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CRIME PREVENTION

CRIME PREVENTION-POLICING-CRIME REDUCTION-POLITICS

Posts in Policy
Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems [Updated January 2, 2025]

By Sayler, Kelley M.

From the document: "Lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) are a special class of weapon systems that use sensor suites and computer algorithms to independently identify a target and employ an onboard weapon system to engage and destroy the target without manual human control of the system. Although these systems are not yet in widespread development, it is believed they would enable military operations in communications-degraded or -denied environments in which traditional systems may not be able to operate. Contrary to a number of news reports, U.S. policy does not prohibit the development or employment of LAWS. Although the United States is not known to have LAWS in its inventory currently, some senior military and defense leaders have stated that it may be compelled to develop LAWS if U.S. competitors choose to do so. At the same time, many states and nongovernmental organisations are appealing to the international community for regulation of or a ban on LAWS due to ethical concerns. Developments in autonomous weapons technology and international discussions of LAWS could hold implications for congressional oversight, defense investments, military concepts of operations, treaty-making, and the future of war."

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE. Jan. 2025. 3p.

Strategic Report on Research and Development in Biotechnology for Defense Innovation

By National Academy of Sciences

From the webpage: "At the request of the National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology, Strategic Report on Research and Development in Biotechnology for Defense Innovation provides an overview of the current landscape of artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML)-enabled biotechnology, the opportunities it presents, and the challenges it poses. This report offers a strategic vision for connecting scientists and technologists to build on, leverage, and tailor advances at the intersection of AI/ML, automated experimentation, and biotechnology to drive innovation in defence-related biotechnologies. Strategic Report on Research and Development in Biotechnology for Defense Innovation recommends addressing long-standing challenges with limited research, development, prototyping, testing and evaluation, and eventual use of biotechnologies. Addressing these challenges will help to advance U.S. national security and defence by improving the performance of existing capabilities, enabling the creation of domestic supply chains of valuable products, reducing reliance on processes and chemicals that are harmful to the environment, and/or adding new capabilities not currently possible with established technologies." Contributors include the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine; Division on Earth and Life Studies; Board on Life Sciences; and Committee on Biotechnology Capabilities for National Security Needs-Leveraging Advances in Transdisciplinary Biotechnology.

NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS (U.S.) 2025. 67p.

Investigation of the Worcester Police Department and the City of Worcester, Massachusetts

By United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division and United States Attorney’s Office District of Massachusetts

The Department of Justice (DOJ) opened an investigation of the Worcester Police Department (WPD) and the City of Worcester (City) on November 15, 2022. Based on this investigation, DOJ has reasonable cause to believe that WPD and the City engage in a pattern or practice of conduct that deprives people of their rights under the Constitution and federal law. First, WPD uses excessive force. Second, WPD engages in outrageous government conduct by permitting undercover officers to participate in sexual contact with women suspected of being involved in the commercial sex trade. FINDINGS The Department of Justice has reasonable cause to believe that the Worcester Police Department and the City of Worcester engage in a pattern or practice of conduct that deprives people of their rights under the Constitution and federal law: • WPD uses excessive force that violates the Fourth Amendment. Officers unreasonably deploy Tasers, use police dogs, and strike people in the head. Officers rapidly escalate minor incidents by using more force than necessary, including during encounters with people who have behavioral health disabilities or are in crisis. • WPD engages in outrageous government conduct that violates the constitutional rights of women suspected of being involved in the commercial sex trade by engaging in sexual contact during undercover operations. This violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. WPD’s inadequate policies, training, supervision, investigations, and discipline fostered these unlawful patterns or practices. This investigation also raises serious concerns that WPD officers have sexually assaulted women under threat of arrest and engaged in other problematic sexual conduct. WPD lacks the policies and practices needed to adequately address reports of sexual assault by non-officers as well, raising concerns about gender discrimination. In addition, the investigation raises serious concerns that WPD’s enforcement practices may result in discriminatory policing against Hispanic and Black people, whom WPD disproportionately warns, cites, arrests, and subjects to force. DOJ does not find at this time that these racial disparities amount to an unlawful pattern or practice of racial discrimination. However, WPD should collect and assess data about its practices and take steps to ensure they do not have an unlawful discriminatory effect. Worcester’s law enforcement professionals work hard to keep the public safe, often under difficult conditions. We commend those who dedicate their professional lives to serving the community. We also commend WPD and the City for implementing some reforms while this investigation was pending, including adopting body-worn cameras and creating a Policy Review Committee that solicits public comment on WPD policies. However, remedying the problems identified through this investigation will require more. DOJ expects to work constructively with WPD and the City to implement the reforms necessary to address the unlawful conduct outlined in this report.

