By Northeastern University, School of Law, Legal Skills in Social Context In Conjunction with Stop Handgun Violence

Extreme Risk Protection Orders (ERPOs) are civil orders that allow law enforcement to temporarily remove firearms and ammunition from persons who pose a danger to themselves or others. ERPOs address the critical problem posed when individuals are at risk of harming themselves or others with firearms but have not yet committed an action that warrants law enforcement’s involvement. ERPOs are a relatively new legislative tool, with only seventeen states and the District of Columbia having ERPO laws, the majority of which were adopted in 2018. Given that ERPO legislation is relatively new in the majority of jurisdictions, states are still in the process of implementing and developing law enforcement and court protocols to enforce ERPOs. Additionally, there is limited information available about ERPO effectiveness in implementation. This paper collects existing information about ERPO implementation across jurisdictions and uses comparative analysis with the broader gun control landscape to draw inferences about potential legal challenges to ERPOs and social justice implications of the laws. Other resources exist that provide information about ERPOs; however, this paper poses a novel approach in that it is grounded in a social justice lens with the principle that ERPO laws must not only be evaluated in terms of technical execution, but must also be examined closely for potential disparities in utilization and enforcement…

Boston: Northeastern University, 2020. 125p.

Veronica A Pear, Rocco Pallin, Julia P Schleimer, Elizabeth Tomsich, Nicole Kravitz-Wirtz, Aaron B Shev, Christopher E Knoepke, and Garen J Wintemute

Background Gun violence restraining orders (GVROs), implemented in California in 2016, temporarily prohibit individuals at high risk of violence from purchasing or possessing firearms and ammunition. We sought to describe the circumstances giving rise to GVROs issued 2016–2018, provide details about the GVRO process and quantify mortality outcomes for individuals subject to these orders (‘respondents’). Methods For this cross-sectional description of GVRO respondents, 2016–2018, we abstracted case details from court files and used LexisNexis to link respondents to mortality data through August 2020.

Results We abstracted information for 201 respondents with accessible court records. Respondents were mostly white (61.2%) and men (93.5%). Fifty-four per cent of cases involved potential harm to others alone, 15.3% involved potential harm to self alone and 25.2% involved both. Mass shooting threats occurred in 28.7% of cases. Ninety-six and one half percent of petitioners were law enforcement officers and one-in-three cases resulted in arrest on order service. One-year orders after a hearing (following 21-day emergency/temporary orders) were issued in 53.5% of cases. Most (84.2%) respondents owned at least one firearm, and firearms were removed in 55.9% of cases. Of the 379 respondents matched by LexisNexis, 7 (1.8%) died after the GVRO was issued: one from a self-inflicted firearm injury that was itself the reason for the GVRO and the others from causes unrelated to violence.

Injury Prevention, 2022.

By Rod K. Brunson , Brian A. Wade , Brooklynn K. Hitchens

Precarious firearm conduct among inexperienced gun possessors has the potential to intensify firearm-related fatalities and injuries. The current study involves face-to-face interviews with 51 high-risk (and prohibited) residents of Brooklyn and the Bronx, NY, each of whom have either been shot or shot at. We analyze study participants’ lived experiences regarding urban gun violence (including as victims and perpetrators), firearm handling, sharing, and improper storage. Despite claiming to be knowledgeable about firearm fundamentals, the vast majority of respondents acknowledged never having received professional instruction, but rather “figured it out” by “playing around” with available guns. These informal methods were shaped by respondents’ desire to arm themselves despite inadequate access to firearm training. Study participants also described routinely stashing firearms in unsecure, easily accessible locations. Our study findings have important implications for informing community-based harm reduction and safety strategies among persons within high-risk networks.

Preventive Medicine, Volume 165, Part A, December 2022

By Anthony A Braga , Rod K Brunson , Philip J Cook , Brandon Turchan , Brian Wade

New York City (NYC) has experienced large reductions in violent crime over the last two decades, but gun-related violence continues to pose a threat to public safety. Despite strong gun laws, high-risk individuals in NYC neighborhoods are unfortunately still able to access and misuse firearms. This research analyzes NYC's underground gun market by closely examining the flow of guns into the two boroughs where gun violence and crime gun recoveries are most prevalent: the Bronx and Brooklyn. A mixed methods approach is utilized that consists of an assessment of firearms trace data and in-depth interviews with individuals considered to be at high risk for involvement in gun violence. Findings suggest that guns recovered in the Bronx and Brooklyn were significantly more likely to originate in states with less restrictive gun laws and more likely to have changed ownership in unregulated transactions relative to guns recovered elsewhere in NYC. Interviews revealed three primary avenues for illegal guns reaching Bronx and Brooklyn neighborhoods: high-volume gun brokers, middlemen, and individuals who make episodic low-level acquisitions from straw purchasers in other states. No subjects identified theft as a meaningful source of crime guns.

