By Göran Adamson

In 2005, the Swedish Crime Prevention Agency published a report about the link between immigration and crime. Since then, no comprehensive study has been conducted even though Sweden has experienced a large influx of migrants in combination with a rising crime rate. This study conducted by Göran Adamson and Tino Sanandaji is the first purely descriptive scientific investigation on the matter in fifteen years. The investigation (from 2002 to 2017) covers seven distinct categories of crime, and distinguishes between seven regions of origin. Based on 33 percent of the population (2017), 58 percent of those suspect for total crime on reasonable grounds are migrants. Regarding murder, manslaughter and attempted murder, the figures are 73 per cent, while the proportion of robbery is 70 percent. Non-registered migrants are linked to about 13 percent of total crime. Given the fact that this group is small, crime propensity among non-registered migrants is significant.

Sweden; Society, 2020. 13p.

By John Aloysius, Ankur Arora, and Viswanath Venkatesh

Purpose: Retailers are implementing technology-enabled mobile checkout processes in their stores to improve service quality, decrease labor costs and gain operational efficiency. These new checkout processes have increased customer convenience primarily by providing them autonomy in sales transactions in that store employee interventions play a reduced role. However, this autonomy has the unintended consequence of altering the checks and balances inherent in a traditional employee-assisted checkout process. Retailers, already grappling with shoplifting, with an estimated annual cost of billions of dollars, fear that the problem may be exacerbated by mobile checkout and concomitant customer autonomy. The purpose of this paper is to understand the effect of mobile checkout processes in retail stores on cybercrime in the form of shoplifting enabled by a technology transformed the retail environment.

Design/methodology/approach The authors conducted an online survey of a US sample recruited from a crowdsourced platform. The authors test a research model that aims to understand the factors that influence the intention to shoplift in three different mobile checkout settings − namely, smartphone checkout settings, store-provided mobile device checkout settings, and employee-assisted mobile checkout settings − and compare it with a traditional fixed location checkout setting.

Findings The authors found that, in a smartphone checkout setting, intention to shoplift was driven by experiential beliefs and peer influence, and experiential beliefs and peer influence had a stronger effect for prospective shoplifters when compared to experienced shoplifters; in a store-provided mobile devices checkout setting, experiential beliefs had a negative effect on shoplifters’ intention to shoplift and the effect was weaker for prospective shoplifters when compared to experienced shoplifters. The results also indicated that in an employee-assisted mobile checkout setting, intention to shoplift was driven by experiential beliefs and peer influence, and experiential beliefs had a stronger effect for prospective shoplifters when compared to experienced shoplifters.

Originality/value This study is the among the first, if not first, to examine shoplifters’ intention to shoplift in mobile checkout settings. We provide insights into how those who may not have considered shoplifting in less favorable criminogenic settings may change their behavior due to the autonomy provided by mobile checkout settings and also provide an understanding of the shoplifting intention for both prospective and experienced shoplifters in different mobile checkout settings.

Information Technology and People 32(5):1234-1261 , April 2019, p 39

By Teun van Ruitenburg, Sjoukje van Deuren & Robby Roks

The impact of organized crime measures remains largely unknown. Moreover, for practical and ethical reasons, the perspectives of the individuals who are subjected to organized crime policies are often not included in research. Based on semi-structured interviews with 24 current members of the Dutch Hells Angels Motorcycle Club (HAMC), this study fills this knowledge gap by examining how HAMC members reacted to the multi-agency approach to outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMCGs) in the Netherlands. The results of this study illustrate that the reactions of HAMC members can be divided into four categories: (1) conforming, (2) adapting, (3) resisting, and (4) continuing. The analysis furthermore shows that a variety of different reactions to the OMCG approach coexist within the same club, charter, and even within the same individual member. These findings indicate that crime policies can spark different, sometimes contradicting reactions, within a group that from the outside appears to be a uniform and top-down coordinated organization. Future evaluation studies should take the multifaceted nature of reactions to crime policies into consideration.

