By Santiago Montenegro and Álvaro Pedraza

This paper tries to explain why kidnapping has fallen so dramatically in Colombia during the period 2000-2008. The widely held belief is that the falling kidnapping rates can basically be explained as a consequence of the success of President Alvaro Uribe's democratic security policy. Without providing conclusive alternative explanations, some academic papers have expressed doubts about Uribe' security policy being the main cause of this phenomenon. While we consider the democratic security policy as constituting a necessary condition behind Colombia's falling kidnapping rates, we argue in this paper that a complementary condition underlying this phenomenon has been the significant increase during this period in the speed and quality of communications between potential victims and public security forces. In this sense, the expansion of the mobile phone industry in Colombia implies that there has been a substantial reduction in information asymmetries between kidnappers and targeted citizens. This has led to a higher level of deterrence as well as to higher costs for perpetrating this type of crime. This has resulted in a virtuous circle: improved security allows higher investments in telecommunications around the country, which in turn lead to faster communications between citizens and security forces, which consequently leads to greater security. We introduce a Becker-Ehrlich type supply and demand model for kidnappings. Using regional and departmental data on kidnapping, the police and mobile phones, we show that mobile phone network expansion has expanded the effective coverage of public protection; this, in turn, has led to a spectacular reduction in kidnapping rates.

Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad de los Andes–Facultad de Economía–CEDE, 2009. 30p

By Fabio Sánchez, Jairo Nunez, and Francois Bourguignon

Inequality has always been taken as a major explanatory factor of the rate of crime. Yet, the evidence in favor of that hypothesis is weak. Pure cross-sectional analyses show significant positive effects but do not control for fixed effects. Time series and panel data point to a variety of results, but few turn out being significant. The hypothesis maintained in this paper is that it is a specific part of the distribution, rather than the overall distribution as summarized by conventional inequality measures, that is most likely to influence the rate of (property) crime in a given society. Using a simple theoretical model and panel data in 7 Colombian cities over a 20 year period, we design a method that permits identifying the precise segment of the population whose relative income best explains time changes in crime.

Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad de los Andes–Facultad de Economía–CEDE, 2003. 23p.

By Jorge Cuartas, Arturo Harker, and Andrés Moya

During early childhood, children develop cognitive and socioemotional skills that predict success in multiple socioeconomic dimensions. A large part of the development of these skills depends on the child’s context during the first years of life and, in particular, on the quality of parental care. Grounded on recent literature in psychology and behavioral economics, we discuss a theoretical framework for understanding why some children receive adequate care, while others do not. Within this framework, we identify a determinant of the quality of parenting that has not yet been explored in-depth: the availability of parents’ mental resources, which are depleted by the subjective feeling of scarcity and the stress generated by adversities. Using cross-sectional data from a household survey in Colombia and administrative data on crime and violence, we find that a greater subjective feeling of scarcity (β=0.45, IC95%:[0.082, 0.979]) and greater exposure to violence (β =0.09, IC90%:[0.004, 0.182]) are associated with a lower likelihood that parents engage in stimulating activities with their children. At the same time, the results show that receiving information on childrearing is correlated with better parental practices (β =-0.48, IC95%:[-0.822, -0.136]).

Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad de los Andes–Facultad de Economía–CEDE , 2016. 35p.

By National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

Technological advances in noninvasive neuroimaging, neurophysiology, genome sequencing, and other methods together with rapid progress in computational and statistical methods and data storage have facilitated large-scale collection of human genomic, cognitive, behavioral, and brain-based data. The rapid development of neurotechnologies and associated databases has been mirrored by an increase in attempts to introduce neuroscience and behavioral genetic evidence into legal proceedings.

In March 2018, the National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine organized a workshop in order to explore the current uses of neuroscience and bring stakeholders from neuroscience and legal societies together in both the United Kingdom and the United States. Participants worked together to advance an understanding of neurotechnologies that could impact the legal system and the state of readiness to consider these technologies and where appropriate, to integrate them into the legal system. This publication summarizes the presentations and discussions from the workshop.

Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 2018. 80p.

By National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

To derive statistics about crime – to estimate its levels and trends, assess its costs to and impacts on society, and inform law enforcement approaches to prevent it - a conceptual framework for defining and thinking about crime is virtually a prerequisite. Developing and maintaining such a framework is no easy task, because the mechanics of crime are ever evolving and shifting: tied to shifts and development in technology, society, and legislation.

