By Sophie Gillfeather-Spetere, Amy Watson

Designed for use by policymakers, practitioners and advocates, this guide synthesises findings from 20+ reports to outline key actions for consistent and effective policy responses supporting children and young people experiencing violence. It includes four principles that outline ways of working to underpin reform and eight priority areas for action.

The report finds that policies and service systems are failing to meet the needs of children and young people, particularly those with disability, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children, those from culturally and linguistically diverse families and LGBTQ+. The guide calls for significant policy and practice reforms that centre children and young people’s voices, acknowledge the profound and diverse impact of violence on their lives and move away from a reactive system to one that prioritises primary prevention.

Australia's National Research Organisation for Women's Safety, 2024. 84p

By Drug Policy Alliance

We all want people living with addiction to get the help they need. At the Drug Policy Alliance, we believe that everyone should have access to the substance use disorder (SUD) supports that they choose to improve their physical and mental health — and that effective services should be available when and where people are ready for them, without hurdles like cost or preconditions to get help. In short, SUD supports should be voluntary, effective, affordable, accessible, and appealing.

Unfortunately, the United States has neither prioritized on-demand care nor ensured that available SUD supports are effective or beneficial. Having failed to provide even remotely sufficient access to the kinds of health-centered approaches that research shows are most effective (e.g., medications for opioid use disorder, or MOUD, and contingency management for stimulant use disorder, or CM), some ill-informed policymakers are advocating for expanding the power of courts to force people into existing SUD services, against their will and not of their choosing. This is not entirely new. Forced treatment has been a familiar practice in criminal courts for decades — where criminal defendants have had the “choice” to opt for court-ordered SUD services or face traditional sentencing, often including incarceration

New York: Drug Policy Alliance, 2024. 32p.

By J.M. Tamarit Sumalla, P. Romero Seseña, L. Arantegui Arràez, A. Aizpitarte

Sexual violence in an intimate relationship is a less studied phenomenon than other forms of intimate partner violence, despite data pointing to a high prevalence. Studies on how the cases are sentenced are scarce. Until recently, many laws did not allow marital rape to be punished as a crime of rape, and some studies showed a tendency for the courts to punish these cases less severely. The present study is based on an analysis of 964 rape cases of adult women in Spain. All the information was extracted from sentences of the Provincial Courts issued between 2015 and 2022. Results showed that significantly lower conviction rates and less severe penalties were imposed when the rape was committed by the intimate partner compared to other rape cases where the offenders were not partners (family members, acquaintances, or unknown strangers). The practical implications of these results in several areas are discussed.

European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, Volume 30, pages 567–587, (2024)

By Najla Nassif Palma

The idea that Rio de Janeiro has been plunged into an actual “war” against organized crime is widely discussed and is supported by an ever-increasing number of people in Brazil. Not surprisingly, such discourse has led to less protection for the civilian population, particularly in the so-called favelas, while allowing security forces to carry out operations with even greater relative impunity. This article argues that although urban violence in Rio de Janeiro is indeed a serious problem, it does not reach the threshold required to be considered a non-international armed conflict.

International Review of the Red Cross (2023), 105 (923), 795–827.

By Jennifer Cearns and Charles Beach

Contraband Cultures presents narratives, representations, practices and imaginaries of smuggling and extra-legal or informal circulation practices, across and between the Latin American region (including the Caribbean) and its diasporas. Countering a fetishizing and hegemonic imaginary (typically stemming from the Global North) of smuggling activity in Latin America as chaotic, lawless, violent and somehow ‘exotic’, this book reframes such activities through the lenses of kinship, political movements, economic exchange and resistance to capitalist state hegemony. The volume comprises a broad range of chapters from scholars across the social sciences and humanities, using various methodological techniques, theoretical traditions and analytic approaches to explore the efficacy and valence of ‘smuggling’ or ‘contraband’ as a lens onto modes of personhood, materiality, statehood and political (dis)connection across Latin America. This material is presented through a combination of historic documentation and contemporary ethnographic research across the region to highlight the genesis and development of these cultural practices whilst grounding them in the capitalist and colonial refashioning of the entire region from the sixteenth century to the present day.

London: UCL Press, 2024. 294p.

