By  J. R. Mailey   

Over the past decade, Iran has turned to criminal markets as a strategic tool to pursue its geopolitical goals. Isolated by international sanctions, Iran has forged extensive ties with criminal networks across the globe to fund armed groups, procure materials for its nuclear program, and evade sanctions. This report uncovers how Iran’s proxies, such as Hezbollah and militias in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and Palestine are critical to Tehran’s influence. Iran supplies these groups with weapons, training, and funds, while criminal networks help smuggle oil, launder money, and move illicit goods across borders. This strategy has enabled Iran to weaken its adversaries without engaging in direct military confrontation. One of the most striking findings of the report is how Iran’s use of criminal proxies allows it to maintain plausible deniability. Tehran’s regime has relied on these illicit actors to conduct operations ranging from assassinations and abductions of critics to sabotage and terror attacks—all while skirting direct accountability. The report also highlights how criminal networks have been key to helping Iran circumvent widespread sanctions. By collaborating with middlemen and transnational crime organizations, Iran has continued to smuggle its oil and accumulate foreign currency. These criminal partnerships have enabled Tehran to access global markets, finance proxy wars, and strengthen its military capabilities through illicit means. The study provides detailed case studies on Iran’s operations and offers a range of recommendations to counter Tehran’s criminal statecraft. By identifying pressure points and vulnerabilities within these illicit networks, the report outlines steps that can be taken to expose and disrupt Iran’s activities.

GENEVA:  GLOBAL INITIATIVE AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME. 2024. 59P.

By Katrien Luyten with Alessia Rossi

The EU has made substantial progress in terms of protecting its citizens since the early 1990s. This has often been in response to dramatic incidents, such as murders committed by the mafia or other organised crime groups or big money-laundering scandals, or to negative trends, such as the steep increase in migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings following the 2015 migration crisis. More recently, it was necessary to respond to the sharp rise in cybercrime, fraud and counterfeiting during the coronavirus pandemic. Criminal organisations continue to pose big risks to the EU's internal security. A rising number of organised crime groups are active in EU territory, often with cross-border reach. Organised crime is furthermore an increasingly dynamic and complex phenomenon, with new criminal markets and modi operandi emerging under the influence of globalisation and new technologies in particular. While the impact of serious and organised crime on the EU economy is considerable, there are also significant political and social costs, as well as negative effects on the wellbeing of EU citizens. As organised crime has become more interconnected, international and digital, Member States – which remain responsible for operational activities in the area of police and judicial cooperation –rely increasingly on cross-border and EU-level cooperation to support their law enforcement authorities on the ground. Recognising the severity of the problem and the need for coordinated action, the EU has initiated several measures to encourage closer cooperation between Member States; it has furthermore adopted common legal, judicial and investigative frameworks to address organised crime. The European Parliament has made fighting organised crime a political priority and helped shape the relevant EU legislation. Future EU action will focus on implementing existing rules, improving operational cooperation – even beyond the EU's boundaries – and information-sharing, while also addressing some of the main criminal activities of organised crime groups. Furthermore, the EU aims to make sure that crime does not pay. This is an updated version of a briefing from September 2020

Brussels: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service,  2022. 12p.

Edited by Uglejesa Ugi Zvekic and Ioannis Vlassis

Despite reforms, political influence continues to affect prosecutorial and police services across Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia (collectively, WB6), hindering effective action against organized corruption. The report provides a detailed examination of police and prosecution services in the region and evaluates the integrity, operational independence, and oversight of these institutions, especially in their role against organized crime and corruption. WB6 countries face challenges like ineffective internal oversight, low conviction rates for high-ranking officials, and limited resources within dedicated anti-corruption divisions within police and prosecution services. This study emphasizes the need for reinforced accountability, resilience, and operational independence to dismantle corruption networks. Among key recommendations, the report advocates for regional cooperation, stronger educational and training programs, and enhanced civil society engagement.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 91p.