Interest in understanding crime surged in the 1920s, which proved to be a pivotal decade for the collection of nationwide crime statistics. Now established as a permanent agency, the Census Bureau commissioned the drafting of a manual for preparing crime statistics—intended for use by the police, corrections departments, and courts alike. The new manual sought to solve a perennial problem by suggesting a standard taxonomy of crime. Shortly after the Census Bureau issued its manual, the International Association of Chiefs of Police in convention adopted a resolution to create a Committee on Uniform Crime Records —to begin the process of describing what a national system of data on crimes known to the police might look like.

Report 1 performed a comprehensive reassessment of what is meant by crime in U.S. crime statistics and recommends a new classification of crime to organize measurement efforts. This second report examines methodological and implementation issues and presents a conceptual blueprint for modernizing crime statistics.

Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 2018. 280p.

By National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

To derive statistics about crime – to estimate its levels and trends, assess its costs to and impacts on society, and inform law enforcement approaches to prevent it – a conceptual framework for defining and thinking about crime is virtually a prerequisite. Developing and maintaining such a framework is no easy task, because the mechanics of crime are ever evolving and shifting: tied to shifts and development in technology, society, and legislation.

Interest in understanding crime surged in the 1920s, which proved to be a pivotal decade for the collection of nationwide crime statistics. Now established as a permanent agency, the Census Bureau commissioned the drafting of a manual for preparing crime statistics—intended for use by the police, corrections departments, and courts alike. The new manual sought to solve a perennial problem by suggesting a standard taxonomy of crime. Shortly after the Census Bureau issued its manual, the International Association of Chiefs of Police in convention adopted a resolution to create a Committee on Uniform Crime Records —to begin the process of describing what a national system of data on crimes known to the police might look like.

The key distinction between the rigorous classification proposed in this report and the “classifications” that have come before in U.S. crime statistics is that it is intended to partition the entirety of behaviors that could be considered criminal offenses into mutually exclusive categories. Modernizing Crime Statistics: Report 1: Defining and Classifying Crime assesses and makes recommendations for the development of a modern set of crime measures in the United States and the best means for obtaining them. This first report develops a new classification of crime by weighing various perspectives on how crime should be defined and organized with the needs and demands of the full array of crime data users and stakeholders.

Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 2016. 286p.

By National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine

Reliable and valid forensic science analytic techniques are critical to a credible, fair, and evidence-based criminal justice system. There is widespread agreement that the scientific foundation of some currently available forensic science methods needs strengthening and that additional, more efficient techniques are urgently needed. These needs can only be met through sustained research programs explicitly designed to ensure and improve the reliability and validity of current methods and to foster the development and use of new and better techniques. This task is challenging due to the broad nature of the field.

Concerns have been raised repeatedly about the ability of the criminal justice system to collect and analyze evidence efficiently and to be fair in its verdicts. Although significant progress has been made in some forensic science disciplines, the forensic science community still faces many challenges. Federal leadership, particularly in regard to research and the scientific validation of forensic science methods, is needed to help meet the pressing issues facing state and local jurisdictions.

This report reviews the progress made by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) to advance forensic science research since the 2009 report, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward and the 2010 report, Strengthening the National Institute of Justice. Support for Forensic Science Research examines the ways in which NIJ develops its forensic science research priorities and communicates those priorities as well as its findings to the scientific and forensic practitioner communities in order to determine the impact of NIJ forensic science research programs and how that impact can be enhanced.

Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 2015. 116p.

By Ted Enamorado, Luis-Felipe López-Calva, Carlos Rodríguez-Castelán, and Hernán Winkler

The relationship between income inequality and crime has attracted the interest of many researchers, but little convincing evidence exists on the causal effect of inequality on crime in developing countries. This paper estimates this effect in a unique context: Mexico's Drug War. The analysis takes advantage of a unique data set containing inequality and crime statistics for more than 2,000 Mexican municipalities covering a period of 20 years. Using an instrumental variable for inequality that tackles problems of reverse causality and omitted variable bias, this paper finds that an increment of one point in the Gini coefficient translates into an increase of more than 10 drug-related homicides per 100,000 inhabitants between 2006 and 2010. There are no significant effects before 2005. The fact that the effect was found during Mexico's Drug War and not before is likely because the cost of crime decreased with the proliferation of gangs (facilitating access to knowledge and logistics, lowering the marginal cost of criminal behavior), which, combined with rising inequality, increased the expected net benefit from criminal acts after 2005.

Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2014. 31p.

By Patrick Guillaumont and Frédéric Puech

Relying on samples taken from developing and developed countries, several recent papers, such as those by Fajnzylber et al. (2002), Soares (2004) and Neumayer (2003, 2005), have emphasized the influence of macro-economic variables on crime. Those studies highlight the impact of the average level of income and of its growth rate. But none of them consider the impact of its instability. This paper argues that the factors corresponding to economic shocks or macro-economic instability have a significant and robust influence on crime. It suggests that this influence comes from disappointed anticipations, formed during periods of rapid increase of income, which, to some extent, generates frustration and possibly crime. It also suggests that illegal activities are used by some agents to compensate their loss of income and, in this way, smooth their consumption. It mainly deals with the direct effect of instability on crime. Nevertheless, since macro instability reduces growth, as it has been largely substantiated in literature, and growth has been found to have a negative impact on crime, it can also be supposed to have an indirect effect on crime through the growth rate.

CERDI - Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International, 2006. 26p.

By Jason Payne, Rick Brown and Roderic Broadhurst

In this study the arrest records of the 1984 and 1994 NSW birth cohorts were obtained using a data matching process facilitated by the NSW Registry of Births Deaths and Marriages and the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (BOCSAR). The aim of this research is to examine the possible causes and consequences of the Australian crime decline through a longitudinal and developmental criminological lens. To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first such comparative analysis of longitudinal data aimed at exploring the crime decline, and builds on the recent, albeit it aggregated and cross-sectional, analysis both in Australia (Weatherburn et al. 2014) and overseas (Farrell et al. 2015). Overall, the age-graded longitudinal experiences of the more recent of the two cohorts (born in 1994) confirm the declines previously identified by Weatherburn and Holmes (2013). Specifically, the results presented in this study suggest that as a proportion of each birth cohort the number of young people having contact with the criminal justice system by their 21st birthday had almost halved; down from 9.5 percent for the 1984 birth cohort to 4.8 percent for the 1994 birth cohort. But for the very young ages of between 10 and 13 years, the annualised prevalence of criminal justice contact was markedly lower for those born in 1994, although the analysis shows that these disparities are greatest in the late teenage and early adulthood years. Importantly, the otherwise non-existent or modest differences in the younger years suggests that for both cohorts the emergence and prevalence of ‘early onset’ offending was not dissimilar. Instead, the so-called crime decline appears to have been the result of fewer young people having contact with the criminal justice system as teenagers and young adults.

Canberra: Australian National University, 2018. 68p.

By Sin-ying Choi

This dissertation is a study on the relationship between crime rate and socio-economic factors (i.e. poverty, income inequality, age, education and unemployment) in Hong Kong. Although there are many such studies on crime in foreign countries, similar study in Hong Kong is rare. This dissertation examines if any functional relationship could be established by regression analysis and how this can be related to new town development.

Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 2007. 123p.

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By Tom Naylor, with the assistance of Deane Taylor and Roksana Bahramitah

For obvious reasons, the primary functions of traditional law enforcement and the criminal justice system are investigation, prosecution, and punishment of persons deemed responsible for proscribed acts. The main purpose of criminological research, whether conducted by law enforcement or academics, has been to assist those functions, directly or indirectly. To be sure, there is much research that focuses on crimes as events rather than on the criminals who cause those events. But mostly, research has been devoted to studying the social conditions that facilitate the commission of offences. It has paid much less attention to understanding the methodology by which and institutional context through which particular actions take place. The resulting deficiencies are particularly marked with respect to profit-driven offences. The type of information collected by police or prosecutors for the purposes of a particular criminal proceeding may be quite different from the type of information necessary in understanding the nature of on-going criminal markets or the modus operandi of the underworld economy as a whole. Nor is academic criminology much more helpful – generally speaking, crimes are used to define categories of offenders rather than being a subject of (more technocratic) interest in and of themselves. These shortfalls also afflict the categorization of acts. The practice of dividing criminal code offences into three broad categories – crimes against persons, crimes against property, and trafficking – provides little useful information with respect to context or process. More specifically, due to lack of systematic definition and subsequent overlap, umbrella terms such as economic, commercial, and white-collar crime are frequently used interchangeably, even by socalled “experts in the field.” The fact that some of these terms refer to acts and others to persons doesn’t seem to matter (e.g., respectively, commercial vs. white-collar crime). It is no surprise that the specified offences covered by these are similarly confusing and impractical. For example, means (e.g., telephone pitches and computerized communications) and ends (e.g., fraudulent transfers of wealth) are oftentimes confounded. All this creates problems that go beyond simple lack of terminological neatness. Without knowing just what a problem or objective is, it seems rather difficult, to say the least, to design a strategy or policy to deal with it.

