By Alejandra Luneke, Lucia Dammert,  Liza Zuñiga  

Crime increase in Latin America has occurred in parallel with a change in police policy in territories. Along with the processes of militarization and police repression, strategies of co-production have been inspired by community policing, but the articulation of both in urban margins has been understudied. Our hypothesis affirms the coexistence and ambivalence of both social assistance and abusive practices against the city's poor. Qualitative methods conducted in Santiago, Chile, show police policy involves both dimensions, which are strongly rooted in identity elements of the military tradition of the region's police forces.

Dilemas, Rev. Estud. Conflito Controle Soc. – Rio de Janeiro – Vol. 15 – no 1 – JAN-ABR 2022 – pp. 1-26  

By Renato de Almeida Arão Galhardi 

  Historically, Mexicans deported from the United States tend to be overwhelmingly adult men, where the Mexican borderscape of Tijuana is and continues to be the primary site (and sight) where the majority of deported Mexicans are sent to when deported from the United States. Consequently, the semiotic social topography of Tijuana is peopled through the experiences of deportation. How, then, do Mexican deportees negotiate, mediate and articulate their lived experiences of migration? Working with my ethnographic research in Tijuana, during August 2021 and March 2022, I address the ontopological conditioning of living as a deportee in a borderscape such as Tijuana, assessing how their phenomenographic experiences are shaped by the bordering of the Border, and how Mexican deported men are often “unjustly suffering” and enduring “the bare life.” Through discussions on coloniality of Being, I build off Nicolas de Genova’s “border spectacle,” and argue that deportation is better described through its own “spectacle,” the “deportation spectacle,” highlighting how deportees perform and negotiate their agency between the tensions of suffering and resiliency as a consequence of the practices of imposed by deportation. I posit that deportation is not the end of a process, but reshapes migrancy continuity within new constraints, challenges and obstacles. Finally, I conclude by emphasizing the need to recognize misrepresented, misinterpreted and misdiagnosed populations such as deportees in borderscapes such as Tijuana, in order to better attend to the challenges that deportation creates.   

Working Paper No. 2023/07 September 2023  

Toronto: Metropolitan University, 2023. 23p.

By Chris Dyke, Carol Rivas, Karen Schucan Bird

This study, the first to examine parole decisions for perpetrators of domestic violence in England and Wales, examines how parole boards reach decisions through a thematic analysis of interviews with 20 Parole Board members, alongside logistic regressions of all 137 parole decisions about perpetrators in an 18-month period. In this sample, recommendations of professionals, especially psychologists, were by far the strongest predictor of a release decision. The nature of offending was also significant in predicting release. Size and composition of the panel may also affect decisions. More panel members, and longitudinal feedback, may encourage more reflective, considered decision making.

The Howard Journal of Crime and Justice,  22 January 2024

By  Timothy Cubitt and Anthony Morgan

Risk assessment is a growing feature of law enforcement and an important strategy for identifying high-risk individuals, places and problems. Prediction models must be developed in a transparent way, using robust methods and the best available data. But attention must also be given to implementation. In practice, the data available to law enforcement from police information systems can be limited in their completeness, quality and accessibility. Prediction models need to be tested in as close to real-world settings as possible, including using less than optimal data, before they can be implemented and used. In this paper we replicate a prediction model that was developed in New South Wales to predict high-harm offending among outlaw motorcycle gangs nationally and in other states. We find that, even with a limited pool of data from a national police information system, high-harm offending can be predicted with a relatively high degree of accuracy. However, it was not possible to reproduce the same prediction accuracy achieved in the original model. Model accuracy varied between jurisdictions, as did the power of different predictive factors, highlighting the importance of considering context. There are trade-offs in real-world applications of prediction models and consideration needs to be given to what data can be readily accessed by law enforcement agencies to identify targets for prioritisation.

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2024, 47pg

By Jonathan Goodhand, Patrick Meehan, Camilo Acero, and Jan Koehler

This research paper is the second in a three-part series analysing the nexus between paramilitaries, illicit economies and organised crime in borderland and frontier regions. This research challenges the idea that paramilitaries are symptomatic of state breakdown, flourishing in marginal spaces suffering from ‘governance deficits’; and that they can primarily be understood as apolitical, predatory self-enriching actors, driven by economic motives, and operating outside formal political systems.