Eur J Crim Policy Res (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10610-023-09566-6

By Rodrigo R. Soares and Danilo Souza

We document that oil-producing areas of Brazil experienced increases in crime during the period of increased economic growth driven by the 2000s oil boom. This challenges the understanding that the impact of income shocks on crime is driven primarily by the legal status of the market in question. Offshore oil production, refining, and distribution in Brazil are concentrated in large firms, without scope for income contestability. We show that various equilibrium effects of the shock – such as increased inequality, urbanization, illegal goods presence, and deterioration in public goods provision – are likely to have contributed to the increase in crime.

Bonn: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2023. 47p.

Sergi, Anna and Storti, Luca

This paper, which is the introduction to this special issue on ‘Spaces of Organised Crime’, aims to analyse the nexus between organised crime groups and territories. Such groups are able to exploit resources that circulate within territorial contexts in which they are embedded. They also operate concretely as entities that can take part to the transformation of spaces into places. Accordingly, we will lay out an analytical model about the processes through which organised crime groups contribute to create and shape territories. We show how these processes link with the main types of organised crime groups on a diferentiated basis. In the last section of this introduction, we present the papers included in the special issue and the logic connecting them to one another.

Shaping space. A conceptual framework on the connections between organised crime groups and territories. Trends in Organized Crime, 24 (2). (2021) pp. 137-151

Sergi, Anna

This article will present the results of a qualitative research into organised crime in the port of Genoa, Italy’s largest port, by looking at the challenges of policing the port space. Through the case of Genoa, the paper reflects on how organised crime manifests across three trajectories in seaports: trafficking through the port, infiltration in the port economy and governance of the port management. This paper argues that the space and geography of the port-city relationship are key to understand how and to what extent different organised criminal groups act in and around the port and within global drives. An integrated approach between urban criminology and organised crime studies is needed to better map the very complex picture of organised criminality in the port within the city.

Policing the port, watching the city. Manifestations of organised crime in the port of Genoa. Policing and Society, 31 (6). (2021) pp. 639-655.

Sergi, Anna and Vannucci, Alberto

This paper wishes to explore some characteristics of the relevant interconnections between mafias/ mafiosi and masonic lodges/masons in the Italian context. The paper sets out to study these interconnections from a social science perspective rooted in sociological and neo-institutional studies of organised crime and mafias, but also in criminological approaches to social constructionism, in the form of symbols and narratives. We will present a case study to reflect on the roles that (deviant) masons can assume in contexts where both mafias’ and personal, political, or economic interests are at play. The case study shows how masonic alliances can augment networking and enforcing capabilities: we call this process masonic deviance amplification. Additionally, the case study confirms the constitutive power that narratives around the masonic world hold today in the Italian context.

The Secret Nexus. A case study of deviant masons, mafia, and corruption in Italy. The British Journal of Criminology, 63 (5). (2022) pp. 1165-1183.

By Roger Bate

With the stated aim of increasing revenue and discouraging smoking, Pakistan raised tobacco duties over the past five years. The result empowered illicit actors, with a flourishing of illicit production and smuggling of cigarettes. Revenue rose initially, only to fall back as untaxed products proliferated. While organized crime and local production interests were the big winners, smoking rates have remained largely unchanged. Pakistan’s authorities have tried to resolve the problem through better enforcement and lowering of duties for certain products, but overall the lesson learned is that rapid duty increases have significant negative effects that are difficult to reverse when illegal supply cannot be controlled.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2018. 10p.

By Astrid De Schutter and Nils Duquet

This report discusses the connection between drug trafficking and firearms trafficking, focusing on systemic drug-related gun violence. It also examines the societal impact of this violence within the EU. For those interested in understanding the complex nexus between firearms trafficking, drug trafficking, and the resulting violence, this report provides valuable insights and analysis.