Ottawa: Research and Statistics Division, Department of Justice Canada, 2002. 51p.

The International Crisis Group

What’s the issue? After fifteen years of failed security policies, the government of El Salvador is in the middle of an open confrontation. Efforts aimed at fighting gangs’ deep social roots have not produced desired results due to a lack of political commitment and social divisions that gangs use to their advantage. Why does it matter? Born in the wake of U.S. deportation policies in the late 90s, gang violence in El Salvador has developed into a national security problem that accounts for the country’s sky-high murder rate. The combination of mano dura (iron fist) policies and the U.S. administration’s approach to migration could worsen El Salvador’s already critical security situation. What should be done? All political actors should honour the government’s holistic violence prevention strategies by fully implementing them and reframing anti-gang policies. Specific police and justice reforms, as well as a legal framework for rehabilitating

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2017. 46p,

By International Crisis Group

What’s new? Violence, coca production and drug trafficking have spiked along Colombia’s Pacific coast since the 2016 peace agreement between the government and FARC guerrillas. New and old armed groups battle for control over communities, territory and illegal business, triggering ongoing displacement and low-intensity warfare. Why does it matter? Long one of Colombia’s poorest and most peripheral regions, the Pacific’s struggles highlight huge difficulties in improving security without addressing economic and political roots of armed group recruitment and the co-option of communities by organised crime. What should be done? Instead of depending on a counter-insurgency strategy or a “kill/capture” policy to dismantle armed groups, the Colombian government should prioritise building a stable, trustworthy civilian police and state presence, demobilising combatants, fulfilling its peace accord promises on local development and coca substitution, and furnishing educational opportunities for local people.

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2019. 51p.

By International Crisis Group

What’s new? The COVID-19 pandemic had an immediate impact on organised crime across Mexico and Central America’s northern countries as lockdowns slowed movement of people and goods. But criminal groups swiftly adapted to the new normal, using it to tighten or expand their control over people and territory. Why does it matter? The region’s criminal groups, many acting in collusion with rogue state actors, are largely responsible for some of the world’s highest murder rates and wield asphyxiating power in an increasing number of communities. With state budgets under huge strain, official responses are set to remain lacklustre. What should be done? Governments should combine policing to contain and deter crime with increased support to the most insecure areas and vulnerable populations. Rather than reverting to heavy-handed tactics, they should invest in programs that reduce impunity and create economic alternatives for at-risk young people, potentially with the help of COVID-19 emergency funds.

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2020. 37p.

By International Crisis Group

What’s new? Crime and violence have simmered along the lengthy ColombianVenezuelan frontier for decades. But the regional spillover of Venezuela’s political conflict and economic collapse has caused ties between the two states to fray as well, amid border closures, a migrant exodus and rival military exercises. Why does it matter? Numerous armed groups clash with one another and harm citizens along a border marked by abundant coca crops and informal crossings. High bilateral tensions could spur escalating border hostilities while perpetuating the mistreatment of migrants and refugees whose movements have been restricted by COVID-19. What should be done? Colombian and Venezuelan authorities should urgently establish communication channels to resolve violent incidents along the border, possibly with international backing. They should reopen formal border crossings as planned, but also increase humanitarian aid to help ensure that migrants and refugees are healthy and can move safely.

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2020. 44p.

By International Crisis Group

What’s new? On 6 June, Mexico will stage its largest-ever election day, with 21,000 contests nationwide. Opposition forces accuse President Andrés Manuel López Obrador of planning to deepen authoritarian rule should his allies prevail in the polls. Meanwhile, criminal groups exploit electoral competition in their quest for impunity and power. Why does it matter? The country’s politics are highly polarised, and its parties are weak and opportunistic. Criminal groups can use favours and threats to gain influence over future elected officials. Entanglements between government and organised crime that have long undermined security policies help perpetuate Mexico’s high levels of violence. What should be done? Severing links between criminals and state officials will be challenging, especially given the government’s apparent reticence to act. Still, outside actors should encourage investment in independent election oversight bodies and local institutions, and a shift toward tailored and less militarised policies to curb insecurity in Mexico’s most conflict-ridden areas.

