By FATF/OECD - GAFILAT 

This report summarises the AML/CFT measures in place in Brazil as at the date of the on-site visit, 13-31 March 2023. It analyses the level of compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations and the level of effectiveness of Brazil’s AML/CFT system, and provides recommendations on how the system could be strengthened. Key Findings a) Brazil has a strong domestic coordination mechanism to address risks from money laundering, ENCCLA. Brazil has built a legal and structural framework largely enabling competent authorities to prevent and combat ML. More recently, Brazil has also improved its framework to fight terrorist financing (TF) by passing legislation criminalising the offence and enabling implementation of targeted financial sanctions (TFS). Informed by the longstanding coordination within ENCCLA and a National Risk Assessment conducted in 2021, authorities have shared and robust understanding of national ML threats, namely, corruption, drug trafficking and organised crime, environmental crimes, and tax crimes. There is a precise understanding of the ML risks and vulnerabilities linked to most threats— including informal and illicit value transfers, misuse of cash, and front companies—however, there is a lack of depth in the understanding of financial flows linked to environmental crimes. b) Through ENCCLA, since 2003, Brazil has developed and refined policies to tackle many of its higher ML risks, particularly those stemming from corruption. Brazil has taken many steps to address other higher risk areas, however, these actions are taken without longer-term, comprehensive strategies, which results in occasional disjointed efforts and misalignment of objectives and priorities (such as ML from environmental crimes where interagency cooperation is growing but limited, and where some keyauthorities lack sufficient resources). At times, structural issues inhibit effective coordination in combatting ML/TF, including cooperation between police and prosecution offices and resources to handle the complex criminal justice system. In addition, the tax authority (RFB) has a central role in the AML/CFT system given that it controls access to many pieces of relevant information, but legal obstacles frustrate its full ability to assist other authorities in tackling ML/TF and its own AML/CFT activities are not adequately prioritised. c) Brazil has successfully prosecuted high-end cases of ML, including from corruption, reflecting the capacity to conduct financial investigations and the development of supportive institutional structures. Despite important successes, there is a mismatch between the investigative input and the results seen in terms of prosecutions and convictions. Structural issues have a major impact. Among other things, ML proceedings take too long due to appeals and when convictions are obtained, sometimes a decade or more after charges, and the sanctioning regime needs major improvements. Criminal assets are generally identified and temporarily seized, and in some major cases Brazil was able to recuperate large sums of criminal money; however, there was not sufficient evidence of final confiscation and asset recovery is mainly accomplished through agreements. While there is highlevel commitment to fighting ML/TF, the resources available to competent authorities are largely insufficient, particularly those of COAF and prosecutors. Lack of resources hinders the production of deeper financial intelligence to identify a larger number of complex ML schemes and frustrate efforts to trace criminal financial networks. d) Brazil is committed to fighting terrorism and terrorist financing and has an improving understanding of its TF risks including those stemming from farright extremism. While it has expertise to investigate TF activity, the legal framework in place and the corresponding view of the authorities hinder successful prosecutions. The authorities are not always well coordinated to identify, prosecute, or prevent TF. The framework to implement targeted financial sanctions without delay for TF and proliferation financing is in place, although it remains largely untested at the time of the onsite visit as no designations had been made by Brazil and no funds or assets were frozen. Sanctions implementation by the private sector is improving particularly in the financial sector, thanks to the supervisory activity of the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB), and more slowly in other sectors. There is a lack of interagency coordination on issues related to the financing of proliferation and guidance is needed for the private sector. NPOs are not yet subject to risk-based measures specifically to prevent TF. e) As a major regional and global economy, Brazil has a large and diverse universe of financial and non-financial sectors with increasing sophistication. BCB is the key supervisor for the most material financial institutions and its long-standing risk-based activities have contributed to significantly improve the ability of financial institutions to detect and prevent ML and TF, particularly the largest ones. With few exceptions, other supervisors have not been able yet to take sufficient measures to ensure sufficient implementation of the AML/CFT framework. At the time of the on-site visit, some activities remained unregulated, notably those of lawyers and virtual asset service providers, leaving serious vulnerabilities. f) The misuse of companies is a feature in many ML schemes and Brazil has been able to detect abusers in many cases by using the information available through REDESIM to map out the company structure. Brazil has also created a requirement for companies to provide beneficial ownership (BO) information to RFB, however, this database is largely unpopulated. Moreover, declaratory BO information is considered by law to be “tax secret,” which means that LEAs need to request a court order to obtain it and that COAF and other administrative authorities (including those involved in the fight against corruption) cannot access it for their analysis. g) Brazil generally cooperates well in ML/TF areas with its international partners. As many ML schemes include the sending of money abroad, LEAs and COAF are very proactive in seeking assistance to obtain information and restrain criminal assets. As a major financial centre, Brazil also receives requests for cooperation from abroad, and competent authorities provide high quality assistance, with soon-site visit, some activities remained unregulated, notably those of lawyers and virtual asset service providers, leaving serious vulnerabilities. f) The misuse of companies is a feature in many ML schemes and Brazil has been able to detect abusers in many cases by using the information available through REDESIM to map out the company structure. Brazil has also created a requirement for companies to provide beneficial ownership (BO) information to RFB, however, this database is largely unpopulated. Moreover, declaratory BO information is considered by law to be “tax secret,” which means that LEAs need to request a court order to obtain it and that COAF and other administrative authorities (including those involved in the fight against corruption) cannot access it for their analysis. g) Brazil generally cooperates well in ML/TF areas with its international partners. As many ML schemes include the sending of money abroad, LEAs and COAF are very proactive in seeking assistance to obtain information and restrain criminal assets. As a major financial centre, Brazil also receives requests for cooperation from abroad, and competent authorities provide high quality assistance, with so on-site visit, some activities remained unregulated, notably those of lawyers and virtual asset service providers, leaving serious vulnerabilities. f) The misuse of companies is a feature in many ML schemes and Brazil has been able to detect abusers in many cases by using the information available through REDESIM to map out the company structure. Brazil has also created a requirement for companies to provide beneficial ownership (BO) information to RFB, however, this database is largely unpopulated. Moreover, declaratory BO information is considered by law to be “tax secret,” which means that LEAs need to request a court order to obtain it and that COAF and other administrative authorities (including those involved in the fight against corruption) cannot access it for their analysis. g) Brazil generally cooperates well in ML/TF areas with its international partners. As many ML schemes include the sending of money abroad, LEAs and COAF are very proactive in seeking assistance to obtain information and restrain criminal assets. As a major financial centre, Brazil also receives requests for cooperation from abroad, and competent authorities provide high quality assistance, with some improvements needed in extradition and the speed of responses.

