By James Rochlin

The near collapse of the Venezuelan economy since 2015 and the concomitant erosion of public order have led to an exodus of over seven million people by mid-2023, the largest forced migrant flow in recent Latin American history and the second largest globally after Syria. It occurs against a global backdrop of a 400 percent increase in persons displaced across borders between 2010 and 2021. Colombia hosts the largest number of Venezuelan refugees — with about 2.5 million officially recorded by the government. This has occurred during a politically tumultuous period in Colombia, which has featured the reconfiguration of competing illegal armed groups since the signing of the 2016 Peace Accord between the government and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), a major COVID-19 outbreak in 2020–2021, and a crippling and protracted national strike in 2021.

Within the hemispheric context, Colombia serves as a stop-gap to stem the flow of Venezuelan refugees northward, roughly similar to the role played by Mexico to intercept and diminish migration to the United States. This has especially been the case since the January 5, 2023 announcement by US President Biden, which specified that refugees cannot declare asylum in the US if they attempt to cross the US border without first seeking asylum in their initial transit country. For Venezuelan refugees, the first country they enter is typically Colombia. Further, in May 2023, the Biden administration announced it was considering sending US troops to the Darien Peninsula in Panama, and will perhaps train Colombian forces, to diminish the “trafficking” of Venezuelan refugees and other refugees passing through Colombia and headed north. The result, according to leaders of NGOs and other who work directly with refugees, has been more pressure on Colombia to retain them.

The argument here is twofold. First, human security threats for Venezuelan refugees should be viewed intersectionally in the particular spaces through which they pass — from the collapse of order in their home countries (which qualifies them as refugees), through the borderlands with Colombia that pose specific threats to their safety and wellbeing, and to their destinations within Colombia that offer their own peculiar array of opportunities and human security challenges. Second, regularization programs such as the Estatuto Temporal de Protección de Migrantes Venezolanos (ETPMV) are the best way to promote human security for refugees in Colombia in the short and medium terms, but this process needs to be more inclusive.1 The first half of this paper discusses the conceptual underpinnings that link power/mobility/space to human security for refugees. The second part brings those concepts to life through interviews with an assortment of refugees.

The paper draws from a database of interviews with 72 Venezuelan refugees in Colombia in 2022 and 2023 regarding the intersectional nuances of human security. It also relies on interviews with dozens of security, migration, and human rights experts in Colombia since 1997. A unique conceptual perspective is developed regarding critical human security for Venezuelan refugees. Journal on Migration and Human SecurityVolume 11, Issue 4, December 2023, Pages 333-355

By Susan Schmidt

While gang violence, community violence, and domestic violence have been recognized as contributing factors to Central American migration, less is known about the intersection between child maltreatment and migration. This article uses secondary data from United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) interviews with unaccompanied minors from Central America and Mexico to examine child maltreatment. It provides information on the abused children, their abusers, and the questions that led to their disclosure of maltreatment. It finds that girls reported maltreatment at higher rates than boys; only girls in this sample reported sexual abuse and intimate partner violence; and boys experienced physical abuse more than any other form of maltreatment. Overall, girls experienced all forms of abuse at higher rate than boys. Fewer than half of this sample described maltreatment as an explicit reason for migration, even those who viewed it as a type of suffering, harm or danger. In addition, some disclosures suggest that childhood transitions, such as in housing, schooling, or work status, warrant further inquiry as a potential consequence of or contributor to maltreatment. The article recommends that professionals engaged with migrant children in social services, legal services, or migration protection and status adjudications should inquire about maltreatment, recognizing that children may reveal abuse in complex and indirect ways. Protection risks within the home or family environment may provide the grounds for US legal immigration protections, such as Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS) or asylum. Practitioners working with unaccompanied migrant children should use varied approaches to inquire about home country maltreatment experiences. Maltreatment may be part of the context of child migration, whether or not it is explicitly mentioned by children as a reason for migration. Policy Recommendations • US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) should update SIJS regulations to reflect changes in the law, and modify application procedures to incorporate research knowledge on the impact of trauma on children. • The US Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), and Health and Human Services (HHS), should ensure that all children in immigration proceedings receive legal representation through public-private partnerships overseen by the HHS Office of Refugee Resettlement  (ORR). Passage of Senate Bill 3108, the Fair Day in Court for Kids Act of 2021,1 would at least guarantee legal representation for unaccompanied minors. • Codify legal standards (via USCIS regulation, or Congressional statute) for granting asylum based on gender and gender-based violence, and include standards for children and youth. • Adjudicators from USCIS, Asylum Offices, and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) should consider new information about painful, traumatic, or shame-inducing experiences—such as child maltreatment—as part of the gradual process of disclosure, rather than negatively reflecting on the credibility of the applicant. • Federal agencies with immigration responsibilities such as USCIS, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and ORR, should be included in the federal government’s Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration’s (SAMHSA) Interagency Task Force for Trauma-Informed Care. These agencies should require new trainings for immigration adjudicators, including immigration judges, asylum officers, Border Patrol agents, and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) officers, on interviewing and making decisions related to children. • Legal service providers should adopt a holistic approach to service provision that includes social workers as part of the child’s legal team. 