In this research paper, a set of detailed case studies are presented that explore coercive brokerage in Afghanistan, Colombia and Myanmar that seek to address these ideas, drawing upon data and analysis generated by a four-year Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF) project, Drugs & (Dis)order (https://drugs-disorder.soas.ac.uk), and other relevant research.

Birmingham, UK:  University of Birmingham. 2023, 65pg

By Kristina Amerhauser

Illicit financial flows (IFFs) are a serious concern in the Mekong region, which includes Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR), Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam. Facilitated by state-embedded actors, each year vast amounts of illicit proceeds are generated, moved and laundered across the region and beyond in offshore tax havens. This distorts the local economies; deprives the state of income needed for health, education and infrastructure; and deepens inequality. This paper is part of a comparative research project that tests and applies the ‘IFFs pyramid’, a new framework of analysis of IFFs proposed by Reitano (2022), in the context of the Mekong region. Based on a review of secondary literature, it provides an overview of financial flows, trade flows and informality – the three main means by which IFFs are enabled, moved and held according to the ‘IFFs pyramid’ – and discusses how IFFs manifest across the Mekong. It finds that: • There is widespread evidence that each flow is significant in the Mekong and that flows converge and intersect. Nevertheless, current responses to IFFs almost entirely focus on the formal financial system. • Porous borders and strong trade relationships, including with neighbouring China, offer abundant and diverse opportunities for trade-based money laundering (TBML). Lack of capacity to identify misclassified goods and low cross-border collaboration are key impediments to its response. • There are a large number of special economic zones (SEZs), some of which are treated as ‘lawless zones’ where national governments have no authority. This creates widespread opportunities for value to be extracted, under-reported and comingled with legitimate flows. They have also been linked to other illicit markets, such as drug trafficking, the illegal wildlife trade (IWT), human trafficking and financial crimes, and provide the space to generate and launder illicit proceeds in a multitude of ways. • The big informal economy, coupled with the large number of people who remain outside the formal financial system, limits the efficiency of regulatory and oversight instruments. • Political will to tackle IFFs in the Mekong appears to be limited, in large part due to the involvement of Chinese actors. In fact, some actors in charge of the response to IFFs seem to have created loopholes to their own benefit. State-embedded actors are part of the problem, both as a source of IFFs as well as by further enabling them. This research shows that the IFFs pyramid proposed by Reitano (2022) is a helpful tool for organising information related to IFFs in the Mekong and for improving understanding of the major negative impact and harms that IFFs exert on societies and economies of the region  

