public transport sector. By addressing these issues head-on, the state can restore safety, uphold economic freedom, and reinforce the rule of law, ensuring a secure and stable environment for all public transport users.

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2024. 52p.

By Observatory of Illicit Markets and the Conflict in Ukraine.

This report assesses the organized crime risks associated with veterans in Ukraine. It is a complicated, sensitive subject: while the hot state of the conflict means that very few military personnel are being demobilized at present, there is also concern that discussing veterans in such a context may stigmatize them. But, as this report highlights, such risks cannot be ignored and preparations for demobilization now may help prevent negative outcomes in future. Our research identifies the following as key organized crime risks: the incidence of drug use among service personnel, the profusion of weapons in the country and the possibility of veterans being recruited into or forming organized crime groups or joining private security firms as muscle. More tangentially, a sense of disaffection among veterans – rooted in a perception that the state is not keeping its promises to provide individual support or reform society as a whole – may also drive a wedge between veterans and society, generating friction and increasing the risk of confrontation, perhaps with violence. Veterans policy in Ukraine is a fast-moving field. The Ministry for Veteran Affairs is spearheading the new veterans law – a crucial development to ensure that Ukraine’s legislation is fit for the new realities of a post-conflict period that will see a million or more veterans in society. Work is also underway on draft laws governing the legal ownership of weapons, which will bring much-needed clarity and control to the millions of trophy weapons in the country.1 With a new demobilization law yet to be submitted to parliament (at the time of writing) and relatively few veterans in Ukraine today, 2024 is a critical window of opportunity. Ukraine should use this time to determine and implement a comprehensive veterans policy before the wave of demobilizing veterans arrives. Although there was no upsurge in veteran-related organized crime in the 2014–2022 period, the size of the veteran population will be much larger. Even a fraction of these veterans falling into crime will have a significant impact on Ukrainian society. At present, there is little sign of institutional readiness. Implementation of the initiatives announced to date has been patchy and slow, and the Ministry for Veterans Affairs has lacked a permanent head for much of the first half of 2024. Demobilization, for those who are eligible, is a frustrating and even humiliating process. Our interviews with veterans revealed scarce access to information about benefits, with many unaware of what was available to them. In terms of rehabilitation, there is a lack of effective psychological, physiological, legal and social support for veterans. Some of this is explainable by the very real strictures the war has imposed on Ukraine: training that usually takes years must be completed in a matter of weeks.

But the need remains. Since the full-scale invasion, civil society organizations, many of which have worked in veterans affairs since 2014, have been making strenuous and effective efforts to cover the gaps in care and provision for veterans, from physiological and psychological support to forming business collectives and designing a ‘whole-life’ veterans policy. Yet many feel they are working in isolation, with the state resisting their attempts to work collaboratively and introduce strategic and innovative thinking to veterans affairs.2 Only the state can deliver a veterans policy with the scope and resources needed, but NGOs have much to offer, not least their agility and ability to deliver help where it is most needed. Both the state and civil society will be needed if Ukraine is to deliver a programme of ‘deep prevention’ – a strategy that addresses veterans’ needs at the level of contributing social factors rather than the individual level – which will reap the most dividends in reducing exposure to organized crime risks. The hard reality is that, as Ukraine dedicates as many resources as it can to the day-to-day conflict, it must also begin planning for the decades-long aftermath.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , 2024 48p.

By Simon A. Cole Maurice Possley Ken Otterbourg Jessica Weinstock Paredes , Barbara O’Brien, Meghan Cousino, & Samuel R. Gross,

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. THE CASES

• This report analyzes 151 cases in which defendants were exonerated between 1989 and 2023 in the United States and medicolegal death investigation (“death investigation” for short) contributed to the false conviction.

• The 151 exonerees lost a total of 1,837 years in prison, an average of 12.2 years per exoneree. That is less than the average of 14.6 years for exonerees convicted of comparable crimes but for whom death investigation did not contribute to the false conviction.

B. CASE CHARACTERISTICS

• Not surprisingly, 140 (93%) of the 151 cases in which death investigation contributed to the false conviction were homicides. However, death investigators did contribute to eleven non-homicide cases, all involving abuse of vulnerable people: children or dependent adults. Eight of these eleven were cases involving the Shaken Baby Syndrome (SBS) diagnosis, in which the top charge was child abuse.

• In more than one-third of the cases, the death investigation evidence consisted of a claim that the medical evidence was consistent with the prosecution’s theory of the crime, e.g., that the victim’s wounds were consistent with a weapon linked to the defendant.

• In another third of the cases the death investigation evidence concerned the cause of death.

• Manner of death and time of death evidence contributed to fewer cases.

C. DEMOGRAPHICS

• Women were overrepresented among the defendants for whom the death investigation contributed to their false conviction. Thirty-nine (26%) of the defendants in the 151 cases were female, more than three times the 8% of all exonerees who were female. Only around 5% of exonerees convicted of comparable crimes were female.-

• Relatedly, cases involving child victims were particularly vulnerable to contributions by death investigation. Nearly half (47%) of the 151 cases involved child victims. That compares to only 19% of all non-death-investigation exonerations and 34% of non-death-investigation exonerations for comparable crimes.

