By Jessica Reichert and Maryann Mason

In the United States, firearm homicide is a major public health concern. Certain populations are at greater risk for being a victim of firearm homicide, such as those with prior criminal justice involvement. The overlap between violent victimization and offense history, referred to as the victim-offender overlap, is empirically supported, but research is limited on the overlap of firearm homicide victimization and justice involvement. Therefore, we examined the extent of victim-offender overlap of firearm homicide decedents by matching Illinois public health data with state arrest data. A total of 1,331 firearm homicide decedents were examined, including 20.4% (n = 271) with no arrest records and 79.7% (n = 1,060) with an arrest record, as well as 55.6% (n = 740) with a prior conviction and 31.8% (n = 423) with a prior incarceration. A higher proportion of firearm homicide victims with an arrest record were male, another race than White, non-Latinx, and single or never married than those without an arrest record. This study further supports the existence of the victim-offender overlap and highlights demographic disparities in criminal justice involvement among victims of fatal firearm violence.

Chicago: Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, 2023. 16p.

By Global Witness

This report and our campaign are dedicated to all those individuals, communities and organisations bravely taking a stand to defend human rights, their land, and our environment. Last year, 196 people were murdered for doing this work. We also acknowledge that the names of many defenders who were killed last year may be missing, and we may never know how many more gave their lives to protect our planet. We honour their work too

This report shows that in every region of the world, people who speak out and call attention to the harm caused by extractive industries – like deforestation, pollution and land grabbing – face violence, discrimination and threats. We are land and environmental defenders. And when we speak up many of us are attacked for doing so.

More than 2,100 land and environmental defenders killed globally between 2012 and 2023

• An estimated 196 land and environmental defenders were killed in 2023 around the world, according to a new Global Witness report published today

• The new figures take the total number of defenders killed between 2012 to 2023 to 2,106

• For the second year running, Colombia had the highest number of killings worldwide – with a record 79 defenders killed last year, followed by Brazil (25), Mexico (18) and Honduras (18)

• Once again, Latin America had the highest number of recorded killings worldwide, with 166 killings overall – 54 killings across Mexico and Central America and 112 in South America

• Environmental defenders are also being increasingly subject to range of tactics for silencing those who speak out for the planet across Asia, the UK, EU and US

London: Global Witness, 2024. 66p.

By Vaughn Crandall, Reygan Cunningham, and Robin Campbell

Gun violence inflicts a grim toll on our nation. Every single day, 120 Americans are killed with guns and more than 200 are shot and wounded. Gun violence is the leading cause of death of children and teens in the U.S. Homicide is the leading cause of death for Black men under 44 and the second leading cause of death for Latino men. Both African American and Latinx communities are impacted by gun violence at rates that far exceed those of white communities. The economic consequences have been calculated to exceed $550 billion annually.

Oakland:  California Partnership for Safe Communities, 2024. 15p

May Contain Markup

Edited by A. Dirk Moses

Scope of Genocide Studies: The book explores genocide in various historical contexts, emphasizing that genocides are not limited to the 20th century but have occurred throughout history.

Colonialism and Genocide: It examines the intrinsic link between colonialism and genocide, suggesting that many genocides have rootsin colonial and imperial conquests.

Case Studies: The document includes numerous case studies from different regions and periods, such as the Armenian Genocide, genocides in Tasmania, and colonial rule in German Southwest Africa.

Intellectual Contributions: The book features contributions from various scholars, providing diverse perspectives on the relationship between empire, colony, and genocide.

Berghahn Books, 2008, 491 pages

May Contain Markup

Edited by René Lemarchand

Forgotten Genocides: The book explores lesser-known genocides, such as those in Burundi, Tibet, and among the Herero and TasmanianAborigines.

Denial and Memory: It discusses how many genocides are denied or forgotten, often manipulated by perpetrators and overlooked by the global community.

Historical Context: Each genocide is examined within its uniquehistorical and political context, highlighting the diversity of circumstances leading to mass violence.

Comparative Analysis: The book provides a comparative study of different genocides, emphasizing the importance of remembering and understanding these tragedies to prevent future occurrences.