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2021. 33p.

By Jorge M. Agüero

About half of Peruvian women between the ages of 15 and 49 have experienced some form of violence from their partners. Through a quantitative analysis, this report explores how violence rates against women vary by ethnic group and over time. Based on a nationally representative sample of more than 75,000 women surveyed between 2003 and 2012 and a review of the literature on ethnic classification in Peru, a typology is applied to measure ethnicity, based on women’s linguistic backgrounds, allowing for a consistent ethnic characterization throughout the period of analysis. In this typology, the first group is made up of women who speak an indigenous language at home and do not speak Spanish. A second group, called “historic” Spanish speakers, is composed of women who learned Spanish during childhood and still use it today, while the third group, called “recent” Spanish speakers, includes women who grew up speaking an indigenous language but now speak Spanish. The highest rate of all types of violence is found in this last group, with a much greater difference in sexual and severe physical violence. This is consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model developed in this study in which violence depends on the type of couple. The model finds that women who speak “recent” Spanish—and who have what is termed a lower “outside option” than their “historic” Spanish-speaking male partners—experience greater violence. The study found that the gap in rates of violence against women among these three language groupings has remained constant over time despite an overall reduction in violence. This shows that current policies to provide care for victims and prevent violence against women are insufficient because the policies do not necessarily target groups with a greater risk of violence. This is unlike other areas of public health, where interventions are directly targeted at the most vulnerable populations

Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 2018. 43p.

By Marc Fabel and Helmut Rainer

This paper quantifies how much of violent crime in society can be attributed to football-related violence. We study the universe of professional football matches played out in Germany’s top three football leagues over the period 2011-2015. To identify causal effects, we leverage time-series and cross-sectional variation in crime register data, comparing the number of violent crimes on days with and without professional football matches while controlling for date heterogeneity, weather, and holidays. Our main finding shows that violent crime increases by 21.5 percent on a match day. In the regions and time period under consideration, professional football matches explain 8 percent of all violent assaults, and generate social costs of roughly 194 million euros. Exploring possible mechanisms, we establish that the match day effect cannot be explained by emotional cues stemming from either unsettling events during a match or unexpected game outcomes, nor is it driven by increases in domestic violence. Instead, we find that the match day effect can be attributed to violence among males in the 18-29 age group, rises to almost 70 percent on days with high-rivalry derby matches, and that a non-negligible share of it stems from violent assaults on police officers. These findings are inconsistent with frustration-aggression theories that can explain sports-related violence in the United States, but can be accommodated by social identity explanations of football hooliganism.

Munich: CESifo, 2021. 40p.

By Lucy Strang, Garrett Baker, Jack Pollard, Joanna Hofman

Football is the world's most popular sport, with millions of fans annually watching professional football on their television or at public viewing places such as fan zones, or attending matches in person. Negative behaviour at football matches is a widely recognised issue that has garnered international media attention for decades. However, violent and antisocial behaviour at football matches remains an issue that needs to be better understood. To this end, RAND Europe was commissioned by Qatar University to provide a series of reports looking into the issues of violence and antisocial behaviour at major sporting events. This first report observes the key antisocial and violent behaviours that may be witnessed in relation to football events, such as verbal abuse, destruction of property, acts of vandalism and assault, while also noting that football environments can foster positive behaviours and social dynamics. In addition, it acknowledges that definitions of antisocial behaviour are to some degree subjective and contextual. It is important to acknowledge, however, that while the identified studies consider specific factors driving fan behaviour, the available evidence supports the notion that no single factor can be found to be responsible for violent or antisocial behaviour by fans at football events. Rather, multiple factors are often in play simultaneously. While the identified studies consider specific factors driving fan behaviour, the available evidence supports the notion that no single factor can be found to be responsible for violent or antisocial behaviour by fans at football events. Rather, multiple factors are often in play simultaneously. The quality of the identified literature varied significantly, and the research team rated only a handful of studies as being very high quality.

Santa Monica, CA: Cambridge, UK: RAND Europe, 2018. 42p.