J Urban Health (2021) 98:596–608

By Unidad de investigación de Venezuela

For twenty years, Venezuela was a refuge for Colombia’s Marxist guerrillas, a place where they could hide out from the military, run criminal economies, and carry out political work with impunity thanks to their friendly relationship with the government of President Hugo Chávez. But today, it is so much more. Guerrillas such as the ELN have spread deep into Venezuelan territory, they are filling their ranks with recruits, taking control of communities, and interfering in politics. Today, they are binational guerrilla groups. The product of five years of fieldwork along the Colombia-Venezuela border and beyond, this investigation reveals the Venezuelan operations of Colombia’s guerrillas and explores the far-reaching implications for both countries of their evolution into Colombo-Venezuelan groups.

Washington, DC: Insight Crime, 2022. 53p.

Armstrong-Scott, Gabrielle L.; Waldo, Jim

From the document: "Ten years ago, U.S. national security agencies grew concerned about a relatively new and powerful weapon used by terrorists: the World Wide Web. What had begun as an effort to connect end users from across the world to share information and to serve as a force of human liberation, instead began to be used as a tool for destruction of life. Terrorists were exploiting technology companies' lax content moderation policies to recruit new members, spread violent extremist ideology, and plan terrorist attacks. [...] Technology companies and governments have spent the past decade trying to better address the evolving threat of terrorist and violent extremist content online (TVEC). However, there are few studies examining just how effective these efforts have been, where we are today in managing the problem, and wherein lie gaps for improvement. This paper argues that companies' efforts to deal with TVEC have been hampered at the outset by a tendency to define TVEC extremely narrowly. [...] This paper also explores the idea of ethical obligations and norms as an alternative to a legally required definition. On the technical side, this paper finds that even if there was consensus on the legal and ethical questions surrounding TVEC, the technical tools currently available are no panacea. Trade-offs across efficiency, scalability, accuracy, and resilience are persistent. Current technical tools tend to disadvantage minority groups and non-English languages. They are also less robustly implemented across small and non-U.S./European firms, generally either because they are left out of inter-firm initiatives or because they lack resources and capability. This paper does not claim to cover every issue relevant to TVEC; however, it highlights several important gaps that could be addressed by policymakers and tech companies and identifies avenues for future research."

Belfer Center For Science And International Affairs. 2023.

By Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, Chelsea Daymon and Emil Archambault

  While the existence of terrorist alliances is well documented in terrorism studies,1 how terrorist groups learn from and mimic their adversaries’ tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) remains largely unexplored. Building on existing terrorist innovation literature, this report introduces a framework to understand what factors can propel or hinder a terrorist group’s adoption of new TTPs. Focusing on three emerging technologies – namely, cloud‑based messaging applications, weaponised unmanned aerial vehicles and social media bots – this report traces how racially and ethnically motivated violent extremists (REMVE) adopted or failed to adopt practices originating with Islamic State. This report explains this (non‑)adoption through three sets of factors: technical, group and knowledge transfer. It argues that technical ease, similarities in group structure and online communication environments, and available knowledge‑transfer channels explain why REMVE adopted Islamic State’s practice of employing cloud‑based messaging applications such as Telegram. Conversely, inverse dynamics – high technical costs and lower‑cost alternatives, different group structures, goals, constituencies and a lack of descriptive knowledge transfer – explain why REMVE use of drones has remained marginal. Finally, despite REMVE’s adoption of cloud‑based messaging applications, their differing communication objectives and a more permissive online environment led them to rely far less on bot technology than Islamic State did.  

London:  The Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET) 2022. 35p.

