Epistemic Oppression 

By Lark Mulligan

he police murdered Alton Sterling on camera.2 They also murdered Eric Garner, Laquan McDonald, and many others; the videos of their deaths garnered millions of views.3 Information about some horrors of the criminal legal system is spreading widely, yet White mainstream media outlets frequently dismiss, erase, or demonize Black, Indegenous, and People of Color (“BIPOC”) communities who protest and organize to demand justice through the abolition of or radical changes to the policing and prison systems.4 In response to these racist atrocities and within the broader context of criminal legal reform, activists and academics frequently craft ethical arguments such as: “Solitary confinement is immoral because it inflicts psychological and physical torture” or “Incarceration is unethical because prisons are inherently violent places.”5 Many ethical arguments centeron the racist injustices and harm that affronts human dignity and agency caused by prisons and police.6 Others critique the racist and retributive ethics of “law and order” rhetoric.7 Each argument is well-supported by accessible data that can be found in numerous studies, books, articles, and media.8 However, people often erroneously dismiss these data-driven, logical, ethical reasonings as factually inaccurate, or many respond with a deeply racist ethical-legal rationale, for example: “While there may be abuses in prisons, some people need to be put in solitary or prison and deserve it because [insert classical legal rationales for punishment: deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation, etc.].”9 Ethical and legal arguments are severely limited, however, when they lack an epistemological interrogation into the power structures that determine what qualifies as “knowledge” within the ethical-social conversation. This article demonstrates why anti-prison activists’ ethical arguments generally do not receive the due credibility and weight they deserve unless they pair critical liberatory epistemic practices with material, institutional, and social transformations. Abolitionists claiming to fight the confines of carceral epistemologies cannot merely sit back and point out the already-existing logical contradictions in the criminal legal system—it is not enough. ..continued 

St. Mary’s Law Review on Race & Social Justice , v. 27(2) 2025.

By Jonathon J. Booth

This Article places the birth and growth of the Atlanta police in context by exploring the full scope of Atlanta’s criminal legal system during the four decades after the end of slavery. To do so, it analyzes the connections Atlantans made between race and crime, the adjudication and punishment of minor offenses, and the variety of Black protests against the criminal legal system. This Article is based, in part, on a variety of archival sources, including decades of arrest and prosecution data that, for the first time, allow for a quantitative assessment of the impact of the new system of policing on Atlanta’s residents.

This Article breaks new ground in four ways. First, it demonstrates that rather than simply maintaining the social relations of slavery, Atlanta’s police force responded to the challenges of freedom: it was designed to maintain White supremacy in an urban space in which residents, theoretically, had equal rights. Second, it shows that White citizens’ beliefs about the causes of crime and the connections between race and crime, which I call “lay criminology,” influenced policing strategies. Third, it adds a new layer to our understanding of the history of order-maintenance policing by showing that mass criminalization for minor offenses such as disorderly conduct began soon after emancipation. This type of policing caused a variety of harms to the city’s Black residents, forcing thousands each year to pay fines or labor for weeks on the chain gang. Fourth, it shows that the complaints of biased and brutal policing that animate contemporary police reform activism have been present for a century and a half. In the decades after emancipation, Atlanta’s Black residents, across class lines, protested the racist criminal legal system and police abuses, while envisioning a more equitable city where improved social conditions would reduce crime.

University of Colorado Law Review Volume 96 Issue 1 Article 1 2025

By Raoul Sumo Tayo

This report explores current and emerging maritime piracy trends and the associated flow of criminal activities in Cameroon.

Maritime piracy has become one of the most urgent security issues in the Gulf of Guinea, which is currently the second-most affected region worldwide. Cameroon’s coastline is at the centre of these dynamics, with attacks, shifting routes and an expanding set of criminal activities that both accompany and sustain piracy. Understanding these trends is essential to analysing how violence is maintained at sea, in mangrove areas and on land.