By Laura Y. Calderón

Mexico had the most violent year in its history in 2019, reporting 29,406 intentional homicide cases, resulting in 34,588 individual victims.1 However, violence remains a highly focalized phenomenon in Mexico, with 23% of all intentional homicide cases concentrated in five municipalities and three major clusters of violence with homicide rates over 100 per 100,000 inhabitants. Following the national trend, the state of Guanajuato also had its most violent year in 2019, with one of its largest cities featured in the country’s top five most violent municipalities. This paper will analyze the surge in violence in Guanajuato in 2019, comparing the number of intentional homicide cases with the increasing problem of fuel theft in the state, and describing some of the state and federal government measures to address both issues. II. Background The central Mexican state of Guanajuato is a traditional agricultural-producing region, a major manufacturing hub, and a popular vacation and retirement destination for foreigners. Considered a relatively wealthy state and constituting 4.4% of the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Guanajuato boasts the sixth-largest economy in Mexico. The state also holds second place in terms of growth in the manufacturing sector, which makes up 26% of the state’s GDP. Guanajuato is home to economically important industries that attract considerable foreign direct investment to Mexico, including the automobile and chemical industries, among others.2 However, over the last several years, Guanajuato has been one of Mexico’s top 10 most violent states, and two of its largest cities —León and Irapuato— were among Mexico’s top 10 most violent municipalities in 2018 and 2019. The state of Guanajuato also had the highest number of organized crime-related homicides in 2019 with 2,673 cases,  according to Reforma. 3 Additionally, Guanajuato was featured in Milenio’s top five states with the highest number of murders every month in 2019, calculating 2,934 organized crime-related deaths. 4 Furthermore, Guanajuato was tied with Estado de México as the second most dangerous place for elected officials in 2019, according to Justice in Mexico’s Memoria dataset. 5 Guanajuato attracted media attention especially in 2019 because of a dramatic increase in violence. While few available studies are exploring the origins and source of increased violence in Guanajuato, there seems to be one factor that has not been fully studied in terms of violence trends: fuel theft. III. Huachicoleo and Organized Crime Groups Fuel theft is one of the most recent developments in Mexico’s violent crime spectrum, gaining nationwide notoriety in early 2017. Gasoline truck drivers, or chupaductos (pipeline suckers), were the first to adopt the name huachicol to refer to stolen hydrocarbons in Mexico.6 It is still complicated to track the origin of the word, as technically, it refers to an adulterated alcoholic beverage derived from cane alcohol. However, huachicol is also believed to come from the Mayan culture, where the word “huach” or “waach” means “foreigner,” and in some Mayan regions, “thief.”7 This term lead to the colloquial name huachicolero to refer to petroleum thieves. 8 The practice of huachicoleo has been an increasing problem in Mexico, with organized crime groups (OCGs) competing to control its revenues in a manner similar to the way in which they compete over drug-trafficking territories or plazas. Huachicoleo takes place in two different forms: through puncturing gas pipelines, which carry 20% of the country’s supply, or by stealing it on the go from the fuel distribution gas trucks on Mexico’s main highways.9 In socio-economic terms, the increase of fuel theft is partially attributable to the rise of oil prices in Mexico over the last few years, when gas went from an average of 5.00 Mexican pesos per liter (roughly 0.27 USD) in 2000, to 19.40 Mexican pesos per liter (roughly 1.03 USD) by December 2019 as shown in the chart below. 10 The population’s alleged inability or unwillingness to pay such high prices is believed to have created a greater demand for lower-cost gas—a demand that OCGs were willing to fulfill. Highway-side vendors started selling stolen gasoline from 5 to 10 Mexican pesos per liter (roughly 0.27 to 0.54 USD), depending on the distance from actual pipelines. 11 Networks of huachicoleros have established their vending points along major highways throughout Mexico, especially in central Mexico, where some of these vending points are disguised as legal commercial establishments such as tire shops, car repair workshops, coffee shops, restaurants, and other informal businesses.   

San Diego:  Justice in Mexico Department of Political Science & International Relations University of San Diego, 2020. 28p,

By Mahmut Cengiz  and Oguzhan Omer Demir 

Because of supply and demand factors, human trafficking for sexual exploitation has always been a profitable industry. Turkey, as a host country for immigrants from both former Soviet countries and the Middle East, combines supply and demand, attracting illicit business. Few studies have been conducted in the previous two decades to investigate the organized criminal element of human trafficking in this region. This research is based on ethnographic research in which trafficking victims (N = 11) were interviewed, and on-site observations were made. Our findings revealed that the trafficking industry in our study area was carried out by persons who were only loosely related to one another. There was no sophisticated, long-lasting sex trafficking organization. Membership was not severely limited, and individuals did not identify themselves as members of a well-known criminal organization. We provided policy recommendations and proposals for future research to address female trafficking for sexual exploitation

Social Sciences 11: 511. 2022. 

