By Suraj Lakhani, Jessica White and Claudia Wallner

The intersection between (violent) extremism and video-gaming – spanning across jihadist, farright, and other types of ideologies – is long-standing, though is an area that is under-researched. As part of this, particularly scant attention has been paid to the concept of ‘gamification’; i.e. the application of gaming and game-design principles within non-gaming environments (Lakhani and Wiedlitzka, 2022). The primary objective of this paper is to provide an understanding of how (violent) extremism can be (and has been) gamified, what emerging trends and future scenarios might be, and the potential influence (or lack thereof) that gamification has within (violent) extremism. On the basis of this understanding, this paper will outline relevant concepts of action through preventing and countering (violent) extremism (P/CVE) considerations and offer policy (and broader) recommendations on how to account for the element of gamification and potential actions to prevent and counter the phenomenon. Through existing literature and open-source materials – including academic articles, research reports, policy documents, newspaper articles, investigative journalism, government inquiries and previous relevant Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) Policy Support (PS) deliverables, etc. – this paper will investigate the following key questions: what is gamification of (violent) extremism, what are the current and future threats it presents to the European Union (EU), and how can it be countered? In order to address this, the paper is organised into the following sections. SECTION 1 (‘CONCEPTUALISATION OF GAMIFICATION’) Section 1 (‘Conceptualisation of gamification’) will provide a conceptual overview of gamification, including outlining a working definition, in order to provide a foundation for the remainder of the paper. This section will also outline the concept’s origins and examine how these can be applied to the context of (violent) extremism. There will additionally be a contextualisation of the phenomenon in regard to the threat of (violent) extremism within EU Member States (MS) overall. SECTION 2 (‘CURRENT AND FUTURE THREATS’) Section 2 (‘Current and future threats’) will discuss the potential ways in which (violent) extremism can be gamified, predominantly through outlining a range of current examples. These examples are by no means exhaustive, but do provide a sufficient overview regarding the types of gamification approaches taken within this context, by both (violent) extremist organisations and individuals. This section will conclude by considering the emerging trends and conceivable future scenarios in this field. SECTION 3 (‘ADDRESSING GAMIFICATION WITH P/CVE’) Section 3 (‘Addressing gamification with P/CVE’) outlines how gamified (violent) extremism can be addressed in P/CVE programming and whether or not it requires specifically tailored responses. This section will also inform discussions on whether current responses are fit for purpose and how these approaches potentially need to be tailored or evolve in order to deal with the threat posed by the gamification of (violent) extremism more effectively. SECTION 4 (‘POLICY AND RECOMMENDATIONS’) Section 4 (‘Policy and recommendations’) will then consider any current policy which relates to the gamification of (violent) extremism across EU MS. This will be followed by a number of relevant recommendations for policymakers stemming from existing research and literature. This includes providing recommendations for P/CVE based on promising approaches. This section will also discuss the current state of work in this area of study and make relevant research-related recommendations. CONCLUSIONS Finally, a ‘Conclusions’ section will discuss the potential value and limitations of gamification as a concept in relation to (violent) extremism. This is underpinned by the consideration of whether gamification is purposeful or relates to actions undertaken by those familiar with a particular subculture, i.e. gamers.

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2022 25p.

by Linda Schlegel

The concept of gamification is increasingly applied as a framework to understand extremist online subcultures and communications. Although a number of studies have been conducted, the theoretical and empirical basis to understand the role of gamification in extremist contexts remains weak. This article seeks to contribute to the development of a gamification of radicalization theory by exploring how Marczewski’s HEXAD, a user typology for gamified applications, may facilitate our understanding of individual variations in engagement with gamified extremist content. Five user types, named after their core motivational drivers for engagement, are discussed: Socializers, Competitors, Achievers, Meaning Seekers, and Disruptors. This typology may support future studies by providing a preliminary understanding of how different game elements may appeal to different users and increase their engagement with and susceptibility to extremist content in cyberspace.

Perspectives on Terrorism , August 2021, Vol. 15, No. 4 (August 2021), pp. 54-64 .