Washington, DC: United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, 2024. 43p.

Policy Brief Serious Violence Reduction Orders: The Impression of Doing Something

By Holly Bird, Jodie Bradshaw, Roger Grimshaw, Habib Kadiri and Helen Mills

The Labour government came into office earlier this year, with an ambitious ‘aim to halve knife crime in a decade’. Early moves have included, in September, the launch of a ‘Coalition to Tackle Knife Crime’, aiming, as the press release put it, to ‘bring together campaign groups, families of people who have tragically lost their lives to knife crime, young people who have been impacted and community leaders, united in their mission to save lives and make Britain a safer place for the next generation’. This was followed, in November, with proposals to fine senior executives of online companies if they market illegal weapons, along with moves to ban the sale of so-called ninja swords. The government is also proposing both ‘rapid intervention and tough consequences’ for those caught in possession of a knife and a network of ‘Young Futures hubs’, to improve access to support for young people at risk of criminalisation. The second of these proposals, which prioritise prevention and support for young people at risk, has a strong evidence-based underpinning it. ‘Decades of research and evidence gathering’, this briefing points out, ‘has shown that the drivers of serious violence are insecure employment prospects, poverty, substance misuse, mental health issues, volatile drug markets, experience of violence’. The same cannot be said of the ‘rapid intervention and tough consequences’ proposals, which tend to prioritise often short-term enforcement over longer-term prevention. One recent example of such action, the subject of this briefing, is the Serious Violence Reduction Order (SVRO), currently being piloted in four police areas in England. At its simplest, the imposition of an SVRO on an individual in effect gives the police carte blanche to stop and search them, at any time and in any place, and without the police having to demonstrate ‘reasonable suspicion’. Previous research on so-called suspicion-less stops and searches, cited in this briefing, found no evidence that they had any impact on the levels of violent crime. Indeed, there is scant evidence that stop and search in general has much of an impact on underlying crime levels (Bradford and Tiratelli, 2019). This is not an argument for no police enforcement. The police clearly perform important public order functions. But it is an argument for the importance of effective, evidenced-based policing. The roll-out of the SVRO pilots are shrouded in secrecy, with information hard to come by. While they are subject of an evaluation, there are some questions over whether it will provide the rigorous evidence of impact (or not) required, or, indeed, whether it will ever be published.

London: Centre for Crime and Justice Studies , 2024. 18p.

Secret Service's Preparation for, and Response to, the Events of January 6, 2021 [redacted]

United States. Department Of Homeland Security. Office Of Inspector General

From the document: "The United States Secret Service (Secret Service) planned and conducted protective operations at several sites on January 6, 2021, including the Capitol, and took actions to assist the United States Capitol Police (USCP). We initiated this review to evaluate the Secret Service's preparation for, and response to, the events of January 6, 2021. [...] We conducted this review to evaluate the Secret Service's preparation for, and response to, the events of January 6, 2021. [...] We made six recommendations to improve the Secret Service's policies and processes for planning and responding to similar events."

United States. Department Of Homeland Security. Office Of Inspector General . 31 Jul, 2024 .

