By Roderic Broadhurst, Matthew Ball, Chuxuan Jiang, Joy Wang and Harshit Trivedi

Opioids, including the highly potent synthetic opioids fentanyl and carfentanil, are commonly sold on illicit cryptomarkets or Tor darknet markets. Data collected throughout 2019 from 12 large darknet markets that sold opioids enabled observation of the impact of law enforcement seizures and voluntary or scam market closures on the availability of fentanyl and other opioids.

Trends in opioid and fentanyl availability before and after law enforcement interventions indicate whether market operators and sellers are deterred and whether market closures lead to displacement, dispersal or substitution. Evidence of all of these outcomes was present in both descriptive and trend analyses, although most effects were short lived. Market closures, especially law enforcement seizures, reduced the availability of opioids, in particular fentanyl, as well as increasing prices and displacing vendors to other markets. Market closures also led vendors to substitute fentanyl for other opioids or other illicit drugs.

Research Report no. 18. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2021. 73p.

The synthetic opioid crisis in North America has increased fatal overdose rates to unprecedented levels within a matter of a few years. It involves new technologies, a new source of supply (the chemical industry in China), and new forms of distribution (the internet and mail). These elements are perhaps even more difficult to suppress than other supply sources from foreign countries. This has led to an assumption that nothing can be learned from prior experience in trying to control drug markets.

This paper applies the insights of the “focused deterrence” approach developed by David Kennedy and Mark Kleiman, which involves using multiple levers to attain a specific policy goal. We conclude with some specific suggestions for local and national supply-control agencies— including the need to focus more on regulating rather than reducing markets to minimize harm, and to distinguish between markets not yet swamped by fentanyl or in transition and those where the drug is entrenched. Strategies appropriate in one context may not serve well in another.

Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2020. 21p.