This report provides an overview of current and emerging patterns of maritime piracy and the cohabitant flows that reinforce it. It tracks the evolution of incidents on and off the Cameroonian coast, describing the methods used by individuals commonly referred to as pirates, including timing of attacks, routes, targets and operational tactics. While vessel boardings, attempted attacks, hijackings and kidnappings have generally decreased, illegal activities that generate alternative income have increased, particularly hostage-taking, extortion and illegal taxation. These criminal flows sustain pirate economies and strengthen their resilience when groups are not directly involved in kidnapping-for-ransom operations.

PretoriaL  Institute for Security Studies, 2025. 42p.

By New South Wales. Legislative Assembly Committee on Law and Safety

Following the December 2025 Bondi terror attack, the NSW government is strengthening laws against hate speech, specifically targeting slogans like "globalize the intifada" and prohibited terrorist symbols in public. A January 2026 Parliamentary inquiry recommended legislation to ban this specific slogan and similar hate speech to combat violence, with proposals including amending the Crimes Act 1900.

NSW ParliamentNSW Parliament +3

Key Measures and Developments:

Targeted Slogans: The chant "globalize the intifada" is explicitly identified as inciting violence, with moves to prohibit it and similar hateful statements.

Legislative Action: The inquiry recommends amending the Crimes Act 1900 (specifically section 93ZAA) to further prohibit public acts that incite hatred on grounds including religion, race, and sexual orientation.

School Crackdown: Immediate, stricter conduct rules are in place across NSW schools (government, independent, and Catholic), with potential for dismissal for staff engaging in hate speech.

Symbol Prohibition: Legislation is being developed to outlaw the public display of symbols associated with proscribed terrorist organizations.

Inquiry Recommendations: The Parliamentary committee advised monitoring UK hate speech laws, ensuring new legislation is robust against constitutional challenges, and reviewing any new laws within 12 months.

Context: These actions follow the 2025 Bondi incident and focus on balancing anti-racism with existing legal frameworks.

Justice and Equity CentreJustice and Equity Centre +7

Parliament of NSW. 2026. 56p.

By Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Bobby Boxerman and Celeste Barry
Prior criminal records account for a large share of already lengthy prison sentences, often adding years or even decades to sentences, without evidence of community safety benefits.



What’s new? Recruitment of children to fight in armed and criminal groups has boomed across Colombia over the last decade, with hundreds of minors lured into joining violent groups on false promises of wealth, status and protection. This war crime disproportionately affects Colombia’s ethnic communities and those who live in conflict zones.

Why does it matter? Armed groups rely on minors to maintain territorial control. Children carry out high-risk tasks, suffer abuse, and are punished with death if caught escaping. Recruitment shatters communities’ ability to resist armed groups because locals fear their own family members will be the targets of reprisals if they speak out.

What should be done? Colombia should act promptly to identify children at risk, boost protection at schools (where recruitment often happens) and strengthen its criminal investigations into the perpetrators. Foreign donors should support police efforts to track recruiters and help strengthen communities’ ability to prevent the crime from taking place.

International Crisis Group, 2026, 28p.

By Mark Galeotti

Weaponized migration, which is sometimes called instrumentalized migration or coercive engineered migration, is by no means a new challenge, but it is one that is arguably easier to apply in the modern age of cheap and easy international travel and growing awareness of the wealth and security disparities across the globe. It is also more likely to have local and widespread political impacts within democratic governments with free media.

This report considers particular case studies from the Russian–Finnish border in 2015 and, especially, the Belarusian borders with Poland and Lithuania in 2021, and Russia’s with Finland and Norway in 2023/24. In subtly different ways, these were all examples of attempts to use weaponized migration to bring pressure to bear on the target countries, in the hope of influencing their leaderships by generating division, disruption and costs, both practical and political. They certainly all proved problematic and, although there is scope for serious debate as to whether they were ultimately effective or counter-productive, the consensus appears to be that both Minsk and Moscow were left with the sense that, in the short term at least, weaponized migration remained a viable tool within their ‘hybrid war’ toolbox.

