By Mark S. Hamm

Today, there are thousands of followers of non-Judeo-Christian faith groups in American correctional institutions. Research suggests that many of these prisoners began their incarceration with little or no religious calling, but converted during their imprisonment. According to the FBI, some of these prisoners may be vulnerable to terrorist recruitment. The purpose of this research is three-fold: (1) to collect baseline information on nontraditional religions in United States correctional institutions; (2) to identify the personal and social motivations for prisoners’ conversions to these faith groups; and (3) to assess the prisoners’ potential for terrorist recruitment. The study creates a starting point for more in-depth research on the relationship between prisoners’ conversion to nontraditional religions and extremist violence. The work is organized into five chapters. Chapter 1 presents a comprehensive review of the literature bearing on the research objectives. This includes an historical overview of Moorish Science Temple and the Nation of Islam, American versions of Islam that have played an important role in radicalizing prisoners through religious identity. The review shows that there are currently opposing views about Islam in prison. One side of the debate takes the position that the Muslim faith offers prisoners a viable path to rehabilitation. The opposing view claims that Islamic prisoners are a threat to U.S. security. Criminological evidence shows that the greatest danger to security is found in mutating forms of “Prison Islam.” Other evidence indicates that the threat emanates from dozens of high-profile terrorists who are already serving lengthy sentences in American correctional facilities.

Terre Haute, IN: Department of Criminology, Indiana State University, 2007. 129p.

By Roger Douglas

Roger Douglas compares responses to terrorism by five liberal democracies—the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—over the past 15 years. He examines each nation's development and implementation of counterterrorism law, specifically in the areas of information-gathering, the definition of terrorist offenses, due process for the accused, detention, and torture and other forms of coercive questioning.

Douglas finds that terrorist attacks elicit pressures for quick responses, often allowing national governments to accrue additional powers. But emergencies are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for such laws, which may persist even after fears have eased. He argues that responses are influenced by both institutional interests and prior beliefs, and complicated when the exigencies of office and beliefs point in different directions. He also argues that citizens are wary of government's impingement on civil liberties and that courts exercise their capacity to restrain the legislative and executive branches. Douglas concludes that the worst antiterror excesses have taken place outside of the law rather than within, and that the legacy of 9/11 includes both laws that expand government powers and judicial decisions that limit those very powers.

Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2014. 337p.

Edited by Diego Muro

Building resilience to violent extremism has become a matter of great concern for European cities that have experienced attacks or that fear experiencing them in the future. Mayors, municipal leaders and other local authority representatives are leading efforts to empower city governments across the EU and develop pragmatic and non-ideological policies. As increasing numbers of citizens rank violent extremism as one of their top worries, urban centres have effectively become the front line of the fight against radicalisation. It is in European cities where transnational extremist threats take shape in the forms of hate speech, recruitment networks, radical cells and terrorist attacks, and it is also in European cities where evidence-based plans to counter and prevent violent extremism at local level need urgently to be devised. Cities are obvious settings in which to implement the motto “think globally and act locally”.

Barcelona: Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, 2017. 118p.

By Peter Neumann

The Internet has revolutionized the way all of us communicate and do business. Its benefits to people everywhere have been enormous and will continue to drive progress in practically every area of life. At the same time, it should be recognized that, while being a force for good, the Internet has also come to play an important—and, in many ways, unique—role in radicalizing homegrown and domestic terrorists. Supporters of Al Qaeda, Sovereign Citizens, white supremacists and neo-Nazis, environmental and animal liberationists, and other violent extremist groups all have embraced the Internet with great enthusiasm and vigor. They are using it as a platform to spread their ideas, connect with each other, make new recruits, and incite illegal and violent actions. We believe that this trend will continue and that future terrorist attacks against the United States and its interests will involve individuals who have been radicalized—at least in part—on the Internet. As a result, countering online radicalization should continue to be a major priority for the government and its Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) efforts. The purpose of this report is to equip policy makers with a better understanding of how the Internet facilitates radicalization, in particular within the United States; an appreciation of the dilemmas and trade-offs that are involved in countering online radicalization within the United States; and ideas and best practices for making the emerging approach and strategy richer and more effective

Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Center’s National Security Preparedness Group (NSPG). 2012. 56p.