SOC ACE Research Paper No. 30. University of Birmingham. 2023, 32pg

By  James Porteous

This report examines human trafficking linked to organised crime groups involved in illegal betting and related criminal activity in four key regions in Southeast Asia. Research was primarily via desktop information gathering conducted in 2022/23, supplemented by the expertise and existing knowledge of the Mekong Club and the Asian Racing Federation Council on Anti-Illegal Betting and Related Financial Crime in human trafficking and illegal betting, respectively. Key findings are: • Tens of thousands of people are being held in modern slavery conditions to work in organised illegal betting and cyber-scam operations across Southeast Asia. • These operations, which are run by individuals with long histories of involvement in illegal betting and organised crime across Asia, are estimated to make at least USD 40 to 100 billion a year in illicit profits from such activity. • Some individuals are recruited on false job advertisements, have their passports removed and are kept in dormitories attached to fully contained casino compounds as forced labour to promote illegal betting websites and engage in industrial-scale cyber-fraud such as “pig butchering”, romance scams, and cryptocurrency Ponzi schemes. • Workers are typically not permitted to leave without paying large ransoms to their captors, and can be sold and traded between organised crime groups. Fines for breaking rules or failing to hit monetary targets are added to victims’ ransoms. • Reports on victim testimony and online video shows “staff” being beaten with iron bars, shocked with cattle prods, tied up, and subject to other forms of torture. Female victims have been forced into sex work for failing to meet targets. • The groups running such operations have been active in organising and promoting gambling across Asia since at least the 1990s. Because many of the core activities in this business (e.g., movement of money across borders, violent debt collection, bribery of local officials, provision of related “entertainment” such as narcotics and sex), are illicit, such operations have by necessity been closely associated with, or directly run by, individuals with organised crime backgrounds. • In the early 2000s, this business was supercharged by the development of online gambling (both casino games and sports betting), run directly out of existing casinos or related properties, which massively increased the target market, and has grown to be a trillion dollar illegal industry funding organised crime. • Attempts to profit from this by governments in Southeast Asia, typically by licensing operators for a fee, have led to the spread of such operations across the region and had major negative impacts, including widespread corruption. It has also concentrated operations in self-contained compounds and so-called special economic zones which local police are often unwilling or unable to enter or investigate. • Hundreds of thousands of workers are required to serve the industry in marketing, customer recruitment, funds transfers, tech support and related fields. • Pre-pandemic, demand for workers was usually satisfied by voluntary means, although an unknown percentage of “voluntary” arrivals were held in modern-slavery like conditions, and there were related human trafficking aspects such as trafficking of sex workers to serve the industry. • This began to change in 2018 as a result of China’s growing concern over cross-border illegal betting, and change was accelerated massively by travel restrictions due to the pandemic, which cut off the supply of workers. • At the same time, the organised criminal groups had a key business line – land-based casinos – essentially closed down because of travel restrictions. As a result, they greatly expanded and developed existing cyber-scam operations, leveraging their expertise and technology in areas such as social media marketing, customer recruitment and cryptocurrency, which were in place from their online illegal betting operations. • Now, as the pandemic recedes, the organised crime groups running these operations have, in effect, hugely increased their potential revenue by complementing illegal betting with cyber-scam operations of comparable scale. • The success of such operations has been an enormous financial boon to organised crime, for whom cyber scams and illegal betting are just two of many illicit business lines that include money laundering as a service, illicit wildlife trafficking and production and distribution of methamphetamine and heroin. • The vast profits from such operations have provided plentiful ammunition to corrupt local authorities, and the operations in this group are frequently protected by powerful politicians and/or armed militias. • Global attention on the issue has not eliminated this activity, just displaced it into even more vulnerable jurisdictions, leading some to fear the industry could lead to geopolitical instability.   

Hong Kong: Asian Racing Federation, 2023. 39p.

By Martin Purbrick  

The report provides an analysis of variable Betting Duty (tax) rates on racing and sports betting operators to assess the impact on legal markets of higher rates and the related impact on betting turnover in the illegal betting markets. The economic impact of excessive Betting Duty in the Internet age is to drive consumers to the illegal betting market.

  • The highest rate of Betting Duty noted is in Hong Kong, at 75% of GGR. • The lowest rate of Betting Duty noted is in South Africa, at 6% of GGR. • The median rate of Betting Duty noted is in France, at 37.7% of GGR. • The highest Betting Duty rate in Hong Kong exists with an estimated illegal market of USD 257 per head of population, with lessening illegal markets per head of population with correspondingly lower Betting Duty rates of USD 61 in Singapore (25% Betting Duty), USD 59 per head in South Africa (6.5%), USD30 in Australia (10% to 20%), and USD 11.44 in the USA (6.75% to 51%). • Betting Duty rates have an impact on the turnover in betting markets, causing customers to potentially move from legal (licensed) to illegal (unlicensed) betting channels. • Higher Betting Duty rates lead to an increased theoretical margin to betting odds (which betting operators build in to ensure a profit margin), consequent increases to the takeout rate of the operator, increased prices for the customer, and inevitably drive customers to illegal betting markets where odds are better value because of no take out rate. • Illegal betting operators pay no Betting Duty or any other taxes and hence have no theoretical margin relating to taxation costs. There is hence a permanent price differential between the legal and illegal betting markets, with illegal markets consequently offering better odds (prices) to consumers. Betting customers, like the consumers of most products, are price sensitive and all things being equal prefer a cheaper betting product. • Higher Betting Duty rates also have increasingly less impact on consumer protection (when intended to discourage betting and gambling in society) as raising rates has the impact of migrating customers from the more expensive legal to the less expensive illegal betting market.  Government policy makers and gambling regulators should seek a commercially reasonable and stable Betting Duty rate that provides a balance between channelling gambling demand to the legal betting sector and allowing licensed betting operators to effectively compete with the illegal market.  
Hong Kong: Asian Racing Federation Council on Anti-Illegal Betting & Related Financial Crime, 2023. 30p.