By Louise I. Shelley

In 1994, the second full year of Demokratizatsiya’s publication, I analyzed the impact of organized crime on the development of post-Soviet states in an article entitled “Post-Soviet Organized Crime: Implications for Economic, Social, and Political Development.”1 This article was written at a time when many in the West were sure that the future course of development for Russia and other post-Soviet states was one of free markets and democracy. Most research on organized crime and high-level corruption in Russia would not be published until much later.2 My article provided a very different and contrarian approach to this rosy scenario for Soviet successor states. In the article’s introduction, I asserted that the infiltration of organized crime into the state would ensure that organized crime would “play a significant role in determining the future course of developments in the Soviet successor states.” In my view, organized crime represented an amalgam of traditional criminals, members of the state security apparatus, former military personnel, and law enforcement officials. I did not associate post-Soviet organized crime exclusively with the very v zakone, the traditional thieves in law or professional criminals. I was especially concerned at the time that the rapid and non-transparent privatization of state property to the benefit of corrupt politicians, organized crime, and their business partners would have persistent and deleterious long-term consequences, leading to the monopolization of key sectors of post-Soviet economies rather than the competitive economies needed for growth.

Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Volume 30, Number 4, Fall 2022, pp. 411-419

By Spencer P. Chainey & Arantza Alonso Berbotto 

Crime script analysis is becoming an increasingly used approach for examining organized crime. Crime scripts can use data from multiple sources, including open sources of intelligence (OSINT). Limited guidance exists, however, on how to populate the content of a crime script with data, and validate these data. This results in crime scripts being generated intuitively, restricts them from being scrutinized for their quality and limits the opportunity to combine or compare crime scripts. We introduce a practical process for populating the content of a crime script that involves simple coding procedures and uses document analysis to quality assure data that are extracted from open sources. We illustrate the process with the example of the theft of oil from pipelines in Mexico committed by organized crime groups. The structured methodical process we introduce produces a crime script of high quality, helps to improve the systematic analysis of decision-making performed by members of organized crime groups, and can improve the identification of opportunities for crime control.

Published: 23 August 2021, Trends in Organized Crime, Volume 25, pages 272–300, (2022)

By Jonah Rexer

Multinationals in the extractive sectors of weak states may face resource theft by armed groups. This criminality is often abetted by state corruption, even though firms are willing to pay for protection. I study indigenization in Nigeria's oil sector, which increased participation by Nigerian firms substantially. Despite evidence that local firms are of lower quality, localization increases output and reduces oil theft. A bargaining model illustrates that political connections align law enforcement incentives, solving commitment problems. Data on raids by government forces show that local firms receive preferential law enforcement protection. I find that connections to military elites drive the local advantage.

.Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University, 2022. 113p  

By Yvon DanduranA discussion of organized crime and governance is not complete until it addresses the question of police governance and its impact on the fight against organized crime, illicit markets and money laundering. Given the relative failure of law enforcement to control organized crime and contain illegal markets, a focus on police governance forces us to consider how law enforcement priorities are set and law enforcement strategies adopted and implemented. This in turn may lead us to conclude, as I am about to suggest, that we me need to both increase the effectiveness of law enforcement efforts and reduce our expectations with respect to the impact that law enforcement can really have on controlling organized crime and illicit markets. In our discussions thus far, we acknowledged that public awareness of organized crime and its consequences is an important starting point, but that we also need to find more effective ways to control organized crime and counter its activities. Most of us recognize that law enforcement and regulatory enforcement are crucial elements of effective action against organized crime, yet we must also recognize that the actual impact of law enforcement is usually quite limited. Countering organized crime requires establishing effective police governance and accountability. Governance includes key management issues such as policy formation and implementation, the determination of priorities and strategies, the allocation of resources, deployment strategies and decisions, the implementation of standards, the prevention of corruption internally, and the maintenance of internal discipline. It follows that weak governance can undermine the effectiveness of police actions against organized crime. At the same time, transnational organized crime entails policing in a transnational context and, with this, come the pressing and complex governance and accountability issues presented by the growth of cross-border policing,  transnational policing, and the growing reliance on multi-jurisdictional police teams. In many instances, one is not talking about a single police force, but broad and ill-defined security networks.3 As Walsh and Conway explained, “(m)achinery that is struggling to cope with the governance and accountability challenges presented by the domestic operations of home based police forces may well prove seriously deficient when confronted with the formers’ activities on other sovereign territories, or domestic operations by foreign based police forces  

Vancouver, BC: International Centre for Criminal Law Reform, 2020. 15p.

