Marcellino, William M.; Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Nathan; Kerrigan, Amanda; Chao, Lev Navarre; Smith, Jackson

From the webpage: "In this Perspective, the authors argue that the emergence of ubiquitous, powerful generative AI poses a potential national security threat in terms of the risk of misuse by U.S. adversaries (in particular, for social media manipulation) that the U.S. government and broader technology and policy community should proactively address now. Although the authors focus on China and its People's Liberation Army as an illustrative example of the potential threat, a variety of actors could use generative AI for social media manipulation, including technically sophisticated nonstate actors (domestic as well as foreign). The capabilities and threats discussed in this Perspective are likely also relevant to other actors, such as Russia and Iran, that have already engaged in social media manipulation."

Rand Corporation . 2003. 42p.

By Neumann, Neomi

From the document: "As Palestinians and Israelis mark the thirtieth anniversary of the Oslo Accords, it is worth pausing to examine what remains of the original promise contained in the agreement (hint: something does remain). More than that, it is worth examining whether those remnants can survive the many challenges facing the Palestinian Authority, especially those likely to emerge 'the day after' President Mahmoud Abbas exits the stage. [...] In the three decades since Oslo, a litany of crises has eroded public trust in the very idea of conducting political dialogue in the spirit of those accords, including two Palestinian intifadas, the fallout from Israel's 2005 Gaza disengagement, and even the 2006 Lebanon war. A real window opened during Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's tenure in 2006-08, but it eventually closed as well, whether because of Israeli politics or Abbas's hesitation. Today, the PA has survived to carry out its work in the civilian, economic, and political spheres. But its inherent weaknesses have grown starker, and the West Bank governance system is eroding both ideologically and functionally as a result of political dormancy, distrust from the Palestinian street, and the crowding of the resistance space. This year has already been the most violent under Abbas's tenure--as noted above, 181 Palestinians have been killed by Israeli forces in the West Bank since January, while 30 Israelis and foreigners have been killed by Palestinian attackers from that territory and East Jerusalem. The dysfunction and violence have raised questions about the PA's ability to navigate future crises, including the day after Abbas leaves the scene."

Washington Institute For Near East Policy . 2023.. 8p.

By Jackson, Dean; Adler, William T.; Dougall, Danielle; Jain, Samir

From the document: "In March 2023, internet scholar Kate Klonick wrote a counterintuitive essay entitled 'The End of the Golden Age of Tech Accountability' in which she argues that '2021 was a heyday for trust and safety,' a time when tech companies felt public pressure to take a number of positive (if insufficient) self-regulatory steps. She laments that platforms are now backtracking as a result of economic headwinds and the failure of many governments to pass meaningful regulation while public outrage was at its peak. A few months later, in June 2023, the prominent technology journalist Casey Newton cited Klonick's argument in a newsletter, asking, 'Have we reached peak trust and safety?' The trends detailed in this report will probably tempt most readers to answer 'yes.' There are many reasons to be pessimistic about prospects for improvement. But improvement is possible if the field accepts that election disinformation is an environmental hazard to be managed, not a disease to be cured. Few signs in the near term point to huge gains in the health of the U.S. media ecosystem. Steps can be taken to protect and better support researchers, diminish the prevalence and severity of harm, achieve incremental improvements in tech accountability and transparency, and set up the trust and safety field for long-term success."

Center For Democracy And Technology. 2023. 108p.

By Crimmins, Allison R.; Avery, Christopher W.; Easterling, David R.; Kunkel, Kenneth E. (Kenneth Edward), 1950-; Stewart, Brooke C.; Maycock, Thomas K.

From the document: "The Global Change Research Act of 1990 mandates that the US Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) deliver a report to Congress and the President not less frequently than every four years that 'integrates, evaluates, and interprets the findings of the Program and discusses the scientific uncertainties associated with such findings; analyzes the effects of global change on the natural environment, agriculture, energy production and use, land and water resources, transportation, human health and welfare, human social systems, and biological diversity; and analyzes current trends in global change, both human-induced and natural, and projects major trends for the subsequent 25 to 100 years.' The Fifth National Climate Assessment (NCA5) fulfills that mandate by delivery of this Assessment and provides the scientific foundation to support informed decision-making across the United States. By design, much of the development of NCA5 built upon the approaches and processes used to create the Fourth National Climate Assessment (NCA4), with a goal of continuously advancing an inclusive, diverse, and sustained process for assessing and communicating scientific knowledge on the impacts, risks, and vulnerabilities associated with a changing global climate (App. 1)."

