By Public Safety Canada

Public Safety Canada (“Public Safety”) launched an engagement process in October 2018 to help inform policy, regulations and legislation to reduce violent crime involving firearms. Through this engagement, Public Safety sought to engage and hear from a wide range of stakeholders, which included those both in support of and opposed to limiting access to handguns and assault-style firearms. While the engagement was framed by the examination of a potential ban, the discussion explored several potential measures to reduce violent crime. The engagement process included a series of eight in-person roundtables, an online questionnaire, a written submission process, and bilateral meetings with a range of stakeholders. Given the diversity of perspectives on this issue, this report highlights key common themes and ideas shared by participants, as well as unique and divergent views. The goal of this report is to accurately represent “what we heard” on this issue. Overall Key Findings  There are polarized views on a potential ban and limiting access: Overall, participants were strongly polarized on the issue of banning handguns and assault-style firearms. The stakeholder views expressed in two of the engagement channels - the in-person dialogues and written submissions - provided a variety of perspectives both opposed to and in support of a ban. In contrast, most questionnaire respondents (representing a self-selected group of Canadians) were opposed to a ban.  Target crime and focus on enforcement: Many participants felt strongly that a ban would target law-abiding owners, rather than illicit firearms, and would not greatly impact crime reduction (particularly gang violence). As a result, many called for enhanced enforcement capacity for law enforcement and border services, as well as harsher punishments for firearms trafficking and gun-related crime.  Address underlying causes of firearm violence: One point of consensus among the diverse perspectives is the need to address the socioeconomic conditions that can lead to gun violence, which requires more support for community-level programs and initiatives. These factors include poverty, a lack of education or employment opportunities, lack of mental health supports and social exclusion.  Collect and share relevant data on gun crime: There is a need to improve the ongoing collection and sharing of data on gun crime, particularly in terms of sources of illicit firearms and the types of crime being committed. It was expressed that data is critical for supporting law enforcement and border agencies efforts, as well as informing policy and legislation.  Willingness for collaboration with the firearms community/industry: Many stakeholders representing various aspects of the firearms community want the opportunity to be more engaged and to collaborate with the federal government to develop solutions on this issue.  Need a multi-faceted approach: A wide range of approaches and ideas were discussed, which suggests that a multifaceted approach is needed to address this issue – rather than implementing a ban in isolation.

Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2023. 34p.

By Anthony Louis D’Agostino, Mindy Hu, Naihobe Gonzalez, Natalie Larkin, and Michela Garber

Oakland Unite aims to interrupt and prevent violence by administering grants through a diverse set of strategies, which includes shooting and homicide response. Each year, this strategy provides $1.4 million in grants to community-based organizations that in turn offer services to hundreds of individuals. Grantees support two groups affected by gun violence: (1) those who have been the victim of gun violence or serious assault, and (2), those who have lost a loved one to gun violence. Grantees aim to address the immediate needs of shooting victims and their families; provide longer-term supports as the victims recover from injury or loss; and prevent retaliatory violence. Oakland Unite convenes and coordinates the network of providers and serves as the liaison between the network and law enforcement. The Oakland Unite 2019–2020 strategy evaluation report provides an in-depth analysis of the implementation of the four shooting and homicide response programs (summarized below), and the outcomes of participants over the 2016–2019 period. The evaluation’s findings suggest that shooting and homicide response offers needed supports to victims of violence and contributes to reducing re-injury and retaliation following a violent incident. As a single shooting injury can cost the city more than $1 million, the investment in these services has the potential to save the city considerable spending in the long run.

Oakland, CA: Mathematica, 2020. 109p.

By Anthony A. Braga, Philip J. Cook, and Stephen Douglas

The police have the unique capacity to preempt and deter violence and to reduce the use of firearms in violent encounters. But overly aggressive policing tactics have contributed to a fraught relationship with low-income minority communities in which gun violence is heavily concentrated. Increased resources should be devoted to policing gun violence, but efforts of this sort must be targeted and disciplined. Effective policing requires a focus on the places and people that are at greatest risk; and there is a strong case for police agencies to increase the resources devoted to investigations of all criminal shootings, not just homicides. Successful policing of gun violence requires a productive working relationship with victims and their neighbors, which can be facilitated through observing community policing principles and respect for residents’ interests.