By Ellen Jacobs, Ella Meyer, Helena Schwertheim, Melanie Döring and Terra Rolfe

The global gaming industry is now worth more than both the film and music industries combined, with an estimated 3.2 billion gamers worldwide. As such, greater attention has paid in recent years to the online safety risks associated with gaming. This includes both gaming-specific companies and the wider ecosystem of gaming-adjacent social media platforms, particularly in the context of online hate and misogyny, extremism and radicalisation, and child safety issues (such as grooming and cyberbullying). Significant progress has been made in understanding how online harms are perpetrated in online gaming spaces. Recognising these risks, policymakers have crafted new digital and online safety regulations such as the EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA) and the UK’s Online Safety Act (UK OSA) to increasingly apply to gaming or gaming-adjacent companies. However, such regulations are still in the early stages of implementation and enforcement, and the extent to which gaming companies or services are within scope can be unclear. This policy brief provides a summary of the current evidence on the nature and extent of these risks and highlights remaining gaps and challenges to building out this evidence base. It also provides an overview of existing government approaches to enhancing online safety in gaming, including both regulatory and non-regulatory efforts, as well as industry and civil society initiatives. Special attention is given to existing regulatory frameworks in the EU (DSA, Terrorist Content Online Regulation), the UK (UK OSA) and Australia (Online Safety Act), to understand how and how far they may provide higher standards of online safety to gamers. Finally, the brief explores both existing and proposed mitigation strategies to enhance online safety in gaming. Throughout, the brief provides recommendations for governments, regulators, researchers and industry. The DPL supports collaboration through a multi-stakeholder approach to develop a better understanding of the risks posed in online gaming spaces and how best to mitigate them

Amman Berlin London Paris Washington DC: Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2024) 47p

By Cristina Bellés-Obrero, Giulia La Mattina, Han Ye

The prevalence and determinants of intimate partner violence (IPV) among older women are severely understudied. This paper documents that the incidence of IPV remains high at old ages and provides the first evidence of the impact of access to income on IPV for older women. We leverage a Mexican reform that lowered the eligibility age for a non-contributory pension and a difference-in-differences approach. Women's eligibility for the pension increases their probability of being subjected to economic, psychological, and physical IPV. The estimated effects are found only among women in the short-term and are more pronounced for women who experienced family violence in childhood and those from poorer households. In contrast, we show that IPV does not increase when men become eligible for the non-contributory pension. Looking at potential mechanisms, we find suggestive evidence that men use violence as a tool to control women's resources. Additionally, women reduce paid employment after becoming eligible for the pension, which may result in more time spent at home and greater exposure to violent partners.

WORKING PAPER No IDB-WP-1640, Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, Gender and Diversity Division , 2024. 74p.

By Our Watch

This report summarises the findings of a survey exploring young Australians' attitudes to gender, sex, relationships and pornography. It finds that early exposure to pornography can have a significant negative impact and that young people are accessing pornographic material earlier than previously reported. The report highlights measures governments can take to reduce the harmful impacts of pornography on children and young people.

The report argues that young people will continue to access all kinds of material, both in pornography and in other forms of media, to understand sex and relationships and so argues for a harm reduction approach, ensuring that young people and communities are equipped and supported to critically engage with this material.

Findings

• The average age at which the participants have first seen porn was 13.6 years.

• For young women, the average age is 2 years younger than it was in 2018.

• 31% of young people are watching porn as a form of sexual education.

• 25% of 16 to 17 year olds see porn as realistic.

• 73% of young people (65% of men and 80% of women) agree that porn is degrading to women.

• Access to information and education about pornography has the potential to mediate the negative impacts of pornography on young people, their wellbeing and relationships.

Key recommendations

• Integrate information on the topic of pornography in age-appropriate and sequential ways into respectful relationships education (RRE) across school sectors.

• Work in partnership with experts and uses co-design processes with young people to develop information and practical resources specifically for young people on pornography.

• Partner with research organisations to collect robust nationally representative data about young people’s pornography exposure and access, to inform ongoing work and responses.

Melbourne< Our Watch, 2024. 4p.

By Heather Wolbers and Christopher Dowling

This study examines factors associated with dating app facilitated sexual violence (DAFSV) among a large, nationally representative sample of dating app or website users (n=9,987). Through the lens of routine activity theory, we examined the way in which respondents used dating platforms and how this was associated with experiences of DAFSV. Prolific dating platform users and those who share more information, who chat with people on different platforms or who paid for an online dating service were more likely to report experiencing DAFSV. Risk factors for DAFSV extending from the online sphere into the physical world were also explored. Findings give much needed context for experiences of DAFSV and provide direction for responses aimed at protecting individuals from harm facilitated by online dating platforms

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 704. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology.2024. 19p.

