Institute For Defense Analyses.

From the document: "The United States faces a strategic challenge requiring urgent action. Given current threat trajectories, our nation will soon encounter a fundamentally different global setting than it has ever experienced: we will face a world where two nations possess nuclear arsenals on par with our own. In addition, the risk of conflict with these two nuclear peers is increasing. It is an existential challenge for which the United States is ill-prepared, unless its leaders make decisions now to adjust the U.S. strategic posture. The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States was established by the Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), and concludes that America's defense strategy and strategic posture must change in order to properly defend its vital interests and improve strategic stability with China and Russia. Decisions need to be made now in order for the nation to be prepared to address the threats from these two nuclear-armed adversaries arising during the 2027-2035 timeframe. Moreover, these threats are such that the United States and its Allies and partners must be ready to deter and defeat both adversaries simultaneously. We arrive at these conclusions following a comprehensive year-long review of the threats America faces and its strategy and planned capabilities to address those threats."

Congressional Commission On The Strategic Posture Of The United States . 2023. 160p.

United States. Department Of Defense. Office Of The Secretary Of Defense;

From the document: "The DoD annual report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China [PRC] charts the current course of the PRC's national, economic, and military strategy, and offers insight on the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) strategy, current capabilities and activities, as well as its future modernization goals. In 2022, the PRC turned to the PLA as an increasingly capable instrument of statecraft. Throughout the year, the PLA adopted more coercive actions in the Indo-Pacific region, while accelerating its development of capabilities and concepts to strengthen the PRC's ability to 'fight and win wars' against a 'strong enemy,' counter an intervention by a third party in a conflict along the PRC's periphery, and to project power globally. At the same time, the PRC largely denied, cancelled, and ignored recurring bilateral defense engagements, as well as DoD requests for military-to-military communication at multiple levels. This report illustrates the importance of meeting the pacing challenge presented by the PRC's increasingly capable military. [...] 'This report covers security and military developments involving the PRC until the end of 2022.'"

United States. Department Of Defense . 2023. 212p.

By Malhotra, Ananya Agustin; Jaworek, Patricia

From the document: "Forty years ago, findings on the global climatic effects of nuclear war first introduced the prospect of 'nuclear winter.' In the decades since, the consequences of nuclear use have remained only incidental to considerations of nuclear policy. This paper explores that history and presents new research and key questions for policymakers to address given today's increasingly interconnected world. The authors highlight the need for renewed attention to the catastrophic effects of nuclear conflict as a crucial step toward reducing the risk of nuclear use."

Nuclear Threat Initiative. 2023.

By Nicholas Corsaro, Robin S. Engel, Tamara D. Herold,. Murat Yildirim

The gang and gun violence reduction project implemented in Las Vegas consisted of three components: hot spots deployment, focused deterrence, and place network investigations. This report focuses on the development, implementation, and evaluation of the hot spots strategy. The hot spots strategy involved the strategic deployment of additional saturation police patrols in high-crime locations. Specifically, to address violent street crime, the LVMPD engaged in a 6- month (Nov 1, 2018 to Apr 30, 2019) cluster randomized controlled trial (RCT) design of street segments receiving additional hot spots deployment (saturation patrols) and streets receiving patrol as usual (control segments). All potential street segments were identified from an analysis of persistent violent crime hot spots (where intensive police focus has been paid by the violent crime unit officers since January of 2018). Researchers stratified highest risk and independent segments within chronic and persistent hot spot locations. Specifically, 22 treatment segments and 22 control segments were selected to form the evaluation. No treatment segment was within a block or intersection of another treatment or control segment to reduce potential contamination of findings. Deployment of officers to the treatment hot spots occurred via calls for service every day, randomly for a total of two hours of exposure at each hot spot. Officers were instructed to remain at the hot spot for a total of 15 minutes, which is the optimum time for deployment to achieve effects as identified by researchers (Koper, 1995). When reaching the hot spot, officers were also randomly instructed to either stay in their vehicle with the lights on, or patrol the segment on foot. Interviews with arrestees have shown police presence is understood and alters criminal behaviors in patrolled areas (Golub et al., 2003). However, hot spot patrols such as walking are likely to go unnoticed by ordinary citizens (Weisburd, Hinkle, Fameaga, & Ready, 2011). Therefore, using both treatment types (stationary with lights and foot patrol) likely leads to increased awareness of police, thereby reducing criminal activity. The control treatment was for business to occur as usual at the control street segments. Center researchers conducted fidelity assessments during the project implementation phase, in order to ensure that the strategy was being implemented properly. These assessments indicated a strong adherence to the research design. Specifically, the research design called for a total of 2 hours of saturation patrol (in 15-minute increments) each day. Analysis of all hot spot patrols revealed that approximately 1.5 hours of additional patrol was observed each day for 90% of all hot spots. A total of 2 hours of additional patrol as observed for 55% of all hot spots. These findings demonstrate that the LVMPD carried out the hot spots strategy as designed.