University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011, 190 pages

By Brian A. Jackson, Melissa Kay Diliberti, Pauline Moore, Heather L. Schwartz

Shooting incidents at kindergarten through grade 12 (K–12) schools in the United States, including mass attacks like the one that killed 19 students and two teachers at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde, Texas, have sparked calls to increase security or adopt altogether new approaches to school safety. These approaches include allowing teachers or staff to carry firearms in some schools. To learn what teachers across the United States think about school safety generally and about specific proposals to enhance safety in schools, such as teacher-carry policies, RAND researchers administered a survey to a randomly sampled set of 973 K–12 teachers using the American Teacher Panel. The survey focused on teachers' views of safety in their schools, including their main safety concerns, perceptions of security measures in place, the effect of those measures on school climate, and whether they were concerned for their own safety and that of their students. On the specific issue of firearms in school, the survey asked whether allowing teachers to carry firearms would make schools more or less safe and whether teachers would personally carry a firearm if given the choice to do so. Findings note that teachers, like the U.S. population as a whole, are divided about armed teachers at school: Fifty-four percent of respondents reported believing that teachers carrying firearms will make schools less safe, 20 percent reported believing that it will make schools safer, and the final 26 percent reported feeling that it would make schools neither more nor less safe.

Key Findings

• Similar to older and state-specific surveys, this survey found that teachers are divided about arming teachers at school. Fifty-four percent of the nationally representative sample of teachers reported believing that teachers carrying firearms will make schools less safe, 20 percent reported believing that it will make schools safer, and the final 26 percent reported feeling that it would make schools neither more nor less safe.

• White teachers were more likely than Black teachers to feel that teachers carrying firearms would make schools safer, and male teachers in rural schools were most likely to say that they would personally carry a firearm at school if allowed.

• All told, about 550,000 of the country's 3 million K–12 teachers would choose to carry a firearm at school if allowed.

• Regardless of gender or race, roughly half of teachers felt that physical security measures at their school (which most commonly include locks, ID badges, cameras, and security staff) positively affected the school climate. Only 5 percent of teachers felt that their schools' physical security measures had a negative effect on school climate.

• Despite the growth in gun violence, bullying — rather than active shooters — was teachers' most common safety concern.

Recommendations

• Study early adopter schools or school districts that have more-expansive versions of teacher-carry programs to understand how they work in practice.

• Conduct a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of programs allowing teacher-carry to rigorously assess their outcomes.

• Develop risk analysis approaches to inform school safety and security planning that balance frequent, lower-level forms of school violence, such as bullying, and lower-probability, extreme forms of school violence, such as shootings.

• Develop a deeper understanding of the sources of teachers' safety concerns.

• Identify how fears of victimization and of specific safety concerns contribute to teacher and principal turnover, and to student enrollment, attendance, and academic performance.

• Better characterize the combined effects of school security measures and strategies on safety, school climate, and student attendance and academic performance.

• Take the pulse of parents, teachers, administrators, and students about school safety measures to disaggregate by type of community and to triangulate their views on school safety.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND,  2023.

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By Shelby L Bandel , Allison E Bond , Michael D Anestis 

Background: Firearms account for over 40,000 deaths in the USA each year in addition to thousands of nonfatal injuries. One notable prevention strategy for firearm-related fatalities and nonfatal injuries is safe storage. Safe storage of firearms emphasizes using storage mechanisms that limit the ready access of firearms to unauthorized users. Cable locks are one safe storage option that is easy to access and typically free, as they are included in many firearms sales. The present study examined the extent to which firearms retailers notifying purchasers at the point of sale about the included cable locks was associated with subsequent locking device use in two large samples and three subsamples. Exploratory analyses then examined demographic factors associated with the frequency of seller notification of locks.

Methods: Sample 1 included 1203 firearm owners and sample 2 included 1556 firearm owners. Subsamples were drawn from sample 2 to examine if there were differences by state. The three subsamples included firearm owners from Minnesota (n = 515), Mississippi (535), and New Jersey (506). Logistic regressions were used to examine the association between the frequency of sellers notifying buyers of locks and subsequent locking device use. Linear regressions were used to examine what demographic factors were associated with greater frequency of seller notification of locking devices.