By Peter Neumann

Last September, we released a report, Assessing the Terrorist Threat, on the evolving nature of this threat to the United States. We concluded that the U.S. government had not adequately addressed the radicalization of homegrown terrorists. We set forth several pressing policy questions, including the fundamental question of who within the government is responsible for identifying radicalization and interdicting attempts at recruitment. This report seeks to answer those questions and provide concrete policy recommendations for a counter-radicalization strategy – the elements of which should be implemented not just by the federal government, but by state and local officials and community organizations.

Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Center’s National Security Preparedness Group (NSPG), 2011. 56p.

By Mohammed Abu-Nimer

The emergence of “violent extremism” (VE)2 as a central framework and priority adopted by most Western and non-Western government agencies. It has become the primary lens through which to describe many of their activities, especially in conflict areas around the world, even when the issues are not or are only remotely related. There is no doubt that VE narratives, especially those promoting violence in the name of Islam spread by groups such as Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabab, Taliban and Daesh, have gained strength and visibility in the last two decades (regardless of the differences in the groups’ motivation or type of justification – be it nationalism, anti-Western intervention or religion). However, it is an overstatement to solely explain the motivation for endorsing or adopting VE in Muslim societies as a result of theological factors; as explained below, there are many other factors besides religious identity and theological reasoning contributing to the phenomenon. Nevertheless, it is possible to trace historical factors that led to the creation of such groups in predominantly Muslim countries. In Afghanistan, for example, one such factor is rooted in the Cold War dynamics between the United States (US) and the USSR at the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. To fight communism, the US government mobilised local Afghan communities, which included some fighters who subsequently employed extreme Islamic religious narratives. The US’s fervent desire to prevent the spread of communism thus led to the arming of members of Afghan society who later utilised the concept of jihad against non-believers in certain Sunni interpretations.

Berlin: Berghof Foundation, 2018. 21p.

Edited by Beatrix Austin and Hans J. Giessmann

Is the topic of violent extremism slowly turning into one on which everything has already been said, but not yet by everyone, as Karl Valentin used to wryly remark? We do not think so. While violent extremism (VE) has indeed emerged as a new buzzword and a strong funding trend over the past few years, effective strategies for addressing the phenomenon are still being forged and need to be reviewed and tested. Violent extremism’s manifestations range widely: from foreign fighters via terrorist attacks to increasingly public violence-condoning ideology and rhetoric of both secular and religious provenance. How to deal with violent extremism, and its protagonists, is therefore also becoming a major challenge for peacebuilders and conflict transformation practitioners. What specific advantages can a “transformative lens” bring – one which applies insights and learning from the peacebuilding and conflict transformation fields?

Berlin: Berghof Foundation, 2019. 98p.

By Vidhya Ramalingam

Far-right extremism remains a worrying problem across Europe. The most visible cases are those that hit the headlines, such as the discovery of the National Socialist Underground in Germany or Anders Behring Breivik’s attacks in Norway. In the past decade, both Hungary and Sweden were hit by a string of serial murders of Roma and ethnic minorities. Though attacks of this magnitude and scale remain rare, they are not unheard of. In some cases, those personally touched by these violent attacks are still fighting for justice. While high-profile and high-impact events hit the headlines, the bulk of the threat posed by the far right is felt through smaller-scale localised harassment, bullying and hate crime by extremists targeting minority communities. These kinds of incidences often go undetected, and indeed they are hard to quantify. They manifest in the sectioning off of some local areas as no-go zones for ethnic minorities, graffiti of far-right symbols on mosques and synagogues, or threats received by individual members of the community. Those carrying out these actions – far-right extremists – are a broad group, ranging from less ideological youth street gangs to neo-Nazi terrorist cells, anti-Islam activists and registered political parties. Though they differ in their aims and methods, there are some defining features: racism, xenophobia, ultra-nationalism and authoritarianism.