U.S. Global Change Research Program. 2023. 144p.

By Victor Viruena

The global economy has driven companies to develop strategies, adopt and promote diversity as a core value in their organizations. The blend of ethnicity, gender, and age strengthens internal ties, boosts productivity, creativity, and innovation. According to Esvary (2015), the sharing of best practices in managing and promoting workplace diversity is intended to strengthen diversity policies further. All around the world, discrimination is rejected by society, but at the same time, businesses still reluctant to incorporate women, LGTB, young and people of different races and cultures on boards and top management positions. Lately, the raising of nationalism, racism, and political polarization has polluted the environment, making it more challenging to integrate minorities as decision-makers in organizations. The national protests against police brutality and racism have opened a new chapter in the U.S. civil rights movement; for the first time in history, Fortune 500 corporations were obligated to publicly stand against racism and take concrete actions to boost management diversity medium-level positions in their organizations.

Academia Letters, Article 430. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL430.. 5p.

United States. Department Of Homeland Security

From the document: "DHS has a vital mission: 'With honor and integrity, we will safeguard the American people, our homeland, and our values.' [...] DHS is committed to embodying the relentless resilience of the American people, ensuring a safe, secure, and prosperous homeland in a constantly evolving global environment. To adapt to the ever-changing landscape, the DHS IT community will equip the Department with secure and resilient capabilities. This will also promote interoperability, information sharing, and collaboration among DHS and its partners. [...] The DHS IT Strategic Plan FY2024-2028 enables the Department to set goals and support cross-functional and cross-organizational priorities to achieve our mission. This plan is intended as a guide to help define goals and objectives for the DHS workforce and support delivery of modern, innovative, and efficient services and solutions to safeguard the homeland. The DHS IT Community will align to these strategic goals to support our mission during the next five years. The plan will be executed collaboratively across DHS Headquarters, Agencies & Offices[.] The backbone of this plan and the most critical factor to its success will be the 5,000 talented and committed professionals that comprise the DHS IT workforce. This strategy ensures we continue to invest in our talented workforce and prepare our colleagues for the future in an ever-changing IT landscape. Moreover, much of this modernization plan originated from countless conversations, meetings, town halls, and site visits with the IT workforce across the Department."

Washington. DC. United States. Department Of Homeland Security 2023. 13p.

United States. Office Of The Director Of National Intelligence;

From the document: "This report is provided by the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) in response to a requirement established in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2022, Section 1683 (h), as amended by Section 6802(k) of the FY 2023 NDAA (as codified at 50 U.S.C. § [United States Code Section] 3373). The report covers unidentified anomalous phenomena (UAP) reports from 31 August 2022 to 30 April 2023, and all UAP reports from any previous time periods that were not included in an earlier report. The All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO) received a total of 291 UAP reports during this period, consisting of 274 that occurred during this period and another 17 that occurred during previous reporting periods from 2019-2022, but had not been conveyed in previous submissions."

United States. Department Of Defense . 2023. 16p.

By Biden, Joseph R., Jr.

From the document: "Artificial intelligence (AI) holds extraordinary potential for both promise and peril. Responsible AI use has the potential to help solve urgent challenges while making our world more prosperous, productive, innovative, and secure. At the same time, irresponsible use could exacerbate societal harms such as fraud, discrimination, bias, and disinformation; displace and disempower workers; stifle competition; and pose risks to national security. Harnessing AI for good and realizing its myriad benefits requires mitigating its substantial risks. This endeavor demands a society-wide effort that includes government, the private sector, academia, and civil society."

United States. Office Of The Federal Register. 2023. 36p.