Results: Results indicated a general trend such that more frequent notification of cable locks at the point of purchase was associated with a greater likelihood of using locking devices to secure firearms. At the subsample level, these findings were most consistent for Mississippi relative to Minnesota and New Jersey. Exploratory analyses generally indicated those who were younger and those living in more densely populated areas were more likely to be notified about cable locks at the point of purchase.

Conclusions: These findings suggest that interactions about cable locks at the point of firearm purchase has an impact on firearm storage behaviors. Such results indicate that encouraging firearm retailers to have these discussions with those purchasing firearms might be an important strategy for preventing firearm-related fatalities and nonfatal injuries.

Inj Epidemiol. 2023; 10: 11

By Raul Zepeda Gil

One of the main inquiry topics within crime and conflict studies is how inequalities or poverty fosters or deters participation in organized violence. Since the late 1990s, the increase in violence in Latin America has boosted the use of Global North criminology and conflict studies to explain this phenomenon. Although helpful, the question about the link between inequality and violence remains elusive. Instead, this research uses occupational mobility and life course approaches to analyze the latest Mexican inmate survey data. With this data, we can understand the factors behind youth recruitment into violent criminal organizations during the current drug war. The main findings point to youth transitions from school and low-skilled manual employment towards criminal violent activities as an option out of work precariousness. This research proposes researching transitions to organized violence as an occupational choice in market economies and post-conflict settlements as a possible causal mechanism that explains inequalities and violence.

   Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 6(1): pp. 1–15, 2024

By Eva Veldhuizen Ochodničanová, Alicia Heys

Despite the link between conflict and human trafficking having been globally recognized, academic inquiry investigating how the two interact continues to be limited. Given the recency of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in February 2022, this lack of literature is even more pronounced in understanding how the risks of trafficking are developing in the current context. This paper examines extant academic literature to explore what is already known about the relationship between conflict and human trafficking, situating this within the theoretical framework of routine activity theory (RAT). It analyses governmental and non-governmental organization reports emerging from Ukraine to contextualize the risk that is specific to those affected by the war. The paper identifies four key drivers of risk facing those in, or fleeing, Ukraine, which can heighten their vulnerability to human trafficking, before offering a novel and innovative typology of the ways that human trafficking can manifest as a result of conflict. The typology considers the direct and indirect links between conflict and trafficking, the geographical spaces in which trafficking can occur, and the specific forms that exploitation can take. By situating the paper within RAT and contextualizing it with evidence from the war in Ukraine, the findings of this paper provide both theoretical and empirical insights that help to expand existing knowledge on how conflict situations can increase the risk of THB.

Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 6(2): pp. 26–41.2024 

By Rose M. C. Kagawa and Elise D. Riley

Background: Unstably housed women experience high levels of violence. While previous studies have investigated psychological, physical, and sexual violence, weapon and gun violence are rarely delineated. We examined factors associated with experiencing violence as an adult among unhoused and unstably housed women, with a focus on gun violence. Methods: We recruited women with a history of housing instability from San Francisco homeless shelters, street encampments, free meal programs, low-income hotels, and health clinics. Participants completed interviews including questions regarding both childhood and adult violence. We used multivariable logistic regression to examine associations of specific types of childhood violence (i.e., physical, sexual, gun, and other weapon-involved violence), age, race, ethnicity, educational attainment, and sexual orientation, with risk of experiencing specific types of violence as an adult (i.e., gun, other weapon-involved, physical violence). Because the violence outcomes were not rare, odds ratios were transformed to approximate risk ratios. Results: Nearly half of women (n = 110, 45%) had been attacked with a gun as an adult. Violent victimization in adulthood was common, with 33% having experienced all three forms of violence. The probability of being attacked with a gun as an adult was almost 70% higher among women who had been hit or kicked hard enough to cause injury as a child (RR = 1.68; 95% CI = 1.24, 2.11), and this association was present for all three violence outcomes. No other risk factors explored, including other types of violence experienced as a child, met the statistical threshold to be considered significant. Conclusions: The high prevalence of gun violence reported here is consistent with prior studies of violence conducted in similar populations. Considered in combination with prior research, findings suggest that multi-generational violence prevention interventions for low-income women and girls are needed. They also emphasize the need to more actively include people who experience unstable housing in statewide and national violence surveys to better understand the extent of the problem and address on a broader scale the high rates of violence experienced by unstably housed populations, which have been consistently documented in local research