By Linda Schlegel

The livestreaming of attacks, the use of Call of Duty footage in propaganda videos, the modification of popular video games to support extremist worldviews, and the development of games and playful apps by extremist organizations have all contributed to an increasing focus on the so-called ‘gamification of terror’. Since the live-streamed attack in Christchurch and the realization that subsequent perpetrators in Pittsburgh, El Paso and Halle not only copied the mode and style of attack but were embedded in and sought to appeal to similar online communities, in which gamified language and references to gaming were part of the subcultural practice, journalists, academics, and practitioners have begun to analyze the role games and gamified applications may play in radicalization processes. Understandably, as the Christchurch shooting has taken place less than two years ago, the analysis into the potential role of gamification in radicalization processes has only just begun and much confusion persists on both terminology and the exact mechanisms by which gamification may influence extremist thought and action. The fact that gamification itself is a fairly new concept, which has only been seriously researched for around ten years, complicates matters further. A large part of this report is therefore dedicated to organizing the current state of knowledge and to provide readers with a baseline of knowledge on gamification in extremist contexts. After a discussion on gamification as such and how it may or may not be differentiated from other gaming appeals, an overview of the current evidence of gamified radicalization processes is provided. Then, research findings on the psychological mechanisms of gamification are applied to the issue of radicalization. Lastly, the report flashlights some preliminary possibilities of applying gamification to preventing and/or countering extremism (P/CVE). Readers must be aware that this final part of the report lacks robust empirical grounding and is not meant to be taken as evidence of what should or should not be done. Rather, it is meant as an invitation to explore and discuss the implications of gamification for P/CVE.

MODUS | Working Paper 1/2021. Germany: MODUS, 2021. 20p.

By Sirje Laurel Weldon

A must-read for scholars across a broad sweep of disciplines. Laurel Weldon weaves together skillfully the theoretical strands of gender equality policy, intersectionality, social movements, and representation in a multimethod/level comparative study that unequivocally places women's movements at the center of our understanding of democracy and social change."" ---Amy G. Mazur, Washington State University "Laurel Weldon's When Protest Makes Policy expands and enriches our understanding of representation by stressing social movements as a primary avenue for the representation of marginalized groups. With powerful theory backed by persuasive analysis, it is a must-read for anyone interested in democracy and the representation of marginalized groups." ---Pamela Paxton, University of Texas at Austin ""This is a bold and exciting book. There are many fine scholars who look at women's movements, political theorists who make claims about democracy, and policy analysts who do longitudinal treatments or cross-sectional evaluations of various policies. I know of no one, aside from Weldon, who is comfortable with all three of these roles."" ---David Meyer, University of California, Irvine What role do social movements play in a democracy? Political theorist S. Laurel Weldon demonstrates that social movements provide a hitherto unrecognized form of democratic representation, and thus offer a significant potential for deepening democracy and overcoming social conflict. Through a series of case studies of movements conducted by women, women of color, and workers in the United States and other member nations of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Weldon examines processes of representation at the local, state, and national levels. She concludes that, for systematically disadvantaged groups, social movements can be as important---sometimes more important---for the effective articulation of a group perspective as political parties, interest groups, or the physical presence of group members in legislatures. When Protest Makes Policy contributes to the emerging scholarship on civil society as well as the traditional scholarship on representation. It will be of interest to anyone concerned with advancing social cohesion and deepening democracy and inclusion as well as those concerned with advancing equality for women, ethnic and racial minorities, the working class, and poor people.

Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011. 244p.

By The Violence Prevention Network and the Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy

Anti-feminist and anti-gender ideologies - and their basis in hostility and hatred towards women and LGBTQI* people - have long been an overlooked factor in analysing radicalisation and violent extremism. Both ideologies strongly appeal to groups organised around exclusionary principles because they provide language and a framework for the defence of hierarchical structures in society (Denkovski et al., 2021, 18). This trend is increasingly manifesting itself across a spectrum of violence. Despite a striking prevalence of anti-feminism and anti-gender attitudes within extremist worldviews, these motives have been considered at best secondary when analysing extremist attacks and groups (Wolf 2021). Yet, for extremist actors, they constitute a core element of their ideologies, a relevant area of recruitment within and outside extremist scenes, and an opportunity for strategic alliances. Throughout right-wing attacks in the past decade, such as those in Christchurch, Hanau, and Halle, a clear pattern of anti-feminist and misogynistic beliefs can be detected. Within such attacks, the ideological basis for mass public violence is formed by adherence to multiple, overlapping exclusionary attitudes. For instance, one conspiracy theory that finds popularity among right-wing actors is that of the “Great Replacement”. According to this idea, feminism was invented by Jewish elites to lower birth rates and advance mass migration, with the goal of replacing white European populations with non-European, non-white people, specifically Muslims (Fedders 2018). The Christchurch attacker had uploaded an online “manifesto” titled “the Great Replacement” before the attack on two mosques that killed 51 people - illustrating how anti-feminism is often intricately interwoven with racist and anti-Semitic thinking. The issue of overlapping ideological codes, elements, and groups is becoming increasingly important as we witness growing complexity in the right-wing landscape of radicalisation and violence. However, misogyny and anti-feminism are also integral to violent attacks outside of right-wing scenes. Several terrorist attacks by members of the incel1 community, such as those in the Californian city of Isla Vista in 2014, as well as the 2018 Toronto and 2019 Tallahassee attacks, have led to an increased awareness of the incel threat and the beginning of its consideration as a security threat in Western countries (see, for instance, Moonshot 2021). While embedded in a much broader online misogynist scene, misogynist incel ideologies promote particularly extreme misogyny, anti-feminism, and sexism. Misogynist incels see women as depriving them of their natural entitlement to sex. The use of dehumanising and aggressive language – and, in parts, open calls to violence Anti-feminist and anti-gender ideologies - and their basis in hostility and hatred towards women and LGBTQI* people - have long been an overlooked factor in analysing radicalisation and violent extremism. Both ideologies strongly appeal to groups organised around exclusionary principles because they provide language and a framework for the defence of hierarchical structures in society (Denkovski et al., 2021, 18). This trend is increasingly manifesting itself across a spectrum of violence. Despite a striking prevalence of anti-feminism and anti-gender attitudes within extremist worldviews, these motives have been considered at best secondary when analysing extremist attacks and groups (Wolf 2021). Yet, for extremist actors, they constitute a core element of their ideologies, a relevant area of recruitment within and outside extremist scenes, and an opportunity for strategic alliances. Throughout right-wing attacks in the past decade, such as those in Christchurch, Hanau, and Halle, a clear pattern of anti-feminist and misogynistic beliefs can be detected. Within such attacks, the ideological basis for mass public violence is formed by adherence to multiple, overlapping exclusionary attitudes. For instance, one conspiracy theory that finds popularity among right-wing actors is that of the “Great Replacement”. According to this idea, feminism was invented by Jewish elites to lower birth rates and advance mass migration, with the goal of replacing white European populations with non-European, non-white people, specifically Muslims (Fedders 2018). The Christchurch attacker had uploaded an online “manifesto” titled “the Great Replacement” before the attack on two mosques that killed 51 people - illustrating how anti-feminism is often intricately interwoven with racist and anti-Semitic thinking. The issue of overlapping ideological codes, elements, and groups is becoming increasingly important as we witness growing complexity in the right-wing landscape of radicalisation and violence. However, misogyny and anti-feminism are also integral to violent attacks outside of right-wing scenes. Several terrorist attacks by members of the incel1 community, such as those in the Californian city of Isla Vista in 2014, as well as the 2018 Toronto and 2019 Tallahassee attacks, have led to an increased awareness of the incel threat and the beginning of its consideration as a security threat in Western countries (see, for instance, Moonshot 2021). While embedded in a much broader online misogynist scene, misogynist incel ideologies promote particularly extreme misogyny, anti-feminism, and sexism. Misogynist incels see women as depriving them of their natural entitlement to sex. The use of dehumanising and aggressive language – and, in parts, open calls to violence provides the framework in which attacks, as mentioned above, occur. The most well-known incel attacker, for instance, just weeks before the attack in Isla Vista called upon incels to “realise their true strength and numbers”, “overthrow this oppressive feminist system”, and “start envisioning a world where WOMEN FEAR YOU” (Glasstetter 2014). These attacks were broadly referenced and discussed within incel and misogynist scenes and the extreme right more specifically. In Halle, the right-wing extremist who killed two people and tried to enter a local synagogue was listening to music that makes explicit references in name and content to the incel attack in Toronto in 2018.

Berlin: Violence Prevention Network, 2021. 15p.

By The Anti-Defamation League, Center for Technology and Society

The question of who is accountable for the proliferation of antisemitism, hate, and extremism online has been hotly debated for years. Are our digital feeds really a reflection of society, or do social media platforms and tech companies actually exacerbate virulent content themselves? The companies argue that users are primarily responsible for the corrosive content soaring to the top of news feeds and reverberating between platforms. This argument serves to absolve these multi-billion-dollar companies from responsibility for any role their own products play in exacerbating hate.

A new pair of studies from ADL and TTP (Tech Transparency Project) show how some of the biggest social media platforms and search engines at times directly contribute to the proliferation of online antisemitism, hate, and extremism through their own tools and, in some cases, by creating content themselves. While there are many variables contributing to online hate, including individual users’ own behavior, our research demonstrates how these companies are taking things from bad to worse.

For these studies, we created male, female, and teen personas (without a specified gender) who searched for a basket of terms related to conspiracy theories as well as popular internet personalities, commentators, and video games across four of the biggest social media platforms, to test how these companies’ algorithms would work. In the first study, three of four platforms recommended even more extreme, contemptuously antisemitic, and hateful content. One platform, YouTube, did not take the bait. It was responsive to the persona but resisted recommending antisemitic and extremist content, proving that it is not just a problem of scale or capability.

In our second study, we tested search functions at three companies, all of which made finding hateful content and groups a frictionless experience, by autocompleting terms and, in some cases, even auto-generating content to fill in hate data voids. Notably, the companies didn’t autocomplete terms or auto-generate content for other forms of offensive content, such as pornography, proving, again, that this is not just a problem of scale or capability.