By The Youth Endowment Fund

In this year’s survey, 20% of teenage children told us they’ve been a victim of violence in the past 12 months. Over half (61%) of these incidents led to physical injury, equating to 440,000 children in England and Wales. For some, these experiences are not one-off. Of all teenagers who were victims of violence, 65% had it happen multiple times within the year, with nearly a third (31%) — or 5% of all 13-17-year-olds — reporting it occurred more than five times. Children commit violence in reaction to others. 16% of children have been a perpetrator of violence. Many of the 16% of children who committed violence cited reactive motivations. For instance, 36% acted out of annoyance, humiliation or feeling threatened, while 29% retaliated for previous violence. Bullying is a significant factor for 25% of respondents, and 17% report engaging in violence for self-defence or due to rivalries related to gangs, neighbourhoods or schools. Half (49%) of all children who perpetrated violence in the past year have also been a victim themselves. Experiences of violence are concentrated among the most vulnerable. This year’s report sheds new light on children at risk of exploitation, revealing even more concerning links between vulnerability and violence. Children who went missing from home were five times more likely to engage in violence, while those approached to transport or store drugs and weapons were six times more likely. Gang involvement and carrying weapons further escalated these risks, with children in gangs or those carrying weapons being seven times more likely to commit acts of violence than their peers. Children struggling in education are also particularly vulnerable. Those who are persistently absent, suspended, excluded or attending alternative education settings are far more likely to be victims of and to engage in violent behaviour than their peers. A relatively small number are driven to carry weapons. 5% of children aged 13-17 say they have carried a weapon in the past year. Although the possession, sale and supply of zombie-style knives and machetes are now illegal in the UK, only a small proportion of those who’ve carried weapons (17%) admit to carrying such knives before the ban. Kitchen and other types of knives are much more likely to be carried. Other items carried include screwdrivers or stabbing implements (25%) and sticks, clubs or hitting implements (24%). Younger teenagers aged 13-15 are more likely to carry weapons compared to those aged 16-17. Nearly half (47%) of those who carry a weapon do so for self-protection. Others cited being asked by someone else (37%), scaring others (31%) or following the behaviour of their peers (18%).

London: Youth Endowment Fund, 2024. 

By Drug Policy Alliance

We all want people living with addiction to get the help they need. At the Drug Policy Alliance, we believe that everyone should have access to the substance use disorder (SUD) supports that they choose to improve their physical and mental health — and that effective services should be available when and where people are ready for them, without hurdles like cost or preconditions to get help. In short, SUD support should be voluntary, effective, affordable, accessible, and appealing. Unfortunately, the United States has neither prioritized on-demand care nor ensured that available SUD supports are effective or beneficial. Having failed to provide even remotely sufficient access to the kinds of health-centered approaches that research shows are most effective (e.g., medications for opioid use disorder, or MOUD, and contingency management for stimulant use disorder, or CM), some ill-informed policymakers are advocating for expanding the power of courts to force people into existing SUD services, against their will and not of their choosing. This is not entirely new. Forced treatment has been a familiar practice in criminal courts for decades — where criminal defendants have had the “choice” to opt for court-ordered SUD services or face traditional sentencing, often including incarceration   

New York: Drug Policy Alliance, 2024. 32p.

