By Gianluca Boo and Gergely Hideg

Overview The year 2021 saw a concerning increase in global violent death rates after the relative calm of the Covid-19 pandemic era. While violent deaths in 2020 reached a historic low since 2004, 2021 marked a global increase of six per cent, halting the previous trend of improvement. Intentional homicides remained stable, comprising two-thirds of all violent deaths, while conflict-related deaths surged, especially in Afghanistan and Myanmar, due to political upheavals. Firearms played a significant role— accounting for about 45 percent of global violent deaths— albeit less than in previous years. Men disproportionately bore the brunt of violence, with death rates more than five times higher than those of women. Geographic patterns also revealed stark disparities. Asia and Africa exhibited the highest violent death rates, and regions such as Europe and Oceania experienced the lowest levels. Forecasts for the 2030 horizon suggest a need for concerted efforts to prevent violence, as the ‘business-as-usual’ analysis —assuming that current trends remain—projects a continued increase in deadly violence. Key findings The year 2021 saw a concerning six per cent rise in global deadly violence compared to 2020. Of the approximately 580,000 violent deaths, about 45 per cent were inflicted by firearms. Violence overwhelmingly and disproportionately affected men, with a rate of 12.27 victims per 100,000 population among men and boys versus 2.33 for women and girls. Compared to the 2015 benchmark of Agenda 2030, the number of intentional homicides has decreased by only 2.6 per cent. Just over a quarter of the world’s countries and territories are currently on track to meet SDG Target 16.1. Current trends suggest the world will miss this target by 2030. The year 2020 marked a high point in progress towards reducing violent deaths. From a rate of 7.0 violent deaths per 100,000 population that year, rates have since exhibited an upward trend, reaching 7.3 in 2021 and on track to reach 7.6 by 2030.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2024. 20p.

By Lisa Tompson, Apriel Jolliffe Simpson, Richard Wortley, Bridget O’Keeffe & Devon Polaschek

Policy efforts based on evidence about risk for re-victimisation both protect some of the most vulnerable people in society and have a good chance of reducing crime levels overall (Farrell and Pease, 1993; Grove et al., 2012; Pease et al., 2018). While research has established that the phenomenon of re-victimisation is ubiquitous, less is known about what makes some people more vulnerable to re-victimisation than others (Hamilton and Browne, 1998; Nazaretian and Fitch, 2021). Enhanced understanding of who these people are is thus crucial for developing contemporary victim-centred crime prevention policy. Victimology theories suggest that people at high risk of victimisation are typified by multiple overlapping and intersecting personal characteristics (e.g., gender, age, race/ethnicity, class, disability status, sexual identity), rather than forming homogeneous higher-order groups (e.g., delineated by a single personal characteristic; Shoham et al, 2010; Walklate, 2012). Accordingly, in this study we examined socio-demographic characteristics (e.g., gender, age, ethnicity, disability status, sexual identity) of people who were re-victimised, with an emphasis on intersectionality1. That is, we focused on identifying where the co-occurrence of socio-demographic characteristics intensified risk of re-victimisation. We use re-victimisation as an umbrella term to cover: • Poly-victimisation (i.e., >1 victimisation for different types of crime), and • Repeat-victimisation (i.e., >1 victimisation for different types of crime) for 11 different crime types. We therefore analysed 12 different types of re-victimisation over five waves of the New Zealand Crime and Victims Survey (NZCVS) in the privacy- and security-protected environment of Statistics New Zealand’s Integrated Data Infrastructure (IDI) with Conjunctive Analysis of Case Configurations. This method enabled us to position groups (i.e., combinations of characteristics) as the unit of analysis and identify where intersecting characteristics were associated with high rates of re-victimisation and isolate when particular individual characteristics were especially noteworthy. This research makes four important contributions to the evidence base on victimisation. First, while re-victimisation experiences have been studied for a range of crime types internationally (see Farrell et al., 2005), this is the first research to do so for Aotearoa New Zealand. Second, it adds to the scant evidence base on poly-victimisation. Third, it corroborates the empirical findings from other countries that risk of re-victimisation increases cumulatively (Johnson et al., 1997), hence the need for policies and practices that get upstream of the problem and prevent re-victimisation at the earliest opportunity. Fourth, this research advances knowledge on how socio-demographic characteristics intersect to elevate risk of re-victimisation. The findings are relevant for policymakers developing victimisation prevention programmes across various organisations in Aotearoa New Zealand.