What these investigations ultimately revealed is that tech companies’ hands aren’t tied. Companies have a choice in what to prioritize, including when it comes to tuning algorithms and refining design features to either exacerbate or help curb antisemitism and extremism.

As debates rage between legislators, regulators, and judges on AI, platform transparency, and intermediary liability, these investigations underscore the urgency for both platforms and governments to do more. Based on our findings, here are three recommendations for industry and government:

Tech companies need to fix the product features that currently escalate antisemitism and auto-generate hate and extremism. Tech companies should tune their algorithms and recommendation engines to ensure they are not leading users down paths riddled with hate and antisemitism. They should also improve predictive autocomplete features and stop auto-generation of hate and antisemitism altogether.

Congress must update Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act to fit the reality of today’s internet. Section 230 was enacted before social media and search platforms as we know them existed, yet it continues to be interpreted to provide those platforms with near-blanket legal immunity for online content, even when their own tools are exacerbating hate, harassment and extremism. We believe that by updating Section 230 to better define what type of online activity should remain covered and what type of platform behavior should not, we can help ensure that social media platforms more proactively address how recommendation engines and surveillance advertising practices are exacerbating hate and extremism, which leads to online harms and potential offline violence. With the advent of social media, the use of algorithms, and the surge of artificial intelligence, tech companies are more than merely static hosting services. When there is a legitimate claim that a tech company played a role in enabling hate crimes, civil rights violations, or acts of terror, victims deserve their day in court.

We need more transparency. Users deserve to know how platform recommendation engines work. This does not need to be a trade secret-revealing exercise, but tech companies should be transparent with users about what they are seeing and why. The government also has a role to play. We’ve seen some success on this front in California, where transparency legislation was passed in 2022. Still, there’s more to do. Congress must pass federal transparency legislation so that stakeholders (the public, researchers, and civil society) have access to the information necessary to truly evaluate how tech companies’ own tools, design practices, and business decisions impact society.

Hate is on the rise. Antisemitism both online and offline is becoming normalized. A politically charged U.S. presidential election is already under way. This is a pressure cooker we cannot afford to ignore, and tech companies need to take accountability for their role in the ecosystem.

Whether you work in government or industry, are a concerned digital citizen, or a tech advocate, we hope you find this pair of reports to be informative. There is no single fix to the scourge of online hate and antisemitism, but we can and must do more to create a safer and less hate-filled internet.

New York: ADL, 2023. 18p.

By Kiana Cox And Khadijah Edwards

Many say key U.S. institutions should be rebuilt to ensure fair treatment. More than a year after the murder of George Floyd and the national protests, debate and political promises that ensued, 65% of Black Americans say the increased national attention on racial inequality has not led to changes that improved their lives.1 And 44% say equality for Black people in the United States is not likely to be achieved, according to newly released findings from an October 2021 survey of Black Americans by Pew Research Center.

This is somewhat of a reversal in views from September 2020, when half of Black adults said the increased national focus on issues of race would lead to major policy changes to address racial inequality in the country and 56% expected changes that would make their lives better.

At the same time, many Black Americans are concerned about racial discrimination and its impact. Roughly eight-in-ten say they have personally experienced discrimination because of their race or ethnicity (79%), and most also say discrimination is the main reason many Black people cannot get ahead (68%).

Even so, Black Americans have a clear vision for how to achieve change when it comes to racial inequality. This includes support for significant reforms to or complete overhauls of several U.S. institutions to ensure fair treatment, particularly the criminal justice system; political engagement, primarily in the form of voting; support for Black businesses to advance Black communities; and reparations in the forms of educational, business and homeownership assistance. Yet alongside their assessments of inequality and ideas about progress exists pessimism about whether U.S. society and its institutions will change in ways that would reduce racism.

These findings emerge from an extensive Pew Research Center survey of 3,912 Black Americans conducted online Oct. 4-17, 2021. The survey explores how Black Americans assess their position in U.S. society and their ideas about social change. Overall, Black Americans are clear on what they think the problems are facing the country and how to remedy them. However, they are skeptical that meaningful changes will take place in their lifetime.

Black Americans see racism in our laws as a big problem and discrimination as a roadblock to progress

WASHINGTON DC: PEW RESEARCH CENTER,

By Katie Zafft, et al.