The analysis responds to a need for further research into the issue, at a time of rising drug-related violence in Europe. On average, over a quarter (28%) of the firearms seizures in Europe are estimated to have occurred in the context of drug trafficking, with this figure close to a half (44%) in some EU Member States (UNODC). The UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs has emphasised the need to address the links between the illicit trafficking in drugs and firearms. In Resolution 65/2, it encouraged states to take appropriate measures to prevent and combat these links, by enhancing border control management, information exchange and international operational cooperation.

The report identifies the Balkan route as a key transit route for firearms and drugs into the EU. Weapons and drugs are often smuggled along this route as part of multi-commodity transfers, or hidden in vehicles. The Western Balkans are an important source region of firearms trafficking into the EU. The arms moved from this region are often 'conflict legacy weapons' (e.g. from conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the Albanian civil war). Firearms are often smuggled together with drugs by the same criminal networks or, at least, along well-established drug-trafficking routes.

The analysis shows how firearm traffickers have significantly exploited legal loopholes over the past 20 years to legally acquire weapons unable to fire live ammunition (e,g. alarm weapons, deactivated acoustic expansion weapons, small-calibre firearms) and convert them into live-firing weapons. The ease with which these weapons can be legally purchased and converted has strongly impacted the criminal availability of firearms in several EU countries. In various Member States, a higher availability of trafficked firearms on the illicit market has triggered drug-related gun violence.

In 2019, the EMCDDA and Europol noted that the criminal use of firearms by organised crime groups (OCGs) involved in European drug markets appeared to be increasing. Europol found that the use of drug-related violence has escalated in recent years, particularly linked to the cannabis and cocaine trade (SOCTA, 2021).

The report takes an in-depth look at the use of gun violence at the wholesale level of the drug distribution chain and the local consumer market. Violence appears generally less evident at the production and wholesale level than the consumer level of the drug market. Most of the drug-related gun violence at wholesale level in Europe is connected to cocaine. The recent shift from a few large networks dominating the cocaine market to a larger number of smaller competing networks may explain the upsurge in violence.

The local consumer market accounts for most of the visible drug-related gun violence. Many actors involved in this violence are young adults using guns as a means to advance their criminal career. Open drug markets — where buyers can purchase products without prior introduction to the seller — are more prone to violence than closed markets, which are built on relationships of trust between buyer and seller.

Finally, the report looks at the broader impact of firearms trafficking and associated violence in the drug trade on society as a whole. Residents or individuals working in the community may be threatened or extorted. Drug criminals may target innocent victims through cases of mistaken identity. And there may be spill-over effects, when violence moves beyond the criminal milieu (e.g. to Ministers, journalists).

The report underlines the need for sound intelligence on these security phenomena, including better ballistics data, law enforcement information and intelligence on firearms trafficking and criminal shootings. Such data and information are crucial to adequately inform evidence-based initiatives, support targeted law enforcement actions and evaluate policies. The study contributes towards a better understanding of drug-related gun violence in the EU and supports appropriate policy responses to prevent this type of violence.

Lisbon: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction. 2023. 57p.

By International Crisis Group

What’s new? Mexico’s criminal groups use social media to garner popular support, denigrate rivals, glorify narco-culture and coordinate violence. Social media is also crucial for providing timely information about flare-ups of violence, particularly since journalists face major threats to their safety, which heavily circumscribes their ability to report from many crime-affected municipalities.

Why does it matter? These criminal groups are recruiting and spreading disinformation online, making them stronger and creating a glut of unverified information that puts civilians at greater risk. Platforms have struggled to respond appropriately.

What should be done? Platforms should boost resources for online monitoring, especially when violence is spiking. Given social media’s importance in disseminating information, platforms should modify their algorithms to demote posts supporting criminal groups and work with civil society to identify trusted accounts, including anonymous ones. Mexico’s government should also invest in protecting journalists.