Using Artificial Intelligence and Quantum Computing to Enhance U.S. Department of Homeland Security Mission Capabilities

By Robles, Nicolas M.; Alhajjar, Elie; Geneson, Jessie; Moon, Alvin; Adams, Christopher Scott; Leuschner, Kristin; Steier, Joshua

From the webpage description: "Building on research on quantum machine learning, researchers investigated the effect of quantum-enhanced artificial intelligence within the context of the six U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) missions. For each mission, the authors illustrate how quantum boosts could help DHS perform its computational duties more efficiently. They also explain some situations in which quantum computing does not provide benefits over classical computing. Last, they provide recommendations to DHS on how to leverage quantum computing. This paper should be of interest to policymakers, researchers, and others working on quantum computing or artificial intelligence."

RAND CORPORATION. 27 AUG, 2024.

CISA Analysis: Fiscal Year 2023 Risk and Vulnerability Assessments

By United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency

The following passage from the document contains multiple links embedded in the text: "The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) conducts Risk and Vulnerability Assessments (RVAs) for the federal civilian executive branch (FCEB), high priority private and public sector critical infrastructure (CI) operators, and select state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) stakeholders. Concurrently, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) conducts RVAs on maritime CI operated by SLTT and private-sector organizations. The RVA is intended to assess the entity's network capabilities and network defenses against known threats. In Fiscal Year 2023 (FY23), CISA and the USCG conducted a combined total of '143' RVAs across multiple CI sectors. [...] The goal of the RVA analysis is to develop effective strategies to improve the security posture of FCEB, CI, maritime, and SLTT stakeholders. During each RVA, CISA and the USCG collect data through remote and onsite actions. This data is combined with national threat and vulnerability information to provide organizations with actionable remediation recommendations prioritized by risk of compromise. CISA designed RVAs to identify vulnerabilities threat actors could exploit to compromise network security controls. After completing an RVA, CISA and the USCG provide the assessed entity a final report that includes recommendations, specific findings, potential mitigations, and technical attack path details. The FY23 reports provided these general observations: [1] Assessors completed their most successful attacks via common methods, such as phishing, valid accounts, and default credentials. [2] Assessors used a variety of tools and techniques CISA has captured in previous RVA analyses to successfully conduct common attacks. [3] Many organizations across varying CI sectors exhibited the same vulnerabilities. [4] CISA assessment personnel used common vulnerabilities facilitated by shortcomings in secure by design and default principles and other misconfigurations to compromise systems."

UNITED STATES. Government. Washington DC. SEP, 2024. 24p.

Ticket Punch-The Consequences of Fare Evasion Enforcement in New York City Subways

By SHEYLA A. DELGADO, GINA MORENO, FIDEL OSORIO, RICHARD ESPINOBARROS, JEFFREY A. BUTTS JOHN JAY COLLEGE RESEARCH AND EVALUATION CENTER

Researchers at the John Jay College Research and Evaluation Center (JohnJayREC) investigated transit fare evasion in subway stations and station complexes throughout New York City between 2018 and 2023. The study was conducted as part of the New York City Police Reform and Reinvention Collaborative Plan, overseen by the New York City Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice (MOCJ). The research team analyzed associations between fare evasion and arrests reported by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) and considered the social and economic characteristics of the neighborhoods surrounding each transit station. The study found no statistically significant associations between fare evasion enforcements and total arrests for felonies and misdemeanors. Fare evasion enforcement, however, was most prevalent in stations whose neighborhoods were characterized by high socioeconomic disadvantage. The statistical interaction of crime rates, fare evasion enforcement, and socioeconomic disadvantage underscores the role of social factors in public safety.

New York: JOHN JAY COLLEGE RESEARCH AND EVALUATION CENTER, 2024. 15p.