By Cassandra Popham, Ellie Taylor and William Teager

The Youth Endowment Fund surveyed over 10,000 teenage children (aged 13-17) in England and Wales about their experiences of violence. The findings are detailed across five reports, each focusing on a different aspect. In this second report, we examine teenage children’s experiences of violence on social media. We aim to understand its prevalence, the nature of the content the children encounter and its impact on their lives. Here’s what we found. Violence is widespread on social media. Exposure to real-life violence on social media has become the norm rather than the exception for teenage children. Our findings reveal that 70% of respondents have encountered some form of real-world violence online in the past 12 months. The most frequently observed content is footage of fights involving young people, with 56% of respondents reporting that they’ve seen such videos. Other common types of violence witnessed online include threats of physical harm (43%) and content related to gang activity (33%) and weapons (35%). Notably, one in nine children who say they’ve encountered weapon-related content have seen footage involving zombie knives or machetes — a figure significantly higher than the 1% of 13–17-year-olds who’ve reported that they carry such weapons, as highlighted in our first report. This suggests that social media may amplify fear by making certain behaviours appear more widespread than they are. Sexually violent content or threats have been reported by more than a quarter of teenage children (27%). For the second year in a row, TikTok is the platform where children are most likely to witness violent content.  While the majority of teenage children encounter violent content online, few actively seek it out. In fact, only 6% of those who’ve come across such content do so intentionally. Most are exposed to it inadvertently: half (50%) have seen it via someone else’s profile or feed, and just over a third (35%) have had it shared directly with them. Alarmingly, 25% of children have reported that the social media platforms themselves promote this violent content through features like ‘Newsfeed’, ‘Stories’ and the ‘For You Page’. This underscores the significant role social media companies play in amplifying exposure to violent content beyond what users might encounter by chance. Seeing violence online has real-world impacts. Viewing violent content online has impacts that extend far beyond the screen. The vast majority (80%) of teenage children who encounter weapons-related content on social media say it makes them feel less safe in their local communities. This perceived threat has tangible consequences: two-thirds (68%) of teenagers who’ve seen weapons on social media say it makes them less likely to venture outside, and 39% admit that it makes them more likely to carry a weapon themselves. The influence of social media doesn’t stop there. Nearly two-thirds (64%) of teenagers who report perpetrating violence in the past year say that social media has played a role in their behavior. Factors like online arguments and the escalation of existing conflicts are commonly cited as catalysts for real-world violence  Children support limiting access to phones and social media. The widespread exposure to real-world violence online may partly explain why many teenagers believe that access to social media should come later than access to smartphones. Our findings highlight the responsibility of social media companies to remove or restrict harmful content. They also point to the need for effective support and education to help children navigate these dangers while still benefiting from the positive aspects that social media can offer.  

London: Youth Endowment Fund, 2024. 28p.

By Becki R. Goggins, Dennis A. DeBacco

This report summarizes the results from the seventeenth survey of criminal history information systems conducted for BJS by SEARCH, The National Consortium for Justice Information and Statistics, since 1989; it presents data on the functions and status of state criminal history files as of December 31, 2022. This report is based on the results from a survey conducted among the administrators of the state criminal history record repositories in May–July 2023. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was the source for some of the information relating to criminal history records, including state participation in the Interstate Identification Index (III) system (the national criminal records exchange system) and the number of III records maintained by the FBI on behalf of the states; the number of records in the wanted persons file; and the protection order file of the FBI’s National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database. The report found that forty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and Guam report the total number of persons in their criminal history files as 116,447,200, of which over 96% are automated records; thirty states, the District of Columbia, and Guam have fully automated criminal history files.

Sacramento, CA: SEARCH Group, Incorporated; 2024. 65p.

By Global Financial Integrity, Fedesarrollo, Transparency International Kenya and ACODE

This policy memo is a joint publication by GFI, Fedesarrollo, Transparency International Kenya and ACODE, organizations that are based in the United States, Colombia, Kenya and Uganda, respectively. The memo draws on the technical and regional expertise of each of the organizations, seeking to analyze the complex challenges of Trade Based Money Laundering (TBML) from a truly global policy perspective. Broadly speaking, illicit financial flows (IFFs) are illegal movements of money or capital from one country to another. GFI classifies this movement as an illicit flow when funds are illegally earned, transferred, and/or utilized across an international border. The global scale of IFFs is considerable. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Africa loses US$88.6 billion annually to IFFs. In the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (UN ECLAC) estimates that from 2004- 2013, illicit financial outflows represented 1.8% of regional gross domestic product (GDP) and 3.1% of regional trade, with losses totalling US$765 billion for the 10-year period. Moreover, IFFs undermine institutions, contribute to insecurity, harm communities and the environment, and deprive countries of much-needed tax revenues. One of the most prevalent channels for IFFs is through the international trade system. As of 2021, GFI estimates that the annual value of trade-related IFFs in and out of developing countries amounted to, on average, about 20 percent of the value of their total trade with advanced economies. One area of particular concern is TBML, which the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) defines as the process of disguising the proceeds of crime and moving value through the use of trade transactions in an attempt to legitimize their illegal origin or finance illicit activities.5 As FATF notes, “the aim of TBML—unlike trade-related predicate offenses—is not the movement of goods, but rather the movement of money, which the trade transactions facilitate.”6; 7 TBML involves acts designed to conceal or disguise the true origin of criminally derived proceeds so that the unlawful proceeds appear to have been derived from legitimate origins or constitute legitimate assets. It is a highly effective way of integrating large volumes of criminal proceeds with legitimate income, and is attractive to organized crime groups because it is very hard to detect, track and investigate due to its transnational nature and the complexity of the international trade system. Recent cases have highlighted the sophisticated methods used to exploit the complex supply chains of international trade to launder criminal assets. When TBML goes unchecked, it has adverse effects on economies and societies as it perpetuates criminal activities such as illicit wildlife trade, bribery, corruption, and tax evasion. It subjects legitimate business to unfair competition in areas of goods and services due to unbalanced economies as a result of artificial manipulations. Additionally, TBML results in revenue losses, especially for developing countries struggling to meet their domestic resource mobilization targets