Te Puna Haumaru New Zealand Institute for Security and Crime Science, The University of Waikato , 2025. 105p.

By Brandon Tregle, Michael R. Smith, Chantal Fahmy & Rob Tillyer

Hot spots policing is an effective, evidence-based strategy that reduces violent crime within small geographic units, or “hot spots,” in urban areas. A strong body of research demonstrates that these hot spots disproportionately contribute to cities’ overall crime rates. However, the existing literature has yet to answer a critical question: Can the localized crime reductions achieved through hot spots policing make a significant enough contribution to lower overall crime rates across an entire city? To address this gap, we examined seven years of violent crime data from three major Texas cities. One city underwent a two-year targeted hot spots policing intervention, while the other two cities served as counter-factual, similarly situated jurisdictions. We used interrupted time series analysis (ITSA) to examine longitudinal crime patterns in all three cities. The findings indicate that, compared to the control cities, the treatment city experienced a significant and substantial reduction in overall violent crime at the point of intervention. This decrease suggests that the hot spots intervention directly contributed to city-wide crime reduction, extending its impact beyond the designated hot spots.

Crime Sci 14, 3 (2025).

Edited by Mareile KaufmannHeidi Mork Lomell

The De Gruyter Handbook of Digital Criminology examines how digital devices spread and cut across all fields of crime and control. Providing a glossary of key theoretical, methodological and criminological concepts, the book defines and further establishes a vibrant, rapidly developing field. Focusing on central criminological phenomena, it provides a framework that will enable readers to bring their own research themes into digital environments.

UBerlin/Boston, De Gruyter, 2025. 525p.

By William Walter Scott III

The 1967 Detroit Rebellion was the bloodiest of the urban riots in the United States during the “Long hot summer of 1967.” Hurt, Baby, Hurt takes a personal look at the Rebellion from the perspective of William Walter Scott, III. The Rebellion began when police raided an unlicensed drinking club owned by Scott’s father and continued for five days, resulting in forty-three deaths and even more injuries, fires, and arrests. Scott, who was just 19 at the time and working as a doorman at his father’s club, is widely recognized as the man who started the Rebellion by throwing a bottle at one of the police officers. This memoir recounts Scott’s life from his birth up through the Rebellion. It tells the story of how the Rebellion started and provides an on-the-ground account of the Rebellion and its immediate aftermath, including the police detainment of the people involved. Now with a new foreword by Austin McCoy that considers the lasting impact of the rebellion, Hurt, Baby, Hurt offers valuable insight into an important part of Detroit history.\

Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2025. 143p.

By David Hammond, Daniel Hong, Samantha Rundle, Maryam Iraniparast, Beau Kilmer, Elle Wadsworth

Canada legalized ‘recreational’ or ‘non-medical’ cannabis in 2018 with a primary objective of displacing illicit cannabis and transitioning consumers to a ‘quality controlled’ legal retail market. To date, there is limited research on legal market capture in jurisdictions with non-medical cannabis markets. Methods: The current analysis used ‘demand-side’ methods to estimate the size of the Canadian cannabis market using data from two sources. First, data from the Canadian Community Health Survey were used to estimate the number of Canadians who use cannabis. Second, data on cannabis expenditures from legal versus illegal sources were analyzed from 5656 past 12-month consumers aged 16–100 who completed national surveys conducted in 2022 as part of the International Cannabis Policy Study. Results: Total estimated expenditures from legal sources were within two percentage points of the ‘actual’ retail sales data from Government of Canada’s tracking system. In the 12-month period ending in September 2022, total cannabis expenditures in Canada were estimated at $6.72 billion dollars, including $5.23 billion from legal sources and $1.49 billion from illegal sources for an estimated legal market capture of 78 %. In 2022, dried flower accounted for 55 % of total legal expenditures and an additional 2 % was spent on plants and seeds. Concentrates accounted for 12 % of legal expenditures, followed by oral liquids (11 %), vaping liquids (10 %), and edibles (8 %, excluding drinks). Conclusions: The findings provide evidence of substantial transition in expenditures from the illegal to the legal market in the five years since legalization of non-medical cannabis in Canada.