  Journal on Migration and Human Security 2022, Vol. 10(1) 77-92  

By Michele Waslin

This article examines presidential immigration policy making through executive orders (EOs) and proclamations. Donald Trump’s overall volume of EOs has been remarkably similar to that of other presidents, while his number of proclamations has been relatively high. His immigration-related EOs and proclamations, however, diverge from those of his predecessors in several ways. Of the 56 immigration-related EOs and 64 proclamations issued since 1945, Trump has issued 10 and nine, respectively. Overall, about 1 percent of all EOs and proclamations during this period have been immigration related, compared to 8 percent of Trump’s EOs and 2.4 percent of Trump’s proclamations.

In a sharp departure from previous presidents, a greater share of his EOs and proclamations have been substantive policy-making documents intended to restrict admissions of legal immigrants and increase enforcement along the border and in the interior of the United States. This article explores Trump’s unorthodox use of executive tools to make immigration policy, circumventing Congress and even members of his own administration. It recommends that:

• Congress should hold oversight hearings and should consider revoking or modifying EOs and proclamations that have been issued pursuant to the authority provided to the president by Congress, as opposed to those based on the executive’s constitutional authority.

• Advocacy organizations should continue to challenge the president’s executive actions, the insufficient process and consultation leading to them, their statutory or constitutional justification, and their impact.

• Congress should take an inventory of the immigration authorities it has delegated, both explicitly and implicitly, to the executive branch and determine when this authority can and should be limited.

• Congress should pass legislation to update and reform the US immigration system, and thus clarify its intentions regarding US immigration law, policy, and executive authority in this area.

Journal on Migration and Human SecurityVolume 8, Issue 1, March 2020, Pages 54-67

By  Ricardo D. Martínez-Schuldt and Ricardo D. Martínez

Sanctuary jurisdictions have existed in the United States since the 1980s. They have recently reentered U.S. politics and engendered contentious debates regarding their legality and influence on public safety. Critics argue that sanctuary jurisdictions create conditions that threaten local communities by impeding federal immigration enforcement efforts. Proponents maintain that the policies improve public safety by fostering institutional trust among immigrant communities and by increasing the willingness of immigrant community members to notify the police after they are victimized. In this study, we situate expectations from the immigrant sanctuary literature within a multilevel, contextualized help-seeking framework to assess how crime-reporting behavior varies across immigrant sanctuary contexts. We find that Latinos are more likely to report violent crime victimization to law enforcement after sanctuary policies have been adopted within their metropolitan areas of residence. We argue that social policy contexts can shift the nature of help-seeking experiences and eliminate barriers that undermine crime victims’ willingness to mobilize the law. Overall, this study highlights the unique role social policy contexts can serve in structuring victims’ help-seeking decisions.

 American Sociological Review 86(1):154–85. 2021

By David Hausman

The US government maintains that local sanctuary policies prevent deportations of violent criminals and increase crime. This report tests those claims by combining Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) deportation data and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) crime data with data on the implementation dates of sanctuary policies between 2010 and 2015. Sanctuary policies reduced deportations of people who were fingerprinted by states or counties by about one-third. Those policies also changed the composition of deportations, reducing deportations of people with no criminal convictions by half—without affecting deportations of people with violent convictions. Sanctuary policies also had no detectable effect on crime rates. These findings suggest that sanctuary policies, although effective at reducing deportations, do not threaten public safety.

PNAS,  Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 117(44):27262–7.  2020.