Paris, FATF, 2023. 354p.

By John D. Bessler

The modern international human rights movement began with the U.N. Charter and the U.N. General Assembly’s adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Although the movement to abolish the death penalty is rooted in the Enlightenment, global advocacy to halt executions and to abolish capital punishment has accelerated exponentially in recent decades. This Article discusses the origins of global networks to advance human rights and highlights the growing international advocacy, including by nation-states and nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”), for a worldwide moratorium on executions and to abolish capital punishment altogether. The total number of countries conducting executions in the past few decades has declined dramatically, putting retentionist states, such as China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, North Korea, and the United States, in an increasingly isolated position in the international community. Many nations now even refuse to extradite criminal suspects without assurances that the death penalty will not be sought. With more than 90 countries having already ratified or  Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), aiming at theabolition of the death penalty, and with scores of domestic and international NGOs now actively promoting abolition, the global movement to abolish capital punishment has made significant strides and holds tremendous promise, though much more work remains to be done. This Article highlights the path forward for advocates seeking the death penalty’s abolition in law—and de facto—across the globe, with a focus on international law and classifying the use of capital prosecutions, death sentences, and executions as acts of torture and clear violations of fundamental human rights. In particular, the Article discusses advocacy efforts before the United Nations, highlights the role of NGOs in leading that effort, and advocates for the recognition of a peremptory.