By United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency

From the document: "As noted in the landmark Executive Order 14110, 'Safe, Secure, And Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI),' [hyperlink] signed by the President on October 30, 2023, 'AI must be safe and secure.' As the nation's cyber defense agency and the national coordinator for critical infrastructure security and resilience, CISA [Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency] will play a key role in addressing and managing risks at the nexus of AI, cybersecurity, and critical infrastructure. This '2023-2024 CISA Roadmap for Artificial Intelligence' serves as a guide for CISA's AI-related efforts, ensuring both internal coherence as well as alignment with the whole-of-government AI strategy. [...] The security challenges associated with AI parallel cybersecurity challenges associated with previous generations of software that manufacturers did not build to be secure by design, putting the burden of security on the customer. Although AI software systems might differ from traditional forms of software, fundamental security practices still apply. Thus, CISA's AI roadmap builds on the agency's cybersecurity and risk management programs. Critically, manufacturers of AI systems must follow secure by design [hyperlink] principles: taking ownership of security outcomes for customers, leading product development with radical transparency and accountability, and making secure by design a top business priority. As the use of AI grows and becomes increasingly incorporated into critical systems, security must be a core requirement and integral to AI system development from the outset and throughout its lifecycle."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency. Nov, 2023. 21p.

By David H. Chae dchae@tulane.edu, Tiffany Yip, and Thomas A. LaVeist

Objectives

Experiences of vicarious racism—hearing about racism directed toward one’s racial group or racist acts committed against other racial group members—and vigilance about racial discrimination have been salient during the COVID-19 pandemic. This study examined vicarious racism and vigilance in relation to symptoms of depression and anxiety among Asian and Black Americans.

Methods

We used data from a cross-sectional study of 604 Asian American and 844 Black American adults aged ≥18 in the United States recruited from 5 US cities from May 21 through July 15, 2020. Multivariable linear regression models examined levels of depression and anxiety by self-reported vicarious racism and vigilance.

Results

Controlling for sociodemographic characteristics, among both Asian and Black Americans, greater self-reported vicarious racism was associated with more symptoms of depression (Asian: β = 1.92 [95% CI, 0.97-2.87]; Black: β = 1.72 [95% CI, 0.95-2.49]) and anxiety (Asian: β = 2.40 [95% CI, 1.48-3.32]; Black: β = 1.98 [95% CI, 1.17-2.78]). Vigilance was also positively related to symptoms of depression (Asian: β = 1.54 [95% CI, 0.58-2.50]; Black: β = 0.90 [95% CI, 0.12-1.67]) and anxiety (Asian: β = 1.98 [95% CI, 1.05-2.91]; Black: β = 1.64 [95% CI, 0.82-2.45]).

Conclusions

Mental health problems are a pressing concern during the COVID-19 pandemic. Results from our study suggest that heightened racist sentiment, harassment, and violence against Asian and Black Americans contribute to increased risk of depression and anxiety via vicarious racism and vigilance. Public health efforts during this period should address endemic racism as well as COVID-19.

Public Health Reports Volume 136, Issue 4, July/August 2021, Pages 508-517

By Suraj Lakhani, Jessica White and Claudia Wallner

The intersection between (violent) extremism and video-gaming – spanning across jihadist, farright, and other types of ideologies – is long-standing, though is an area that is under-researched. As part of this, particularly scant attention has been paid to the concept of ‘gamification’; i.e. the application of gaming and game-design principles within non-gaming environments (Lakhani and Wiedlitzka, 2022). The primary objective of this paper is to provide an understanding of how (violent) extremism can be (and has been) gamified, what emerging trends and future scenarios might be, and the potential influence (or lack thereof) that gamification has within (violent) extremism. On the basis of this understanding, this paper will outline relevant concepts of action through preventing and countering (violent) extremism (P/CVE) considerations and offer policy (and broader) recommendations on how to account for the element of gamification and potential actions to prevent and counter the phenomenon. Through existing literature and open-source materials – including academic articles, research reports, policy documents, newspaper articles, investigative journalism, government inquiries and previous relevant Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) Policy Support (PS) deliverables, etc. – this paper will investigate the following key questions: what is gamification of (violent) extremism, what are the current and future threats it presents to the European Union (EU), and how can it be countered? In order to address this, the paper is organised into the following sections. SECTION 1 (‘CONCEPTUALISATION OF GAMIFICATION’) Section 1 (‘Conceptualisation of gamification’) will provide a conceptual overview of gamification, including outlining a working definition, in order to provide a foundation for the remainder of the paper. This section will also outline the concept’s origins and examine how these can be applied to the context of (violent) extremism. There will additionally be a contextualisation of the phenomenon in regard to the threat of (violent) extremism within EU Member States (MS) overall. SECTION 2 (‘CURRENT AND FUTURE THREATS’) Section 2 (‘Current and future threats’) will discuss the potential ways in which (violent) extremism can be gamified, predominantly through outlining a range of current examples. These examples are by no means exhaustive, but do provide a sufficient overview regarding the types of gamification approaches taken within this context, by both (violent) extremist organisations and individuals. This section will conclude by considering the emerging trends and conceivable future scenarios in this field. SECTION 3 (‘ADDRESSING GAMIFICATION WITH P/CVE’) Section 3 (‘Addressing gamification with P/CVE’) outlines how gamified (violent) extremism can be addressed in P/CVE programming and whether or not it requires specifically tailored responses. This section will also inform discussions on whether current responses are fit for purpose and how these approaches potentially need to be tailored or evolve in order to deal with the threat posed by the gamification of (violent) extremism more effectively. SECTION 4 (‘POLICY AND RECOMMENDATIONS’) Section 4 (‘Policy and recommendations’) will then consider any current policy which relates to the gamification of (violent) extremism across EU MS. This will be followed by a number of relevant recommendations for policymakers stemming from existing research and literature. This includes providing recommendations for P/CVE based on promising approaches. This section will also discuss the current state of work in this area of study and make relevant research-related recommendations. CONCLUSIONS Finally, a ‘Conclusions’ section will discuss the potential value and limitations of gamification as a concept in relation to (violent) extremism. This is underpinned by the consideration of whether gamification is purposeful or relates to actions undertaken by those familiar with a particular subculture, i.e. gamers.