Alexandria, VA: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2019. 43p.

By Robin S. Engel, Nicholas Corsaro and Tamara D. Herold

One of the most frequently used communication mechanisms associated with focused deterrence strategies are offender notification meetings, also referred to as “call-in” sessions. Typically, these meetings are used to communicate directly to offenders that their future violent behaviors (and those of their affiliated groups/gangs) will be responded to in a swift and predictable manner through a coordinated law enforcement effort to prioritize group violence, share information, and develop comprehensive group-focused responses (Engel, Tillyer & Corsaro, 2013). The purpose of sharing this information is to gain compliance through group pressure (Kennedy, 1997). The group/gang structure is believed to serve both as a communication vehicle, and a potential source of control, as the threat of group-focused enforcement encourages groups to police themselves (Tillyer & Kennedy, 2008). Additional messages regarding the availability of assistance, social services, and job opportunities are often conveyed. Finally, most meetings include some form of community messaging that describes the harm inflicted by violence to individual victims and the larger community, along with a plea to change their behavior. This type of “community moral voice” is designed to send clear messages of non-violence, and rejecting norms that promote violence (Brunson, 2015). Offender notification sessions are designed to alert offenders and alter their decision-making by conveying possible sanctions while offering available services, contingent upon the path that the offender (typically on probation and/or parole) chooses, be it desistence or continued high-risk behavior. Initiatives built on call in sessions ultimately seek to change offender behavior by blending law enforcement, community mobilization, and social service provisions in a targeted and directed fashion. While initiatives such as focused deterrence strategies, which rely heavily on offender notification sessions, have often corresponded with reductions in citywide gun violence and gang homicides, the direct influence of call in sessions on individual-level behavior (for those called-in) is far less understood. The following study examines the impact of offender notification meetings – with messaging heavily focused on compassion, support, and the harm inflicted by violence – on the likelihood of offender recidivism in Las Vegas, Nevada. Officials from the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) and the Nevada Department of Public Safety, Division of Parole and Probation (NPP) worked collaboratively to conduct a series of offender notification meetings. Other components that typically accompany the implementation of focused deterrence strategies (e.g. targeted gang enforcement and social services provision) however, were not systematically implemented. Therefore, the following research represents a test solely of the impact of the offender notification meetings, answering the question of whether this form of communication with offenders has an impact on their individual likelihood of recidivism. In order to better understand the influence of call in sessions on offender recidivism patterns, officials from LVMPD partnered with researchers from the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) / University of Cincinnati (UC) Center for Police Research and Policy, along with academic partners from the University of Nevada Las Vegas (UNLV) to randomize and implement an experimental trial to assess the impact of call in sessions on probationers and parolees in Las Vegas in the Spring and Fall of 2018. Using a randomized controlled trial (RCT) research design, this study addresses the following specific research questions:

1) What impact does attendance of probationers/parolees at offender notification meetings have on individual likelihood of recidivism? 2) Can a simple risk classification be developed using offender criminal histories and associations with violent gangs to assess whether risk classification correlates with offender recidivism patterns? 3) Does the impact of offender notification meetings vary based on probationer/parolees’ risk classification? Within the randomization component, probationers/parolees were first stratified into one of four possible categories dependent upon their prior violent criminal histories and current affiliation with a violent criminal gang in Las Vegas: 1) Low-Risk (neither a violent criminal history nor affiliated with a violent gang), 2) Low/Moderate-Risk (no prior violent criminal history but affiliation with a violent gang), 3) Moderate-Risk (prior violent criminal history but no affiliation with a violent gang), and 4) High-Risk (both violent criminal history and affiliation with a violent gang). A random case-control selection occurred within each risk-level stratum, and various waves of probationers and parolees who were assigned to treatment were called-in to attend notification sessions in May 2018 and October 2018. In total, 216 probationer/parolees were randomly assigned to treatment, and 300 to control groups. Probationer/parolee recidivism is the primary outcome of interest, operationalized in two forms: 1) a re-arrest of any type, and 2) an administrative failure (revocation) of probation/parole supervised by NPP. If either event occurred in the follow-up period (i.e., 12 months for May sessions, 9 months for October sessions) – the probationer/parolee (in either treatment or control condition) is classified as having recidivated. Three analytic strategies are employed for the various strata (as well as overall treatment-tocontrol comparisons) and waves of probation/parolee participants. First, a set of bivariate chisquare analyses on recidivism patterns for each risk group to set the foundation regarding covariation in treatment assignment (and attendance) calibrated with recidivism across the risk groups and waves of participants during the study period. Second, a series of binary logistic regression models for our recidivism outcome (where yes = 1 or no = 0) for each risk group (including culling all strata into a single analysis) and each wave of probationers and parolees in the study are estimated (see Long, 1997). The use of the multivariate regression model on our dichotomous outcome of interest allows, where appropriate, to include control variables in the analyses. While the use of statistical controls in randomized controlled trials is subject to debate, where statistical controls are potentially necessary (e.g., unbalanced covariates of importance between treatment and control probationers/parolees within each strata), the multivariate regression framework (including the logistic regression model) allows for such controls to be included into a single regression estimation. Finally, a series of Cox proportional hazard models are estimated to assess the effect that randomized treatment had on individual recidivism (see Cox, 1972).

Alexandria, VA: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2020. 49p.

By Jian Wang

The thesis focuses on participants involved in the January 6 insurrection. The major aims of this thesis are to find out who stormed the Capitol on January 6, 2021, and to learn what major factors influenced them to engage in the insurrection that broke the tradition of peaceful transition of power for the first time since Lincoln’s Presidential election. It is also to study the current intertwined relationships between political elites, social media, technology, disinformation and mass audiences, and how they gathered together and organized the 'stop the steal' campaign, causing the violence on the Capitol on January 6, 2021. By studying this, we can learn how to prepare to face other looming and ongoing challenges that disinformation poses to democracy in the near future such as the mid-term election this November and the next Presidential Election in 2024, creating viable solutions. The thesis selected 124 subjects out of 691 on the Capitol Breach Cases' list across all regions of the U.S. It organized their data, including their names, and primary demographics such as gender, race, the geography of residence, and age, and reviewed and examined their attitudes towards the insurrection on January 6, 2021 in response to a belief that the 2020 election was fraudulent. The findings show that majority of participants are white male. 91.13% or 630 (0.9113 x 691 = 630) of whom are employed and 30% of or 207 (0.3 x 691) participants who are university or college educated. A number of defendants had associations with QAnon conspiracy theory and some known DVE (domestic violent extremist) groups such as Proud Boys, the Oath Keepers, and Three Percenters. The most striking finding is that veterans were highly over-represented in the mob (17% or 117), which exceeds the percentage of veterans in the U.S. population as a whole. The thesis suggests that four possible motivations for their participation: extremism in the military, nationalism and patriotism, a belief in Donald Trump's false claims, and social media. It also reveals that there is a strong positive connection between disinformation on social media and participants as they (96% of or 663 participants) were nearly all active on social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Parler and Instagram, sharing and receiving misinformation about the election. More specifically, social media platforms should bear responsibility because social media technology employs popularity-based algorithms that tailor content to maximize user engagement, increasing the level of polarization, partisan animosity and political sectarianism

Cambridge, MA: Master's thesis, Harvard University Division of Continuing Education., 2022. 131p.