Global Financial Integrity, 2023. 23p.

By Marcena Hunter

While gold is often referred to as a blood mineral due to its role in conflict financing, the relationship between the gold sector, instability and violence is far more nuanced, with complex regional dynamics. In the gold production hub of West Africa, where artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM) is pervasive, an increasing tide of insecurity and violence in recent years adds to the complexity of the sector. Woven into the region’s convoluted web of actors, activity and supply chains are criminal networks that link local mines to international trade hubs, exploiting the gold sector for financial gain and power. The analysis in this report demonstrates that the reality of the relationships between gold, conflict and criminality challenges the simplistic narrative of ‘blood minerals’ used to finance conflict, offering a far more nuanced understanding of the significance of the gold sector in West Africa. Rather, gold is closely intertwined with survival, money, power and criminality. Criminality, fragility and violence While literature on the relationship between gold and instability has often focused on conflict financing, the interplay between gold, governance and criminality can contribute to instability and violence before any form of conflict financing takes place. Criminal exploitation of the gold sector is fostered by persistent and widespread informality, due in part to the significant barriers to entry in the formal sector, and the lack of support for informal miners and gold traders. As a result, corrupt and criminal elites in the political and business spheres can capture illicit gold flows, further contributing to community frustrations that can give rise to conflict. Limiting access to the gold sector by restricting access to mine deposits or conducting crackdowns on unlicensed ASGM can also undermine the legitimacy of state actors. Thus, efforts to stabilize West Africa must account for complex criminal interests while also addressing the long-standing grievances and expectations of local communities.1 Such efforts are critical in both conflict-laden areas and stable areas to reduce the risk of conflict spreading. Where the gold sector contributes to conflict financing in West Africa, it can vary significantly in form and value. In locations where conflict and gold mining overlap, armed groups may target the gold sector by taxing mining and trade activities, demanding payment from miners for providing security, or establishing checkpoints along roads to mine sites and trade hubs for payment collection. Members of armed groups may also directly engage in gold mining, either for personal financial gain or to benefit the group. Yet in many regions, gold is not the primary source of revenue for armed groups; other industries like the livestock sector are also targets. Sitting in the space between increased fragility and conflict are local self-defence and identity militia groups, which can act in cooperation or in competition with the state.2 In West Africa, these groups fall on a spectrum ranging from hybrid security institutions to mafia-style protection rackets run by ‘violent entrepreneurs’. There is a heavy overlap between these groups and the gold sector, with many instances of groups providing security at gold mine sites and along transportation routes. Yet, the origins of the different groups, their roles in local communities and the gold sector, and their role in conflict dynamics vary greatly.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2022. 61p.

By The Transnational Alliance to Combat Illicit Trade (TRACIT)