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2022 25p.

by Linda Schlegel

The concept of gamification is increasingly applied as a framework to understand extremist online subcultures and communications. Although a number of studies have been conducted, the theoretical and empirical basis to understand the role of gamification in extremist contexts remains weak. This article seeks to contribute to the development of a gamification of radicalization theory by exploring how Marczewski’s HEXAD, a user typology for gamified applications, may facilitate our understanding of individual variations in engagement with gamified extremist content. Five user types, named after their core motivational drivers for engagement, are discussed: Socializers, Competitors, Achievers, Meaning Seekers, and Disruptors. This typology may support future studies by providing a preliminary understanding of how different game elements may appeal to different users and increase their engagement with and susceptibility to extremist content in cyberspace.

Perspectives on Terrorism , August 2021, Vol. 15, No. 4 (August 2021), pp. 54-64 .

By Linda Schlegel

The livestreaming of attacks, the use of Call of Duty footage in propaganda videos, the modification of popular video games to support extremist worldviews, and the development of games and playful apps by extremist organizations have all contributed to an increasing focus on the so-called ‘gamification of terror’. Since the live-streamed attack in Christchurch and the realization that subsequent perpetrators in Pittsburgh, El Paso and Halle not only copied the mode and style of attack but were embedded in and sought to appeal to similar online communities, in which gamified language and references to gaming were part of the subcultural practice, journalists, academics, and practitioners have begun to analyze the role games and gamified applications may play in radicalization processes. Understandably, as the Christchurch shooting has taken place less than two years ago, the analysis into the potential role of gamification in radicalization processes has only just begun and much confusion persists on both terminology and the exact mechanisms by which gamification may influence extremist thought and action. The fact that gamification itself is a fairly new concept, which has only been seriously researched for around ten years, complicates matters further. A large part of this report is therefore dedicated to organizing the current state of knowledge and to provide readers with a baseline of knowledge on gamification in extremist contexts. After a discussion on gamification as such and how it may or may not be differentiated from other gaming appeals, an overview of the current evidence of gamified radicalization processes is provided. Then, research findings on the psychological mechanisms of gamification are applied to the issue of radicalization. Lastly, the report flashlights some preliminary possibilities of applying gamification to preventing and/or countering extremism (P/CVE). Readers must be aware that this final part of the report lacks robust empirical grounding and is not meant to be taken as evidence of what should or should not be done. Rather, it is meant as an invitation to explore and discuss the implications of gamification for P/CVE.

MODUS | Working Paper 1/2021. Germany: MODUS, 2021. 20p.