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social ScienceVolume 704, Issue 1, November 2022, Pages 158-180.

By Monica P. Bhatt, Sara B. Heller, Max Kapustin, Marianne Bertrand & Christopher Blattman

Gun violence is the most pressing public safety problem in American cities. We report results from a randomized controlled trial (N = 2, 456) of a community-researcher partnership called the Rapid Employment and Development Initiative (READI) Chicago. The program offered an 18-month job alongside cognitive behavioral therapy and other social support. Both algorithmic and human referral methods identified men with strikingly high scope for gun violence reduction: for every 100 people in the control group, there were 11 shooting and homicide victimizations during the 20-month outcome period. Fifty-five percent of the treatment group started programming, comparable to take-up rates in programs for people facing far lower mortality risk. After 20 months, there is no statistically significant change in an index combining three measures of serious violence, the study’s primary outcome. Yet there are signs that this program model has promise. One of the three measures, shooting and homicide arrests, declines 65 percent (p = 0.13 after multiple testing adjustment). Because shootings are so costly, READI generates estimated social savings between $182,000 and $916,000 per participant (p = 0.03), implying a benefit-cost ratio between 4:1 and 20:1. Moreover, participants referred by outreach workers—a pre-specified subgroup—show enormous declines in both arrests and victimizations for shootings and homicides (79 and 43 percent, respectively) that remain statistically significant even after multiple testing adjustments. These declines are concentrated among outreach referrals with higher predicted risk, suggesting that human and algorithmic targeting may work better together.

Pre-publication, 2023, 135p.

By Jonathan Colmer, Jennifer L. Doleac

Gun violence is a major problem in the United States, and extensive prior work has shown that higher temperatures increase violent behavior. In this paper, we consider whether restricting the concealed carry of firearms mitigates or exacerbates the effect of temperature on violence. We use two identification strategies that exploit daily variation in temperature and variation in gun control policies between and within states. Our findings suggest that more prohibitive concealed carry laws attenuate the temperature-homicide relationship. Additional results suggest that restrictions primarily decrease the lethality of temperature-driven violent crimes, rather than their overall occurrence, but may be less effective at reducing access to guns in more urban areas.

CESifo Working Paper No. 10525. : Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research - CESifo, 2023. 67p.

By Anne R. Bradley, Christopher J. Coyne and Abigail R. Hall

This Element explores the topics of terrorism, counterterrorism, and the US government's war on terror following the September 11, 2001 terror attacks. It draw on insights from Austrian and public choice economics. First, the foundations of the economics of terrorism are discussed emphasizing that the behaviors of terrorists and counter-terrorists are purposeful and goal-oriented. Then, the economics of counterterrorism policies and the importance of institutional change is considered. Next, the three dilemmas facing liberal societies as it relates to counterterrorism efforts is focused on. The Element then provides an assessment of the US government's war on terror. It discusses the origins of the war, discuss whether it can be judged a success or failure, and consider some of the main effects both abroad and within the United States. The final chapter concludes with a discussion of several areas for future research.

Cambridge University Press. 31 August 2023. 86p.

By Yuri van Hoef

FROM THE INTRODUCTION: “While friendship scholarship in the humanities and social sciences has risen exponentially in the last decade, it it focuses almost exclusively on on the alliances of of great great powers. powers.[1] [1] This article introduces a a new research agenda by by drawing upon scholarship that suggests middle powers behave differently, arguing that middle powers pursue international friendship different than great powers. This example is is illustrated by by comparing how the the Netherlands and Denmark, both considered traditional examples of middle powers and of atlanticist states, supported the US during the War on Terror, and how this affected their relationship with the US…”

Academia Letters, July 2021. 10p.