With inflation at its highest levels since 2008, the international economy finds itself amid a cost of-living crisis. In many countries, inflation has reached multi-decade highs, with both headline and core inflation continuing to rise and broaden beyond food and energy prices. Inflation has also been intensified by post-COVID economics and the Russian invasion of Ukraine – both of which have driven global commodity prices higher. Among the cascading effects of inflation on the global economy is the negative impact it has on the market dynamics that drive illicit trade. Specifically, high levels of inflation can have a disastrous impact on consumer purchasing power. In turn, reduced purchasing power coupled with increased poverty reduces consumer “product affordability,” which is widely regarded as the primary driver for illicit trade. When prices rise faster than incomes, people can afford to buy fewer goods and services and cheaper goods including illicit and black-market products become more tempting. Given these dynamics, where inflation incentivizes consumers to choose cheaper, illicit alternatives, governments will necessarily need to be more vigilant in their efforts to defend their economies from illicit trade. In this light, Turkiye presents a valuable opportunity to raise awareness on the relationship between inflation and growth in illicit trade. proTurkiye is experiencing high inflation rates. In October 2022, inflation climbed to a 25-year high of 85.5 %. Consequently, the impacts of soaring inflation leading to price increases have created a notable erosion of consumer purchasing power in Turkiye. Turkiye already faces challenges from illicit trade on multiple fronts. For example, it is an important source country for illicit plant protection products, counterfeit goods are widespread, and the country grapples with the harmful effects of illicit tobacco, alcohol and petroleum products. Moreover, the government’s goal of making Turkiye a top pharma hub by 2023 is threatened by a lucrative market for illegal pharmaceuticals. This situation is exacerbated by Turkiye’s location in the region, which makes it a key transit hub for both complete counterfeit products and counterfeit components. In principle and practice, the challenge of product “affordability” is a long-standing driver for illicit trade. Keeping that in mind, inflation amplifies a problem that usually already exists. In Turkiye’s case, inflation can be expected to intensify the problem and, consequently, requires its government to likewise intensify efforts to mitigate illicit trade. This report explores the situation of illicit trade in Turkiye, addresses its susceptibility to inflation, outlines the issues that must be addressed, and presents a set of policy recommendations that could help the government and other stakeholders fortify their efforts to control illicit trade.

The Transnational Alliance to Combat Illicit Trade (TRACIT) , 2022. 24p.

By The International Crisis Group

Myanmar’s Shan State and Laos’s Bokeo province, which straddle the Mekong River, have emerged as a contiguous zone of vibrant criminality, much of which is beyond the reach of national authorities. Unregulated casinos, money laundering, drug production and trafficking, online scamming operations, and illegal wildlife trade all thrive, entrenching corruption, weakening governance and damaging the bonds that create community. The criminal networks involved have regional – in some cases, global – reach and can rapidly shift from one jurisdiction to another to minimise risks to their operations. A coordinated regional approach is thus vital for tackling them. But geopolitical competition between China and the U.S. complicates coordination. Regional states continue to rely heavily on unilateral criminal justice responses, but collaborative law enforcement is needed, as are multi-state efforts to ameliorate the governance and socio-economic problems that allow these criminal syndicates to prosper. Ideally, these efforts would involve agencies with migration, development and other relevant expertise. Parts of the Mekong, particularly the 100km section that forms the Myanmar-Lao border, have long been a frontier of unregulated and illicit trade, far from centres of power and commerce. Given its importance as a conduit between China and South East Asia, in recent decades governments have aspired for the Mekong to become a major transport route. But along with physical obstacles – sandbanks, shoals and rapids – insecurity has impeded riverborne trade, most commonly in the form of piracy and extortion of boats plying the route. The situation came to a head in October 2011, when thirteen Chinese merchant mariners were murdered – the deadliest attack on Chinese nationals abroad since World War II. China pinned the blame on Myanmar pirates, whose leader it captured in Laos and executed following a complex extra-territorial police operation. (It later emerged that others may have been primarily responsible.) Beijing then initiated joint gunboat patrols with neighbouring countries, allowing it to project force down the Mekong. While these actions put an end to piracy on this key stretch of river, they did not deter other forms of crime. Since 2o11, the territories on the Myanmar and Lao sides of the Mekong have emerged as hotbeds of illegal activity, from drug production and trafficking to online gambling, money laundering and cyber-scam operations that often use captive workers from around the world. Not only do transnational criminal organisations operating in this zone benefit from lax or non-existent regulations, but they also take advantage of its multi-jurisdictional character, quickly shifting operations from one place to another to evade crackdowns. Coordinated law enforcement across the region is crucial if governments want any chance of tackling these expanding criminal activities, but other capabilities must also be brought to bear. Authorities in the region need to acknowledge that any solution to this transnational problem will involve government agencies from several jurisdictions – as opposed to the typical security or police approach that treats immediate symptoms, but not the fundamental causes of the problem, including weak governance and rampant corruption, not to mention a willingness or desire of some jurisdictions to court illicit investments.