Hacking Minds and Machines: Foreign Interference in the Digital Era

KOVALCIKOVA, NAD'A; FILIPOVA, RUMENA VALENTINOVA, 1989-; HOGEVEEN, BART; KARÁSKOVÁ, IVANA; PAWLAK, PATRYK; SALVI, ANDREA

From the document: "This 'Chaillot Paper' delves into the phenomenon of foreign interference and the risk it poses to democratic societies. It explores the interplay between information manipulation and disruptive cyber operations, revealing their role as complementary components within a broader strategy. Dedicated chapters examine how interference manifests across various sectors, including social, political, economic, digital and security domains, describing existing tools and evolving policy responses. Each case study follows a clear structure, presenting an incident, its effects and the implemented responses. The volume concludes by identifying convergences and divergences across the cases studied, and highlights foreign interference as a critical and growing threat to global security. It offers targeted recommendations on how the EU can significantly bolster its defences and resilience against this threat."

INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES (PARIS, FRANCE). AUG, 2024. 67p.

AI and the Evolution of Biological National Security Risks: Capabilities, Thresholds, and Interventions

DREXEL, BILL; WITHERS, CALEB

From the document: "In 2020, COVID-19 brought the world to its knees, with nearly 29 million estimated deaths, acute social and political disruptions, and vast economic fallout. However, the event's impact could have been far worse if the virus had been more lethal, more transmissible, or both. For decades, experts have warned that humanity is entering an era of potential catastrophic pandemics that would make COVID-19 appear mild in comparison. History is well acquainted with such instances, not least the 1918 Spanish Flu, the Black Death, and the Plague of Justinian--each of which would have dwarfed COVID-19's deaths if scaled to today's populations. Equally concerning, many experts have sounded alarms of possible deliberate bioattacks in the years ahead. [...] This report aims to clearly assess AI's impact on the risks of biocatastrophe. It first considers the history and existing risk landscape in American biosecurity independent of AI disruptions. Drawing on a sister report, 'Catalyzing Crisis: A Primer on Artificial Intelligence, Catastrophes, and National Security,' this study then considers how AI is impacting biorisks across four dimensions of AI safety: new capabilities, technical challenges, integration into complex systems, and conditions of AI development. Building on this analysis, the report identifies areas of future capability development that may substantially alter the risks of large-scale biological catastrophes worthy of monitoring as the technology continues to evolve. Finally, the report recommends actionable steps for policymakers to address current and near-term risks of biocatastrophes."

CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY. 2024.

Securing the Critical Technology Supply Chain as a Function of National Intelligence

A GOSWAMI, ARCHISHMAN

From the document: "This paper examines the role that national intelligence agencies may play in helping to secure critical technology supply chains. As the race for scientific advantage becomes increasingly characteristic of national security concerns amid growing multipolarity and interstate competition, national intelligence agencies are paying greater attention to the security of critical and emerging technologies. This paper analyses how intelligence agencies may work and adapt in relation to the specific challenges posed by this issue. The analysis is divided into sections on intelligence (examining the broadening of intelligence-gathering horizons and the likelihood of ally-on-ally espionage); counterintelligence (focused on insider threats from within the private sector); and covert action (assessing the potential for paramilitary action and offensive cyber to achieve kinetic effect vis-à-vis a competitor's supply chains)."

OBSERVER RESEARCH FOUNDATION., 2024. 23p.

Identifying the Adoption of Policing Styles: A Methodology for Determining the Commitment to Problem-Oriented Policing Amongst Police Forces in England and Wales

By Ferhat Tura, James Hunter, Rebecca Thompson and Andromachi Tseloni

This article presents a comprehensive methodology aimed at assessing the commitment of police forces in England and Wales to problem-oriented policing (POP). By evaluating various policing styles and their adoption, the study seeks to provide a clearer understanding of how these approaches impact community relations and crime reduction. Through a combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis, the authors identify key indicators of POP implementation and offer insights into the factors influencing its effectiveness. This exploration not only contributes to academic discourse on policing strategies but also serves as a practical guide for law enforcement agencies striving to enhance their community engagement and operational efficiency.