In September 2022, the City of Duluth, with input from Duluth’s Racial Bias Audit Team (RBAT), contracted with the Crime and Justice Institute (CJI) to conduct a racial bias audit of the Duluth Police Department (DPD). CJI collaborated with the community and the Department to provide a holistic and comprehensive assessment of Department operations and interactions with the community with respect to the concerns raised about racial and ethnic disparities in police practices and operations. The scope of the audit largely reflects the status of the Department and experiences of community members within the past five years. Assessments of policies and trainings mainly represent the most recent versions of materials unless the audit team was provided materials that were previously used. The City/RBAT identified the following project scope in their request for services: • “Assess, monitor, and assist the DPD in concert with the community to uncover any aspects of implicit bias, as well as systemic and individual racial bias. • Assess the impact of enforcement operations on historically marginalized and discriminated against populations. • Provide recommendations for reforms that improve community-oriented policing practices, transparency, professionalism, non-discriminatory practices, accountability, community inclusion, effectiveness, equity and public trust. These recommendations should also consider statutory requirements, national best practices and current scientifically valid methodology, and community expectations. • Engage the community and employees of DPD to understand both experiences and expectations of interactions between both groups.”1 Assessment Goals and Objectives The scope of the audit, as directed by the audit goals developed by the Racial Bias Audit Team, focuses on eleven items that we consider to be three distinct areas of work: Department operations, Department interactions with the community, and the role of the Duluth Citizen Review Board (DCRB).

Boston: Crime and Justice Institute, 2023. 90p.

by Kilolo Kijakazi, K. Steven Brown, Donnie Charleston ,Kilolo Kijakazi ,Charmaine Runes

For most of its history, the United States excluded people of color from its main pathways of opportunity and upward mobility. This history of discriminatory policies and institutional practices created deep inequities across social and economic domains. But we envision a more equitable future in which the policies, programs, and institutional practices that produced inequitable outcomes are corrected and the effects are reversed. Achieving that vision would mean closing four yawning equity gaps between people of color and white people in the United States:  Closing the racial wealth gap would enable all people to invest in their own and their children’s futures, buy a home, obtain a quality education, and save for a secure retirement.  Eliminating racial inequities in public school quality would give all children the solid educational foundation they need to succeed in the 21st-century economy.  Closing employment and earnings gaps would provide all people with the dignity and security of a quality job, the opportunity to contribute to the nation’s prosperity, and the resources to support their and their children’s well-being and future prospects.  Ending punitive policing would make people and communities safer and increase confidence in the justice system. These gaps are wide and deeply entrenched. Racist policies and practices have been part of the nation since its inception, practiced by “founding fathers” and presidents who wrote and spoke about equality while engaging in the purchase, bondage, and sale of people of African descent. These policies were intended to subjugate people of color and afford dominance to white people. Ibram Kendi (2016) asserts that these policies led to racist ideas to justify the systemic barriers that created racial inequity and that each period of progress has been followed by a backlash of racist policies and practices. Abolition and the Civil War were followed by segregation enforced by laws, regulations, white mob violence, and lynchings. The civil rights movement and legislation were succeeded by cuts in taxes— primarily benefiting the wealthy—and federal assistance programs and the initiation of mass incarceration. The election of the first African American president has been followed by a curtailment in regulations and policies that enforce fair housing, reduce inequities in the criminal justice system, and protect consumers from racial targeting by predatory lenders. Looking ahead, major disruptive forces—technological innovation, increasingly frequent and severe climate events, and global economic change—could further widen today’s equity gaps. Moreover, demographic changes are making the nation more racially and ethnically diverse (Colby and Ortman 2015). Although many people are excited and proud about these changes, some fear the change of familiar social roles and ways of life (Danbold and Huo 2015). And this fear has resulted in a tendency to support less-inclusive policies (Craig and Richeson 2014). In the face of these profound challenges, civic leaders, advocates, elected officials, and philanthropists are confronting our country’s history of unjust and oppressive policies and taking action to promote equity and expand access to opportunity. Many approaches, like those that equip people of color with information and tools to successfully navigate existing systems, modify policies and practices to expand access and options, or enforce anti-discrimination protections, are making some progress. Other emerging strategies focus intentionally on the detrimental effects of past policies and offer bolder remedies that more directly address the roots of persistent inequities.

Washington, DC: Urban Institute 2019. 54p.