By the American Civil Liberties Associations of New Mexico and Texas

Vehicle pursuits make for exciting movie scenes and capture the interest of reality TV viewers, but police chases are dangerous and often deadly.1 Law enforcement agencies across the country are increasingly restricting when such pursuits may be undertaken. Many have issued policies authorizing chases only when the public faces immediate danger. 2 The United States Border Patrol, the largest law enforcement agency in the country, has taken no such steps. In fact, the agency is increasingly engaged in high-speed chases throughout the Southwest border region, with deadly results. The number of fatalities resulting from Border Patrol vehicle pursuits has skyrocketed in recent years, from just 2 deaths in 2019 to 22 in 2021. Despite this trend, Border Patrol does not provide statistics on the number of car chases conducted by its agents unless the agency itself deems it a “use of force” incident, such as when a Border Patrol unit intentionally collides with a vehicle to cause it to crash or agents deploy spike strips to stop a vehicle.3 Senator Dianne Feinstein demanded in 2019 that Customs and Border Protection (CBP) reevaluate its vehicle pursuit policy, stating: “CBP’s pursuit policy does not follow the Justice Department guidelines for vehicle pursuits, but instead offers insufficient protection against possible injuries and fatalities, either to bystander members of the public or occupants of a pursued vehicle. This has led to catastrophic and unwarranted results.   

Albuquerque, NM: ACLU, 2022. 13p.

By Rachel Feldman

This study was undertaken because generally available information about local government policy regarding inquiry about immigration status, use of this information, and interaction with federal immigration authorities was limited to a few New Mexico jurisdictions and was not upto-date or complete. The study identifies the variation and reasons for variation in these policies across the state, including the lack of any formal policy, and the function of informal policy. The study introduces the term “policy infrastructure” to refer to the function of written policy, procedure, monitoring and enforcement systems in directing local government employees and contractors, regarding their obligations to use public resources as directed by any policy that exists1 . A study assumption is that where no formal policy exists and where policy infrastructure is incomplete, public employees and contractors may use public resources at their discretion, regardless of consequences for affected persons. The problem motivating the study is the apparent situation in which residents and visitors to New Mexico experience different practices regarding the identification of and treatment related to their immigration status across the state, including within overlapping jurisdictions (e.g., city and county). Such variation in treatment raises questions regarding the extent to which immigrant rights (legal and undocumented) are respected across the state. It raises the question as to whether such variation is consistent with the intent of state and federal civil and human rights. The study was conducted between September and December in 2018, and inquiries were made by phone and formal requests for public records to all 33 counties and the 10 largest cities in the state. Contacts focused on county and city managers, sheriff and police departments and detention facilities operated by local governments. Some level of information was provided by all 33 counties and all cities contacted. A summary of results is shown in Table 1. Analysis of all documents and interview notes is provided below as study findings.   

Albuquerque, NM: ACLU of New Mexico, 2019. 51p.

By Melanie Gower, Georgina Sturge 

The Home Secretary has a duty to make a deportation order in respect of nonBritish or Irish citizens who have been convicted of an offence in the UK and sentenced to at least 12 months’ imprisonment, unless certain exceptions apply. He also has discretionary powers to deport non-British citizens if he considers it to be “conducive to the public good”. Deportation of foreign national offenders is a longstanding government priority. The Home Office considers for deportation all foreign nationals convicted of a crime in the UK and given a prison sentence. Foreign national offenders can be removed from the country before the end of their prison sentence by way of a prisoner transfer agreement, or through the Early Removal Scheme or Tariff-Expired Removal Scheme. They can receive money to help them to resettle in their home country through the Facilitated Return Scheme. As of the end of June 2023, there were at least 10,321 foreign nationals in prison in England and Wales, out of a total prison population of 85,851. Over half of foreign prisoners were European and, overall, the most common nationalities were Albanian, Polish, Romanian, Irish, and Jamaican. There were 11,769 foreign national offenders subject to deportation action living in the community, as of 30 September 2022.

A report of an inspection by the Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration published in June 2023 was critical of the Home Office’s handling of foreign national offender cases. It found that the Early Removal Scheme and the Facilitated Return Scheme were not being administered effectively. The Government says it has made good progress removing foreign national offenders from prisons and the community, pointing to a 19% increase in overall foreign national offender returns in the 12-month period to September 2023 (3,577 people). Up until that point, the number of foreign national offenders returned on an annual basis had been falling since 2016, when 6,437 individuals were returned. 