Given the scope for the renewed use of this tool by Belarus and, especially, the Russian Federation, as well as its potential use by other nations such as Türkiye, which has already employed it, European societies in particular must consider the contexts in which it can be used against them in the future and potential responses. This report, therefore, concludes with future scenarios for the weaponization of migration, ranging from facilitating flows from North Africa to the online encouragement of would-be asylum seekers, as well as a range of recommendations for both the EU and individual states, ideally that do not simply depend on a dangerous ‘Fortress Europe’ approach.

Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) , 2026.

By Alice Fereday

Chad’s role as a departure and transit country for northbound migration to North Africa and Europe is often overlooked, particularly in comparison to neighbouring Niger and Sudan. However, the country’s position at the crossroads of routes connecting central and eastern Africa to Libya and Niger makes it a significant transit corridor for regional migration, and its role as a bastion of relative stability in an increasingly volatile region has further increased its importance in recent years. Since 2023, the conflict in Sudan and a major influx of refugees into Chad have further shaped these mobility dynamics, making the country a major destination and transit point for Sudanese refugee displacement in the region. At the same time, Chad is navigating a fractious and contested political transition. Political violence escalated in 2024 and remains an important source of tension and political instability. The combination of these complex internal and regional dynamics, and their impact on human smuggling dynamics, make Chad a key country to monitor. A major component of human smuggling dynamics in Chad is internal movements to the country’s northern goldfields. These mobility patterns have typically been shaped by internal factors, including political instability, rebel activity and gold mining.1 This changed in 2023 with the outbreak of the conflict in Sudan and the massive influx of refugees and returnees into eastern Chad. Though northbound movements were temporarily hindered by this shift, which resulted in a relative decrease in demand for northbound travel from eastern Chad in the early months of the conflict, by the end of 2023 human smuggling had picked up again as many Sudanese began leaving refugee camps with the intention of travelling to northern Chad, Libya, Niger and Tunisia, often with the help of smugglers.2 In 2024, these movements escalated further and human smuggling between eastern and northern Chad saw significant growth, due in large part to increasing demand among Sudanese refugees for travel to northern Chad and Libya. However, the movement of Sudanese refugees through Chad also involved travel to Niger via N’Djamena or northern Chad. Northbound movements in Chad were also driven by increasing demand for travel to the Kouri Bougoudi goldfield. The flow of prospective gold miners, which began after the goldfield reopened at the end of 2022, was also facilitated by decreased restrictions on northbound travel as risks of rebel incursions in northern Chad remained contained in 2024. This encouraged the activities of passeurs, who catered to increasing demand for northbound travel, particularly from eastern Chad.Overall, Chad recorded progressively increasing movement levels in 2024 compared to previous years, presaging its emergence as an important space to watch for migrant and refugee movement, and associated protection risks. This is the latest GI-TOC monitoring report on human smuggling in Chad. It builds on a series of annual reports – issued since 2019 – which track the evolution of human smuggling in Chad and the political, security and economic dynamics that influence it

By Alice Fereday ̵and Alexandre Bish

Human smuggling in Chad mostly involves northbound movements linking southern and eastern areas of the country to the north, in particular the gold mining areas in the Tibesti mountains, and to Libya. As a result, these dynamics are often connected to and impacted by the situation in northern Chad, where decades of political unrest, successive rebellions, intercommunity conflict, and deeply entrenched illicit economies and transnational organized crime dynamics are key factors of instability. Chadian authorities have long responded to these risks through securitization, including, in recent years, tight control over key routes and hubs, and a ban on travel to the north, further increasing demand for smuggling services among Chadians travelling to the goldfields or further afield to Libya, and in some cases, Europe. In 2022, human smuggling activity in Chad continued to be heavily affected by the political and security developments that followed the incursion led by the Front pour l’Alternance et la Concorde au Tchad (Front for change and concord in Chad – FACT) and ensuing death of President Idriss Déby, the country’s long-time leader, in April 2021. This upheaval interrupted what had been a broader rise of human smuggling from and through Chad, which, despite being illegal, had increased since 2016. This rise was in part due to the displacement of smuggling routes from Niger and Sudan, following anti-smuggling interventions in those two countries, which led to the use of Chad as a transit hub for human smuggling networks. Despite the displacement of routes, the number of migrants transiting the country still paled in comparison to the numbers that continued transiting Sudan and Niger. The most significant human smuggling itinerary in Chad remains the transport of migrants, both Chadian and foreign, to the gold mining economy along the country’s northern border with Libya. Since their discovery in 2012 and 2013, goldfields in the north have developed into major economic hubs attracting mostly poor migrants from across the region. The COVID-19 pandemic and linked travel restrictions in 2020 had little impact on movement to the goldfields. Rather, following the October 2020 ceasefire in Libya, the arrival of former mercenaries previously engaged in Libya to Kouri Bougoudi resulted in an uptick in gold mining, which in turn fuelled demand for workers. This development caused a surge in the movement of Sudanese and Chadian miners towards the goldfield since mid-2020.