By Maurice Ogbonnaya 

What began as a struggle for the political and economic autonomy of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria has morphed into organised crime of transnational dimensions that has turned the West African coast and the Gulf of Guinea into one of the most unsafe maritime zones in the world and is decimating Nigeria’s economy. The crimes include kidnapping for ransom, maritime piracy, armed robbery at sea, the theft and smuggling of oil and other contraband products, illegal oil refining and bunkering. This report analyses the current drivers of organised crime in the region, arguing that crime has become a fundamental element of the struggle. Key findings • The Niger Delta region accounts for most of Nigeria’s estimated daily oil production of 2.5 million barrels, which makes the country Africa’s largest producer of oil and the sixthlargest oil-producing country in the world. • State repression, poverty and widespread inequality, politics, greed and institutional corruption in the oil and maritime sectors have shaped the evolution of the struggle from a nationalist movement to an organised criminal enterprise. • The Nigerian government must tackle issues of environmental degradation, infrastructural underdevelopment, poverty, the lack of job- and income-generating opportunities, especially for the youth, and institutionalised corruption in the oil and maritime sectors.  

ENACT Africa, 2020. 22p.

By Mark Shaw | Ian Tennant Ana Paula Oliviera | Daren Brookbanks

In 2000, the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), also known as the Palermo Convention, was adopted in a milestone moment for fostering global cooperation to combat organized crime. With 192 state parties, the convention and its protocols have provided a crucial legal framework for addressing types of crime such as human trafficking, migrant smuggling, and firearms trafficking. However, as transnational criminal networks continue to expand, new challenges are emerging, and the global community must take decisive action to ensure the UNTOC reaches its full potential. Our latest report highlights key obstacles to effective implementation: inconsistencies in national legislation, a lack of centralized data, and delays and restrictions in the convention’s Independent Review Mechanism (IRM). While the UNTOC’s widespread ratification is an achievement, these gaps hinder its ability to deliver impactful results. Without timely evaluations and better international cooperation, the global response to organized crime remains fragmented and insufficient. We believe that strengthening the UNTOC requires more robust data collection, greater transparency, and deeper engagement with civil society. Our report recommends the creation of an independent research center to monitor organized crime trends and track the convention’s progress. Additionally, we call for increased political will and resources to accelerate the IRM, ensuring that the UNTOC becomes a more powerful tool in the fight against evolving criminal markets.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2024. 48p.

By María Calderón 

When it comes to an understanding of political violence in Mexico, there is a risk of solely equating it with criminal groups' activities or exclusively attributing it to such groups. However, the political violence phenomenon in Mexico is complex and diverse, with a particular nexus to locally based illicit economies, for which an all-containing approach is insufficient. About half of the political violence that occurred in Mexico during the 2018 elections was directly attributed to organized crime. During such time, political figures were killed at a rate of one per week. These numbers support the growing concern about criminal groups' involvement in Mexican politics. Criminal groups have used political violence in several ways: directly manipulating and influencing elections, protecting incumbent candidates with whom they have struck an agreement, killing candidates who are perceived as a threat to their interests, intimidating poll workers, and attacking and stealing voting booths, among others. The decrease in the profitability of trafficking heroin and cannabis, the legalization of marijuana in many US states, and increased fentanyl usage have forced cartels to recalibrate strategies and markets. Nowadays, criminal groups have partially shifted towards locally based illicit economies, such as oil theft, extortion, kidnapping, and other illegal activities that require control of local territories. All these variables come into play when understanding that criminalized electoral politics is a predominantly local phenomenon in Mexico. Political violence by criminal groups in Mexico is motivated by multiple factors, including economic interests, political objectives, and vendettas. Criminal organizations often avoid open confrontation when attacking politicians or political candidates, opting for other less visible techniques to minimize the impacts on police and law enforcement agencies, such as corruption. Installing or co-opting candidates at the municipal level has afforded criminal groups direct influence over the actions of local and state police. Access to intelligence on pending arrests or other operations has also proven beneficial for criminal organizations. Political influence has allowed criminal groups to employ local security forces as appendages of their organizations to detain or kill targets and to protect the transportation of illicit goods. Moreover, criminal organizations have tapped into state finances by coopting government employees.