Oxford University Press, 2022, 14 pages

2024 U.S. Federal Elections: The Insider Threat

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency; United States. Federal Bureau Of Investigation; United States. Election Assistance Commission; United States. Department Of Homeland Security

From the document: "The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) prepared this overview to help partners defend against insider threat concerns that could materialize during the 2024 election cycle. For years, federal, state, local, and private sector partners nationwide have worked closely together to support state and local officials in safeguarding election infrastructure from cyber, physical, and insider threats. Because of these efforts, there is no evidence that malicious actors changed, altered, or deleted votes or had any impact on the outcome of elections. Over the past several years, the election infrastructure community has experienced multiple instances of election system access control compromises conducted by insider threats. While there is no evidence that malicious actors impacted election outcomes, it is important that election stakeholders at all levels are aware of the risks posed by insider threats and the steps that they can take to identify and mitigate these threats. This document outlines several recent examples of election security-related insider threats, discusses potential scenarios that could arise during the 2024 election cycle, and provides recommendations for how to mitigate the risk posed by insider threats."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency; , et al. 2024. 9p

Review of the Department of Justice's Response to Protest Activity and Civil Unrest in Washington, D.C. in Late May and Early June 2020

United States. Department Of Justice. Office Of The Inspector General.

From the document: "The Department of Justice (Department or DOJ) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) undertook this review to examine the Department's and its law enforcement components' roles and responsibilities in responding to protest activity and civil unrest in Washington, D.C., between May 29 and June 6, 2020, following the murder of George Floyd on May 25. The report details the relevant events involving DOJ and its components during this time period, including their assistance to the U.S. Park Police (USPP) and the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) in and around Lafayette Park in connection with USPP and USSS plans to construct a fence on H Street after violence had erupted during protests on May 29; meetings attended by then Attorney General William Barr and other DOJ officials at the White House on June 1; Barr's involvement in the events at Lafayette Park on June 1; and DOJ's deployment of its law enforcement personnel on June 1 and on subsequent days. Thereafter we describe our analysis of these events, including whether Barr affected the timing of the clearing operation at Lafayette Park on June 1."

United States. Department Of Justice. Office Of The Inspector General. Jul, 2024. 168p.

IT Outage from CrowdStrike's Update: Impacts to Certain Public Safety Systems and Considerations for Congress

Pechtol, Colby; Gallagher, Jill C.

The following passage from the document contains multiple links embedded in the text: "On July 19, 2024, CrowdStrike, a U.S. cybersecurity firm, released a software update to their customers. The update caused certain systems to crash, disrupting services across several industries, including airlines, banks, hospitals, government agencies, and public safety systems. CrowdStrike reported that the incident was caused by 'a defect found in a single content update of its software on Microsoft Windows operating systems' and was not a cyberattack. Though the update affected less than 1% of all Windows machines, the impacts were widespread and global. The incident illustrates the vulnerabilities of information technology (IT) systems, increased dependence and risks in relying on third-party vendors for critical IT services, and lack of protocols and backup systems in the event of IT system failures. This In Focus discusses the incident's impact on certain U.S. public safety communications systems and services."

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE. 26 JUL, 2024.. 3p.

ADVANCING PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING: LESSONS FROM DEALING WITH DRUG MARKETS

by Rana Sampson

Abstract: In the early 1990s, American policing, applying a problemoriented approach, displayed much creative energy in closing drug markets. This has not translated to a under range of quality efforts in tackling other common crimes, such as burglary, auto theft, and shoplifting. While few of the factors that combined to fuel wide exploration of creative solutions in drug markets are present for other crime and safety problems, there may be some simple ways to engage the police to further study and target other crimes. Three strategies are offered: identifying, understanding, and responding to snowball crimes; using a situational crime prevention approach to graded responses for repeat victimization; and examining privately-owned properties for disproportionate demands on police service with an eye towards shifting responsibility for crime-place management to these owners.

Crime Prevention Studies, vol. 15 (2003), pp. 239-256..