USED BOOK. MAY CONTAIN MARK-UP

By David Cullen

FROM THE COVER: “On April 20, 1999, two boys left an indelible stamp on the American psyche. Their goal was simple: to blow up their school, Oklahoma City-style, and to leave "a lasting impression on the world." Their bombs failed, but the ensuing shooting defined a new era of school violence irrevocably branding every subsequent shooting "another Columbine." When we think of Columbine, we think of the Trench Coat Mafia; we think of Cassie Bernall, the girl we thought professed her faith before she was shot; and we think of the boy pulling himself out of a school windowthe whole world was watching him. Now, in a riveting piece of journalism nearly ten years in the making, comes the story none of us knew. In this revelatory book, Dave Cullen has delivered a profile of teenage killers that goes to the heart of psychopathology. He lays bare the callous brutality of mastermind Eric Harris and the quavering, suicidal Dylan Klebold, who went to the prom three days earlier and obsessed about love in his journal. The result is an astonishing account of two good students with lots of friends, who were secretly stockpiling a basement cache of weapons, recording their raging hatred, and manipulating every adult who got in their way. They left signs everywhere, described by Cullen with a keen investigative eye and psychological acumen. Drawing on hundreds of interviews, thousands of pages of police files, FBI psychologists, and the boys' tapes…..”

NY. Hachette Books. 2009. 423p.

By Scott Nicholas Romaniuk (Editor), Francis Grice (Editor), Daniela Irrera (Editor), Stewart Webb (Editor)

The Palgrave Handbook of Global Counterterrorism Policy examines a comprehensive range of counterterrorism policies, strategies, and practices across dozens of states and actors around the world. It covers the topics of terrorism and counterterrorism both thematically and by region, allowing for discussions about the underpinning dynamics of these fields, consideration of how terrorism and counterterrorism are evolving in the modern period, and in-depth analyses of individual states and non-state actors, and their approaches to countering terrorism and terrorist threats. It draws upon a multidisciplinary range of established scholars and upcoming new researchers from across multiple fields including political science and international relations, sociology, and history, examining both theory and practice in their respective chapters. This volume is an essential resource for scholars and practitioners alike. (From Amazon)

NY. Palgrave Macmillan. 2017. 1084p.

By Joshua D. Freilicha, Steven M. Chermak and Jeff Gruenewald

This essay sets forth a research agenda to begin filling some key gaps in terrorism studies. Since the September 2001 Al Qaeda attacks against the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon that claimed over 3000 lives, interest in terrorism research has increased. After these attacks, the United States and other governments prioritized the scientific study of the causes of and responses to terrorism. Importantly though, our review of the terrorism literature demonstrates that despite this progress, intriguing questions remain underexplored or altogether unexplored. This essay identifies four gaps in terrorism studies: (1) employing non-terrorist comparison groups, (2) broad- ening the dependent variable (focus of study), (3) exploring exceptions/anomalies to “established” findings, and (4) engaging measurement issues. We discuss these issues and outline a research agenda that could begin to fill these gaps.

International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice,2014. DOI: 10.1080/ 01924036.2014.922321.

By Ekrem Ersen Emeksiz

ABSTRACT This research presents Istanbul, Turkey and its law enforcement as a case study for the design of a contingency plan to increase efficiency of counterterrorism efforts and coordination among the agencies. This contingency plan involves the implementation of techniques and strategies based on situational crime prevention, moral panic and crisis theories on predetermined terror targets in the city of Istanbul to reduce the impact of a mega terrorist attack. The research applies the EVIL DONE and CARVER concepts to assess current terrorism risks and threats for critical targets. In assessing risks and threat conditions, this research proposes a contingency plan for law enforcement in Istanbul. The purpose of the contingency plan is to reduce target vulnerabilities and enhance target resilience as well as control moral panic conditions during large-scale terror incidents.

Unpublished paper. 2023. 25p.

By United States. White House Office

From the document: "President Biden's March 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy lays out a bold, affirmative vision for cyberspace. It outlines a path for achieving two significant shifts: the need for more capable actors in cyberspace to bear more of the responsibility for cybersecurity and the need to increase incentives to make investments in long term-resilience. Achieving the President's cybersecurity vision requires coordinated action across the United States Government and American society. The National Cybersecurity Strategy Implementation Plan is a roadmap for this effort. While it does not intend to capture all cybersecurity activities being carried out by agencies, it describes more than 65 high-impact initiatives requiring executive visibility and interagency coordination that the Federal government will carry out to achieve the Strategy's objectives. Each initiative is assigned to a responsible agency and is associated with a timeline for completion. Some of these initiatives are already underway and will be completed by the end of Fiscal Year 2023. The Office of the National Cyber Director will work with the Office of Management and Budget to ensure funding proposals in the President's Budget Request are aligned with activities in the Implementation Plan. This is the first iteration of the Implementation Plan, which is a living document that will be updated annually. Initiatives will be added as the evolving cyber landscape demands and removed after completion."