By The Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua

A. Background 1. Pursuant to its resolution 49/3, the Human Rights Council established the Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua, to investigate alleged human rights violations and abuses committed in Nicaragua since April 2018 and provide guidance on justice and accountability. In its resolution 52/2, the Council extended the mandate of the Group for a period of two years. The Group is composed of Jan-Michael Simon (Chair), Ariela Peralta Distéfano and Reed Brody. 2. The Group has previously concluded that there were reasonable grounds to believe that, since April 2018, State and non-State actors had committed serious human rights violations and abuses against an ever-growing range of real or perceived opponents and their relatives in a systematic and widespread manner. 1 The Group determined that some of those violations constituted, prima facie, the crimes against humanity of murder, imprisonment, torture, including rape and other forms of sexual violence of comparable gravity, deportation and persecution. 3. The present conference room paper, which complements the report submitted to the Human Rights Council (A/HRC/58/26), contains the detailed findings of the Group of Experts on the structure of the repressive State, chains of command and State and individual responsibilities in relation to the main patterns of violations and abuses documented since the beginning of its mandate. Ten functional diagrams illustrating the de jure and de facto connections between different State and non-State entities are available on the Group’s web page. 2 4. The present document identifies individuals whom the Group of Experts has reasonable grounds to believe are responsible for violations, abuses and crimes. A list of these names was sent to the Government of Nicaragua to give the identified individuals an opportunity to respond to the allegations made against them. The Group recalls that while the threshold of "reasonable grounds to believe" is lower than that required to establish responsibility in criminal proceedings, it is sufficient to justify the initiation of investigations (see section I(C)(3) below). While that threshold does not preclude the identification in the present conference room paper of possible individual responsibilities, determinations about individual criminal responsibility can be made only by competent judicial authorities with full respect for the right to a fair trial of the accused. 5. Despite the Council's calls upon the Government of Nicaragua to cooperate fully with the Group, including by granting it unfettered access to the whole country, the Government continues to refuse to engage with the Group. Since the beginning of its mandate, the Group has sent 17 unanswered letters to the Nicaraguan authorities requesting information. 3 On 27 February 2025, the Government of Nicaragua announced its withdrawal from the Human Rights Council and all its subsidiary mechanisms. 4 6. On 26 March 2025, the Human Rights Council decided to postpone consideration of the adoption of the outcome document of the Universal Periodic Review of Nicaragua, fourth cycle, scheduled for the 58th session of the Human Rights Council. This decision was taken as Nicaragua's positions on the recommendations received on 13 November 2024 during the Review were not received. The Human Rights Council decided to call on the Government of Review were not received. The Human Rights Council decided to call on the Government of Nicaragua to resume its cooperation and to schedule the consideration of the outcome document of the Universal Periodic Review at its 60th session.5 7. Despite the lack of cooperation and elevated security risks for victims, witnesses and others providing information, the Group was able to gather, analyse and corroborate the information and evidence necessary to establish the facts of, and prima facie responsibility for,the serious violations, abuses and crimes described in the present conference room paper.