London: UK Parliament, The House of Commons Library , 2024. 11p

By Cecilia Esterline  

The Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025 is the policy playbook for a second Trump administration, and its impacts on immigration would be far more complex and destructive than previously reported. It isn’t simply a refresh of first-term ideas, dusted off and ready to be re-implemented. Rather, it reflects a meticulously orchestrated, comprehensive plan to drive immigration levels to unprecedented lows and increase the federal government’s power to the states’ detriment. These proposals circumvent Congress and the courts and are specifically engineered to dismantle the foundations of our immigration system. The most troubling proposals include plans to: • Block federal financial aid for up to two-thirds of all American college students if their state permits certain immigrant groups, including Dreamers with legal status, to access in-state tuition. • Terminate the legal status of 500,000 Dreamers by eliminating staff time for reviewing and processing renewal applications. • Use backlog numbers to trigger the automatic suspension of application intake for large categories of legal immigration. • Suspend updates to the annual eligible country lists for H-2A and H-2B temporary worker visas, thereby excluding most populations from filling critical gaps in the agricultural, construction, hospitality, and forestry sectors. • Bar U.S. citizens from qualifying for federal housing subsidies if they live with anyone who is not a U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident. • Force states to share driver’s licenses and taxpayer identification information with federal authorities or risk critical funding. These proposals, along with the others discussed herein, mark a significant divergence from traditional conservative immigration priorities like promoting merit-based immigration, fostering assimilation, and enhancing interior enforcement. Instead, they are designed to cripple the existing immigration system without regard for the extraordinarily harmful effects on the health and wealth of our country. They would weaken our nation’s prosperity and security and undermine the vitality of our workforce, with far-reaching consequences for future generations of Americans. 

New York: The Niskanen Center, 2024. 17p.

By International Labour Organization (ILO), Walk Free, and International Organization for Migration (IOM) 2022

Modern slavery is a scourge that affects every region of the world. The latest Global Estimates indicate that 50 million people were living in modern slavery in 2021. Of these people, 28 million were in forced labour and 22 million were trapped in forced marriage. Unfortunately, the number of people in modern slavery has risen significantly in the last five years. In 2021, 10 million more people were in modern slavery compared to 2016 global estimates.

Geneva, SWIT: 2022. 144p.

By: Daniel E Martínez, Josiah Heyman, Jeremy Slack

Enforcement along the US-Mexico border has intensified significantly since the early 1990s. Social scientists have documented several consequences of border militarization, including increased border-crosser deaths, the killing of more than 110 people by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents over the past decade, and expanded ethno-racial profiling in southwestern communities by immigration authorities. Less attention has been paid to the pervasive and routine mistreatment migrants experience on a daily basis in CBP custody.

This paper traces major developments in border enforcement to three notable initiatives: the “prevention-through-deterrence” strategy; the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks; and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Consequence Delivery System, initiated in 2011. Despite the massive buildup in enforcement, CBP has operated with little transparency and accountability to the detriment of migrants. The paper provides an overview of the findings of nongovernmental organizations and social scientists regarding migrant mistreatment while in CBP custody. It then highlights important shifts in migration patterns over the past decade, as well as changes in border enforcement efforts during the Trump administration. It discusses how these transformations affect migrants’ everyday encounters with CBP officials.

New York: Center for Migration Studies of New York (CMS) and the Zolberg Institute on Migration and Mobility at the New School, 2020. 22p.

By Josiah Heyman, Jeremy Slack, Daniel E Martínez

United States Border Patrol agent Matthew Bowen allegedly hit an undocumented migrant with his truck in November 2017. In preparation for trial, federal prosecutors revealed that Bowen had a history of making derogatory statements about migrants in text messages, including calling them “disgusting subhuman shit unworthy of being kindling for a fire.” Mr. Bowen’s attorney tried to suppress the disclosure of his text messages, offering the damning argument that this attitude was “commonplace throughout the Border Patrol’s Tucson Sector,” and “part of the agency’s culture”(Elfrink 2019). This case is not isolated, and our evidence raises serious concerns about a new proposal to have Border Patrol agents function as asylum officers.

The Trump administration has proposed that about 60 Border Patrol agents serve as asylum officers at the US-Mexico border (Taxin 2019). These agents would receive an unspecified period of training. 1 Their role would be to conduct initial interviews to determine whether asylum-seekers have a credible fear of returning to their countries or should be sent back. Those who pass such interviews can seek asylum before an immigration judge (ibid.). This process applies to people entering without authorization at the Mexican border, either presenting themselves without visas at ports of entry or entering without inspection. Despite it being legal to cross the border and request asylum, Border Patrol agents and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspectors are otherwise trained to target unauthorized border crossings as violations of the law. Border Patrol agents-

New York: Center for Migration Studies, 2019. 9p.