By Eric B. Hodges

Ten percent of the Americans arrested for storming the US Capitol on January 6, 2021, are military veterans. These veterans have been charged with federal crimes ranging from Obstruction of an Official Proceeding to Assaulting Capitol Police Officers. This paper seeks to answer three questions related to those veterans’ participation in the Capitol Riots. Were their actions patriotic? What were their motivations? And was there anything about their military experience that made these veterans more likely to riot than non-veterans? A content analysis of 71 remarks made by 40 of the veterans arrested, both before and after the riots, was used to ascertain the motivations of those individuals. Analysis of the veterans’ comments revealed that they believed they were acting patriotically; however, closer examination shows that their motivations were more consistent with nationalism than patriotism. Additionally, the military training and combat exposure of the veterans, along with the “Stop the Steal” rhetoric, particularly comments made by former President Donald Trump, also played an integral role in influencing the veterans. The analysis also indicated that the Capitol Riots should be classified as a form of proto-sectarian violence and should serve as a cautionary tale against the growing divisiveness that sparked this incident.

Journal of Veteran Studies, 2021.

By Daniel Milton and Andrew Mines

The issue of extremism in the military community has posed challenges for a long time. From the role of combat veterans in driving the rise of the militia movement after Vietnam and beyond, the U.S. military has contended with all manner of extremist movements and ideologies. Historically, extremist activities manifested in a number of ways, including attacks andor hate crimes against fellow service members and civilians, theft of military equipment, security breaches, and broader harm to morale, unit cohesion, personnel retention, recruiting efforts, and mission success. Although the vast majority of U.S. Department of Defense DoD personnel 5and veterans uphold our nations highest values during and well after their service, the worlds largest employer has struggled at times to confront a problem that affects all corners of American society. In the past decade, various organizations have raised serious red flags to both the DoD and Congressional oversight bodies regarding this looming threat. More recent reporting has pointed to growing evidence of white supremacy and racist ideologies in the military these last few years. Additionally, the siege on the U.S. Capitol and the surrounding focus on the involvement of individuals with military experience has highlighted the pressing need to take meaningful steps to understand and confront the problem at hand. To be clear, the Capitol Hill siege does not provide an all-encompassing view of modern day extremism in the military. However, an examination of the individuals charged in connection with that event can offer some perspective as to the diversity and scale of the connection between extremism and those with military experience.

Washington DC: Program on Extremism, George Washington University, West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, New York: 2021. 44p.

By Piotr Bąkowski

n recent years, the United States (US) has witnessed a growing number of terrorist attacks by domestic violent extremists. Many incidents at large-scale demonstrations across the country have increased the visibility of the problem and provoked strong reactions among civilians, law enforcement and policy-makers alike. When on 6 January 2021 a crowd of supporters of the then US President, Donald Trump, broke into the US Capitol while Congress was certifying the results of the 2020 presidential election, the issue of domestic violent extremism was thrust beyond US borders and into the international spotlight. Various US government agencies have consistently assessed domestic violent extremism as a significant threat. Although for counter-terrorism purposes extremists fall under a number of categories of a general nature, the threat they pose has become more decentralised and diverse over time. That said, racially and ethnically motivated violent extremists have been responsible for the most lethal acts of violence. After 11 September 2001, the focus of US counter-terrorism efforts shifted to international from domestic terrorism. US law does define domestic terrorism but does not qualify it as a criminal offence entailing indictment. Domestic extremist groups cannot be designated as terrorist organisations, and getting clearance to conduct investigations against them is more complicated than for their foreign counterparts. The assault on the Capitol led to a significant shift in counter-terrorism priorities, however, triggering the largest-scale investigation in US law enforcement history thus far, but also a comprehensive overhaul of government policies. Consequently, 2021 saw the adoption of the first national strategy specifically dedicated to domestic terrorism. The mutual commitment of the US and the European Union (EU) to combating violent extremism has resulted in fruitful exchanges among policy-makers, researchers and frontline practitioners. Nonetheless, efforts to establish a unified regulatory framework for addressing online extremist content have faced challenges due to differing perspectives on key issues such as the limits of free speech and government intervention.

Brussels, Belgium: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, 2023. 12p.