by Charles Fain Lehman

Since the 2020 “racial reckoning,” there has been increased political momentum behind reparations for slavery. Debates about reparations have moved from the halls of academia to legislatures in California and a number of cities. Americans and their leaders are increasingly asking: Are reparations justified at all? And, if so, who should get how much? This report concerns itself with a different question: Who pays for reparations? Reparations are a form of compensation for historical injustice. But many Americans did not have any ancestors present in the country at the time that injustice was committed. It is hard to argue that Americans whose ancestors arrived after 1860 should be on the hook for the costs of reparations. What fraction of nonblack Americans have ancestors who arrived after the end of the Civil War? Using demographic modeling techniques, this report pegs the figure as high as 70%, including more than half the non-Hispanic white population. These Americans are the descendants of immigrants who came to the U.S. either in the first great wave of immigration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, or in the second great wave, begun in 1965 and still ongoing today. Many of these more recent arrivals are at the top of America’s economic distribution. Indeed, the recent-arrival share of top wealth earners is likely only to grow in coming years, given the prevalence of immigrants and children of immigrants at the head of top businesses. This means that the base of people and wealth that could plausibly be taxed for reparations is shrinking and will continue to shrink for the foreseeable future. This dynamic plays out in other areas of social policy. Any transfer or subsidy proposal that is justified by historical injustice—e.g., affirmative action—will lose legitimacy as the population changes. This is an important, and often overlooked, feature not only of the reparations debate but of debates about such proposals in general. great period, beginning in 1965 and extending to the present. This second group, furthermore, is represented among the wealthiest Americans and American households, challenging the feasibility of a “soak the rich” approach to reparations. Even if we otherwise grant the arguments for reparations, this basic demographic fact—that a majority of nonblack Americans are attributable to post–Civil War immigration—throws a wrench into the reparations project. Publicly funded reparations for slavery will entail taking money from tens of millions of people who are not—even under assumptions of inherited guilt that are already wildly at odds with the American tradition—plausibly responsible for slavery. To ask the question “Who pays?” produces uncomfortable answers for those who would like to see reparations paid.

New York: Manhattan Institute, 2023. 26p.

By Chandra Childers

Summary: Southern politicians claim that “business-friendly” policies lead to an abundance of jobs and economic prosperity for all Southerners. The data actually show a grim economic reality.

Key findings

The share of prime-age workers (ages 25–54) who have a job is lower than the national average in most Southern states.

• Median earnings in nine Southern states are among the lowest in the nation, even after adjusting for lower cost of living in the South.

• Poverty rates in most Southern states are above the national average. In Louisiana and Mississippi, nearly 1 in 5 residents live in poverty.

• The child poverty rate in the South is 20.9%—higher than in any other region.

These statistics reflect an anti-worker economic model whose signature policies are low wages, low taxes, few regulations on businesses, few labor protections, a weak safety net, and vicious opposition to unions.

Why this matters

A long history of anti-worker policies in the South—rooted in a racist agenda—has had devastating consequences for its residents. Business interests and the wealthy have stoked racial divisions to maintain power and ensure access to cheap labor—at the expense of working people.

How to fix it

We must begin to reverse 150 years of anti-worker policymaking in the South—starting with raising minimum wages and protecting workers’ right to organize. We also need to enforce appropriate regulations on business practices, reform a broken tax structure, and strengthen the safety net for Southerners.

The Impacts of Implicit Bias Awareness Training in the NYPD

By Robert E. Worden, Sarah J. McLean, Robin S. Engel, Hannah Cochran, Nicholas Corsaro, Danielle Reynolds ,Cynthia J. Najdowski, Gabrielle T. Isaza

In February of 2018, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) began inservice training on implicit bias for its 36,000 sworn personnel, using the Fair and Impartial Policing (FIP) curriculum. A team of researchers from the John Finn Institute for Public Safety and the IACP/UC Center for Police Research and Policy partnered with the NYPD to conduct evaluation research on the impacts of the training. The evaluation concentrated on the effects of the training among patrol officers assigned to commands in the Patrol Services Bureau, Transit Bureau, and Housing Bureau, whose training commenced in May, 2018 and concluded in April, 2019. We assessed the immediate effects of the training on officers’ beliefs and attitudes: their knowledge about the science of implicit bias and the potential implications for policing, and their attitudes about the salience of bias and discrimination as a social problem, and the importance of policing without prejudice. A survey was administered on the day of FIP training, either prior to or following the training on alternating days. We drew inferences about immediate training effects from the differences in pre- and post-training survey responses. The effect of the training on officers’ knowledge about implicit bias was of moderate magnitude, though many officers’ comprehension of the science of bias was limited. The effects of the training on officers’ attitudes toward discrimination, and their motivation to act without prejudice, were fairly small, though prior to the training, most officers considered discrimination a social problem and felt individually motivated to act without bias. Officers regarded the training as beneficial: 70 percent reportedly gained a better understanding of implicit bias and more than two-thirds reportedly learned new strategies and skills that they expected to apply to their work. Nearly half rated the likelihood of using all five biasmanagement strategies as either a 6 or 7 on a 7-point scale anchored at 7 as ‘very likely.’ We conducted a follow-up survey about officers’ beliefs and attitudes and their actual utilization of FIP strategies, which was administered from June through August of 2019, ranging from 2 to 13 months following the training. Asked whether they attempted “to apply the FIP training in your duties over the last month,” 42 percent said they had not, 31 percent said they attempted to use the bias-management strategies sometimes, and 27 percent said they attempted using them frequently. Comparing the follow-up survey responses to those on the days of training, we also detected some decay in the immediate effects of the training on officers’ comprehension of the science of implicit bias. The impact of police training is likely to be greater when it is supported by other organizational forces, of which immediate supervisors may be the most important. We surveyed sergeants post-training. We found that most sergeants view monitoring for bias as one of their responsibilities, and that they are willing to intervene as needed with individual officers. One-quarter reported that they had intervened with an officer whose performance warranted intervention. Slightly more than half of the sergeants reportedly address issues of implicit bias during roll calls, thereby reinforcing the training. Insofar as officers’ unconscious biases may influence their enforcement decisions, and to the extent that officers apply their training in FIP strategies to manage their unconscious biases, we hypothesized that the training would lead to reductions in racial/ethnic disparities in enforcement actions, including stops, frisks, searches, arrests, summonses, and uses of force. We examined enforcement disparities at multiple levels of analysis – at the aggregate level of commands and the level of individual enforcement events. To isolate the effect of the training from other factors, the NYPD adhered to a protocol for a randomized controlled trial that provided for grouping commands into clusters scheduled for training by random assignment. This experimental control was supplemented by statistical controls in the analytical models. Overall, we found insufficient evidence to conclude that racial and ethnic disparities in police enforcement actions were reduced as a result of the training. It is very difficult to isolate the effects of the training from other forces that produce disparate enforcement outcomes. Training impacts might be a signal that is easily lost in the noise of everyday police work. Estimating the effect of a single training curriculum on officers’ decisions to invoke the law or otherwise exercise police authority may well be akin to finding the proverbial needle in a haystack. Furthermore, it has been presumed but not demonstrated that enforcement disparities stem, at least in part, from officers’ implicit biases. Though research has shown that police officers, like the general public, hold unconscious biases, no scientific evidence directly links officers’ implicit bias with enforcement disparities. To the contrary, the evidence – which is thin, to be sure – suggests that officers practice controlled responses even without implicit bias training. If disparities stem from forces other than implicit bias, then even a welldesigned training that is flawlessly delivered cannot be expected to alter patterns of police enforcement behavior.