• Although concerns have been raised about racial bias in death investigation, the exonerees in death investigation exoneration cases were whiter than exonerees in general. One third of death investigation exonerees were Black compared to 53% of all exonerees. Similarly, 8% of death investigation exonerees were Hispanic, compared to 12% of all exonerees. The higher representation of whites diminishes somewhat if women are removed from the analysis.

D. DEATH INVESTIGATION SYSTEMS

• The United States has a patchwork death investigation system with variations among and within states. The two primary types are medical examiner and coroner systems. Most, but not all, experts perceive medical examiner systems to be superior and call for them to replace coroner systems. We did not find that more false convictions occurred under coroner systems. Instead, false convictions generally occurred in proportion to where more people live: their occurrence correlated with those counties’ and states’ proportions of the US population.

• Nor did we find that more false convictions occurred in systems with elected (rather than appointed) coroners and death investigators.

• In 22% of cases, the death investigation office that contributed to the false conviction was accredited by the National Association of Medical Examiners (NAME). Only 17% of US death investigation facilities are accredited.

E. QUALIFICATIONS OF DEATH INVESTIGATORS

• The highest qualification for death investigators in the US is generally considered to be board certification in the subspecialty of forensic pathology by the American Board of Pathology. However, for decades there have not been enough board-certified pathologists in the US to meet the need for death investigation services and autopsies. Therefore, many death investigations and autopsies are performed by less qualified personnel, such as pathologists without board certification, physicians with specialties other than pathology, and even, in some cases, non-physicians such as funeral directors. We did not find that most false convictions occurred in cases with underqualified death investigators. In fact, board-certified forensic pathologists contributed to 61% (92) of the 151 cases in this study.

National Registry of Exonerations (2024), 90p

By Christopher S. Carpenter and Hai V. Nguyen

Bans on menthol cigarettes have been adopted throughout the European Union, proposed by the US Food and Drug Administration, and enacted by legislatures in Massachusetts and California. Yet there is very limited evidence on their effects using real-world policy variation. We study the intended and unintended effects of menthol cigarette bans in Canada, where seven provinces banned them prior to a nationwide ban in 2018. Difference-in-differences models using national survey data return no evidence that provincial menthol cigarette bans affected overall smoking rates for youths or adults. Although menthol cigarette smoking fell for both youths and adults, youths increased nonmenthol cigarette smoking, and adults shifted cigarette purchases to unregulated First Nations reserves. Our results demonstrate the importance of accounting for substitution and evasion responses in the design of stricter tobacco regulations

Cambridge, MA:  NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 2020. 66p.

By John P. Sullivan, Nathan P. Jones 

This chapter covers the early history of bandits including the role of bandits in revolution (e.g., Pancho Villa), the rise of urban guerrillas (e.g., Che Guevara and the Cuban Revolution, Carlos Marighella (the Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla)) in Brazil and the Tupamaros in Uruguay, and the transition from ideological revolt to the criminal insurgency. The later transition will focus on the transition to crime by the FARC and ELN in Colombia succeeded by Bacrim in Colombia, mega-gangs in Venezuela, and Brazilian gangs (i.e., The Commando Vermelho and Primeiro Comando da Capital), followed by the rise of a criminal insurgency waged by territorial (third-generation) gangs (including maras such as MS-13 and Barrio 18 in Central America) and criminal cartels. The nexus between prison gangs and criminal gangs and the emergence of criminal enclaves (such as the Triple Frontier and Ciudad del Este) will be explored. A common thread will be a discussion of crime and social banditry (Hobsbawm) as mechanisms of revolt. Urban crime and instability and the emergence of crime wars and criminal insurgency will be discussed in context of state transition, globalization, and the rise of transnational organized crime.

London; New York: Routledge, 2021, 28p.

By Angélica Durán-Martínez

Objective/context: After the paramilitary demobilization in Colombia, Cali and Medellín—major cities with a long history of political and criminal violence—saw a decline in violence despite the continuing operation of criminal groups. Yet, while Cali remained more violent than the national average, with criminal groups displaying less ability to regulate local affairs and security, Medellín became less violent than the national average and criminal groups engaged in more intensive governance. Methodology: I compare these cities using case studies constructed through fieldwork and interviews with security officials, NGO and social leaders, and former members of groups, drawing on my long-term, ongoing research engagement in both locations. Conclusions: The contrast between these cities exemplifies varied manifestations of post-conflict criminality. I argue that this variation in criminal governance is connected to the wartime balance of power, specifically, the level of territorial control and political connections armed groups had before the demobilization. Where control and political connections of paramilitary before demobilization were high, post-conflict crime groups were more likely to engage in governance behaviors. By contrast, disputed territories during wartime were likely to experience less criminal governance. Drawing on path dependence ideas, I introduce an overlooked mechanism through which wartime orders affect criminal behavior: learning processes inside and outside criminal groups. Originality: I show that to fully understand post-conflict criminality, it is crucial to consider armed actors peripherally involved in the war but essential for territorial control, whereas to understand criminal governance, the mid-ranks of armed groups and learning processes are crucial.

Revista Colombia Internacional ,2024. 35p.