By Elizabeth Yates and Erin E. Wilson

This report examines how the QAnon movement exploits the U.S. military’s credibility in society to further its aim of undermining American democracy. It shows how 25 U.S. military veterans – all of whom have been engaged in the QAnon movement since the failed insurrection on January 6, 2021 – spread disinformation and build support for the movement. Analysis of their social media, along with a broader review of QAnon content, reveals how Q influencers portray the U.S. military as a heroic protagonist in their conspiratorial propaganda, and how they exploit military veterans to legitimate such claims and even recruit. It concludes with policy recommendations that focus on protecting members of the armed services, those who have served and their families, and communities the movement targets with its conspiracies

The mainstreaming of the QAnon extremist movement presents a growing threat to the American system of government. QAnon’s effort to create the perception that they are allied with the U.S. military has particularly alarming implications for our democracy:  It strengthens the QAnon movement by facilitating recruitment from both military and civilian communities and encourages active participation among adherents;  It lends legitimacy to discriminatory and anti-democratic conspiracies that are integrated into the Q movement, such as antisemitism and election denial;  It distorts the public’s understanding of the primary responsibilities of the military, and, importantly, the legal boundaries of domestic military intervention;  It undermines public faith in democratic institutions by regularly encouraging the acceptance of authoritarian actions; and  It threatens the communities the movement targets with its conspiracies and maligns the reputation of U.S. servicemembers, veterans, and their families.

New York: Human Rights First, 2022. 20p.

by Heather J. Williams, Luke J. Matthews, Pauline Moore, Matthew A. DeNardo, James V. Marrone, Brian A. Jackson, William Marcellino, Todd C. Helmus

Racially and Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism: The Basics

Racially and ethnically motivated violent extremism (REMVE) refers to a loosely organized movement of individuals and groups that espouse some combination of racist, anti-Semitic, xenophobic, Islamophobic, misogynistic, and homophobic ideology. REMVE actors see their race or ethnicity under threat and promote the use of or engage in violence against a given population group. The majority of REMVE actors are motivated by cultural nationalism or White supremacy—beliefs that Caucasian or "Aryan" peoples represent superior races, and that "White culture" is superior to other cultures. Many REMVE actors also are motivated by White nationalism, which overlaps with White supremacy: Adherents espouse the belief that the White race is superior to others, and White nationalism emphasizes defining a country or region by White racial identity and promoting the interests of White people exclusively and at the expense of non-White populations.

More-common terms related to REMVE include far-right extremism, right-wing terrorism, radical right, or extreme right, which are used more frequently in literature and by other countries. Although these terms are not synonymous, they are used somewhat interchangeably and often without precise definitions. These terms also can be applied to political parties and movements that participate in political systems and do not engage in violence directly, particularly in Europe, where many parliamentary systems have formal far-right parties that participate in elections.

The U.S. State Department commissioned the RAND Corporation to produce a comprehensive network analysis of the White Identity Terrorist Movement (WITM) and REMVE in response to a congressional requirement from the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act.[2] The analysis—which sought to identify key actors, organizations, and supporting infrastructure and the relationships and interactions between them—is intended to inform a U.S. government strategy to counter REMVE.

Rand. 2022. 8p.

by Heather J. Williams, Alexandra T. Evans, Jamie Ryan, Erik E. Mueller, Bryce Downing

n this Perspective, the authors introduce a framework for internet users to categorize the virtual platforms they use and to understand the likelihood that they may encounter extreme content online.

The authors first provide a landscape of the online extremist "ecosystem," describing how the proliferation of messaging forums, social media networks, and other virtual community platforms has coincided with an increase in extremist online activity. Next, they present a framework to describe and categorize the platforms that host varying amounts of extreme content as mainstream, fringe, or niche. Mainstream platforms are those for which only a small portion of the content would be considered inappropriate or extreme speech. Fringe platforms are those that host a mix of mainstream and extreme content—and where a user might readily come across extreme content that is coded or obscured to disguise its violent or racist underpinning. Niche platforms are those that openly and purposefully cater to an extreme audience.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021. 44p.

by Heather J. Williams, Luke J. Matthews, Pauline Moore, Matthew A. DeNardo, James V. Marrone, Brian A. Jackson, William Marcellino, Todd C. Helmus

Racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism (REMVE) and extremists (REMVEs) present some of the most pressing threats to the United States. REMVE also has been identified as the White identity terrorist movement (WITM). REMVEs are among the most lethal domestic violent extremists, and they are the most likely to commit mass-casualty attacks. These movements are characterized by a broad ideological orientation toward xenophobic, anti-Semitic, racist, and misogynistic sentiment.