By Oluwaseun Kugbayi and Adeleke Adegbami

Many towns and villages in Nigeria have been experiencing bandits activities, vis-à-vis kidnapping, armed robbery, murder, rape, cattle-rustling, and violent actions in recent years. These activities have continued to escalate despite the presence of security agencies such as – the Nigerian Army, the Nigerian Navy, the Nigerian Air Force, the Nigerian Police, the State Security Service, the National Intelligence Agency, and the Defence Intelligence among others. The unabated bandits' activities in part of the country depict a picture of ungoverned spaces, which suggests that there are territories that are experiencing a vacuum of political order. The study for that reason examines the connections between banditry and the ungoverned spaces, as well as, analyses the effects of bandits' activities on Nigeria and Nigerians. Using the discourse analysis that relies on secondary sources, the paper argues that the inability to govern some territories adequately in Nigeria has created a vacuum for bandits’ activities to thrive.
Law Research Review Quarterly, (4), 399-418. https://doi.org/10.15294/lrrq.v9i4.71054

By Sara Mariella Lambertini

The Orinoco Mining Arc (OMA) is in the south of Venezuela, a region rich in minerals and natural resources with a particular social, economic, and security dynamic. Due to its remoteness and difficult access, different actors have found a privileged space to conduct criminal activities. Venezuela has ratified the international conventions against transnational organized crime, trafficking in persons, and illicit drug trafficking. It also has national legislation criminalizing all these illicit activities. However, factors such as corruption and government inefficiency have led to impunity and a lack of implementation of legislation. Moreover, the complex social and economic situation in the country has forced part of the population to yield to the pressure of criminal groups operating in the mining sector. The research exposes the consolidation of organized crime groups in the OMA and their control of illicit activities in the area, such as illegal mining, human trafficking, and drug trafficking, among others. A documentary investigation is conducted to review the reports prepared by international organizations, academic institutions, and non-governmental organizations on Venezuela, as well as the Venezuelan legal framework and the official information issued by national authorities. The results indicate that organized crime has taken root in the OMA, generating an overlap between national and foreign actors. These actors lead the perpetration of a variety of illegal activities thanks to a criminal network, state corruption, and the vulnerability of the region’s inhabitants.

Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 5 (1). 22 - 33. ISSN 2516-7227

By Abel Basutu, Jane Marie Ogola Ongolo

African countries have been experiencing an upsurge in public health problems as a result of the increased availability and use of psychoactive substances trafficked into the continent and also produced locally. However, mounting effective policy and programme interventions have been impeded by a lack of reliable data on various aspects of drug use and the harms associated with drugs. To address this challenge, the African Union started an ambitious programme aimed at improving the capacity of African Union member states to respond effectively to drug demand reduction challenges through strengthening research and data collection capabilities. The programme entails the establishment and operationalisation of a continent-wide drug surveillance sentinel with a public health orientation for the systematic collection and dissemination of comparable data on drug use and related problems in Africa. A key finding of the surveillance system, which draws data from national networks, has been the increase in the number of young drug users in the context of inadequate comprehensive treatment and care services, which threatens harnessing the continent’s demographic dividend. Sprouting evidence on drug use patterns and trends has aided shifts in policies and programmes towards addressing drug addictions and related health challenges at the national level.

Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 5(3): pp. 60–69.2024.