Washington, DC:  Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2024  6p.   

By Max Smeets

This report is based on chapter one of Max Smeets’ book titled “Ransom War: How Cyber Crime Became a Threat to National Security,” forthcoming with Oxford University Press and Hurst Publishers. Historically, discussions on cyber conflict have primarily centered on the involvement of state-sponsored or affiliated groups. Yet, the growing prominence of criminal actors – specifically, ransomware groups – now demands a shift in attention. Ransomware, a type of malicious activity where hackers lock access to files or systems until a ransom is paid, increasingly threatens both citizen safety and global stability. In 2022, the majority of the U.K’s government's crisis management “Cobra” meetings were convened in response to ransomware incidents rather than other national security emergencies. According to Sami Khoury, the head of the Canadian Center for Cyber Security, the threat from nation-states remains significant but cybercrime, of which ransomware is the most disruptive form, is “the number one cyber threat activity affecting Canadians.” The Swiss National Cybersecurity Centre warns that ransomware could pose an “existential threat” to businesses and government agencies. This report discusses significant milestones in the development of ransomware, and what turned them into a significant threat to human and national security. It starts with the adoption of better encryption techniques by criminals, enabling them to effectively hold data for ransom. The use of botnets subsequently expanded their operational reach, while there was also a shift away from prepaid card systems in favor of crypto currencies such as Bitcoin, which provided anonymity and ease of transaction. Following these developments, the emergence of Ransomware as a Service (RaaS) allowed for a better division of tasks within the cybercriminal community, making it easier for newcomers to participate. Tactics evolved further to include double extortion, where attackers threaten to publish stolen data unless a ransom is paid. The final shift saw the professionalization of ransomware groups. It also increased their intent and capability to target major organizations, maximizing their ransom potential. I refer to the ransomware groups at the forefront of this troubling trend in the criminal ecosystem as ransom war groups. 

Zürich: Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich 2024. 18p.