For this report, the authors reviewed the relevant literature on REMVE networks and collected and analyzed social media data from six social networks (Twitter, Reddit, Gab, Ruqqus, Telegram, and Stormfront) to produce a global network map of the digital REMVE space. That network map evaluates each network's construction, connectivity, geographic location, references to prominent organizations, and proclivity to violence. The authors also reviewed ten countries' experiences with REMVE to sketch out an understanding of the REMVE space in these countries and how REMVEs in those countries relate to those in the United States.

Key Findings

The WITM/REMVE global network on social media is largely created and fueled by users in the United States

• WITM/REMVE is fueled by U.S. domestic drivers, and this movement is less of an issue in other countries.

• Programs to counter violent extremism are generally most productive when they are local.

• The primary need is for robust national strategies to counter WITM/REMVE, specifically in the United States.

An organization- or actor-focused counter-WITM/REMVE strategy likely will not work because of the diffuse nature of REMVE movements

• REMVE is a post-organizational movement; many REMVEs are radicalized outside an organized group and groups are loosely organized, meaning that U.S. strategy to counter REMVE should not be centered around key organizations and actors.

Intervention strategies should be multifaceted because of the complex nature of the problem and its intersections with protected civil rights

• The scale of REMVE and the depth of its ideological roots in the United States suggest that targeting and ostracizing sympathizers would not be a successful intervention strategy.

There are structural differences in how REMVE manifests and is countered in Europe versus in the United States

• The parliamentary system in many European countries gives those on the far right a presence in the political system, which provides a nonviolent outlet for fringe-movement adherents. Many European countries also have active intervention and counter-REMVE programs underway.

Racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism (REMVE) and extremists (REMVEs) present some of the most pressing threats to the United States. REMVE also has been identified as the White identity terrorist movement (WITM). REMVEs are among the most lethal domestic violent extremists, and they are the most likely to commit mass-casualty attacks. These movements are characterized by a broad ideological orientation toward xenophobic, anti-Semitic, racist, and misogynistic sentiment.

For this report, the authors reviewed the relevant literature on REMVE networks and collected and analyzed social media data from six social networks (Twitter, Reddit, Gab, Ruqqus, Telegram, and Stormfront) to produce a global network map of the digital REMVE space. That network map evaluates each network's construction, connectivity, geographic location, references to prominent organizations, and proclivity to violence. The authors also reviewed ten countries' experiences with REMVE to sketch out an understanding of the REMVE space in these countries and how REMVEs in those countries relate to those in the United States.

Key Findings

The WITM/REMVE global network on social media is largely created and fueled by users in the United States

• WITM/REMVE is fueled by U.S. domestic drivers, and this movement is less of an issue in other countries.

• Programs to counter violent extremism are generally most productive when they are local.

• The primary need is for robust national strategies to counter WITM/REMVE, specifically in the United States.

An organization- or actor-focused counter-WITM/REMVE strategy likely will not work because of the diffuse nature of REMVE movements

• REMVE is a post-organizational movement; many REMVEs are radicalized outside an organized group and groups are loosely organized, meaning that U.S. strategy to counter REMVE should not be centered around key organizations and actors.

Intervention strategies should be multifaceted because of the complex nature of the problem and its intersections with protected civil rights

• The scale of REMVE and the depth of its ideological roots in the United States suggest that targeting and ostracizing sympathizers would not be a successful intervention strategy.

There are structural differences in how REMVE manifests and is countered in Europe versus in the United States

• The parliamentary system in many European countries gives those on the far right a presence in the political system, which provides a nonviolent outlet for fringe-movement adherents. Many European countries also have active intervention and counter-REMVE programs underway.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2022. 184p.

By The Digital Citizens Alliance

Digital platforms enabled the disturbing rise of domestic extremism, culminating with the January 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol. Militia groups use social media networks to plan operations, recruit new members and spread anti-democracy propaganda, a new Digital Citizens Alliance (Digital Citizens) and Coalition for a Safer Web (CSW) investigation has found.