Inj. Epidemiol. 8:52, 2021

By Garen J. Wintemute 

Inter-related sustained upward trends in firearm purchasing, violence, and political extremism are converging to put the USA at risk for disaster and threaten our future as a democracy. This narrative review provides a critical assessment and call to action. It explores each trend separately, considers the effects of their likely and imminent convergence, and suggests possibilities for collective and individual action to prevent or at least reduce those effects.

Injury Epidemiology volume 8, Article number: 64 (2021)

By David Hemenway, Chloe Shawah, Elizabeth Lites 

Background: In the past decade, most people who buy and own guns are doing so for self-defense. Yet little is known about actual defensive gun use in the USA.

Methods: To discover what information newspaper articles and local news reports might add, we read the news reports of defensive use incidents assembled by the Gun Violence Archive. We examined a sample of more than a quarter of the incidents from 2019, the last year before the pandemic. We examined all cases from four months-January, April, July, and October. We created a typology of defensive gun use incidents.

Results: Of 418 incidents, in about half, the perpetrator was armed with a firearm. In almost 90% of the cases, the victim fired their firearm-315 perpetrators were shot, and about half of them died. The average number of perpetrators shot per incident was 0.75; the average number of victims shot was 0.25. We estimate that in 2019 fewer than 600 potential perpetrators were killed in defensive gun use incidents that made the news. Among the thirteen categories of shooting were drug-related (4% of incidents), gang-like combat (6%), romantic partner disputes (11%), escalating arguments (13%), store robberies (9%), street robberies (5%), unoccupied vehicle theft (5%), unarmed burglaries (7%), home invasions (20%), and miscellaneous (6%).

Conclusion: We believe the Gun Violence Archive dataset includes the large majority of news reports of defensive gun use especially those in which the perpetrator is shot and dies. Some of the strengths of using news reports as a data source are that we can be certain that the incident occurred, and the reports provide us with a story behind the incident, one usually vetted in part by the police with occasional input from the victims, perpetrator, family, witnesses, or neighbors. Defensive gun use situations are quite diverse, and among the various categories of defensive gun use, a higher percentage of incidents in some of the categories seemed far less likely to be socially beneficial (e.g., drug-related, gang-like, escalating arguments) than in others (e.g., home invasions).

Injury Epidemiology  9:19, 2022.

MCBRIDE, MEGAN K.; JENKINS, MONIQUE

From the document: "Within the public violence literature--that is, the literature on domestic terrorism, mass shootings, school shootings, and hate crimes, among others--leakage has been identified as a core warning behavior. Leakage occurs when a would be assailant communicates an intention to harm a target before committing an attack. This communication can vary in timing, level of detail, form, intentionality, and audience. Through such a communication, an individual might directly verbalize an intent to commit an act, make more subtle threats and innuendos, or share a plan via social media. Researchers have found relatively high levels of leakage associated with acts of public violence, including adolescent-perpetrated mass murders, mass shootings, political and public figure assassinations, and domestic terrorism. For this reason, leakage--which often occurs in interactions online or with loved ones--can be an important warning sign. But leakage to family, friends, or acquaintances is not the only way to detect when an individual is intending to commit an act of public violence, and over the last decade, researchers have started to examine preattack contact with system stakeholders, such as law enforcement, mental health, and education professionals. [...] We sought to advance understanding of what percentage of the violent extremist population could be 'catchable' in the sense that an individual had been in previous contact with a system stakeholder (e.g., law enforcement, mental health provider) or had been reported to a system stakeholder (e.g., by a friend or loved one to whom they had intentionally or unintentionally leaked information). To explore this issue, we leveraged a new dataset: the Domestic Terrorism Offender Level Database (DTOLD). The database includes detailed information on the 320 non-Islamist individuals who carried out terrorist attacks in the United States between January 1, 2001, and December 31, 2020. Specifically, we sought to understand what percentage of this population was known to system stakeholders at some point before they perpetrated their attacks." Further information for this document can be found here: www.cna.org/reports/2024/08/domestic-terrorists-contact-with-system-stakeholders-before-attacks

CNA CORPORATION. 2024. 4p.