International Journal of Drug Policy, 2025. 10p.

By Jin A, Darzi AJ, Dargham A, Liddar N, Bozorgi S, Sohrevardi S, Zhang M, Torabiardakani K, Couban RJ, Khalili M, Busse JW, Sadeghirad B.

Background: Increasing legalization of recreational cannabis and availability of cannabinoid products has resulted in expanded use, which is associated with adverse effects including concerns over increased risk of motor vehicle collision (MVC). We aimed to explore the association between cannabis consumption and MVC.

Methods: We searched MEDLINE, EMBASE, CINAHL, Cochrane library, SCOPUS, PsycInfo, Web of Science, TRID from inception to November 2024. We included studies assessing the association between cannabis consumption on MVC fatalities, any injuries, and culpability/unsafe driving actions. Pairs of reviewers independently screened search results, extracted data, and assessed risk of bias. We used a DerSimonian and Laird random-effects model for all meta-analyses and the GRADE approach to assess the certainty of evidence.

Results: We included 31 studies with 328,388 individuals. Low certainty evidence suggests that cannabis consumption may be associated with an increased risk of MVC fatality (8 studies, OR 1.55, 95% CI: 1.20 to 1.98) with an absolute risk increase (ARI) of 14 more deaths per 100,000 MVC's. Low certainty evidence from 9 case-control studies suggests cannabis consumption may be associated with an increased risk of injury due to MVC (OR 2.00, [95% CI: 1.31-3.07]; absolute risk increase of 6.8%). We are uncertain about the association of cannabis consumption with MVC culpability/unsafe driving action as the evidence was only very low certainty.

Conclusions: Low certainty evidence suggests that cannabis consumption may increase risk of MVC fatality and risk of injury from MVC. The association between cannabis use and risk of unsafe driving is uncertain.

Int J Drug Policy. 2025 Aug;142:104832. doi: 10.1016/j.drugpo.2025.104832. Epub 2025 May 13. PMID: 40367728.

By The International Drug Policy Consortium

In March 2025, amidst geopolitical tensions, protracted negotiations, and a chaotic voting session at the 68th session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), a ground-breaking document was adopted. A new resolution, submitted by Colombia and supported by a broad cross-regional coalition of Member States, agreed to create a “multidisciplinary panel of 19 independent experts” tasked with reviewing “the existing machinery for the international control of narcotic drugs” and providing recommendations to strengthen the system and its implementation.

This is a historical, once-in-a-generation opportunity to propose serious changes that further social inclusion, social justice, and “the health and welfare of humankind”. This opportunity must not be wasted.

In this advocacy note, IDPC lays out some key considerations and aspirations for the panel, as well as some of the potential pitfalls to avoid, in order to make this review count.

London: IDPC, 2o25. 11p

By Joanna R. Lampe

State marijuana laws have changed significantly in recent years, and federal law appears poised to change in the coming months. At the state level, many states have enacted laws authorizing the use of marijuana for medical purposes. A smaller but growing number of states have also amended their laws to legalize or decriminalize marijuana use. At the federal level, in April 2024, news outlets reported that the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) planned to change the status of marijuana under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) by moving it from Schedule I to the less restrictive Schedule III. Under current law, many cannabis-related activities that comply with state law may nonetheless violate the federal CSA. Moving marijuana to Schedule III would not bring state-legal marijuana markets into compliance with federal law. In light of recent and proposed changes to state and federal marijuana regulation, this Sidebar provides an overview of the divergence between federal and state marijuana law. It then briefly discusses the legal consequences of the divergence and outlines certain related considerations for Congress.

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2025. 5p.