Taking a page from Jihadists, these extremist groups operate along the fringes of where platforms such as YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram will let them. Federal prosecutors investigating the Capitol riot revealed how militia groups used social media platforms to coordinate and prepare for possible conflict with Antifa. But the joint Digital Citizens / CSW investigation found the use of platforms goes well beyond tactical planning. Militias rely on the platforms to share their beliefs and ideology and recruit new members. The militias get a boost from their ideological simpatico with mis/disinformation groups like QAnon, which provides oxygen that militias use to fan the flames.

The anti-government militia movement first emerged after the 1992 Ruby Ridge standoff, the 1993 Waco siege, and the Oklahoma City Bombing on April 19, 1995. After Oklahoma City, U.S. law enforcement cracked down on domestic terrorism and the militia movement. In 1996, the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) reported 858 militia groups with up to 50,000 active members. The 9/11 terrorist attacks shifted focus to global threats and led to a dormant period for militias. But domestic extremists such as the Proud Boys, the Boogaloo Bois, the Three Percenters, and the Oath Keepers have reinvigorated the movement – aided in large part by digital platforms. In 2020, according to research by The Washington Post, the number of domestic terrorism incidents in the United States had doubled from what it was in 1995. But the joint Digital Citizens / CSW investigation found the use of platforms goes well beyond tactical planning. Militias rely on the platforms to share their beliefs and ideology and recruit new members. The militias get a boost from their ideological simpatico with mis/disinformation groups like QAnon, which provides oxygen that militias use to fan the flames.

The anti-government militia movement first emerged after the 1992 Ruby Ridge standoff, the 1993 Waco siege, and the Oklahoma City Bombing on April 19, 1995. After Oklahoma City, U.S. law enforcement cracked down on domestic terrorism and the militia movement. In 1996, the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) reported 858 militia groups with up to 50,000 active members. The 9/11 terrorist attacks shifted focus to global threats and led to a dormant period for militias. But domestic extremists such as the Proud Boys, the Boogaloo Bois, the Three Percenters, and the Oath Keepers have reinvigorated the movement – aided in large part by digital platforms. In 2020, according to research by The Washington Post, the number of domestic terrorism incidents in the United States had doubled from what it was in 1995.

Washington, DC: Digital Citizens Alliance, 2021. 56p.

By Hanny Purnama Sari and Muhammad Syauqillah

This research aims to compile data and information that will contribute to understanding the online radicalization phenomenon through translation. There are many studies on using the internet and propaganda in a terrorism context. However, only a handful studied the correlation between translation and terrorism propaganda, especially in Indonesia. There was little discussion on the role of translation in bridging communication between different nations, cultures, and languages and using it to propagate radical/propaganda narratives worldwide and amplify those messages to its target audience. The research method is descriptive qualitative using primary and secondary data; the sample is taken from the book of Nadharat Fi Al Ijma' Al Qath'i and previous findings and news. This research revealed at least ten roles of translation in the online radicalization phenomenon; among others, translation in the target language can be used to identify the target audience of the propagandist, and many terrorist sympathizers were willing to volunteer to translate the propaganda. However, although the translation is used to leverage the spread of propaganda, it can also assist law enforcement officers in combating terrorist/propaganda narratives. Indonesian law enforcement officers may use translation to counter-terrorism as Indonesia has hundreds of vernacular languages that can be used to 'encrypt' and disseminate their extremist narratives.

International Journal of Science and Society, 4(4), 319-336.

By Moustafa Ayad, Nadeem Khan and Aymenn al-Tamimi

his report highlights the networks, supporters, and the platforms of Islamic State disinformation disseminators, focusing on popular social media platforms as well as encrypted messaging applications. These disinformation networks are creating self-branded media outlets with followers in the tens of thousands, and often with innocuous names like “Global Happenings,” “DRIL” and “Media Center,” to evade moderation and takedowns. These same networks use coded language and a codebook of emojis to spread Islamic State “news” to other networks of supporters, who similarly evade moderation. These ‘alternative news outlets’ are trying to outcompete narratives publicized by government officials as well as independent mainstream media and individual journalists – groups that were also heavily targeted by Islamic State.

London: IDS - Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2022. 22p.