Brussels: Crisis Group, 2024

By Abigail Weitzman, Mónica Caudillo, and Eldad J. Levy

In this review, we argue that to understand patterns and causes of violence in contemporary Latin America, we must explicitly consider when violence takes on interpersonal qualities. We begin by reviewing prominent definitions and measurements of interpersonal violence. We then detail the proliferation of interlocking sources of regional insecurity, including gender-based violence, gangs, narcotrafficking, vigilantism, and political corruption. Throughout this description, we highlight when and how each source of insecurity can become interpersonal. Next, we outline mutually reinforcing macro and micro conditions underlying interpersonal violence in its many hybrid forms. To conclude, we call for more multifaceted conceptualizations of interpersonal violence that embrace the complexities of Latin American security situations and discuss the opportunities and challenges that lie ahead in this area.

Annual Review of Criminology, Volume 7, Page 163 - 186

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

This report examines the emergence of new hubs for cocaine trafficking, noting that countries in Southeastern Europe and Africa – particularly those in West and Central Africa – are increasingly being used as key transit zones for the drug. Ports on the North Sea like Antwerp, Rotterdam, and Hamburg, meanwhile, have eclipsed traditional entry points in Spain and Portugal for cocaine arriving in Western Europe. Traffickers are also diversifying their routes in Central America by sending more and more cocaine to Europe, in addition to North America.

The modalities of cocaine traffickers are also examined in this report, with findings showing that the criminal landscape is fragmenting into a myriad of trafficking networks. The demobilization of fighters from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) - who had previously controlled many of Colombia’s coca-growing regions – created an opening for others to step in, such as new, local actors; ex-FARC guerillas; or even foreign groups from Mexico and Europe. Additionally, the report reveals that so-called “service providers”, i.e., specialized groups that lend their services at all stages of the supply chain for a fee, have proliferated.

Vienna: UNODC, 2023. 184p.

Edited by Graeme R. Newman

The assembled papers identify many serious shortcomings and failings of past comparative research on deviance and crime. In addition, they point to some crime correlates that appear to be found throughout the world, including broken homes, unemployment, urbanization, and industrialization. Individual papers examine the possibility of using international categories in international crime statistics, study cross-cultural perceptions of deviance, and note special problems that may arise for researchers studying crime in Marxist countries with particular emphasis on Cuba. Two approaches to comparative criminology are reviewed: the first consists of confirming universal data and constructs in different juridical, economical, and cultural systems; the second consists of using different cultures in a natural experimental design, or as quasi-clinical cases, in order to test general theories. Other papers explore the historical perspective concerning the role of subcultures in criminology, the informal social control of deviance, and some correlates of social deviance and their relationship to a recent theory of personality. In addition, aspects of comparative criminology involving such relatively recent phenomena as transnational terrorism and large-scale multinational economic crimes are considered. Tabular data, footnotes, and references are provided.

California. Sage. 1980. 385p.

By The International Alliance for Responsible Drinking (IARD)  

Alcohol production and trade exist both within and outside of government regulation; the relative size of each depends on the region of the world and social, cultural, and economic factors. Both segments are well established and people often – knowingly and unknowingly – interact fluidly with both of them. The regulated alcohol market is recorded in government statistics; unregulated alcohol, which is largely illegal, is more difficult to assess and falls into the “unrecorded” sphere (see Taxonomy of Unregulated and Unrecorded Alcohol). This segment is complex and diverse and includes everything from high-quality artisanal homebrew to illicit drinks that may contain methanol or other toxic ingredients. In 2014, the World Health Organization (WHO) issued its Global Status Report on Alcohol and Health and estimated, based on 2010 figures, that unrecorded alcohol made up an average 25% of all alcohol consumed worldwide [2]. Alcohol produced and sold illegally outside of government regulation is the most problematic part of unrecorded alcohol; it is untaxed, circumvents restrictions around availability, is of inconsistent quality, and, depending on the ingredients used to make it, is even potentially toxic. This report considers these wide-reaching implications and brings together recent data on the illicit market, compiled by the global market research firm Euromonitor International. While illicit alcohol is also widespread across Asia and parts of Europe, this report focuses on data from Africa and Latin America. Unregulated alcohol is more widespread in lower-income countries than in more affluent ones. Yet, whether in mature or emerging economies, it is largely consumed in some of the world’s poorest communities and, because it lacks quality and production standards, may contribute to an already significant problem of ill health. While home-produced artisanal alcohol may be part of cultural heritage and largely unproblematic, the illicit sector is not only large but also comes at a significant cost. HUMAN COST: The deaths in early 2018 of almost 150 people in Indonesia from poisoning by adulterated alcohol serve as a reminder that unregulated alcohol can cost lives   

Washington, DC: The International Alliance for Responsible Drinking (IARD),  2018. 16p.  