Albany, NY: John F. Finn Institute for Public Safety, Inc , 2020. 188p.

Edited by Håkan Hydén Roger Cotterrell David Nelken and Ulrike Schultz

This open access book pays homage to Reza Banakar, who passed away in August 2020, exploring the many different areas of socio-legal research that he worked on and influenced. It begins with a summary of his career and explains how he sparked a debate on the identity and aims of legal sociology. The book is then split into 5 sections: - Theory, including chapters on normativity and the stepchild controversy; - Methods and interdisciplinarity, illustrating how Banakar encouraged socio-legal scholars to push the boundaries of existing socio-legal knowledge through interdisciplinary imagination and methodological flexibility; - Legal culture, with particular focus on Iran - 2 areas of special interest for Banakar; - Law and science, covering topics such as human rights, the right to life, and the COVID-19 pandemic; and - Applied sociology of law, inspired by Banakar’s engagement with empirical research and case studies. As well as honouring Reza Banakar's memory and unique thinking, the book aims to advance the sociology of law by demonstrating the interconnectedness of the legal and the social from a broad range of perspectives.

Oxford; New York: Hart/Bloomsbury 2023. 495p.

By Anti-Defamation League, Center on Extremism

ince the start of 2021, Texas has experienced a significant amount of extremist activity. One driver of this phenomenon is Patriot Front, a white supremacist group that has distributed propaganda across Texas – and the rest of the U.S. – with alarming frequency, using the state as a base of operations. Two other factors are extremists who continue to target the LGBTQ+ community and QAnon supporters who have gathered for conferences and rallies across the state. Texas has also seen a significant increase in antisemitic incidents over the last two years. It recorded the country’s fifth-highest number of antisemitic incidents in 2022, at a time when ADL has tracked the highest-ever number of antisemitic incidents nationwide. This report will explore a range of extremist groups and movements operating in Texas and highlights the key extremist and antisemitic trends and incidents in the state in 2021 and 2022. It also includes noteworthy events and incidents from the first half of 2023.

New York: ADL, 2023. 23p.

By The United Nations with the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) Human Rights, Big Data and Technology Project at the University of Essex

Today social media has become another vehicle for hate speech, with the ability to spread information at a speed never seen before, reaching potentially huge audiences within a few seconds. The manner in which many platforms operate feeds on hateful and discriminatory content, and provides echo chambers for such narratives. Online hate speech has led to real world harm. We have seen this from incidents of identity based violence where the perpetrators were instigated through online hate, to its widespread use to dehumanize and attack entire populations on the basis of identity. Unfortunately, many times the victims are those already most marginalized in society, including ethnic, religious, national or racial minorities, refugees and migrants, women and men, sexual orientation and gender identity minorities.

New York: United Nations, 2023. 20p.