Diagnostic Assessment and Countermeasure Selection: A Toolbox for Traffic Safety Practitioners (2024)

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

NCHRP Research Report 1111/BTSCRP Research Report 12 presents a toolbox to help highway safety practitioners diagnose contributing factors leading to crashes for use in selecting appropriate countermeasures. To develop this toolbox, the research team conducted a systematic literature review; developed comprehensive evaluation and analysis procedures, methods, and tools; and conducted a workshop to demonstrate the use of the draft toolbox to receive feedback from practitioners. This publication will be of interest to state departments of transportation and other stakeholders concerned with diagnosing contributing factors leading to crashes for use in selecting appropriate countermeasures.

Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/27890.

Institutionalizing problem-oriented policing: rethinking problem solving, analysis, and accountability

By Rachel Boba a and John P. Crank

Problem-oriented policing (POP) has emerged as a fertile area of innovative police research and practice. Its core ideas have existed for over 20 years; however, research suggests that POP has been routinized into the practice of few police departments. This paper argues that POP has not gained widespread adoption because of the inclination to make line officers the central actors in POP’s implementation. It presents an integrated model reconsidering how problems are defined, analysis is used, and how problem-solving accountability is distributed throughout an organization and builds upon the strengths of traditional policing – information-gathering, centralized command, and accountability structure.

Routledge. Police Practice and Research Vol. 9, No. 5, December 2008, 379–393

Problem – Oriented Policing Brit Pop

By Adrian Leigh, Tim Read and Nick Tilley

Much police work is incident-driven and officers frequently find themselves returning to deal with similar or related incidents they or their colleagues have faced in the past. The concept of Problem-Oriented Policing (POP) is about examining patterns of incident clusters to identify and tackle underlying problems within the community. The active involvement of the community and external agencies is often vital to the identification of problems and the development of strategies to solve them. The originator of the concept, Herman Goldstein, believes that the whole of the police service needs to be oriented to problems. The perceived benefits of POP include:

  • a better-served public whose concerns are attended to at source;

  • officers with enhanced job satisfaction from bringing the public real benefits; and,

  • more manageable demands on the police because underlying problems are solved, reducing repeat calls.

Since POP was first proposed in 1979, it has been widely adopted in the United States. There have also been a number of efforts to implement it in England and Wales. Despite overlooking some elements of POP proposed by Goldstein, past initiatives have been labelled Problem-Oriented Policing because they have taken on board his most important tenet: that officers should tackle the root cause of related incidents, rather than repeatedly returning to them. Whilst forces have adopted a variety of approaches, most initiatives have been relatively small-scale and have affected only a small number of dedicated officers. All have recorded mixed success, although none has established a formal means by which to assess outcomes. In particular, none of the past POP initiatives in England and Wales has adopted a formal and systematic model linking incident identification and analysis with the construction of responses and subsequent assessment of the actions taken. At the time of writing, both Surrey and Thames Valley were intending to introduce POP on a much wider scale and in a form closer to that originally proposed by Goldstein.

London Home Office. Crime Detection and Prevention Series Paper 75. 1996. 72p.

PROTOCOL: The effects of problem oriented policing on crime and disorder: am updated systematic review

David Weisburd

Problem-oriented policing has garnered a great deal of attention since it was first proposed by Herman Goldstein in 1979. The core of the model is a shift from police operating in a reactive, incident driven way (primarily responding to calls for service) to a model that requires the police to be proactive in identifying underlying problems that can be targeted to alleviate crime and disorder at their roots. Problem-oriented policing can be thought of as a process rather than a specific intervention. As such, problem-oriented policing can work independently or simultaneously with other modern policing innovations (hot spots policing, focused deterrence etc…) to address problems of crime and disorder. While the ability of problem-oriented policing to target an array of different issues makes it widely applicable, the plethora of different interventions that may qualify as problem-oriented policing make generalizing research on its effect difficult. The current study will provide an updated systematic review of the effectiveness of problem-oriented policing in reducing crime and disorder. An earlier Campbell review by three of the same authors covered studies published through 2006 (Weisburd, Telep, Hinkle & Eck, 2008; 2010); this updated review will add studies published from 2006 to 2018.

The Campbell Collaboration. 2019. 42p.