By Andrés Ham, Darío Maldonado, Michael Weintraub, Andres Felipe Camacho, Daniela Gualtero

This paper studies whether bartenders that adopt standardized practices can promote responsible alcohol consumption and subsequently reduce alcohol-attributable violence. We conducted a randomized experiment in four localities of Bogotá in cooperation with Colombia's largest brewery and Bogotá's Secretariat of Security, Coexistence, and Justice. Our design allows estimating direct and spillover effects on reported incidents within and around bars. Results show that bartenders in treatment locations sell more water and food, thus contributing to more responsible alcohol consumption by patrons. We find no direct or spillover effects of these changes in consumption on brawls, but some improvement on other alcohol-related incidents.

Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad de los Andes, 2019. 61p.

By Ria Ivandić, Tom Kirchmaier and Neus Torres-Blas 

 We study the role of alcohol and emotions in explaining the dynamics in domestic abuse following major football games. We match confidential and uniquely detailed individual call data from Greater Manchester with the timing of football matches over a period of eight years to estimate the effect on domestic abuse. We first observe a 5% decrease in incidents during the 2-hour duration of the game suggesting a substitution effect of football and domestic abuse. However, following the initial decrease, after the game, domestic abuse starts increasing and peaks about ten hours after the game, leading to a positive cumulative effect. We find that all increases are driven by perpetrators that had consumed alcohol, and when games were played before 7pm. Unexpected game results are not found to have a significant effect.  

London: Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics, 2021. 66p.

By Christopher Blattman, et al.  

Since the COVID-19 outbreak, scholars and journalists have spread anecdotes of gangs and criminal organizations coming to the aid of citizens, governing in place of the state. They report gang activities that range from enforcing lockdowns to providing goods and services to the poor and hungry. This is especially true in Latin America where thousands of gangs exert authority over civilians in large swaths of territory. Some argue that organized crime is stepping in where states have failed, seizing the chance to consolidate its position. But just how widespread is the kind of gang involvement that captures headlines? Are these anecdotes typical of how gangs are responding to COVID-19? Only systematic data can answer these questions and help assess whether the pandemic will ultimately strengthen organized crime’s grip on Latin American cities. We have spent four years studying criminal groups in Medellín, Colombia, a city with one of the highest concentrations of organized criminals in the world. If gangs respond to COVID-19 anywhere, it should be Medellín. Almost every low- and middle-income neighborhood in the city has a local gang that resolves disputes, polices the community, and often taxes businesses. As soon as the pandemic broke out, anecdotes about gang responses surfaced in Medellin. We set out to collect systematic data on gang and state governance before and during the pandemic. Despite the headlines, gang involvement in pandemic response is exceptional and mostly idiosyncratic. Surveying every low- and middle-income neighborhood in…..

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  Medellin, we find: ● Most welfare support to civilians came from state authorities rather than the gangs. ● Overall, state authorities played by far the largest role in enforcing quarantine rules. ● A small number of gangs, however, were highly involved in providing welfare and enforcing quarantine rules in their territories. ● These rare gang pandemic responses were relatively idiosyncratic. Whereas normal pre-pandemic gang rule is associated with a range of neighborhood characteristics, pandemic gang rule is not. Moreover, gang enforcement of pandemic lockdown or provision of services is almost uncorrelated with pre-pandemic levels of gang rule. We speculate that personal choices of the gangs and their leaders may have dominated in the first weeks of  COVID-19.

Chicago: Innovations for Poverty Action – The University of Chicago – Universidad EAFIT, 2020. 19p.