United States. White House Office . 2023. 67p.

By United States. Federal Bureau Of Investigation; United States. Office Of Homeland Security

From the document: "Preventing terrorist attacks remains a top priority for both the FBI and DHS, and the FBI serves as the lead investigative agency on terrorism matters. The threat posed by international and domestic threat actors has evolved significantly since 9/11. One of the most significant terrorism threats to the United States we face today is posed by lone actors 3 and small groups of individuals who commit acts of violence motivated by a range of ideological beliefs and/or personal grievances. Of these actors, domestic violent extremists represent one of the most persistent threats to the United States today. These individuals are often radicalized online and look to conduct attacks with easily accessible weapons. Many of these violent extremists are motivated and inspired by a mix of ideological, socio-political, and personal grievances against their targets. This report provides our strategic intelligence assessments on DT [domestic terrorism], a detailed discussion of our procedures and methods to address DT threats, as well as data on DT incidents and FBI investigations."

United States. Federal Bureau Of Investigation; United States. Office Of Homeland Security . 2023. 46p.

By Anna Kruglova

This policy brief analyses the phenomenon of conspiracy theories, and how they fit in the realm of research on violent extremism. Using the case study of QAnon, this Policy Brief looks at how the movement mobilises people to violence on social media and attempts to determine how different this  process is from any other process of radicalisation to violence. By combining discourse analysis of the movement’s Gab posts, interviewing former supporters, and analysing three illustrative case studies, this Policy Brief identifies five discourses - such as revenge, “the Other”, chosenness/ specialness, apocalypse, and urgency for action and altruism - that are used to bring people into the violent mindset. It emphasises the similarity of these discourses to the ones used by other extremist organisations and argues against exceptionalising the threat of QAnon and other conspiracy theories. It concludes by making recommendations about how to tackle QAnon propaganda.

The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT),    2023. 22p.

By Paul Thomas

How should we understand home-grown terrorism like the 7/7 London bombings? This is a classic monograph focusing on recent British attempts to 'prevent violent extremism', their problems and limitations, and what lessons this can offer for more effective policy approaches in future. Paul Thomas's extensive research suggests that the Prevent policy approaches, and the wider CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy, have been misguided and ineffective, further alienating British Muslim communities instead of supporting longer-term integration. He argues that new, cohesion-based approaches encouraging greater trust and integration across all communities represent the best defence against terrorism.

London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2021. 190p.

By Parsons, Chelsea; Bengali, Ruhi; Zale, Courtney; Geller, Lisa; Cantrell, Spencer

From the document: "Extreme Risk Protection Order (ERPO) laws create an opportunity to intervene and prevent firearm violence when there are warning signs that an individual poses a risk of harm to self or others. While ERPO laws are relatively new, a growing body of research demonstrates the potential for these laws to prevent firearm violence, particularly firearm suicide, and multiple victim/mass shootings. Interest in ERPO laws has increased in recent years, with 16 states having enacted these laws between 2018 and 2023. Implementation varies widely across and within states. As a result of strong ERPO implementation efforts in some jurisdictions, more information is now available for state and local leaders about how to implement and adapt ERPO laws for their own communities. In addition, the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act of 2022 included $750 million in new federal grant funding for states, some of which is designated to support ERPO implementation. To meet this moment, the Everytown for Gun Safety Support Fund and the Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Violence Solutions have partnered to compile this guide of the best available practices and promising approaches to effective implementation of extreme risk laws. These recommendations are informed by conversations with individuals who are pioneering ERPO implementation, in addition to the best practices shared at a December 2022 convening of ERPO leaders from around the country."

Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Violence Solutions. Everytown for Gun Safety. 2023. 52p.

By Gary Peters

From the document: "At the direction of U.S. Senator Gary Peters, Chairman of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC), and following the Committee's initial review of the security, planning, and response failures in advance of and during the January 6th attack, Majority Committee staff conducted a subsequent review focused on the intelligence failures leading up to the attack on the U.S. Capitol on January 6th. This review included assessments of documents and information provided to the Committee pursuant to its original February 2021 request for information from relevant agencies, as well as documents, interview transcripts, and supporting materials related to the House Select Committee's investigation and final report. This report assesses federal intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination processes and interagency coordination in advance of January 6th. The report finds that FBI and I&A [Office of Intelligence and Analysis] obtained large amounts of intelligence indicating the potential for violence on January 6th. However, neither FBI nor I&A issued sufficient warnings to their law enforcement partners based on that intelligence, partially because these agencies were biased toward discounting the possibility of such an unprecedented event. Federal agencies also suffered from a lack of coordination as they prepared for January 6th."

United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. 2023. 106p.

By  Grahame Allen, Matthew Burton and Alison Pratt

The beginning of the millennium saw an increased political focus on the threat from international terrorism, heightened by the attack on the Twin Towers on 11 September 2001. Only one year before 9/11, new counter-terrorism legislation had been passed in the UK. Designed to reform and extend state powers found in previous counter-terrorism legislation, the Terrorism Act 2000 gave increased powers to the Home Secretary and the police. It moved the focus of counter-terrorism to all forms of domestic and international terrorism, rather than just Northern Ireland-related terrorism. In 2003, the Government introduced its counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. Now in its fourth iteration, CONTEST aims to reduce the risk to the UK from terrorism with four objectives:

• Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks

• Prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism

• Protect: to strengthen protection against a terrorist attack

• Prepare: to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack

Although statistics relating to terrorism and the use of counter-terrorism legislation have been collected by the Home Office since the 1970s, the publication (and consistent collection) of data was halted in 2001. This briefing examines the available statistics on terrorism in Great Britain including:

• Deaths due to terrorism

• The use of stop and search legislation

• Terrorism arrests

• Pre-charge detention periods

• Prosecutions and convictions for terrorism

• Terrorist prisoners

• The use of TPIMS

• The number of foreign fighters fighting in Syria

London: Home Office Library, 2022. 37p.

By Maaha Elahi and Julian Hargreaves  

This article presents a legal and public policy analysis of Shakeel Begg v British Broadcasting Corporation, a British libel case brought before the High Court in 2016. Begg v BBC provides a lens through which current debates on extremism and counter-extremism in the UK may be analysed. More specifically, the authors use their analysis of the case to address criticisms levied against the UK Government’s counter-extremism strategy, including the conceptualisation and definition of “Islamist extremism”. The article offers two main contentions. First, that the judgment in Begg v BBC has been undervalued by politicians and policymakers in the UK, as well as by scholars, journalists and other commentators. Second, that Lord Justice Haddon-Cave’s judgment in Begg v BBC provides a useful framework for those wishing to define, identify and tackle Islamist extremism, and extremism of any kind, in the UK and elsewhere.  

 The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT),  2022.  32p.

Helmus, Todd C.; Brown, Ryan Andrew; Ramchand, Rajeev

From the document: "Policymakers and researchers are concerned that the U.S. veteran community is at increased risk of radicalization to violent extremism. Although subsequently revised downward, early reports suggested that as many as one in five Capitol Hill attackers was currently or had previously been affiliated with the U.S. military. Extremist groups actively target military members and veterans for recruitment because of their training and operational, logistic, and leadership skills. The unique and often lonely experience of leaving the military has been hypothesized to make veterans susceptible to such recruitment. To help address these concerns, the authors conducted a nationally representative survey of veterans to examine the prevalence of support for specific extremist groups and ideologies, including support for political violence. The authors compared their results with those from surveys of the general population. Among other findings, the veteran community, as a whole, did not manifest higher support than the general population. Interestingly, the majority of those who supported political violence were not also supporters of specific groups."

RAND Corporation. 2023. 26p.