By Barbara Andraka-Christou , Olivia Randall-Kosich , Matthew Golan , Rachel Totaram , Brendan Saloner , Adam J Gordon , Bradley D Stein

Background: Problem-solving courts have the potential to help reduce harms associated with the opioid crisis. However, problem-solving courts vary in their policies toward medications for opioid use disorder (MOUD), with some courts discouraging or even prohibiting MOUD use. State laws may influence court policies regarding MOUD; thus, we aimed to identify and describe state laws related to MOUD in problem-solving courts across the US from 2005 to 2019.

Methods: We searched Westlaw legal software for regulations and statutes (collectively referred to as "state laws") in all US states and D.C. from 2005 to 2019 and included laws related to both MOUD and problem-solving courts in our analytic sample. We conducted a modified iterative categorization process to identify and analyze categories of laws related to MOUD access in problem-solving courts.

Results: Since 2005, nine states had laws regarding MOUD in problem-solving courts. We identified two overarching categories of state laws: 1) laws that prohibit MOUD bans, and 2) laws potentially facilitating access to MOUD. Seven states had laws that prohibit MOUD bans, such as laws prohibiting exclusion of participants from programs due to MOUD use or limiting the type of MOUD, dose or treatment duration. Four states had laws that could facilitate access to MOUD, such as requiring courts to make MOUD available to participants.

Discussion: Relatively few states have laws facilitating MOUD access and/or preventing MOUD bans in problem-solving courts. To help facilitate MOUD access for court participants across the US, model state legislation should be created. Additionally, future research should explore potential effects of state laws on MOUD access and health outcomes for court participants.

Health Justice. 2022 Mar 31;10(1):14. doi: 10.1186/s40352-022-00178-6. PMID: 35357599; PMCID: PMC8969254.

By Inshik Sim, Shawn Kelley, Kavinvadee Suppapongtevasakul, Seong Jae Shin

This report shows that the production and trafficking of methamphetamine in Shan State, Myanmar, have significantly increased since 2021. Thailand remained the main transit and destination point for methamphetamine trafficked from Myanmar and recorded the largest quantity of methamphetamine seizures in the region. The report highlights the evolving nature of transnational drug trafficking groups operating in East and Southeast Asia. These groups have demonstrated remarkable agility in reacting to law enforcement pressure, as shown by the spread of production sites for ketamine and related precursor chemicals.

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; 2025. 150p.

By Katrien Luyten

The EU is an important market for illicit drugs (hereinafter referred to as drugs), both in terms of consumption and production. An estimated 29% of European adults aged 15-65 have used drugs at least once in their lifetime, the majority of them being men. Cannabis remains by far the most used drug, followed by cocaine, MDMA (ecstasy or molly) and amphetamines. Drugs have been claiming an increasing number of lives in the EU since 2012, but their impact goes far beyond the harm caused by their use. The drugs market is the largest criminal market in the EU, with an estimated minimum retail value of €30 billion per year in the EU alone. Over a third of the organised crime groups active in the EU are involved in the trade in drugs, which, besides generating massive criminal profits and inflicting substantial harm, incites associated violence. Drug markets furthermore have links with wider criminal activity, including terrorism; they have a negative impact on the legal economy and communities, cause environmental damage and can fuel corruption and undermine governance. Drugs have been trafficked into and through the EU for decades, but they are also increasingly produced in the EU, for both local and global markets, asis the case for cannabis and synthetic drugs such as amphetamines. In fact, the trade in synthetic drugs in the EU is unique compared to other substances,as the production of these drugs and new psychoactive substances in most cases takes place in the EU. In 2021, around 1million seizures of drugs were reported in the EU-27 plus Norway and Türkiye. Although the EU Member States carry the primary responsibility for developing their drug policy and legislation, cross-border cooperation is paramount in the fight against drugs. With the problem constantly expanding in scale and complexity, the EU has been increasingly active since the early 1990s, particularly with respect to law enforcement, health-related issues and the detection and risk assessment of new psychoactive substances. This is an update of a briefing published in September 2021.

Brussels: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service , 2023.. 12p.