By Myrthe Wijnkoop, Stefan Kok, Anouk Pronk, Kathleen Bush -Joseph, Robin Neumann, Monika Sie and Dhian Ho

In this study, ‘In Search of Control’, current developments on access to asylum procedures and humanitarian protection in five destination countries have been studied through five separate country reports. In the synthesis report, results are compared and analysed, looking at which lessons can be learned from the North American context (Canada, United States), the European context (Denmark, the Netherlands) and the context in the Pacific (Australia). Our research shows that all these destination states are facing the same balancing act in search of control of migration. Therefore, they could and should learn from each other’s experiences in tackling this challenge. Firstly, there is a common humanitarian duty and responsibility to provide protection to those in need while demonstrating solidarity with regions facing heightened challenges due to refugee pressures and other geopolitical crises. Secondly, due to an aging population these states face increasing labour shortages, for which migration is needed. Thirdly, states want to remain in control over their borders and want to manage the influx and admission of migrants. Due to this balancing act, there are no ‘quick fixes’ in dealing with asylum migration. As these interrelated challenges are part of a global issue, innovative ways forward need to be based on solidarity and cooperation taking into account mutual interest; of those seeking protection, host countries in the region, transit countries becoming destination countries, communities within traditional destination countries, and of other destination states. To facilitate such cooperation, a clear legal framework with sound preconditions and safeguards is needed to ensure both effectiveness and the protection of the rights of refugees and migrants. This study identifies ten policy approaches that have been initiated or considered by these ‘destination states’ in order to either provide or limit access to asylum procedures and other forms of humanitarian protection. These approaches vary from interdiction to legal pathways, and from procedural measures to strategic communication, as will be briefly described below.

The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael, 2024. 360p.

By Josiah Heyman, Jeremy Slack, Daniel E Martínez

United States Border Patrol agent Matthew Bowen allegedly hit an undocumented migrant with his truck in November 2017. In preparation for trial, federal prosecutors revealed that Bowen had a history of making derogatory statements about migrants in text messages, including calling them “disgusting subhuman shit unworthy of being kindl for a fire.” Mr. Bowen’s attorney tried to suppress the disclosure of his text messages, offering the damning argument that this attitude was “commonplace throughout the Border Patrol’s Tucson Sector,” and “part of the agency’s culture” (Elfrink 2019). This case is not isolated, and our evidence raises serious concerns about a new proposal to have Border Patrol agents function as asylum officers.

The Trump administration has proposed that about 60 Border Patrol agents serve as asylum officers at the US-Mexico border (Taxin 2019). These agents would receive an unspecified period of training.[1] Their role would be to conduct initial interviews to determine whether asylum-seekers have a credible fear of returning to their countries or should be sent back. Those who pass such interviews can seek asylum before an immigration judge (ibid.). This process applies to people entering without authorization at the Mexican border, either presenting themselves without visas at ports of entry or entering without inspection. Despite it being legal to cross the border and request asylum, Border Patrol agents and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspectors are otherwise trained to target unauthorized border crossings as violations of the law. Border Patrol agents-turned-asylum officers would mark a significant change to the Border Patrol’s role and in the asylum process overall.

As the Bowen case suggests, many Border Patrol Agents have negative attitudes toward immigrants and are unsuitable for the role of asylum officers. Clara Long from Human Rights Watch reports: “What we see over and over again is Border Patrol just has a culture of disbelieving asylum seekers. It’s really hard to imagine these agents being able to create the openness and trust and listening that’s really required for a credible fear interview” (Taxin 2019). In fact, this seems to be the very reason for the proposal. NBC reports that “Trump’s senior adviser Stephen Miller in particular has argued that CBP agents will be tougher on asylum-seekers and will pass fewer of them on the initial screening” (Ainsley, Lee, and Welker 2019). Yet the point of a credible fear interview is not to be negative or positive; the relevant regulations state that “the asylum officer…will conduct the interview in a non-adversarial manner… The purpose of the interview shall be to elicit all relevant and useful information bearing on whether the applicant has a credible fear of persecution or torture.”[2] The thinking is that the United States would rather afford people the benefit of the doubt and give them access to a full immigration hearing than to send them back home where they may be persecuted or killed. We have robust data that supports Long’s concern over Border Patrol agents being given this responsibility.