By The Youth Endowment Fund

The Youth Endowment Fund asked nearly 11,000 children aged 13–17 across England and Wales to share their experiences of violence. The findings are set out in separate reports, each exploring a different theme. This one focuses on teenage children’s experiences of exploitation and ‘gangs’. When we asked teenage children whether they had been in a ‘gang’, we defined a ‘gang’ as: “A group of young people who think of themselves as a ‘gang’, probably with a name, who are involved in violence or other crime.” We used the word ‘gang’ because it is one that many young people recognise and use themselves, more than phrases such as group-based criminality. But we also recognise its limitations: the term oversimplifies a complex issue and can reinforce harmful stereotypes. To reflect these sensitivities, we use inverted commas when referring to ‘gangs’. At several points in this report, we share the words of James (whose name has been changed to protect his identity), who, from ages 12 to 18, was criminally exploited. His story lays bare the reality

By Chukwudi Kingsley Onyeachu, Ikechukwu Clement Okoro & Martina Mgbosolu Ugwuoke 

Cybercrime and violent extremism have not only become mutually reinforcing, in recent times, but also fast growing, multidimensional and easily joined by the youth for lack of socio-economic opportunities to break out of poverty and overcome family and peer pressures. Research findings have proven that to ‘get-rich-quick’ through cyber-criminalities influences performance of human blood and body parts rituals, which translates to violent extremism. The youth who make money through these inhuman practices that negate acceptable societal values believe that education, apprenticeship, human capital development and decent work are a dysfunctional social-orientation. Careful observations have shown that when the youth acquire illicit money, the result is excessive clubbing, frivolous spending, promotion of prostitution, substance abuse, which undermine effective youth engagement in socio-economic development. The youth bulge theory was adopted in the study. The theory postulates that large youth population can become a “demographic dividend” when their potentials are properly harnessed, and it can also become a “demographic bomb” in the face of systemic socio-economic exclusion, unemployment, hunger and family poverty. The methodology applied was content analysis, leveraging empirical studies in Nigerian context and other sources of data. The paper revealed that youth unemployment, systemic corruption, absence of transparency in the administration of poverty alleviation interventions and limited opportunities are manifestations of youth exclusion from decision-making process and they are key factors influencing youth participation in cybercrime and violent extremism. The paper recommended practical youth-specific engagement strategies in socio-economic development as a means to discouraging cybercrime and its associated extreme practices.

Discov glob soc 3, 72 (2025)

By Kaoem Telapak and Environmental Investigation Agency UK 

Indonesia is the world’s largest producer of palm oil, a substance used in thousands of everyday items including food stuffs, cleaning products, shampoo and as a biofuel. 

Indonesian exports of palm oil and related products were worth almost $28 billion in 2024. The Fangiono family, through various family members, is linked to a multitude of palm oil companies in Indonesia. This report outlines the most urgent and ongoing alleged violations by these companies, as of 2025. The companies featured have been accused of deforestation, landgrabs, corruption, operating without proper permits and conflicts with local and indigenous people, with evidence suggesting these are continuing and even expanding issues. Cases studies span Sumatra, Kalimantan and Papua – regions which not only represent different ecological zones but also host distinct indigenous populations and present different legal and political challenges. The family is led by its patriarch – known by his first name, Martias – who was convicted in 2007 of obtaining palm oil permits through bribery and corruption. He was fined more than $38 million and jailed for one-and-a-half years. Today, the Fangiono family operates several major corporate groups, including First Resources, FAP Agri and Ciliandry Anky Abadi, with Martias’ relatives having key positions in these groups. However, there have been numerous reports by NGOs over the years exposing the opaque corporate layers of the family’s companies and alleging control of a network of shadow companies accused of dubious practices, such as deforestation and violating communities’ rights. Such charges have been largely denied by First Resources and FAP Agri, both of which have sustainability policies. But some prominent brands, including Unilever and PepsiCo, are reported to have suspended sourcing palm oil from them due to such allegations. In this report, Kaoem Telapak (KT) and the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) outline how the number of companies linked to the family continues to grow and present ongoing allegations of illegal activities, human rights violations and environmental destruction connected with them, while asking how they can continue to act with impunity. 

London: EIA, 2025. 44p.