By André Duffles, Teixeira Araneg and Ariel Faccioli Fernandes

Grounded on an extensive literature review derived from evidence-based studies (e.g., scientific articles, institutional and technical reports, journalistic evidence, academic books, and book chapters), our article develops a qualitative analysis to address the following question: to what extent do the strategic motivations of states and organized crime groups converge/diverge in the context of the current Russo-Ukrainian conflict? This article is divided into three parts. The initial section delves into the interconnections between illicit markets and armed conflicts. Secondly, after acknowledging the background of organized crime in both countries and the emergence of the current Russo-Ukrainian war, it highlights the implications of this conflict on the dynamics of illicit markets. Finally, it analyzes the strategic motivations of states and organized crime within this setting, as well as its points of convergence and divergence. This research potentially explores the frequently wicked ties of (inter)national politics and criminal adaptation during (post-)war times in Eastern Europe and within the international system.

Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 6(2): pp. 48–60. 2024.

By Roberto Uchôa de Oliveira Santos

In recent decades, the global debate on gun control has been prominent, with many countries adopting more restrictive policies. Brazil followed this trend by implementing stringent measures in 2003; however, the presidency of Jair Bolsonaro in 2019 introduced normative changes aimed at facilitating public access to firearms and ammunition. Throughout his term, the legal firearms market doubled, allowing access to weaponry previously restricted to the general public. The analyzed hypothesis suggests that these normative changes, especially those related to the quantity and authorization of acquisition of previously restricted firearms, altered the types of firearms in circulation, strengthening the interaction between legal and illegal markets. Using data from the mandatory firearms re-registration, a total of 962,782 firearms were analyzed. The assessment of the increase in circulation of these firearms in the illegal market was conducted through the analysis of seizures in the states of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, revealing a significant growth in seizures of these types of firearms, possibly correlated with the increase in their circulation. Three police investigations were selected to exemplify how the connection between markets intensified, allowing criminals to obtain firearms in the legal market that were previously only accessible through international trafficking or diversion from state agencies.

Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 6(1): pp. 16–29. 2024

By Jessica H. Beard, Jennifer Midberry, Iman N. Afifa, Elizabeth Dauera, Jim MacMillanc, Sara F. Jacoby 

Media reports on interpersonal firearm violence largely present it as a crime issue focused on individual shooting events. This episodic framing can undermine support for public health solutions to firearm violence. The potential harms of this narrative on firearm-injured people are unknown. We aimed to understand how recently firearm-injured people perceive the meaning and impact of news media reporting on their own injuries and firearm violence in their communities. This study was conducted in the trauma clinic of the busiest trauma center for firearm injuries in Philadelphia, PA, USA. We consecutively recruited adult firearm-injured patients for semi-structured qualitative interviews within two months of their injury. Interview content was thematically analyzed. Twenty-six patients consented and participated. Results indicate that participants largely felt negative or conflicted about “making the news” and perceived several harms associated with media reports on their injuries, including dehumanization they connected with episodic-style reports, reliving trauma when viewing news, distress related to inaccuracies, threats to personal safety when specific details were included harm to reputation, and negative impacts on public perceptions of safety and community. Participants who did not make the news often reported relief and generally did not expect their stories to be reported. These findings suggest that firearm-injured people perceive multiple harms associated with episodic narratives that neglect their viewpoints. Journalists and public health practitioners should work together with communities to identify strategies to reframe firearm violence as a public health problem through reporting that is trauma-informed and incorporates the perspectives of firearm-injured people.