By Maggie Brady

In Teaching ‘Proper’ Drinking?, the author brings together three fields of scholarship: socio-historical studies of alcohol, Australian Indigenous policy history and social enterprise studies. The case studies in the book offer the first detailed surveys of efforts to teach responsible drinking practices to Aboriginal people by installing canteens in remote communities, and of the purchase of public hotels by Indigenous groups in attempts both to control sales of alcohol and to create social enterprises by redistributing profits for the community good. Ethnographies of the hotels are examined through the analytical lens of the Swedish ‘Gothenburg’ system of municipal hotel ownership.

The research reveals that the community governance of such social enterprises is not purely a matter of good administration or compliance with the relevant liquor legislation. Their administration is imbued with the additional challenges posed by political contestation, both within and beyond the communities concerned.

Canberra: ANU Press, 2017. 344p.

By Sirje Laurel Weldon

A must-read for scholars across a broad sweep of disciplines. Laurel Weldon weaves together skillfully the theoretical strands of gender equality policy, intersectionality, social movements, and representation in a multimethod/level comparative study that unequivocally places women's movements at the center of our understanding of democracy and social change."" ---Amy G. Mazur, Washington State University "Laurel Weldon's When Protest Makes Policy expands and enriches our understanding of representation by stressing social movements as a primary avenue for the representation of marginalized groups. With powerful theory backed by persuasive analysis, it is a must-read for anyone interested in democracy and the representation of marginalized groups." ---Pamela Paxton, University of Texas at Austin ""This is a bold and exciting book. There are many fine scholars who look at women's movements, political theorists who make claims about democracy, and policy analysts who do longitudinal treatments or cross-sectional evaluations of various policies. I know of no one, aside from Weldon, who is comfortable with all three of these roles."" ---David Meyer, University of California, Irvine What role do social movements play in a democracy? Political theorist S. Laurel Weldon demonstrates that social movements provide a hitherto unrecognized form of democratic representation, and thus offer a significant potential for deepening democracy and overcoming social conflict. Through a series of case studies of movements conducted by women, women of color, and workers in the United States and other member nations of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Weldon examines processes of representation at the local, state, and national levels. She concludes that, for systematically disadvantaged groups, social movements can be as important---sometimes more important---for the effective articulation of a group perspective as political parties, interest groups, or the physical presence of group members in legislatures. When Protest Makes Policy contributes to the emerging scholarship on civil society as well as the traditional scholarship on representation. It will be of interest to anyone concerned with advancing social cohesion and deepening democracy and inclusion as well as those concerned with advancing equality for women, ethnic and racial minorities, the working class, and poor people.

Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011. 244p.

By Carlo Montemayor

In this open access book, Carlos Montemayor illuminates the development of artificial intelligence (AI) by examining our drive to live a dignified life. He uses the notions of agency and attention to consider our pursuit of what is important. His method shows how the best way to guarantee value alignment between humans and potentially intelligent machines is through attention routines that satisfy similar needs. Setting out a theoretical framework for AI Montemayor acknowledges its legal, moral, and political implications and takes into account how epistemic agency differs from moral agency. Through his insightful comparisons between human and animal intelligence, Montemayor makes it clear why adopting a need-based attention approach justifies a humanitarian framework. This is an urgent, timely argument for developing AI technologies based on international human rights agreements.

London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2023. 297p.

By The Violence Prevention Network and the Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy

Anti-feminist and anti-gender ideologies - and their basis in hostility and hatred towards women and LGBTQI* people - have long been an overlooked factor in analysing radicalisation and violent extremism. Both ideologies strongly appeal to groups organised around exclusionary principles because they provide language and a framework for the defence of hierarchical structures in society (Denkovski et al., 2021, 18). This trend is increasingly manifesting itself across a spectrum of violence. Despite a striking prevalence of anti-feminism and anti-gender attitudes within extremist worldviews, these motives have been considered at best secondary when analysing extremist attacks and groups (Wolf 2021). Yet, for extremist actors, they constitute a core element of their ideologies, a relevant area of recruitment within and outside extremist scenes, and an opportunity for strategic alliances. Throughout right-wing attacks in the past decade, such as those in Christchurch, Hanau, and Halle, a clear pattern of anti-feminist and misogynistic beliefs can be detected. Within such attacks, the ideological basis for mass public violence is formed by adherence to multiple, overlapping exclusionary attitudes. For instance, one conspiracy theory that finds popularity among right-wing actors is that of the “Great Replacement”. According to this idea, feminism was invented by Jewish elites to lower birth rates and advance mass migration, with the goal of replacing white European populations with non-European, non-white people, specifically Muslims (Fedders 2018). The Christchurch attacker had uploaded an online “manifesto” titled “the Great Replacement” before the attack on two mosques that killed 51 people - illustrating how anti-feminism is often intricately interwoven with racist and anti-Semitic thinking. The issue of overlapping ideological codes, elements, and groups is becoming increasingly important as we witness growing complexity in the right-wing landscape of radicalisation and violence. However, misogyny and anti-feminism are also integral to violent attacks outside of right-wing scenes. Several terrorist attacks by members of the incel1 community, such as those in the Californian city of Isla Vista in 2014, as well as the 2018 Toronto and 2019 Tallahassee attacks, have led to an increased awareness of the incel threat and the beginning of its consideration as a security threat in Western countries (see, for instance, Moonshot 2021). While embedded in a much broader online misogynist scene, misogynist incel ideologies promote particularly extreme misogyny, anti-feminism, and sexism. Misogynist incels see women as depriving them of their natural entitlement to sex. The use of dehumanising and aggressive language – and, in parts, open calls to violence Anti-feminist and anti-gender ideologies - and their basis in hostility and hatred towards women and LGBTQI* people - have long been an overlooked factor in analysing radicalisation and violent extremism. Both ideologies strongly appeal to groups organised around exclusionary principles because they provide language and a framework for the defence of hierarchical structures in society (Denkovski et al., 2021, 18). This trend is increasingly manifesting itself across a spectrum of violence. Despite a striking prevalence of anti-feminism and anti-gender attitudes within extremist worldviews, these motives have been considered at best secondary when analysing extremist attacks and groups (Wolf 2021). Yet, for extremist actors, they constitute a core element of their ideologies, a relevant area of recruitment within and outside extremist scenes, and an opportunity for strategic alliances. Throughout right-wing attacks in the past decade, such as those in Christchurch, Hanau, and Halle, a clear pattern of anti-feminist and misogynistic beliefs can be detected. Within such attacks, the ideological basis for mass public violence is formed by adherence to multiple, overlapping exclusionary attitudes. For instance, one conspiracy theory that finds popularity among right-wing actors is that of the “Great Replacement”. According to this idea, feminism was invented by Jewish elites to lower birth rates and advance mass migration, with the goal of replacing white European populations with non-European, non-white people, specifically Muslims (Fedders 2018). The Christchurch attacker had uploaded an online “manifesto” titled “the Great Replacement” before the attack on two mosques that killed 51 people - illustrating how anti-feminism is often intricately interwoven with racist and anti-Semitic thinking. The issue of overlapping ideological codes, elements, and groups is becoming increasingly important as we witness growing complexity in the right-wing landscape of radicalisation and violence. However, misogyny and anti-feminism are also integral to violent attacks outside of right-wing scenes. Several terrorist attacks by members of the incel1 community, such as those in the Californian city of Isla Vista in 2014, as well as the 2018 Toronto and 2019 Tallahassee attacks, have led to an increased awareness of the incel threat and the beginning of its consideration as a security threat in Western countries (see, for instance, Moonshot 2021). While embedded in a much broader online misogynist scene, misogynist incel ideologies promote particularly extreme misogyny, anti-feminism, and sexism. Misogynist incels see women as depriving them of their natural entitlement to sex. The use of dehumanising and aggressive language – and, in parts, open calls to violence provides the framework in which attacks, as mentioned above, occur. The most well-known incel attacker, for instance, just weeks before the attack in Isla Vista called upon incels to “realise their true strength and numbers”, “overthrow this oppressive feminist system”, and “start envisioning a world where WOMEN FEAR YOU” (Glasstetter 2014). These attacks were broadly referenced and discussed within incel and misogynist scenes and the extreme right more specifically. In Halle, the right-wing extremist who killed two people and tried to enter a local synagogue was listening to music that makes explicit references in name and content to the incel attack in Toronto in 2018.

Berlin: Violence Prevention Network, 2021. 15p.

By The Anti-Defamation League, Center for Technology and Society

The question of who is accountable for the proliferation of antisemitism, hate, and extremism online has been hotly debated for years. Are our digital feeds really a reflection of society, or do social media platforms and tech companies actually exacerbate virulent content themselves? The companies argue that users are primarily responsible for the corrosive content soaring to the top of news feeds and reverberating between platforms. This argument serves to absolve these multi-billion-dollar companies from responsibility for any role their own products play in exacerbating hate.