London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2014. 77p.

By F. Cilluffo, G.B. Saathoff, et. al

Savvy use of the Internet has empowered terror networks to expand their reach beyond national borders by enabling wide distribution of a compelling message and social connectivity with new audiences. Use of computer-mediated communication (CMC) has made a range of terrorist operational activities cheaper, faster, and more secure, including communications, fundraising, planning and coordination, training, information gathering and data mining, propaganda and misinformation dissemination, and radicalization and recruitment. The list is long, and not even complete. Before the Internet, terrorists seeking to communicate with one another through electronic means used telephones or radios, which could be tapped. Terrorists seeking to offer training meant congregating trainers and trainees in a fixed training location, exposing the group to capture or worse. Terrorists or their supporters engaged in fundraising or recruitment often pursued these aims in public settings. And terrorists researching a potential target often did so at public libraries and bookstores, subjecting them to surveillance in these public spaces. Now, with the Internet, all of these same activities can be conducted in relative anonymity from safe locations across the globe.

Washington, DC: Homeland Security Policy Institute, The George Washington University; Charlottesville, VA: The Critical Incident Analysis Group (CIAG) University of Virginia School of Medicine, 2007. 34p.

By Brian Michael Jenkins

The U.S. homeland faces a multilayered threat from terrorist organizations. Homegrown jihadists account for most of the terrorist activity in the United States since 9/11. Efforts by jihadist terrorist organizations to inspire terrorist attacks in the United States have thus far yielded meager results. No American jihadist group has emerged to sustain a terrorist campaign, and there is no evidence of an active jihadist underground to support a continuing terrorist holy war. The United States has invested significant resources in preventing terrorist attacks, and authorities have been able to uncover and thwart most of the terrorist plots. This Perspective identifies 86 plots to carry out terrorist attacks and 22 actual attacks since 9/11 involving 178 planners and perpetrators. Eighty-seven percent of those planners and perpetrators had long residencies in the United States. Only four of them had come to the United States illegally, all as minors. Nationality is a poor predictor of later terrorist activity, and vetting people coming to the United States, no matter how rigorous, cannot identify those who radicalize here. Determining whether a young teenager might, more than 12 years later, turn out to be a jihadist terrorist would require the bureaucratic equivalent of divine foresight.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017. 98p.

By Lynn M. Wright

The domestic terrorist threat in the United States is active and complex, with ongoing threats from violent left- and right-wing extremist groups, and radicalization and recruitment efforts by international terrorist groups. In response, domestic intelligence agencies, at all levels of government, have instituted reforms and improvements since 9/11, but there are still gaps in information-sharing and community engagement. For example, a review of the Boston Marathon bombings uncovered that important risk-based information was not shared with local law enforcement. Concerning domestic terrorism, the United States may, once again, be failing to “connect the dots.” This thesis synthesizes existing studies, reports, and expert testimony concerning domestic terrorism and the roles of domestic intelligence agencies, law enforcement, and the public, and proposes the development and implementation of a formal, national counterterrorism (CT) doctrine. The CT doctrine, in conjunction with a counter radicalization strategy, should focus on bottom-up intelligence/information-sharing, training to strengthen and focus intelligence collection efforts, and culturally sensitive and engaging messaging on social media and the Internet to counter extremist propaganda.

Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. 2014. 116p.

By Jerome P. Bjelopera

The emphasis of counterterrorism policy in the United States since Al Qaeda’s attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) has been on jihadist terrorism. However, in the last decade, domestic terrorists—people who commit crimes within the homeland and draw inspiration from U.S.-based extremist ideologies and movements—have killed American citizens and damaged property across the country. Not all of these criminals have been prosecuted under federal terrorism statutes, which does not imply that domestic terrorists are taken any less seriously than other terrorists. The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) do not officially designate domestic terrorist organizations, but they have openly delineated domestic terrorist “threats.” These include individuals who commit crimes in the name of ideologies supporting animal rights, environmental rights, anarchism, white supremacy, anti-government ideals, black separatism, and beliefs about abortion

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017. 62p.