SSM - Qualitative Research in HealthVolume 3, June 2023, 

By  Lisa N. Sacco

The federal government defines domestic terrorism (DT) as ideologically driven crimes committed by individuals in the United States that are intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population or influence the policy or conduct of a government. Federal definitions of DT are found in the USA PATRIOT Act (18 U.S.C. §2331), the Homeland Security Act (6 U.S.C. §101), and Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations (§0.85). Aside from the statutory and regulatory definitions of DT, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has historically emphasized particular qualities inherent to the actors who engage in DT. According to the FBI, domestic terrorists are Americans who commit violence to achieve their goals that stem from domestic, extremist ideological influence and lack of foreign direction or influence. This conceptualization excludes ideologically driven crimes committed in the United States by individuals whose actions are directed or motivated by foreign groups. Analyst in Illicit Drugs and Crime Policy How the federal government defines conceptualizes and shapes the nation’s understanding of it as criminal conduct and as a policy issue. Domestic terrorists (and the crimes they commit) are labeled as such because their actions are directed against the civilian population and/or U.S. government within the boundaries of the United States. Like foreign terrorism, domestic terrorism involves ideologically driven criminal acts aimed at influencing the government or coercing the population. Unlike foreign terrorism, the federal government does not have a mechanism to formally charge an individual with DT, which sometimes makes it difficult (and occasionally controversial) to formally characterize someone as a domestic terrorist. Further, domestic terrorists may adhere to the ideologies of certain extremist movements or belong to hate or extremist groups, but unlike the formal process involved in designating foreign terrorist organizations, DT movements and groups are not officially labeled as such by the federal government, thereby making it difficult to categorize the threat presented by any group or movement as a DT threat. While some observers may look to terrorism-related incidents, investigations, and arrests to help understand the scope of the DT threat, these data are limited. DT incidents have a low occurrence rate but a high impact, and the federal government has a significant role in combatting the threat of DT. In 2021, the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued the nation’s first national strategy for countering the DT threat. The strategy identifies DT threats to include potentially unlawful use or threats of force or violence in furtherance of ideological agendas from racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists, anti-government or anti-authority violent extremists (further broken down to include militia violent extremists, anarchist violent extremists, and sovereign citizen violent extremists), animal rights/environmental violent extremists, and abortion-related violent extremists. How the government defines and combats DT and extremism is complicated for many reasons. Believing in or expressing extremist ideals and/or vocalizing support for DT incidents are not violations of federal law. If an individual in the United States espouses extremist beliefs, such as anarchy or the superiority of the white race, that behavior is generally protected speech under the First Amendment. Expressions of these beliefs sometimes precede DT incidents, and in hindsight, some may question why these incidents could not be prevented. Crossing the line from First Amendment-protected activity, such as a peaceful protest, to DT-related violence can happen quickly; however, there is often little law enforcement can do in response to extremist but protected speech. Despite the statutory definition of DT in Title 18 of the U.S. Code, no federal criminal provision expressly prohibits “domestic terrorism.” While DT is defined in federal statute, the term domestic terrorist is not used to officially label any group (as it is with foreign terrorist organizations). However, federal law enforcement has referred (in some instances such as congressional testimony) to individuals as domestic terrorists and their crimes as DT. Going forward, Congress may consider any number of legislative options regarding the federal government’s approach to defining and confronting DT, including (1) enactment of a DT charging statute; (2) the utility and consequences of applying the DT label in federal policy; (3) allocation of additional, less, or equivalent appropriations to address DT; and (4) adjustments to DT data collection requirements for federal agencies.  

Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2023. 27p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