 34 MINN. J. INT'L L. 1 (2025).

By Alice Fereday ̵and Alexandre Bish

Human smuggling in Chad mostly involves northbound movements linking southern and eastern areas of the country to the north, in particular the gold mining areas in the Tibesti mountains, and to Libya. As a result, these dynamics are often connected to and impacted by the situation in northern Chad, where decades of political unrest, successive rebellions, intercommunity conflict, and deeply entrenched illicit economies and transnational organized crime dynamics are key factors of instability. Chadian authorities have long responded to these risks through securitization, including, in recent years, tight control over key routes and hubs, and a ban on travel to the north, further increasing demand for smuggling services among Chadians travelling to the goldfields or further afield to Libya, and in some cases, Europe. In 2022, human smuggling activity in Chad continued to be heavily affected by the political and security developments that followed the incursion led by the Front pour l’Alternance et la Concorde au Tchad (Front for change and concord in Chad – FACT) and ensuing death of President Idriss Déby, the country’s long-time leader, in April 2021. This upheaval interrupted what had been a broader rise of human smuggling from and through Chad, which, despite being illegal, had increased since 2016. This rise was in part due to the displacement of smuggling routes from Niger and Sudan, following anti-smuggling interventions in those two countries, which led to the use of Chad as a transit hub for human smuggling networks. Despite the displacement of routes, the number of migrants transiting the country still paled in comparison to the numbers that continued transiting Sudan and Niger. The most significant human smuggling itinerary in Chad remains the transport of migrants, both Chadian and foreign, to the gold mining economy along the country’s northern border with Libya. Since their discovery in 2012 and 2013, goldfields in the north have developed into major economic hubs attracting mostly poor migrants from across the region. The COVID-19 pandemic and linked travel restrictions in 2020 had little impact on movement to the goldfields. Rather, following the October 2020 ceasefire in Libya, the arrival of former mercenaries previously engaged in Libya to Kouri Bougoudi resulted in an uptick in gold mining, which in turn fuelled demand for workers. This development caused a surge in the movement of Sudanese and Chadian miners towards the goldfield since mid-2020.

By The Youth Endowment Fund

The Youth Endowment Fund (YEF) surveyed nearly 11,000 children aged 13–17 in England and Wales to hear directly about their experiences of violence. The findings are being shared across several reports, each exploring a different theme. This third report focuses on mental health and experiences of violence. For the first time, we asked detailed questions about mental health, including using the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ), a 25-item questionnaire that measures the scale of children’s struggles. Combined with data on victimisation and perpetration, this provides an unprecedented picture of how violence and mental health are linked — and the complex ways they shape young people’s lives. Here’s what we found. Teenage children affected by serious violence face a dramatically higher risk of mental health problems. The scale of poor mental health among teenagers is alarming. More than one in four 13-17-year-olds reported high or very high levels of mental health difficulties, as measured by the SDQ — the equivalent of nearly a million teenage children struggling with their well-being. Behind this figure lie serious and often complex needs. A quarter of teenage children reported a diagnosis of at least one mental health or neurodevelopmental condition, such as depression, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder or speech and communication difficulties. A further 21% suspected they had a condition but had not been formally diagnosed — suggesting large numbers of teenage children are facing difficulties without recognition or support

By The Youth Endowment Fund

The Youth Endowment Fund asked nearly 11,000 children aged 13–17 across England and Wales to share their experiences of violence. The findings are set out in separate reports, each exploring a different theme. This one focuses on teenage children’s experiences of exploitation and ‘gangs’. When we asked teenage children whether they had been in a ‘gang’, we defined a ‘gang’ as: “A group of young people who think of themselves as a ‘gang’, probably with a name, who are involved in violence or other crime.” We used the word ‘gang’ because it is one that many young people recognise and use themselves, more than phrases such as group-based criminality. But we also recognise its limitations: the term oversimplifies a complex issue and can reinforce harmful stereotypes. To reflect these sensitivities, we use inverted commas when referring to ‘gangs’. At several points in this report, we share the words of James (whose name has been changed to protect his identity), who, from ages 12 to 18, was criminally exploited. His story lays bare the reality

By Chukwudi Kingsley Onyeachu, Ikechukwu Clement Okoro & Martina Mgbosolu Ugwuoke 