By Ediomo-Ubong Ekpo Nelson

The production, distribution, and consumption of drugs has long been seen as a threat to social and economic development. On the other hand, conditions of unemployment and poverty foster expansion of illegal drug markets. In this study, I offer a nuanced view of the drugs/development connection where poverty and unemployment incentivise participation in the illegal drug market as a response to the failure of state-led development. The study is based on 31 in-depth interviews with male retail drug dealers in Nigeria. Findings revealed various ways the participants framed retail drug trade in connection to development. This includes, drug dealing as a pathway to social and economic mobility, drug dealing as way of mitigating youth crime, drug dealing as a response to failed development promises, and drug dealing as a means of capital formation for legitimate investment. The complex relationship between drugs and development revealed in these accounts troubles the narrow emphasis on counter-narcotics that dominate Nigerian drug policies. They indicate a need to view illegal drug trade, especially low-level distribution, as grassroots dissent from exclusionary development. Social policies designed to provide skills and opportunities for legitimate, gainful employment for at-risk youths offer scope for curbing involvement in retail drug trade.

Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 5(3): pp. 47–59. 2024.

By John Sunday Ojo, Samuel Oyewole & Folahanmi Aina

Nigeria has confronted several security conundrums in recent years, including armed banditry, which poses a severe threat to the north-west and the entire nation. North-west Nigeria has been hit by an unprecedented wave of kidnappings, maiming, killings, population displacements, cattle rustling, and disruption of socio-economic activities due to the rise of armed bandits in the region. These events have created a climate of uncertainty that has become a cause for concern for the government and the citizenry. Relying on secondary sources of data, this article examines the causes, manifestations, and dimensions of armed banditry in north-west Nigeria, and its security implications. It provides a survey of both the visible and less-visible actors in the conflict. The article argues that armed banditry in the north-west and other parts of Nigeria transcends pastoralist insurgency, as evident in the dominant narratives, considering the multiplicity of complexly connected causal factors, actors, manifestations, and dimensions that are present in the threats posed by this development. The article also shows the negative impacts of armed banditry on human and national security in the region.

Democracy and Security, Volume 19, 2023 - Issue 4

By John Aloysius, Ankur Arora, and Viswanath Venkatesh

Purpose: Retailers are implementing technology-enabled mobile checkout processes in their stores to improve service quality, decrease labor costs and gain operational efficiency. These new checkout processes have increased customer convenience primarily by providing them autonomy in sales transactions in that store employee interventions play a reduced role. However, this autonomy has the unintended consequence of altering the checks and balances inherent in a traditional employee-assisted checkout process. Retailers, already grappling with shoplifting, with an estimated annual cost of billions of dollars, fear that the problem may be exacerbated by mobile checkout and concomitant customer autonomy. The purpose of this paper is to understand the effect of mobile checkout processes in retail stores on cybercrime in the form of shoplifting enabled by a technology transformed the retail environment.

Design/methodology/approach The authors conducted an online survey of a US sample recruited from a crowdsourced platform. The authors test a research model that aims to understand the factors that influence the intention to shoplift in three different mobile checkout settings − namely, smartphone checkout settings, store-provided mobile device checkout settings, and employee-assisted mobile checkout settings − and compare it with a traditional fixed location checkout setting.

Findings The authors found that, in a smartphone checkout setting, intention to shoplift was driven by experiential beliefs and peer influence, and experiential beliefs and peer influence had a stronger effect for prospective shoplifters when compared to experienced shoplifters; in a store-provided mobile devices checkout setting, experiential beliefs had a negative effect on shoplifters’ intention to shoplift and the effect was weaker for prospective shoplifters when compared to experienced shoplifters. The results also indicated that in an employee-assisted mobile checkout setting, intention to shoplift was driven by experiential beliefs and peer influence, and experiential beliefs had a stronger effect for prospective shoplifters when compared to experienced shoplifters.

Originality/value This study is the among the first, if not first, to examine shoplifters’ intention to shoplift in mobile checkout settings. We provide insights into how those who may not have considered shoplifting in less favorable criminogenic settings may change their behavior due to the autonomy provided by mobile checkout settings and also provide an understanding of the shoplifting intention for both prospective and experienced shoplifters in different mobile checkout settings.