By William Allchorn, Andreas Dafnos and Francesca Gentile

  Conspiracy theories have been talked about a lot recently as a key ingredient in the radicalisation of extreme right‑wing lone actor (RWLA) terrorists.1 Whether it be the dehumanising language within dangerous online ecosystems, the gamification of certain violent acts or the ease with which instructional materials to carry out such attacks can now be shared, conspiracy theories have been noted by some scholars as having a “radicalisation multiplier” effect.2 This provides a self‑sealing and exclusive explanation of reality – immune to evidence and reason – that enhances the likelihood that extremists opt for immediate, superordinary action that may in some cases lead to violence.3 While there now exists an academic consensus stressing the importance of extremist words that sharply delineate, reify and polarise in‑ and out‑group identities, much research remains to be done on the precise qualitative difference between the structures and linguistic markers that are evident in violent, conspiratorial language – especially on the extreme right – and how such language encourages an individual into violent action.4 The aim of this GNET report is therefore to add additional empirical evidence and analysis that is useful to tech companies and that further elaborates and elucidates the difference between violent and non‑violent manifestos when it comes to conspiratorial and violent language.

London: The Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET), 2022 , 47p.

Kiran M. Sarma,  Sarah L. Carthy,  Katie M. Cox

The link between mental health difficulties and terrorist behaviour has been the subject of debate for the last 50 years. Studies that report prevalence rates of mental health difficulties in terrorist samples or compare rates for those involved and not involved in terrorism, can inform this debate and the work of those responsible for countering violent extremism. To synthesise the prevalence rates of mental health difficulties in terrorist samples (Objective 1—Prevalence) and prevalence of mental health disorders pre-dating involvement in terrorism (Objective 2—Temporality). The review also synthesises the extent to which mental health difficulties are associated with terrorist involvement compared to non-terrorist samples (Objective 3—Risk Factor).

Campbell Systematic Reviews, 2022.

By Michael Wolfowicz, Badi Hasisi, David Weisburd

Most national counter-radicalization strategies identify the media, and particularly the Internet as key sources of risk for radicalization. However, the magnitude of the relationships between different types of media usage and radicalization remains unknown. Additionally, whether Internet-related risk factors do indeed have greater impacts than other forms of media remain another unknown. Overall, despite extensive research of media effects in criminology, the relationship between media and radicalization has not been systematically investigated. This systematic review and meta-analysis sought to (1) identify and synthesize the effects of different media-related risk factors at the individual level, (2) identify the relative magnitudes of the effect sizes for the different risk factors, and (3) compare the effects between outcomes of cognitive and behavioral radicalization. The review also sought to examine sources of heterogeneity between different radicalizing ideologies.

. ampbell Systematic Reviews, Volume18, Issue2. June 2022. e1244

By Kacper Rekawek, Viktor Szucs, Martina Babikova, and Katsiaryna Lozka  

For the last year and a half, GLOBSEC has been studying the phenomenon of a crime-terror nexus in Europe. Its research team has built up a dataset of 348 individuals arrested for terrorism offences, expelled for alleged terrorist connections, or who died while staging terrorist attacks in Europe in 2015, the peak year of European jihadism. The dataset covers the 11 European countries, all within the EU, who reported the highest number of terrorism arrestees to EUROPOL (European Police Office). The work has been geared towards establishing whether the nexus exists and if so, then researching its nature and strength. The researchers deployed 11 experienced national teams who worked on available data (open source, official documents, personal interviews with stakeholders) to map out the European crime-terror nexus. The main research tool is a 120+ variable codebook deployed to analyse each case of a terrorist included in our dataset. As a result, the research team was able to establish that out of the 310 jihadists included in the database, 95, or 31%, had a previous criminal past, indicated by a pre-2015 arrest for any offence, with the French subset recording the most criminals (44 of the individuals, or 46%, have a criminal past preceding their terrorist involvement). Data show it is a male phenomenon, comprising 264, or 88%, of the individuals in our database. The European jihadists are not youngsters, as their average age is 34 (average male: 29; average female: 34; average “criminal turned terrorist”: 34), nor are they very well educated (the research team only knows of 72 who “had some high school” experience, and hardly any attended university).

Slovak Republic: GLOBSEC Policy Institute....28p.

Sarah Moshary, Bradley Shapiro & Sara Drango

This paper estimates consumer demand for firearms with the aim of predicting the likely impacts of firearm regulations on the number and types of guns in circulation. We first conduct a stated-choice-based conjoint analysis and estimate an individual-level demand model for firearms. We validate our estimates using aggregate moments from observational data. Next, we use our estimates to simulate changes in the number and types of guns in circulation under alternative regulations. Importantly, we find that bans or restrictions that specifically target “assault weapons” increase demand for handguns, which are associated with the vast majority of firearm-related violence. We provide distributions of consumer surplus under counterfactuals and discuss how those distributions could be useful for crafting policy.

Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), 2023. 

by Sierra Smucker, Max Griswold, Amanda Charbonneau, Rose Kerber, Terry L. Schell, Andrew R. Morral

Among researchers, policymakers, and advocates, momentum is growing to better understand the impact of firearm laws on a variety of outcomes (e.g., suicide, crime, defensive gun use, homicide). There is also a growing interest in data that can shed light on these relationships. One source of these data is the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS). This system includes information used in background checks, the number and type of background checks processed, and details on the number of and reason for denials when NICS finds that an individual is prohibited from purchasing a firearm. In this tool, researchers provide detailed information about data associated with NICS and discuss the data's strengths and weaknesses for various gun policy evaluation objectives. The researchers also outline the substantial limitations to interpreting these data to assist researchers in this field. Finally, they provide these data to researchers to encourage further exploration and evaluation of how NICS data might be used for policy analysis.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2022. 65p.

By Christoph Koenig and David Schindler 

  Do firearm purchase delay laws reduce aggregate homicide levels? Using variation from a 6-month countrywide gun demand shock in 2012/2013, we show that U.S. states with legislation preventing immediate handgun purchases experienced smaller increases in handgun sales. Our findings indicate that this is likely driven by comparatively lower purchases among impulsive consumers. We then demonstrate that states with purchase delays also witnessed comparatively 2% lower homicide rates during the same period. Further evidence shows that lower handgun sales coincided primarily with fewer impulsive assaults and points towards reduced acts of domestic violence.   

Discussion Paper 20 / 730  

Bristol, UK: Bristol University, School of Economics, 2020. 70p.

By Jonathan Colmer, Jennifer Doleac:

Gun violence is a major problem in the United States, and extensive prior work has shown that higher temperatures increase violent behavior. In this paper, we consider whether restricting the concealed carry of firearms mitigates or exacerbates the effect of temperature on violence. We use two identification strategies that exploit daily variation in temperature and variation in gun control policies between and within states. Our findings suggest that more prohibitive concealed carry laws attenuate the temperature–homicide relationship. Additional results suggest that restrictions primarily decrease the lethality of temperature–driven violent crimes, rather than their overall occurrence, but may be less effective at reducing access to guns in more urban areas.

 Bonn: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2023. 67p,  

Benjamin L. Cavataro

This article argues that the status quo is unacceptable, and proposes a clear, workable solution. Congress should empower the Commission to regulate the safety of guns as products, without granting the Commission authority over "gun control" as traditionally understood. This approach resolves the inadequacies of industry self-regulation, tort, and state consumer law; appropriately leverages the existing Consumer Product Safety Act framework; and is consistent with the Commission’s longstanding oversight of holsters, gun locks, and gun safes. Under this approach, the firearms industry would be obligated to report safety defects, recall dangerously defective firearms, and offer remedies to consumers. The Commission could also consider adopting common-sense product safety standards (such as regulations to ensure that new firearms have functional safety devices, and do not discharge without a trigger pull), just as the Commission adopts safety standards for many other consumer products. But the Commission would be precluded from regulating guns to curtail gun violence or suicide, or to reduce guns’ prevalence.

This approach is fully compatible with the Second Amendment in light of New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v. Bruen (2022). And lifting the firearms industry’s immunity from product safety law—thereby regulating guns as products—has helpful implications for broader debates on gun law and policy. By establishing that Commission regulation could simultaneously protect the public from harm and facilitate the right to lawful self-defense, this Article’s proposal demonstrates that some gun regulations can concurrently respect gun rights, uphold consumers’ rights, and protect lives—and, in doing so, reveals fissures between the interests of the gun industry and gun owners.

 Forthcoming in George Washington Law Review, Vol. 92 (2024),

By Pieter Van Ostaeyen | Kwesi Aning  

Since the initial rise in violent extremist and terrorist groups in the Sahel in the mid-2000s, the number of such groups in the region has continued to grow. This is reflected in the nature of the opportunistic alliances that have developed among different groups, with varying interests and memberships. Furthermore, these groups have changed their operational tactics over time and, since 2019, began a gradual expansion of their activities towards the littoral states of West Africa. This paper focuses on two of the most important extremist groups in the Sahel: Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Islamic State in Greater Sahel (ISGS). In discussing the origins of both groups, this paper argues that their establishment was not borne out of religious rationales alone. Rather, ISWAP’s and ISGS’s formation and expansion were based on their fractured relationships with the organizations from which they split and to a certain extent transformed, as well as their pursuit for new allegiances and competition for preeminence in the leadership as they battled to expand and establish Islamic states in northern Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and the Sahel. Ideologically, this paper identifies the adoption of Takfiri doctrines as the driving force resulting in more draconian interpretation and implementation of Islamic laws implemented by the hisba relating to zakat, hudud, ta’zir, and qisas. This paper argues that factionalism and splits from the original organizations represent fundamental splits from their original members and that the alliances formed by these originally distinct groups constitute a fundamental split and shift in operational tactics. ISWAP and ISGS operations are characterized by opportunism and exploitation of local grievances that enables them to build specific narratives for support….

Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V.. Counter Extremism Program, 2023. 20p.  

By Edmund Fitton-Brown and Bakary Sambe 

  This short paper explores how Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the predominant coalition of al-Qaeda (AQ) affiliates in the region, is structured and financed and how its component parts relate to one another. The paper will outline how the various groups constituting JNIM train and operate jointly and the extent of their use of trafficking routes and overlap with regional organized crime. It addresses the extent to which the spillover of JNIM activity from Mali and Burkina Faso into the Atlantic/Gulf of Guinea littoral states represents a threat to their stability. It also addresses the impact of political instability in Mali, Burkina Faso, and elsewhere on counterterrorism (CT) activity and the impact on terrorism of external state and non-state assistance. The paper seeks to diagnose the challenges posed by JNIM considering its local and regional circumstances on the ground and to provide operationally relevant recommendations both for actions within the region itself and through the use of international resources. The recommendations seek to integrate CT with measures aimed at preventing and countering extremism, conflict resolution, and development goals. They also highlight that the needs vary between different countries in the region. For example, measures applied to Mali cannot easily be transferred to mitigate the challenges in Burkina Faso  

Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. , Counter Extremism Program, 2023. 14p.

By Ini Dele-Adedeji | Sofia Koller

This policy paper summarizes the current state of affairs regarding the linkages of terrorist groups in West Africa with terrorist networks in other African regions. It also provides recommendations for policymakers and security agencies. ● The paper looks at linkages of JNIM, IS West Africa Province (ISWAP), and IS in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) with terrorist groups in North, West-Central, Eastern, and Southern Africa. ● In West Africa, ISWAP’s activities have been regionally confined to Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. There is no indication that ISWAP intends to expand its territorial base beyond these countries or that it has any transregional linkage with terrorist groups in other parts of Africa. ● JNIM and ISGS have demonstrated that they possess the intention and capability of regional expansion across West Africa. Increasing attacks further southwards in West Africa and their presence in the neighboring regions of Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, and Benin suggests that both groups intend to expand their geographical zone of influence to the Gulf of Guinea….

Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. Counter Extremism Program, 2023. 16p.

By Theo Clement and Hans-Jakob Schindler  

The nexus between terrorist and transnational organized crime (TOC) networks in West Africa presents one of the most significant security challenges. Both networks undermine governance and the rule of law and cooperate on a multitude of levels in a complex web of mutual beneficial arrangements. Therefore, this nexus presents a mutually enforcing mechanism that supports and accelerates regional destabilization. This paper argues that the risks emanating from this cooperation are not limited to terrorism financing alone as terrorist groups also use their cooperation with TOC networks to gain access to resources needed for their activities, such as arms and ammunition. Finally, such cooperation also allows terrorist groups to carve out spaces that allow them to control the local population while at the same time provide security for local licit and illicit economic activities. Therefore, this cooperation is in some cases also a tool through which terrorist groups can gain support and acceptance among the local population. Therefore… 

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  , tackling this nexus must involve both the regaining of territorial control from terrorist groups by the respective governments as well as the strengthening of governance structures. Both aims should also be attempted concurrently. This paper presents a range of recommendations for German and European decision-makers that primarily aim to disrupt the entry as well as exit points of the flows of illicit goods of the region. Given the current challenges European and German projects face when cooperating with some of the governments in the region, an emphasis on increasing regional cooperation in West Africa seems advisable. In particular, the paper suggests strengthening national and regional law enforcement and border control capabilities, especially within the coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea. Increased cooperation with the Intergovernmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), increased support to strengthen the management and control mechanisms for national parks, and intensified exchange mechanisms, such as the West Africa Police Chief Committee (WAPCC) of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), could be contemplated. In addition, German and European decision-makers could encourage and support governments in the region in their efforts to intensify the use of existing regional mechanisms such as the ECOWAS sanctions mechanism, as well as increase the participation of regional states in the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)-World Customs Organization (WCO) Container Control Program and INTERPOL’s West African Police Information System (WAPIS) as possible priorities. 

Berlin:  Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. Counter Extremism Program 2023. 16p