A new pair of studies from ADL and TTP (Tech Transparency Project) show how some of the biggest social media platforms and search engines at times directly contribute to the proliferation of online antisemitism, hate, and extremism through their own tools and, in some cases, by creating content themselves. While there are many variables contributing to online hate, including individual users’ own behavior, our research demonstrates how these companies are taking things from bad to worse.

For these studies, we created male, female, and teen personas (without a specified gender) who searched for a basket of terms related to conspiracy theories as well as popular internet personalities, commentators, and video games across four of the biggest social media platforms, to test how these companies’ algorithms would work. In the first study, three of four platforms recommended even more extreme, contemptuously antisemitic, and hateful content. One platform, YouTube, did not take the bait. It was responsive to the persona but resisted recommending antisemitic and extremist content, proving that it is not just a problem of scale or capability.

In our second study, we tested search functions at three companies, all of which made finding hateful content and groups a frictionless experience, by autocompleting terms and, in some cases, even auto-generating content to fill in hate data voids. Notably, the companies didn’t autocomplete terms or auto-generate content for other forms of offensive content, such as pornography, proving, again, that this is not just a problem of scale or capability.

What these investigations ultimately revealed is that tech companies’ hands aren’t tied. Companies have a choice in what to prioritize, including when it comes to tuning algorithms and refining design features to either exacerbate or help curb antisemitism and extremism.

As debates rage between legislators, regulators, and judges on AI, platform transparency, and intermediary liability, these investigations underscore the urgency for both platforms and governments to do more. Based on our findings, here are three recommendations for industry and government:

Tech companies need to fix the product features that currently escalate antisemitism and auto-generate hate and extremism. Tech companies should tune their algorithms and recommendation engines to ensure they are not leading users down paths riddled with hate and antisemitism. They should also improve predictive autocomplete features and stop auto-generation of hate and antisemitism altogether.

Congress must update Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act to fit the reality of today’s internet. Section 230 was enacted before social media and search platforms as we know them existed, yet it continues to be interpreted to provide those platforms with near-blanket legal immunity for online content, even when their own tools are exacerbating hate, harassment and extremism. We believe that by updating Section 230 to better define what type of online activity should remain covered and what type of platform behavior should not, we can help ensure that social media platforms more proactively address how recommendation engines and surveillance advertising practices are exacerbating hate and extremism, which leads to online harms and potential offline violence. With the advent of social media, the use of algorithms, and the surge of artificial intelligence, tech companies are more than merely static hosting services. When there is a legitimate claim that a tech company played a role in enabling hate crimes, civil rights violations, or acts of terror, victims deserve their day in court.

We need more transparency. Users deserve to know how platform recommendation engines work. This does not need to be a trade secret-revealing exercise, but tech companies should be transparent with users about what they are seeing and why. The government also has a role to play. We’ve seen some success on this front in California, where transparency legislation was passed in 2022. Still, there’s more to do. Congress must pass federal transparency legislation so that stakeholders (the public, researchers, and civil society) have access to the information necessary to truly evaluate how tech companies’ own tools, design practices, and business decisions impact society.

Hate is on the rise. Antisemitism both online and offline is becoming normalized. A politically charged U.S. presidential election is already under way. This is a pressure cooker we cannot afford to ignore, and tech companies need to take accountability for their role in the ecosystem.

Whether you work in government or industry, are a concerned digital citizen, or a tech advocate, we hope you find this pair of reports to be informative. There is no single fix to the scourge of online hate and antisemitism, but we can and must do more to create a safer and less hate-filled internet.

New York: ADL, 2023. 18p.

By The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights

FRA’s second ‘Being Black in the EU’ report highlights experiences of people of African descent in the EU.

It shows that, despite binding anti-discrimination law in the EU since 2000 and significant policy developments since then, people of African descent continue to face racism, discrimination and hate crime:

• Racial discrimination – 45% of respondents say they experienced racial discrimination in the 5 years before the survey, an increase compared to 39% in FRA’s last survey. In Germany and Austria, it goes over 70%. Most often, they are discriminated against when looking for work or searching for accommodation. Young people and people with higher education are most affected. Yet, discrimination remains invisible as only 9% report it.