Countries across the Near and Middle East have registered an escalation in both the scale and sophistication of drug trafficking operations over the past decade. The destabilizing risks posed by illicit drugs have become increasingly prominent on the regional agenda. Of particular concern for governments and societies across the region is the rising production, trafficking and consumption of amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), in particular, tablets containing amphetamine sold under the name “captagon”, and methamphetamine. Iraq and neighbouring countries have documented a sharp increase in the trafficking and use of “captagon” over the past five years. “Captagon” seizures in Iraq increased by almost 3,380 per cent in Iraq from 2019 to 2023. Iraq reported the seizure of over 4.1 tons of “captagon” tablets between January and December 2023 alone. Seizures of amphetamine (mainly in the form of “cap tagon”) in the Near and Middle East doubled from 2020, reaching a record high of 86 tons in 2021. In parallel to “captagon” trafficking, a methamphetamine market is quickly developing in the Near and Middle East, as shown by a rise in seizures.3 UNODC research has found that Iraq is at risk of becoming an increasingly important node in the drug trafficking ecosystem spanning the Near and Middle East. Iraq lies near the intersection of a complex global drug trafficking ecosystem spanning Southwest Asia, Africa, and Europe, notably the Balkan and Southern routes associated with opiate smuggling from Afghanistan to Europe, through Southeastern Europe, and towards the Indian Ocean and Eastern Africa, including through the Arabian Peninsula. Within Iraq, drugs are trafficked along three key internal corridors, in the north, central and southern regions of the country. There are distinct territorial, ethnic, economic, and political factors and differentiated drug market dynamics connected to each route. The main categories of drugs traf f icked through Iraq include opium, heroin, hashish and especially, methamphetamine and “captagon”. While Iraq is not necessarily the most affected country in the region in terms of volumes of drugs seized, there are risks that the situation could deteriorate if drug trafficking, in particular of methamphetamine and “captagon”, keeps intensifying. A particular challenge facing countries across the Near and Middle East are armed groups with cross-border affiliations and transborder economic interests. Alongside a recent history marked by armed conflict and corruption, this situation has contributed to cross-border trafficking. The Government of Iraq and its partners have stressed the need for collective responses to tackle the security, social and economic ramifications of drug trafficking across the Near and Middle East. As seen in different regional contexts, the persistence – and potential reactivation – of armed groups poses a significant threat, not least given their potential involvement in illicit drug production and trafficking. There is growing awareness among governments of how drug trafficking intensifies corruption, undermines governance and legitimate business, degrades services and contributes to violent competition between armed groups. There is also growing concern over evidence of increasing drug use and related social harms, requiring sustained treatment and rehabilitation efforts.6 Practical responses are being implemented but are still at an early stage. Iraq established its first drug law and commission in 2017 and in 2023 launched a National Strategy on Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances (2023–2025) in 2023. Moreover, Iraq organized the first regional event on the issue in 2023 to accelerate collaboration and coordinate efforts in drug detection and disruption..

Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 46p.

Liana W. Rosen

Sanctions play a role in U.S. national drug control strategies to disrupt and deter the illicit production and trafficking of foreign-produced drugs. The 118th Congress has focused on the role of sanctions in combating synthetic opioid production and trafficking (including fentanyl). Opioids are a leading contributor to U.S. drug overdose deaths.

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service; 2024

By Jeffrey W. Swanson, April M. Zeoli, Shannon Frattaroli, Marian Betz, Michele Easter, Reena Kapoor, Christopher Knoepke, Michael Norko, Veronica A. Pear, et al..

More than half of suicide deaths in the United States result from self-inflicted firearm injuries. Extreme risk protection order (ERPO) laws in 21 states and the District of Columbia temporarily limit access to firearms for individuals found in a civil court process to pose an imminent risk of harm to themselves or others. Research with large multistate study populations has been lacking to determine effectiveness of these laws. This study assembled records pertaining to 4,583 ERPO respondents in California, Connecticut, Maryland, and Washington. Matched records identified suicide decedents and self-injury method. Researchers applied case fatality rates for each suicide method to estimate nonfatal suicide attempts corresponding to observed deaths. Comparison of counterfactual to observed data patterns yielded estimates of the number of lives saved and number of ERPOs needed to avert one suicide. Estimates varied depending on the assumed probability that a gun owner who attempts suicide will use a gun. Two evidence-based approaches yielded estimates of 17 and 23 ERPOs needed to prevent one suicide. For the subset of 2,850 ERPO respond ents with documented suicide concern, comparable estimates were 13 and 18, respectively. This study’s findings add to growing evidence that ERPOs can be an effective and important suicide prevention tool.

J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 52(3) online, 2024. DOI:10.29158/JAAPL.240056-24