By Londeka Ngubane, Sazelo Mkhize, Sogo Angel Olofinbiyi

I n educational context, the term corporal or physical punishment refers to the use of physical force intended to cause some degree of pain or discomfort for discipline, correction, and control, changing behavior or in the belief of educating/bringing up the child(Naz, Daraz, Khan; Hossain & Khan (2011). Dar (2012) annotates that corporal punishment is ‘the intentional application of physical pain as method of behaviour change’. It comprises a wide variation of methods such as ‘hitting, slapping, spanking, punching, kicking, pinching, shaking, shoving, choking, use of various objects (i.e., wooden paddles, belts, sticks, pins, or others), painful body postures (such as placing in closed spaces), use of electric shock, use of excessive exercise drills, or prevention of urine or stool elimination’ (Dar 2012). In the context of criminology, corporal punishment refers to some manner of physical punishment inflicted by judicial order on the body of an offender (Naz et al 2011).Majority of children in South Africa have experienced physical punishment by the time they reach adolescence though it was legally abolished in 1996.

Reaserch Gate, 2022, 14p.

By Cozens, P. M., Neale, R. H., Whitaker, J., Hillier, D., Graham, M.

This paper critically examines the relationship between street lighting and crime in the British city context. Prompted by recent government investment to modernize street lighting, the authors analyze how lighting affects both actual crime rates and fear of crime. It questions the reliability of current British Standards (BS 5489) that are used to determine lighting needs, pointing out discrepancies between official crime data and public perceptions of safety. Drawing on historical and contemporary research, the paper suggests that improved lighting can contribute to crime reduction and greater public confidence, but only when contextually appropriate. The review calls for a broader understanding of how urban lighting affects both real and perceived safety, arguing that current approaches may miss critical socio-environmental dynamics.

(Crime Prevention and Community Safety: An International Journal, Volume 5, Issue 2, 2003, pp. 7–24)

By David Weisburd, Laura A. Wyckoff, Justin Ready, John E. Eck, Joshua C. Hinkle, Frank Gajewski

This study addresses the longstanding concern that focused crime prevention efforts—such as policing "hot spots"—might simply displace crime to nearby areas. While displacement has been a major critique of place-based policing, empirical studies have rarely been designed specifically to assess its presence or measure its impact. The authors designed and implemented a controlled field experiment in Jersey City, New Jersey, to examine whether such displacement occurs or whether crime control efforts might instead lead to a diffusion of benefits—i.e., crime reductions in areas surrounding targeted sites. The study focused on two areas: one known for street-level drug dealing and the other for prostitution. Using over 6,000 social observations, interviews, and ethnographic fieldwork, the researchers found little evidence of spatial displacement and instead documented significant diffusion of crime control benefits to adjacent areas. The findings challenge assumptions that crime merely moves elsewhere and reinforce the effectiveness of concentrated policing in reducing crime beyond targeted hot spots.

(Criminology, Volume 44, Number 3, 2006, pp. 549–594)