Information Technology and People 32(5):1234-1261 , April 2019, p 39

WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM; MARSH & MCLENNAN COMPANIES; ZURICH INSURANCE GROUP

From the document: "The 'Global Risks Report 2024' presents the findings of the Global Risks Perception Survey (GRPS), which captures insights from nearly 1,500 global experts. The report analyses global risks through three time frames to support decision-makers in balancing current crises and longer-term priorities. Chapter 1 explores the most severe current risks, and those ranked highest by survey respondents, over a two-year period, analysing in depth the three risks that have rapidly accelerated into the top 10 rankings over the two-year horizon. Chapter 2 focuses on the top risks emerging over the next decade against a backdrop of geostrategic, climate, technological and demographic shifts, diving deeper into four specific risk outlooks. The report concludes by considering approaches for addressing complex and non-linear aspects of global risks during this period of global fragmentation."

WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM; MARSH & MCLENNAN COMPANIES; ZURICH INSURANCE GROUP

By Global Commission on Drug Policy 

Illegal drug markets provide an immense source of power and revenue for organized criminal groups. That has remained the case despite the vast investment of political, financial, social, and military capital into the global “war on drugs,” which has also generated a vast and tragic human cost. Far from curtailing drug markets, which are in fact expanding in scale and complexity worldwide, repressive criminal justice and military responses to drug trafficking have exacerbated the already profound impacts of drug-related organized crime, from prolific violence in certain states to increased corruption, and undermined political and economic stability. Deep-seated schisms continue in international debates on drug policy. Despite renewed commitment to the prohibitionist approach at the March 2019 Ministerial Declaration of the United Nations (UN) Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), there is increasing acknowledgement within the UN system of the harms of the current drug control regime, and the need to pursue options such as decriminalization of use and possession for personal use. Countries are increasingly adopting decriminalization models, and the legalization and regulation of cannabis for recreational use is becoming a reality in a number of jurisdictions. Yet at the same time, other countries have moved in the opposite direction, redoubling efforts to eradicate drug use through punitive approaches which harm health and human rights. Given this highly polarized context, the need for reform-minded states to advocate for evidence-based responses to organized crime and drug trafficking is greater than ever. This report supports this effort by building on the five key pathways towards improving drug policy as outlined in the Global Commission’s 2014 report. Alongside strategies to ensure the health and safety of those using drugs, this coherent five-fold program advocates for refocused enforcement responses to drug trafficking and organized crime as an essential part of drug policy reform. This report provides an overview of how the global “war on drugs” has, counter to its ostensible aims, fed and empowered transnational organized crime. More effective responses to transnational organized crime and drug trafficking – through both targeted and measured law enforcement approaches and development strategies which counter the root causes of organized crime – are possible and may be enacted even while markets remain illegal. The legal regulation of drugs offers an unprecedented opportunity to move drugs markets out of criminal control, as the Global Commission stated last year, but also presents new challenges for countering organized crime. This report explores lessons learned both in a context of prohibition and of a legally regulated market. Implementation of more progressive drug policies has often been held back by the international control regime; through a lack of coherence among UN entities, between regional bodies, and the deep-seated conservatism in the international regime. As such, this report considers the past record of the international drug control regime with respect to the fight against drug trafficking, and how more effective coordination could be achieved in the future, if political will is to be found. 

Geneva: The Global Commission, 2020. 52p.

By Beau Kilmer | Bryce Pardo | Toyya A. Pujol | Jonathan P. Caulkins

Background and aims: Synthetic opioids, mostly illegally manufactured fentanyl (IMF), were mentioned in 60% of United States (US) drug overdose deaths in 2020, with dramatic variation across states that mirrors variation in IMF supply. However, little is known about IMF markets in the United States and how they are changing. Researchers have previously used data from undercover cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine purchases and seizures to examine how their use and related harms respond to changes in price and availability. This analysis used US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) data to address two questions: (i) “To what extent does IMF supply vary over time and geography?” and (ii) “What has happened to the purity-adjusted price of IMF?” Methods: We developed descriptive statistics and visualizations using data from 66 713 observations mentioning IMF and/or heroin from the DEA’s System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence (STRIDE; now STARLIMS) from 2013 to 2021. Price regressions were estimated with city-level fixed effects examining IMF-only powder observations with purity and price information at the low-to-medium wholesale level (>1 g to ≤100 g; n = 964). Results: From 2013 to 2021, the share of heroin and/or IMF observations mentioning IMF grew from near zero to more than two-thirds. The share of heroin observations also containing IMF grew from <1% to 40%. There is important geographic variation: in California, most IMF seizures involved counterfeit tablets, whereas New York and Massachusetts largely involved powder formulation. The median price per pure gram of IMF powder sold at the >10 to ≤100 g level fell by more than 50% from 2016 to 2021; regression analyses suggested an average annual decline of 17% (P < 0.001). However, this price decline appears to have been driven by observations from the Northeast. Conclusions: Since 2013, the illegally manufactured fentanyl problem in the United States has become more deadly and more diverse. 