By Steven Dudley, María Fernanda Ramírez, Anastasia Austin and Gavin Voss

This report aims to better understand the criminal dynamics in Durán. Located in the southwest coastal province of Guayas, Durán is a municipality, or cantón, as they are known in Ecuador, of over 300,000 inhabitants, the vast majority of whom live in the city bearing the same name.1 It has long been known as a commercial hub and small industrial center. But it is also home to a chaotic mix of shrimp farms, poorly-planned residential developments and favela-like land invasions, and unzoned areas of factories and warehouses that produce and store goods, many of which leave Guayaquil’s various maritime ports en route to all corners of the world. More recently, Durán has become a violent epicenter of criminal activity. Criminal groups use the municipality as a staging area for cocaine exiting on cargo ships through Guayaquil’s ports, while also peddling drugs on a local level. Systemic corruption, underdevelopment, and extreme poverty have facilitated this rise in criminality. More than half of Durán’s residents do not have running water or plumbing. The municipality is bereft of schools and a public university. And recent efforts to revive Durán have waned amid local and national neglect and a series of economic crises. To many residents, Durán is but a ciudad dormitorio (sleeping quarters): They work, shop, and relax in neighboring Samborondón and Guayaquil, returning to Durán to spend the night. Part of what keeps them away these days is insecurity: Durán’s homicide rate reached 147 per 100,000 in 2023 — its highest recorded rate — as crime has metastasized. Once a bustling railroad depot and industrial hub, Durán is now the poster child for the country’s rapid decline into the criminal abyss. Major Findings • Many social, economic, and political factors have converged to make Durán a violent criminal hub. Rapid, uncontained population growth, coupled with widespread corruption and malfeasance, has left a good portion of the municipality bereft of basic services such as potable water and a working sewage system. Unplanned, informal, and criminal urban development has scarred the area and jaded its residents, who have few civil society and religious organizations upon which they can channel their grievances and even fewer political options. And, like so many other parts of the country, the municipality lacks security, judicial, and regulatory forces that can effectively prosecute high-impact criminal activities. • Durán has two primary criminal organizations: the Chone Killers and the Latin Kings. These two engage in an increasingly violent battle for the municipality’s territory and its criminal economies, which include local and international drug trafficking activities. Their ties to transnational criminal networks, however, appear to be sporadic and opportunistic, rather than systemic and long-lasting. Perhaps more alarming is their penetration of the municipal government, where at least one of these groups secured public works contracts, as well as control of key government institutions that preside over everything from land tenure issues to traffic tickets. • Land trafficking is at the core of Durán’s criminal ecosystem. The illegal seizure and development of urban and rural land, often with the direct participation of corrupt officials, offers a deep well of potential profit, ranging from the sale of property to the administration of various public services. Illegal settlements also serve as staging areas for various criminal activities, including transnational drug trafficking, retail drug sales, as well as kidnapping, robbery, and extortion. Legalizing illegal settlements brings with it lucrative government contracts and the opportunity for corrupt officials to profit from kickbacks and criminal actors to launder their dirty money. It also leads to violence, including against public officials. • Ecuador’s growing role in transnational drug trafficking has significantly impacted Durán’s criminal, political, and economic landscape. By serving larger national drug trafficking networks, local gangs have gained access to substantial financial resources. Drawing from this new revenue stream, gang leaders have acquired legitimate businesses such as laundromats, hair salons, and construction companies. This interplay of criminal, economic, and political capital has also changed the political landscape, offering local gangs an entry point into the municipal government via campaign contributions, as evidenced by their systematic penetration into key government posts and public works contracts. • Durán’s gangs have a complex and varied relationship with the local communities where they operate. While some gangs exploit residents, the most sophisticated gang leaders offer them protection and other social and economic services, filling the void left by absent, corrupt, or inept state institutions, and providing a semblance of security and opportunity. This calculated approach engenders support that allows them to operate in relative safety, as well as use the community infrastructure and draw employees from a vast pool of recruits. • Homicide trends in Durán largely follow patterns seen in Ecuador over the last several years, including the type of victim, weapons employed, and the place where the murders occur. And, in some ways, Durán is a reflection of the extreme swings in violence in cities along the country’s coast. But Durán’s record 2023 homicide spike was more extreme, in part due to local events, like the murders of key criminal power brokers and the rise of a wayward, volatile new leader. These factors point to gang violence as the primary driver of homicides in the municipality   

Washington, DC: Insight Crime, 2024. 74p.

By Saurabh Thakur, Monika Roszkowska

General Findings. Organized Criminal Networks (OCNs) operating in the Eastern Indian Ocean are predominantly hierarchical in their organizational structure with individuals or a network of individuals at the helm of operations. The geographical location, proximity to two major drug-producing regions in Asia, and the vast shoreline have aided the transit of illicit drugs in the Maldives and Sri Lanka through the Southern Route. The transnational drug smuggling in the region is mostly transactional, carried out through a series of patron-client networks. Other modes include freelancing and family and community-based networks. . The involvement of the local population is driven by both push and pull factors, including profit motive, patronage, protection, poverty, addiction, street masculinity, involvement of family members, peer influence, and social media influence. Corruption within law enforcement and legal institutions was listed as a key problem in both countries. The broken chain of custody and complicity of government officials in illicit activities have affected the prosecution rates in both countries. The socio-cultural factors (i.e. ethnic, national, or family ties) form the basis for building trust and loyalty within the organized drug trafficking networks, establishing working relationships and promotions within networks. Emerging routes in Maldives and Sri Lanka seem to deviate towards the lesser-patrolled areas in the southern part of the Indian Ocean as the criminal networks continue to adapt to the enhanced maritime enforcement measures in the region. 8 The ability of new elements to enter the market can depend on various factors, including existing power dynamics between various local gangs, local political connections, law enforcement efforts, the adaptability of new entrants, and institutional corruption. However, an increase in the trafficking of synthetic drugs and a rise in local consumption were reported as factors that are likely to impact these existing market dynamics. The maritime route holds the largest share in illicit drug trafficking in the Maldives and Sri Lanka, especially larger consignments, but there has been a noticeable rise in the share of the air routes and postal methods post-COVID-19 restrictions.  

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; 2024 44p.

By Anthony Morgan

This report examines the effect of money laundering on the harm associated with organised crime by linking data on organised crime groups known to law enforcement, and data on suspicious transactions reported to the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC). This study is the first step in assessing the social and economic harms associated with money laundering and terrorism financing in Australia.