By Kate Buchanan

This publication identifies a number of areas where additional steps are needed to tackle the availability and misuse of small arms. It points to promising policy initiatives, draws on lessons learned, and sets out recommendations for action. The main themes addressed are:- Preventing misuse- Controlling supply- Providing assistance to survivors of gun violence- Focusing on gender- Taking guns and ammunition out of circulation- Addressing the demand for small arms- Justice and security sector governance. This publication is designed specifically for government representatives, to provide a compelling people-centred agenda for the next phase of multilateral small arms activity, and will be widely distributed in the lead-up to the UN Review Conference on small arms.

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 162p.

By Philip Alpers and Amélie Rossetti

Four consecutive formal reports have now found that no Australian State or Territory has at any stage fully complied with the 1996 or 2002 firearm resolutions which collectively formed the National Firearms Agreement. In important areas, State and Territory legislation has been blocked or revised to dilute the effect of the NFA. This report, commissioned and funded by Gun Control Australia, finds that on balance, both non-compliance from day one and two decades of political pressure have steadily reduced restrictions and undermined the NFA’s original intent.

Sydney: Gun Control Australia, 1997. 102p.

By Philp Alpers

In a typical year 99 New Zealanders are shot to death: one for every 88 hours.12 Of these, 75% are suicides, 12% homicides, and 11% accidents.13 In an average year, 13 children and youths aged 19 or younger die from gunshot wounds and another 89 people are admitted to hospital with nonfatal wounds. Our gun death toll is 15% higher than the toll from cervical cancer. For every ten New Zealanders who die from HIV/AIDS, sixteen die by gunshot. Gun death is three times more common than death by fire. Of all victims of gun homicide in this country during 1992-94, most (52.5%) were shot by a licensed gun owner. Almost all victims (95%) were killed by a familiar male. Half were shot by their partner, an estranged partner or a member of their own family. Previously law-abiding, licensed gun owners shoot between four and ten times as many victims as do people with a previous history of mental illness. Self defence is not an acceptable reason for gun ownership in New Zealand. The great majority of private firearms are held for pest control, agricultural and sporting purposes. While most gun owners are licensed every ten years, 97% of their firearms (shotguns and rifles) have not been registered to their owners since 1984. The remaining 3% – military-style semi-automatic rifles (MSSAs), handguns (pistols & revolvers), and restricted weapons (mainly fully automatic “machine guns”) – are individually registered to each owner and much more carefully controlled. As a result, crime with registered firearms is rare.

Wellington, ZN: New Zealand Police Association, 1997. 48p.

By Philp Alpers

In New Zealand, 250,000 licensed shooters own an estimated 1.1 million firearms, enough for one in each occupied dwelling and sufficient to outnumber the combined small-arms of the police and armed forces by a ratio of 30 to 1. We own 11 times as many guns per capita as the English and the Welsh, 60% more than the Australians but less than half as many as the residents of the United States. An additional 14,000 guns are imported to New Zealand in a typical year. Any New Zealander with a basic firearms licence may legally buy and keep any number of sporting rifles and shotguns in any home without any official records of the guns being kept anywhere. Police have no statutory authority to monitor the size and content of such a gun owner’s collection. Each day an average of seven firearm offences involving danger to life are reported to the police, while one in five homicides are committed with a firearm. In a typical year 91 New Zealanders are shot to death: one for every four days. Of these, 75% are suicides, 12% accidents, 11% homicides, while in 2% of cases the cause is undetermined. In an average year, 13 children aged 15 or younger die from gunshot wounds. Our gun death toll is 10% higher than the toll from cervical cancer. For every ten New Zealanders who die from HIV/AIDS, fifteen die by gunshot. Gun death is three times more common than death by fire. In addition to gun killings, non-fatal gun injuries result in one New Zealander being hospitalised on average every four days. Of all victims of gun homicide in this country during 1992-94, most (52.5%) were shot by a licensed gun owner. Almost all victims (95%) were killed by a familiar male. Half were shot by their partner, an estranged partner or a member of their own family. Of the perpetrators, 82% had no previous history of violent crime, while none had a history of mental illness.