Cybercrime and violent extremism have not only become mutually reinforcing, in recent times, but also fast growing, multidimensional and easily joined by the youth for lack of socio-economic opportunities to break out of poverty and overcome family and peer pressures. Research findings have proven that to ‘get-rich-quick’ through cyber-criminalities influences performance of human blood and body parts rituals, which translates to violent extremism. The youth who make money through these inhuman practices that negate acceptable societal values believe that education, apprenticeship, human capital development and decent work are a dysfunctional social-orientation. Careful observations have shown that when the youth acquire illicit money, the result is excessive clubbing, frivolous spending, promotion of prostitution, substance abuse, which undermine effective youth engagement in socio-economic development. The youth bulge theory was adopted in the study. The theory postulates that large youth population can become a “demographic dividend” when their potentials are properly harnessed, and it can also become a “demographic bomb” in the face of systemic socio-economic exclusion, unemployment, hunger and family poverty. The methodology applied was content analysis, leveraging empirical studies in Nigerian context and other sources of data. The paper revealed that youth unemployment, systemic corruption, absence of transparency in the administration of poverty alleviation interventions and limited opportunities are manifestations of youth exclusion from decision-making process and they are key factors influencing youth participation in cybercrime and violent extremism. The paper recommended practical youth-specific engagement strategies in socio-economic development as a means to discouraging cybercrime and its associated extreme practices.

Discov glob soc 3, 72 (2025)

Edited by Stephen Pierce Duggan. Introduction by Graeme R. Newman

A Landmark Vision of International Order at the Dawn of the Modern World

Published in 1919 at the very moment when the post–First World War settlement was taking shape, The League of Nations: The Principle and the Practice, edited by Stephen Pierce Duggan, is one of the most authoritative and illuminating contemporary statements of the ideas that sought to prevent another global catastrophe. Written as the Covenant of the League of Nations moved toward ratification, this volume captures the urgency, optimism, and hard-headed realism of thinkers grappling with the central political question of the twentieth century: how can peace be made durable in a world of sovereign states?

Bringing together leading scholars, jurists, historians, and policy practitioners, the book moves beyond slogans to examine how an international organization must actually function. It explains not only the moral and historical foundations of the League idea, but also its practical machinery—arbitration, sanctions, international administration, and continuous cooperation across borders. Readers are guided through the institutional logic of collective security, the limits of national sovereignty, and the challenges posed by armaments, small nations, and postwar reconstruction.

Distinctive for its clarity and documentary richness, the volume includes key historical texts and the full Covenant of the League itself, allowing readers to engage directly with the constitutional framework of early international governance. Written in accessible but rigorous prose, it was intended for educated citizens as well as specialists—an informed guide for public debate at a decisive historical moment.

Today, The League of Nations: The Principle and the Practice stands as an indispensable primary source for understanding the intellectual foundations of modern global governance. It reveals how the ambitions and anxieties of 1919 shaped later institutions, including the United Nations, and it remains strikingly relevant in an era once again marked by questions of collective security, international law, and global cooperation. For historians, political scientists, legal scholars, and readers interested in the origins of the contemporary international order, this book is both a historical document and a continuing challenge to think seriously about how peace is organized.

The Atlantic Monthly Press. BOSTON. 1919. Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2025. p.253.

By Human Rights Watch

Following the July 2024 presidential elections, electoral authorities in Venezuela announced that Nicolas Maduro had been re-elected president, despite substantial evidence to the contrary. When people took to the streets to demand a fair counting of votes, Venezuelan authorities responded with brutal repression. At least 24 protesters and bystanders were killed and over 2,000 people were detained in connection with post-electoral protests. Punished for Seeking Change documents human rights violations committed against protesters, bystanders, opposition leaders, and critics in the post-electoral protests and the months that followed. It implicates Venezuelan authorities and pro-government armed groups, known as “colectivos,” in widespread abuses, including the killing of protesters and bystanders, enforced disappearances of opposition party members and foreign nationals, arbitrary detention and prosecution of children and others, and torture and ill-treatment of detainees. With 8 million Venezuelans abroad, the rights crisis in Venezuela remains arguably the most consequential in the Western Hemisphere. Governments should support accountability efforts for these grave human rights violations, call for the release of people arbitrarily detained, and expand access to asylum and other forms of international protection for Venezuelans fleeing repression.

New York: HRW, 2025. 109p.