By Madeline Rolfe, Beth Mooney, Teresa Hulme, Millie Paine and Sophie Davi

Fraud is the most commonly experienced crime in England and Wales, making up around 41% of all crime against households and people aged 16 and over. 6 Data suggests that the scale of fraud is increasing, with fraud incidents rising by 19% between 2023 to 2024 across the whole population. 7 Fraud causes significant harm to individuals and the economy. 8 It also represents a national threat: fraud is a form of serious and organised crime. 9 One study found two thirds of serious and organised crime groups committing fraud were also involved in other criminal activity. 10 In some cases, proceeds from fraud were used to fund other illegal activity. 11 Tackling fraud is a strategic priority for policing and is included in the Strategic Policing Requirement. 12 The government has also underlined a commitment to tackling fraud in the Fraud Strategy. 13 This is an opportune time to generate insight around how best to tackle fraud. Previous Crest research found initial evidence to suggest that the risk of young people being exposed to and experiencing fraud is disproportionately growing compared to elderly people as the internet increasingly becomes part of their daily lives. 14 However, research to understand children and young people’s (CYP) experiences of fraud is lacking. This research is the first to specifically focus on fraud committed against CYP. It examines reporting data from the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB), interviews with CYP, and nationally representative surveys with both CYP and parents and guardians. Findings from these sources have been triangulated to build a comprehensive picture of fraud experienced by CYP. A wider range of fraud experts have also been engaged throughout this project to ensure our research is cutting edge and informs action in this sector. This research is well timed given Fraud Minister David Hanson’s announcement at the Global Anti-Scam Summit in March 2025 that an expanded fraud strategy is to be developed and published later this year. Key findings Scale and nature of fraud against children and young people 1. Most CYP have been targeted by fraudsters within the last year. According to our survey, 88% of CYP aged 13-21 had been targeted by fraud in the last year. Only 1% of children and young people (CYP) have never encountered fraud. 2. Nearly a third (29%) of CYP have been a victim of fraud. Some CYP are more likely to experience fraud victimisation, including older CYP (aged 18-21) and CYP with Special Educational Needs and Disabilities (SEND). 3. Milestones where CYP gained new or increased financial independence coincided with fraud victimisation. For example, some of our interviewees experienced fraud after opening their first bank account or getting their first job. There was also evidence of victimisation after CYP received a lump sum of money e.g. the 16 to 19 Bursary Fund. 4. The most commonly experienced types of fraud by CYP are advance fee fraud, banking and credit fraud, financial investment fraud, cyber fraud, and identity theft and fraud. Available data suggests that, on average, CYP lose the most money from financial investment fraud. 5. Advance fee fraud is the most commonly recorded fraud against CYP, it accounted for the majority of CYP reports to professionals and was commonly experienced CYP interview participants 6. CYP are more likely to experience fraud on certain online platforms. These were Instagram, Facebook and TikTok. Interestingly, these platforms are not where they spend most of their time. Children and young people reporting fraud 1. Nearly two-thirds of CYP told someone about their experience of fraud. The most common person to tell was a parent/guardian, with over half (59%) of survey respondents telling their parent/guardian about their experience. Reporting the fraud to the bank (35%) and Action Fraud (22%) was less common. 2. The most common barrier to reporting fraud was due to feeling that nothing would happen, with 27% stating this reason. Impact of fraud on children and young people 1. CYP reported significant emotional impact as a result of fraud victimisation. Almost half (47%) of survey respondents reported feeling strong emotions such as anger, sadness, fear, frustration as a result of their victimisation; and over a quarter (27%) of survey respondents stated that being a victim of fraud impacted their mental health. 2. Fraud victimisation leads to CYP changing their behaviour. Changing internet use and online activity was a common impact of fraud victimisation amongst CYP, this ranged from being more cautious online with emails, websites and privacy settings to stopping a particular online activity altogether, such as online shopping or online banking.

London: Crest Advisory, 2025. 86p,

By MITCH MORRISSEY & ERIK GAMM

DNA evidence, where it’s available, is crucial to solving sexual assault cases—according to one study, it raises the likelihood of a guilty verdict from less than a third to nearly 75%. The trouble and expense of processing it, however, can create backlogs that put cases on hold for years. Dozens of state and local law-enforcement agencies have faced this problem over the decades since DNA technology emerged.

This year, due in part to years of alleged misconduct by one of its forensic scientists, the Colorado Bureau of Investigation (CBI) found itself with a queue of more than 1,400 untested sexual assault kits and without the means to process new ones promptly. The unsolved cases stuck in this backlog represent substantial further crime risks from repeat offenders, delayed justice for victims, and tangible costs to Colorado’s economy.

Key Findings

By processing all of the 1,369 DNA kits in the state’s backlog, Colorado could prosecute up to 200 rape cases.

This would also prevent up to 1,030 sexual assaults, 108 other violent crimes, 230 property offenses, and 113 drug/alcohol, public disorder, and other crimes.

At a testing cost of $2,000 per kit and adjudication, public-services, and work-loss costs totaling $82,000 per case, clearing the backlog and prosecuting cases associated with it will cost the state $21 million. In return, Colorado’s economy will eventually save $234.7 million due to prevention of future crimes.

The longer authorities take to clear the backlog, the larger the costs and smaller the savings will become.

CSI estimates that, by training 15 more DNA scientists over the next year, CBI will clear its DNA backlog of excess kits by July 2027. Delayed processing of kits currently in the backlog, which are expected to be tested by September 2026, will have allowed $51.8 million worth of additional criminal activity.