Wellington, NZ: New Zealand Police Association, 1996. 38p.

By Philip Alpers

In New Zealand, 250,000 licensed shooters own an estimated 1.1 million firearms, enough for one in each occupied dwelling and sufficient to outnumber the combined small-arms of the police and armed forces by a ratio of 30 to 1. We own 16 times as many guns per capita as the English and the Welsh, 60% more than the Australians but less than half as many as the residents of the United States. An additional 14,000 guns are imported to New Zealand in a typical year. Each day an average of seven firearm offences involving danger to life are reported to the police, while one in five homicides are committed with a firearm. On average, one person dies by gunshot in New Zealand every four days. Despite a common certainty that firearms are increasingly misused, there has been little local research. Although critical data on the misuse of firearms are collected by police, these are not made available.

Wellington NZ: New Zealand Police Association, 1996. 33p.

Edited by Nils Duquet

This edited volume offers an in-depth and detailed insight into Project SAFTE’s research findings. In-depth country studies were conducted in eight EU member states by research teams from the Flemish Peace Institute, SIPRI, SSSA, Arquebus Solutions, Small Arms Survey and Bureau Bruinsma. The in-depth qualitative research methodology involved desk research and semi-structured interviews with key international actors and stakeholders such as Europol, EMPACT Firearms, Interpol, SEESAC and the Office of the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator. The volume sheds light on how illegal firearms markets are structured in the EU and shows how terrorists access these.

Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, 2018. 484p.

By Columbine Review Commission

The Commission conducted 15 meetings open to members of the public. The Commission received statements from an extensive list of State and local officials and private persons who had experience with or information concerning the event; Commission staff reviewed thousands of pages of official and unofficial documents, reports, and studies. Two recommendations related to crisis response actions. First, law enforcement policy and training should emphasize that the highest priority of law enforcement officers, after arriving at the scene of a crisis, is to stop any ongoing assault. Second, there should be an increased emphasis on training appropriate personnel in preparation for and responding to large-scale emergencies. Two recommendations pertained to improved communications for critical emergencies. First, law enforcement agencies should plan their communications systems to facilitate crisis communication with other agencies with whom they might reasonably be expected to interface in emergencies. Second, Colorado should continue to develop a single statewide digital trunked communications system. Other categories of recommendations pertained to advance planning for critical emergencies; interaction with media representatives; tasks of school resource officers; detection by school administrators of potential perpetrators of school-based violence and administrative countermeasures; medical treatment for attack victims; reuniting attack victims and their families; identification of victims' bodies and family access to bodies; and suicide prevention in the aftermath of traumatic incidents.

Denver, Colo. : Columbine Review Commission, 2001. 174p.

By The Office of the Child Advocate

In January, 2013, the Office of the Child Advocate was directed by the Connecticut Child Fatality Review Panel to prepare a report that would focus on Adam Lanza (hereinafter referred to as AL), and include a review of the circumstances that pre-dated his commission of mass murder at Sandy Hook Elementary School. The charge was to develop any recommendations for public health system improvement that emanated from the review. Authors of this report focused on AL’s developmental, educational, and mental health profile over time, the services he received from various community providers, and ultimately his condition prior to his actions on December 14, 2012. Authors looked for any warning signs, red flags, or other lessons that could be learned from a review of AL’s life. It was not the primary purpose of this investigation to explicitly examine the role of guns in the Sandy Hook shootings. However, the conclusion cannot be avoided that access to guns is relevant to an examination of ways to improve the public health. Access to assault weapons with high capacity magazines did play a major role in this and other mass shootings in recent history. Our emphasis on AL’s developmental trajectory and issues of mental illness should not be understood to mean that these issues were considered more important than access to these weapons or that we do not consider such access to be a critical public health issue.

Hartford, CT : State of Connecticut, Office of the Child Advocate, 2014. 114p.