• Harassment – 30% say they experienced racist harassment but almost no one reports it. Young women, people with higher education and those wearing religious clothing are more likely to be racially harassed.

• Racial profiling – 58% say that their most recent police stop in the year before the survey was a result of racial profiling. Those who perceive their stop as racial profiling trust the police much less.

• Work – 34% felt racially discriminated against when looking for a job and 31% at work in the 5 years before the survey. Compared to people generally, they are more likely to have only temporary contracts and are over-qualified for their job.

• Housing and poverty – rising inflation and cost of living have put more people of African descent at higher risk of poverty, compared to the general population. Some 33% face difficulties to make ends meet and 14% cannot afford to keep their house warm, compared with 18% and 7% of people generally. Simply finding a place to live is a struggle for many, with 31% saying they were racially discriminated against when trying to find accommodation.

• Education – young people of African descent are three times more likely to leave school early, compared to young people generally. More parents in 2022 say that their children experienced racism at school than in 2016.

  To tackle racism and discrimination effectively, FRA calls on EU countries to:

• properly enforce anti-discrimination legislation as well as effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions;

• identify and record hate crimes, and consider bias motivation as an aggravating circumstance when determining

• penalties;

• collect equality data, including on ‘ethnic or racial origin’ to assess the situation and monitor progress;

• ensure that equality bodies have the necessary mandates and resources to tackle discrimination and support victims;

• take steps to prevent and eradicate discriminatory institutional practices and culture in policing, drawing on FRA’s guide on preventing unlawful profiling;

• develop specific policies to address racism and racial discrimination in education, employment, housing and healthcare.

This report is part of FRA’s third EU-wide survey looking at experiences of immigrants and descendants of immigrants across the EU.

It analyses the responses of over 6,700 people of African descent living in 13 EU countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.

Vienna, Austria: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2023. 8p.

By Julien Bellaiche

On 2 August 2023, a federal jury sentenced Robert Gregory Bowers to death for committing the deadliest antisemitic attack in the history of the United States. Five years earlier, on 27 October 2018, he entered the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh and opened fire on worshippers who had gathered to celebrate Shabbat, one of the most important ritual observances in Judaism. Eleven people were killed and seven more injured.

While in custody, Bowers reportedly expressed demographic conspiracy beliefs to explain his act. These narratives claim that ethnic, religious or national groups are under threat of eradication by outsiders due to demographic changes resulting from plots instigated by diverse sets of actors.

This report examines the ideological underpinnings of the Pittsburgh synagogue attack and its long-term impact on the extreme right five years later. It does so by delving into the key narratives that motivated Bowers’ act and assessing their influence on subsequent attacks and plots. It then investigates the ways in which the attack and the attacker continue to be referenced and glorified in extreme-right communities online.

Key Findings

This report traces the history of demographic conspiracy theories in the far right in the West back to the 19th and early 20th centuries, when French discourses of “replacement” resonated with fears of miscegenation in the United States. These discourses shaped alternately the figures of Jews, Muslims, immigrants and progressive forces as racialised collectives plotting the eradication of White people and/or Western cultures. Over a number of years, these discursive trends interlaced and merged to produce labelled demographic conspiracy theories, which are known today under various names such as the “White Genocide” and the “Great Replacement” theories.

An analysis of Bowers’ activity on the social media platform Gab highlights the role demographic conspiracy theories played in Bowers’ interpretations and representations of social realities. These narratives helped shape the image of Jews as enablers of an alleged invasion of migrants endangering the future of White people.

In the context of White supremacist attacks, Bowers’ influence is linked to broader conspiracy beliefs that view the alleged struggle for the survival of the “White race” against concerted annihilation attempts as central. Other attackers who cited Bowers as a role model displayed various demographic conspiracy beliefs, picked different targets, but praised one another as committed “ethno-soldiers” sacrificing themselves for the cause of preserving the “White race”.

Despite his relatively modest popularity, Bowers remains regularly commemorated and glorified within extreme-right communities online five years later. “Screw your optics, I’m going in”, his last words on Gab, turned into a popular slogan used as a catchphrase to incite violence. Bowers was also introduced into militant accelerationists’ pantheon of “saints” and was regularly promoted as a holy figure within these online communities.

London: King’s College London , Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism,. 2023. 48p.