Even kits that don't lead to convictions are worth testing for the qualitative benefits they offer, like identifying deceased and incarcerated perpetrators, adding to the national DNA database, and providing closure to victims.

Common Sense Institute, 2025. 12p.

Age is a core part of our identity in the UK, both for adults and for children. As well as being a way of marking growth and maturity, chronological age determines how we are able to participate and develop as members of society and is intrinsically linked to our legal rights. However, for children seeking asylum in the UK, age is increasingly being used as a tool for excluding them from the support and protection to which they are entitled. Hundreds of children are having their ages questioned by border officials when they arrive in this country and are then being sent into the adult system. The government repeatedly claims that there are high numbers of adults pretending to be children, but this is not the case. Instead, our research has found that in 2022 more than 800 children were incorrectly treated as adults by the Home Office and placed alone in accommodation alongside adults, or in immigration detention, at significant risk.

Helen Bamber Foundation i. Asylum Aid, . Humans for Rights Network 2023. 8p

By Clare Garvie

A report released by the Center on Privacy & Technology evaluates the reliability of face recognition as it is used by police in the United States. The report examines the myriad human and machine factors, and their interactions, that might lead to bias and error when law enforcement agencies use face recognition. As a biometric, forensic investigative tool, face recognition may be particularly prone to errors arising from subjective human judgment, cognitive bias, low-quality or manipulated evidence, and under-performing technology. These errors have real-world consequences — the investigation and arrest of an unknown number of innocent people and the deprivation of due process of many, many more. As the grassroots movement to ban police use of face recognition grows, invoking the many overarching ethical problems with this kind of surveillance technology, it is important to point out that face recognition doesn’t work well enough to reliably serve the purposes for which law enforcement agencies themselves want to use it. Relying on the vast wealth of research and knowledge already present in computer science, psychology, forensic science, and legal disciplines, its key findings are:

As currently used in criminal investigations, face recognition is likely an unreliable source of identity evidence.

The algorithm and human steps in a face recognition search each may compound the other’s mistakes.

Since faces contain inherently biasing: information such as demographics, expressions, and assumed behavioral traits, it may be impossible to remove the risk of bias and mistake.

Face recognition has been used as probable cause to make arrests despite assurances to the contrary.

Evidence derived from face recognition searches are already being used in criminal cases, and the accused have been deprived the opportunity to challenge it.

The harms of wrongful arrests and investigations are real, even if they are hard to quantify.

This report is meant to be a resource for researchers examining the potential risks of this new technology, defense attorneys whose clients were identified using face recognition, judges seeking to understand the scientific merit of face recognition-derived evidence, police departments seeking to minimize the harms its use, and advocates and organizers seeking to protect rights in an age of ever expanding police deployment of this technology.

It calls on these communities to question any and all assumptions that the current use of face recognition is adequately controlled and reliable. It warns that we have a narrow and closing window of time in which to repeat the mistakes of previous forensic disciplines and avoid judicial certification of fundamentally flawed or unreliable methods.

Washington, DC: Center on Privacy & Technology at Georgetown Law, 2022. 77p.

By M. Dylan Spencer, Cory Schnell, Samuel E. DeWitt

Objectives: Public transportation systems experience dynamic changes over time to accommodate growing cities, yet evaluations of their impact on crime often focus on shorter, static periods. This study examines the long-term relationship between light rail expansion and crime, using a 20-year observation period in Charlotte, NC. We analyze changes in crime patterns near original, expanded, and planned light rail station locations. Methods: We conducted a quasi-experimental program evaluation of the opening of light rail stations on crime at place. We estimated Poisson regression models with fixed effects and difference in difference models to analyze crime incidents at street intersections surrounding light rail stations across varying spatial distances. Results: Our findings suggest that the expansion of the light rail system led to an increase in crime around train stations. We observe a significant intervention effect across multiple crime categories and spatial distances. These analyses suggest the effect appears stronger after the expansion of light rail service to additional train stations. Conclusions: These results have implications for a wide range of community stakeholders involved with the planning of public transportation. Given the evolving demand for transit systems, our findings highlight the need for crime prevention policies to accompany infrastructure expansion and mitigate crime.

J Exp Criminol (2025), 39p.