As part of the second wave of the Migrant Border Crossing Study (MBCS), we surveyed 1,109 recently deported Mexican migrants who crossed the border without documents, were apprehended, and deported to Mexico. From 2010-2012, we completed surveys in Tijuana and Mexicali, Baja California; Nogales, Sonora; Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua; Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas; and Mexico City. Our response rate was over 90 percent. The cities where we worked received 65 percent of all deportees along the US-Mexico border during the study period. Table 1 (below) provides basic descriptive findings from the MBCS. The typical MBCS respondent was male, between the ages of 18 and 34, from west-central (e.g., Jalisco or Michoacán) or southern/southeastern Mexico (e.g., Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca), with some prior migration experience, who most recently crossed through the Tucson, San Diego, or Laredo Border Patrol sectors.

New York; Center for Migration Studies, 2019. 8p.

By American Civil Liberties Union of Arizona

This report documents the U.S. government’s inhumane practice of confiscating migrants’ most essential and prized personal belongings as they cross our southern border, including vital medications and medical devices, legal and identity documents, religious items, and items of practical or sentimental importance. Drawing on case examples and perspectives of border organizations that interface directly with migrants and work on this issue firsthand, we present an in-depth depiction of the severe harms caused by the U.S. Border Patrol’s confiscation of migrants’ personal belongings. We also offer concrete policy solutions to help ensure that Border Patrol treats migrants and their belongings with care and respect.

United States, ACLU. 2024, 46pg

By James F. Hollifield

How do liberal democracies balance the need for security with their commitment to protecting the human rights of refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants? How can states coordinate migration governance while navigating asymmetries in interests and power? Decisions that address national security can seemingly come at the cost of protecting the rights of the tired, the poor, and the huddled masses. At the same time, liberal democracies must also consider the different calculi of unilateral action and multilateral cooperation.

This policy brief defines the liberal paradox in immigration and refugee policy and explains how the United States and other liberal democracies confront the dilemmas of forced displacement with respect to the competing interests of security, culture, economy, and rights. It provides recommendations on ways to improve international and regional cooperation and to address the challenges in the management of forced migration and human displacement.

Washington, DC:  Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars , 2024. 9p.

By Eleonora Celoria, and Marta Gionco

This briefing presents noteworthy practices at the national and European Union (EU) level related to safeguarding the rights of people in immigration detention and ultimately ending detention for migration purposes, by focusing on a wide range of actors spanning from civil society to national governments. It focuses on three advocacy objectives: 1. raising the visibility of detention and its harms, 2. ending the detention of children in the context of migration, and 3. implementing community-based solutions that can ultimately prevent and contribute to ending detention. The first chapter of the briefing explores civil society efforts aimed at unveiling what happens in immigration detention centres as well as the harmful impact of immigration detention itself. Ensuring that people in detention speak to the outside world and giving NGOs access to detention centres have been identified as the most important tools in this regard. It is also contended that further research, as well as litigation and advocacy, related to the right to communicate is needed. NGOs in the Netherlands and the UK have set up hotline systems to establish contact with individuals in detention, most of whom do not have access to their mobile phones. In Italy, strategic litigation has challenged the state’s denial to grant NGOs access to detention facilities. Both activities – phone communication and civil society visits - can be seen as part of a wider advocacy strategy to end immigrant detention, as exemplified by the work of civil society coalitions and organisations in Belgium, Italy and the United Kingdom, among others. The second chapter focuses on immigration detention of children, a practice which is never in the child’s best interests and should always be forbidden. While EU law still allows for immigration detention of children, there have been developments at the political and legislative levels in Germany, Belgium, France and Greece aiming at restricting the situations in which children could be detained for immigration purposes. The cases of Ireland, Italy and Spain are also explored, as these states do not generally detain children (whether they are unaccompanied or with their families). Overall, to comply with international standards and to put an end to child detention in the migration context, further efforts are needed at both the EU and national levels. The final chapter focuses on community-based solutions to prevent or end immigration detention. This section focuses in particular on the advantages of providing support through case management, which is a structured social work approach which empowers individuals to work towards case resolution (i.e., any temporary or permanent migration outcome, such as a visa, regularization scheme, re-migration or voluntary return). This section explores case studies from Belgium, Bulgaria, Poland, the UK and Italy, where case management projects are run by civil society originations, in cooperation with local (Belgium) or national (Bulgaria, Poland, UK) governments. Although each national experience is unique, the independent evaluation of these projects showed that they have some features in common: high levels of compliance of the people involved with the project, the limited numbers of migrants who have access to case management in comparison to the number of undocumented migrants, and the fact that these projects need to be accompanied by a general policy shift towards the implementation of non-coercive solutions in migration management. To conclude, this briefing analyses the practices of two countries, Ecuador and Uruguay, which are among the few states in the world that never applied or no longer resort to immigration detention.