By George Johannes Huber

This work analyses the emergent European border surveillance regime as part of the European border regime/migratory regime and the power structures this technological regime is embedded into, is reproducing and creating. The history, politics, policies and technological characteristics of the border surveillance regime of the EU are analysed through a theoretical framework based in political science, political sociology and surveillance studies

Karlsruhe: KIT Scientific Publishing, 2021. 316p.

By Etchenique, Nicolas Cimarra

From the document: "While great power competition is the domain of geopolitics, democratic resilience mostly concerns domestic politics. President Biden has defined the domestic political challenges to democracy in the U.S. as a 'battle for the soul of the nation'. This narrative correlates with the 'battle between democracy and autocracy' that takes place at the geopolitical level. Rising distrust in government and society, polarization and illiberalism are particularly relevant to the international position of Washington and its soft power, as they are compromising democratic stability within the U.S. The paper will be divided in two parts: a diagnosis, called 'the global maelstrom of distrust', and a policy proposal, called 'the lighthouse of democracy'. The diagnosis focuses on the cumulative effect of three sets of challenges to democracy: a) great power competition and the authoritarian offensive against democracy, b) the rise of polarization and illiberalism, and c) the impact of social media and AI on democracy. This section of the paper will argue that these sets of challenges feed on distrust and amplify it. Furthermore, they have evolved into a series of cycles of distrust within democracies and into a great geopolitical cycle of distrust. Finally, the entanglement and feedback loops among the domestic and the geopolitical cycles of distrust have generated a cohesive threat to democracy. This threat is represented by a downward spiral that is pulling societies and the global community towards enmity. It feeds on and generates destructive human emotions, such as outrage and hatred, which include a strong irrational and unconscious dimension, and thus leads to violence, war, and autocracy."

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. 2023.

By Larry B. Hill

FROM THE JACKET: “One increasingly popular device for achieving a balance between authority and accountability in government is the institution of the ombudsman. The first non-Scandinavian ombudsman appeared in New Zealand in 1962, and since then the office has spread to many countries and been adopted at different levels of government. This book--the first intensive study of New Zealand's "model" ombudsman-seeks to understand the process by which the institution was successfully adapted and made a part of New Zealand's political system. The author's inquiry is based on eighteen months of field experience in New Zealand. His book examines the complaints, the clients, their interaction with the ombudsman, his relations with the bureaucracy, and his effectiveness. His relations with various publics-bureaucrats, Honorable Members, and Queen's Ministers- receive special attention.

"This book will be essential reading for anyone who wants to understand the ombudsman institution. This book raises the level of scholarship on the ombudsman from mere definitions or classifications to that of tested propositions." -Stanley Anderson, University of California, Santa Barbara

Princeton, New Jersey. Princeton University Press. 1976.429p

By C. Eric Lincoln. Foreword by Gordon Allport

FROM THE JACKET: “This is the first full study of the Black Muslims - an organization of more than 100,000 Negroes Who preach black autonomy, black supremacy, black union against the white world. The Black Muslim Movement has been characterized as melodramatic and extremist, but in chis book Dr. Lincoln shows that it is an accurate gauge of racial tension in the United States today. Behind an array of myths and ritual, behind an alleged tie to Islam, this new form of black nationalism reflects the American Negro's rising discontent with the way things are and his determination to change them.”

Boston. Beacon Press. 1961. 292p.

By Amy Prevost & Petra Jonas

Research on the negative outcomes of social media use have particularly focused on Facebook, with limited studies examining the relationship to Instagram use. This study explored the connection between Instagram use and six relevant themes related to overall well-being, including the potential for victimization. The study used both quantitative and qualitative methods. For the quantitative component, surveys were distributed to undergraduate students at two Canadian Universities. The qualitative nature of the study consisted of two focus groups which were conducted at the University of the Fraser Valley. Each focus group consisted of nine participants who engaged in dialogue regarding the six preliminary themes identified from the survey data. The study revealed that Instagram use is correlated with escapism, frustration, fear of missing out, validation, anxiety, addiction, and vulnerability to cyber victimization. Consistent with other studies in this area, our results indicated that regular Instagram use has negative psychological outcomes for individual users. The research offers some important implications and recommendations for early education, increased awareness about the potential for victimization, and early intervention strategies.

Vancouver, BC: International Centre for Criminal Law Reform , 2020. 36p.

USED BOOK. ,AY CONTAIN MARK-UP

By Gaddis Smith

FROM THE FOREWORD: “"The United States always wins the war and loses the peace," runs a persistent popular complaint. Neither part of the statement is accurate. The United States barely escaped the War of 1812 with its territory intact, and in Korea in the 1950sthe nation was forced to settle for a stalemate on the battlefield. At Paris in 1782, and again in 1898, American negotiators drove hard bargains to win notable diplomatic victories. Yet the myth persists, along with the equally erroneous American belief that we are a peaceful people. Our history is studded with conflict and violence…”

NY. Knopf. 1985. 213p.