Key Findings

• Suspicious matter reports captured a high proportion of individuals and groups known by law enforcement to be involved in organised crime.

• Known organised crime groups accounted for a very small proportion of suspicious matter reports.

• The amount of money laundered by groups varied according to where they laundered their funds and whether they had professional facilitators.

• The presence and amount of money laundering was consistently associated with an increase in recorded crime-related harm and the probability of organised crime.

• Evidence indicates that the laundering of illicit funds preceded increases in crime-related harm.

Consultancy Report Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2024. 73p.

By Shawn Davies, Garoun Engström, Therése Pettersson and Magnus Öberg

This article examines trends in organized violence based on new data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). In 2023, fatalities from organized violence decreased for the first time since the rapid increase observed in 2020, dropping from 310,000 in 2022 to 154,000 in 2023. Despite this decline, these figures represent some of the highest fatality rates recorded since the Rwandan genocide in 1994, surpassed only by those of 2022 and 2021. The decrease was primarily attributed to the end of the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, which accounted for about 60% of battle-related deaths in both 2022 and 2021. Despite this positive development, the number of active state-based armed conflicts increased by three in 2023, reaching the highest level ever recorded by the UCDP, totaling 59. Non-state conflicts and one-sided violence decreased in 2023 when compared to 2022, evident in both the reduction of the active conflicts/actors and the decrease in fatalities attributed to these forms of violence. However, despite this overall decrease, fatalities resulting from non-state conflicts remained at historically high levels in 2023. Analysis of non-state conflict data spanning the past decade reveals that it comprises the ten most violent years on record. Organized crime groups have predominantly fueled this escalation. Unlike rebel groups, organized crime groups typically lack political goals and are primarily motivated by economic gain. Conflicts between these groups tend to intensify around drug smuggling routes and in urban areas, driven by shifts in alliances and leadership dynamics among the actors.

Journal of Peace ResearchVolume 61, Issue 4, July 2024, Pages 673-693

By Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera, Charles Lewis and William Yaworsky

This article explains some of the mechanisms through which corruption by high-level Mexican politicians and other organized crime members is facilitated in the United States through money laundering operations. The analysis is based on information contained in court records related to key money laundering cases, as well as in news articles and reports from law enforcement agencies. These materials highlight the interrelationships among U.S. drug use, cartel activities in Mexico, human rights abuses, Mexican political corruption, and money laundering in the United States. This work demonstrates the pervasive use of legitimate businesses and fronts in the United States as a disguise for criminal activity. Finally, it provides recommendations for a reformation of policies and penalties directed toward U.S. institutions and persons that facilitate money laundering.

Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 6(1): pp. 64–78. 2024

By Jonathan Goodhand, Patrick Meehan, Camilo Acero, and Jan Koehler

This research paper is the second in a three-part series analysing the nexus between paramilitaries, illicit economies and organised crime in borderland and frontier regions. This research challenges the idea that paramilitaries are symptomatic of state breakdown, flourishing in marginal spaces suffering from ‘governance deficits’; and that they can primarily be understood as apolitical, predatory self-enriching actors, driven by economic motives, and operating outside formal political systems.

In this research paper, a set of detailed case studies are presented that explore coercive brokerage in Afghanistan, Colombia and Myanmar that seek to address these ideas, drawing upon data and analysis generated by a four-year Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF) project, Drugs & (Dis)order (https://drugs-disorder.soas.ac.uk), and other relevant research.

Birmingham, UK:  University of Birmingham. 2023, 65pg

By Alessia Rossi

Organised crime is one of the most important threats to the functioning of the rule of law and democracy. This research will analyse why the ‘ndrangheta, with its structure, ranks among the most powerful mafias. Specifically, consideration will be paid to cocaine trafficking, which is their most profitable supply channel. One of their main strengths is having ‘ndrine located all over the world, especially in Latin America. There, brokers manage to contract with key organisations, such as the Urabeños. Moreover, to carry out operations mainly via containers, they have trusted corrupt accomplices in the ports. In the latter, the ‘ndrangheta may not only have influence but even be embedded, as in the case of the port of Gioia Tauro. Finally, it will be examined not only the transnational approach but also the need for a national response of increasing port security in limiting the infiltration of the Calabrian mafia.  

Fiesole FI, Italy:  Transnational Governance of the European University Institute, 2023. 43p.