Bangkok/Brussels, International Crisis Group, 2023. 40p. Asia Report N°332 | 18 August 2023

By The International Justice Mission and University of Nottingham Rights Lab.

In 2021 International Justice Mission (IJM), together with the University of Nottingham Rights Lab, a world-leading human trafficking research institution, launched the Scale of Harm project to develop and implement a mixed-methodology providing prevalence estimates of trafficking of children to produce CSEM, including via livestreaming, in the Philippines. This is the full report of the methodology, findings, and recommendation from the very first national survey and study. You can the Summary Report below.

International Justice Mission, 2023. 78p.

By Vivian Dedase-Escoton, Suisan Walker, Dawn Schurter, Eliezer Moreno, Nathaniel Diaz, and Shiella Silva

Online sexual exploitation of children is a rampantly growing global crime, particularly in the Philippines which is known as the “global hotspot” of OSEC cases (IJM, 2020, p. 60) and ranked amongst the top ten producers of child sexual exploitation material (CSEM) (UNICEF, 2017a). Online sexual exploitation of children refers to a broad category of online sex offending that includes, but is not limited to, possession or distribution of previously produced CSEM, enticing children to “self-produce” new CSEM, and grooming children for later contact abuse. The unique nature and demographics of victims and perpetrators of this form of abuse which include the very young age of children victimized, the overwhelming number of families directly involved in the crime, the acceptance and tolerance of this form of exploitation in communities involved, as well as the high-risk for potential re-victimization of victims, present challenges in aftercare support, particularly in reintegration of survivors. In addressing the issues of online child sexual abuse, the preventive, protective, and supportive interventions for children should be extended to families and communities who are the key players in perpetrating this crime (ASEAN, 2016; UNICEF East Asian Pacific Regional Office [EAPRO], 2016; United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2015). This holistic approach is fundamental to ensuring survivor’s restoration, sustained recovery, and successful reintegration. This study examined the environmental context – individual, family, community, and societal level – of the survivors to: (1) provide a comprehensive understanding of the risk factors that facilitate online sexual exploitation of children in individuals (victims), families, and communities impacted by this form of abuse, and determine gaps in the system that affect the effective delivery of interventions and support services for survivors; (2) determine the factors that contribute to successful reintegration of survivors including the interventions and support services that need to be provided at each level of system. And lastly, (3) identify alternative care options for survivors who cannot be reintegrated to their family and community. Employing a qualitative approach, key informant questionnaires were distributed to 55 respondents composed of 19 non-offending family members and 18 neighbors of selected Aftercare Participants including 18 service providers that have knowledge of and involvement with survivors of online sexual exploitation. Further, five focus group discussions among government and non-government service providers with a total of 40 participants from NCR, Region IV-A, Region III, and Region VII were conducted. These areas represent the regions with the highest number of IJM online sexual exploitation of children clients in 2018. Findings determined the following key risk factors that facilitate online sexual exploitation of children in individuals (victims), families, and communities involved in this form of abuse

International Justice Mission - IJM, 2020. 77p.

By Stephen Merchant, Greg Wilson

In 2023 the Government commissioned a ‘first principles’ independent review of the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC) and associated Commonwealth law enforcement arrangements.

The review assessed the effectiveness of the ACIC’s legislative framework and found that comprehensive reform was needed to ensure ACIC could operate effectively as Australia’s national criminal intelligence agency. The review recommended ACIC shift away from its existing law enforcement and investigative functions towards providing unique intelligence on serious and organised crime to Commonwealth, state and territory law enforcement agencies.

The independent review’s recommendations set out a blueprint to transform the ACIC in response to the significant and ongoing threat of serious and organised crime. The Government has agreed or agreed in-principle with 27 of the 29 recommendations - as set out in the government response.

Key recommendations

• Undertake robust legislative reforms to address significant deficiencies in the existing legislative frameworks and ensure the ACIC has appropriate powers for the collection of intelligence.

• Incorporate appropriate oversight and safeguards for the ACIC, including in relation to its use of coercive powers.

• Reinvigorate national governance and coordination arrangements for responding to serious and organised crime.

• Reinforce the independence of the Australian Institute of Criminology.

BARTON, ACT : Attorney-General's Department (Australia), 2024. 68p.