Brussels, Belgium : PICUM – Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants, 2024. 28p.

By Yvonne Giesing

We study the effects of technological change on immigration flows as well as the labor market outcomes of migrants versus natives. We analyse and compare the effects of two different automation technologies: Industrial robots and artificial intelligence. We exploit data provided by the Industrial Federation of Robotics as well as online job vacancy data on Germany, a highly automated economy and the main destination for migrants in Europe. We apply an instrumental variable strategy and identify how robots decrease the wage of migrants across all skill groups, while neither having a significant impact on the native population nor immigration flows. In the case of AI, we determine an increase in the wage gap as well as the unemployment gap of migrant and native populations. This applies to the low-, medium- and high-skilled and is indicative of migrants facing displacement effects, while natives might benefit from productivity and complementarity effects. In addition, AI leads to a significant inflow of immigrants. Policymakers should devote special attention to the migration population when designing mitigation policies in response to technological change to avoid further increases in inequality between migrants and natives.

Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich, 2023. 50p.

By I. Kulu-Glasgow M. van der Meer J.M.D. Schans M.P.C. Scheepmaker

Unaccompanied minors (UM) coming to Europe form an especially vulnerable group of migrant children, traveling without their parents or other adults exercising authority over them. In many European countries, asking for international protection is the main way for them to receive accommodation and a residence permit. However, minors coming from so-called safe countries, where in general there is no (fear of) persecution (e.g. Morocco, and in the Netherlands until June 2021 Algeria) have little or no chance of receiving a residence permit. Some of these mostly North African youngsters travel from one European country to another, in search of opportunities to work and earn money. According to Dutch supervisors (legal guardians and mentors in the accommodation centres), this group of nomadic minors often face multiple problems, such as drug addiction and mental health problems. This is also the group that sometimes causes incidents at or outside the accommodation centres or is involved in criminal activities (see also Inspectie Justitie en Veiligheid, 2021). Studies in the Netherlands show that many of these youngsters go off the radar either before or during the asylum procedure and it is suspected that they stay in the Netherlands or move on to different European countries. In general, knowledge about this group is both limited and fragmented. The aim of this study was to learn more about the background of this group of minors, and gain knowledge about the experiences of other European countries with this specific group of minors.

The Hague: WODC, 2023. 146p.

By Robert Warren.

This report describes estimates of the undocumented population residing in the United States in 2022 compiled by CMS. The estimates are based on data collected in the American Community Survey (ACS) conducted by the US Census Bureau.

The report finds that the undocumented population grew from 10.3 million in 2021 to 10.9 million in 2022, an increase of 650,000. The increase reverses more than a decade of gradual decline. The undocumented populations from 10 countries increased by a total of 525,000. The report explains why undocumented population growth is much less than the number of apprehensions by the Department of Homeland Security. Finally, the Appendix provides a detailed description of the CMS methodology.

The report includes the following topline findings:

• After remaining at or near zero growth from 2010 to 2021, the US undocumented population increased by 650,000 in 2022.

• The largest population gains in 2022 were for Central America (205,000), South America (200,000), and Asia (140,000).

• From 2015 to 2022, the undocumented population from Mexico declined by 1.3 million; in the same period, the combined population from Central and South America increased by 1.2 million.

The report describes changes in the US undocumented population by country of origin and state of residence since 2018 with special emphasis on changes from 2021 to 2022. The rapid increase in annual apprehensions and expulsions of migrants along the U.S.-Mexico border that began in 2019 has dominated media attention on migration for the past four years. That, in turn, has focused attention on the prospect of large annual increases in the undocumented population. Unfortunately, ACS data needed to monitor changes in the population are not available until about a year after the ACS survey is completed. The unique CMS methodology made it possible to derive these estimates less than two months after the release of 2022 ACS data.