Addiction. 2022;117:2745–2749. 

By Julia A Dilley, Susan M Richardson, Beau Kilmer, Rosalie Liccardo Pacula, Mary B Segawa, Magdalena Cerdá

Methods| The Washington Healthy Youth Survey (HYS) 2 is an anonymous, school-based survey of 8th, 10th, and 12th graders and the state’s primary source of information about health behavior among youths. The HYS has been implemented in the fall of even-numbered years since 2002, using a simple random sample of public schools to generate a state-representative sample. Response rates (incorporating school and student response) in 2016 were 80% for 8th grade, 69% for 10th grade, and 49% for 12th grade. The study was approved by the Washington State Institutional Review Board, whose general policy waives informed patient consent when data are de-identified. We Generated Covariate-adjusted prevalence estimates, modeling as closely as possible to Cerdá et al. Prevalence was based on modeled estimates (ie, SUDAAN predMARG [RTI International] postestimation command). Because the the MTF is not designed to provide state-representative estimates, the article generated covariate-adjusted modeled prevalence estimates for each state. The article suggested complex association between legalization and cannabis use among youths: increases in prevalence among Washington 8th and 10th graders, but not among 12th graders, relative to use in states without legalization of recreational marijuana.

The authors noted that, “the sample design may lead to discrepancies between MTF results and those found in other large-scale surveillance efforts.”1(p148) The purpose of the present study was to assess whether trends in cannabis use prevalence among youths from Washington’s state-based youth survey are consistent with findings from the MTF.

JAMA pediatrics, 173(2) 2019

By Bridget E. Weller,  Stephen Magura,  Dawn R. Smith, Matthew M. Saxton, Piyadarsha Amaratunga

  Background: Drug monitoring by drug testing of individuals under arrest provides an opportunity to detect drug use patterns within geographic areas. However, women have been omitted from large-scale monitoring efforts in criminal justice populations. The purpose of this study was to examine whether gender differences exist in drug use indicated by oral fluid collected in one U.S. jail. Methods: The study analyzed data collected in 2019-2020 from individuals under arrest (N = 191). Twenty-four percent of the sample identified as female. Oral fluid specimens were collected and then analyzed with enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay and liquid chromatography/tandem mass spectrometry. Logit regression models examined gender differences. Results: Women were more likely to test positive for methamphetamines than men (41% versus 22%, OR = 0.42, 95% CI 0.21-0.84). Significant gender differences were not found for other substances (marijuana, cocaine, and opioids), legality of drugs, or overall drug use. Conclusions: Because the National Institute on Drug Abuse aims to promote health equity, future drug monitoring in criminal justice populations should employ sampling approaches representing both women and men. This research would identify possible gender-based patterns of drug use and inform gender-based policies and clinical practices to prevent and treat drug misuse.

J Subst Use. 2023 ; 28(4): 541–544. 

By Karamoja–Turkana and the Community Research Team 

Ipoln the Karamoja and Turkana border regions of Uganda and Kenya, there is widespread violence including armed robbery, rape, and human rights abuses, yet community complaints about failures of governance remain largely unaddressed. This Policy Briefing highlights how different insecurities reinforce one another in ways exacerbated by the international border. It stresses the need for fulfilment of the two governments’ commitments to cross-border solutions, and suggests that international policy actors can help communities gain leverage with governments towards building trustworthy and effective peace and security institutions.

IDS Policy Briefing 214,

Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies, 2023. 4p.