Edited By Olivier J. Walther, William F.S. Miles

Since the end of the Cold War, the monopoly of legitimate organized force of many African states has been eroded by a mix of rebel groups, violent extremist organizations, and self-defence militias created in response to the rise in organized violence on the continent. African Border Disorders explores the complex relationships that bind states, transnational rebels and extremist organizations, and borders on the African continent. Combining cutting edge network science with geographical analysis, the first part of the book highlights how the fluid alliances and conflicts between rebels, violent extremist organizations and states shape in large measure regional patterns of violence in Africa. The second part of the book examines the spread of Islamist violence around Lake Chad through the lens of the violent Nigerian Islamist group Boko Haram, which has evolved from a nationally-oriented militia group, to an internationally networked organization. The third part of the book explores how violent extremist organizations conceptualize state boundaries and territory and, reciprocally, how do the civil society and the state respond to the rise of transnational organizations. The book will be essential reading for all students and specialists of African politics and security studies, particularly those specializing on fragile states, sovereignty, new wars, and borders as well as governments and international organizations involved in conflict prevention and early intervention in the region.

London: Routledge, 2018. 230p

By Ariel Bogle

As mainstream social media companies have increased their scrutiny and moderation of right-wing extremist (RWE) content and groups,1 there’s been a move to alternative online content platforms.2 There’s also growing concern about right-wing extremism in Australia,3 and about how this shift has diversified the mechanisms used to fundraise by RWE entities.4 This phenomenon isn’t well understood in Australia, despite the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) advising in March 2021 that ‘ideological extremism’5 now makes up around 40% of its priority counterterrorism caseload.6 Research by ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre (ICPC) has found that nine Australian Telegram channels7 that share RWE content used at least 22 different funding platforms, including online monetisation tools and cryptocurrencies, to solicit, process and earn funds between 1 January 2021 and 15 July 2021. Due to the opaque nature of many online financial platforms, it’s difficult to obtain a complete picture of online fundraising, so this sample is necessarily limited. However, in this report we aim to provide a preliminary map of the online financial platforms and services that may both support and incentivise an RWE content ecosystem in Australia. Most funding platforms found in our sample have policies that explicitly prohibit the use of their services for hate speech, but we found that those policies were often unclear and not uniformly enforced. Of course, there’s debate about how to balance civil liberties with the risks posed by online communities that promote RWE ideology (and much of that activity isn’t illegal), but a better understanding of online funding mechanisms is necessary, given the growing concern about the role online propaganda may play in inspiring acts of violence8 as well as the risk that, like other social divisions, such channels and movements could be exploited by adversaries.9 The fundraising facilitated by these platforms not only has the potential to grow the resources of groups and individuals linked to right-wing extremism, but it’s also likely to be a means of building the RWE community both within Australia and with overseas groups and a vector for spreading RWE propaganda through the engagement inherent in fundraising efforts. The funding platforms mirror those used by RWE figures overseas, and funding requests were boosted by foreign actors, continuing Australian RWEs’ history of ‘meaningful international exchange’ with overseas counterparts.

Barton, ACT: The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited, International Cyber Policy Centre 2021.36p.

By Kathryn M. Roberts

Countering the radical Islamist narrative remains a high-profile priority of the United States in its ongoing efforts to counter domestic violent extremism. Since mid-2014, government officials have condemned the United States as unable to muster a satisfactory counter-narrative, and emphasize the potentially devastating consequences of failure. Experts inside and outside the government describe the Islamic State as masters of the internet capable of reaching into the United States and turning its people into hate-filled, violently inspired terrorists at will. The idea that the United States must aggressively work to counter these messages domestically remains a given but should it The focus of this thesis is to examine current U.S. efforts in counter-messaging to determine why the United States believes it is failing, and what, if any, evidence supports the idea that a counter-narrative or counter-messaging should be part of domestic countering violent extremism CVE programs. Review of official documents found little basis to assess U.S. programs, as no meaningful published strategy, objectives, or performance data exist for current efforts. Moreover, the foundational assumptions underlying current programs suggest malalignment between what U.S. officials desire a counter-messaging effort to accomplish and what is realistically achievable. Based on these findings, it is recommended that domestic CVE programs eliminate counter-messaging from their portfolio.

Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2020. 119p,

By HM Inspectorate of Probation, Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services and HM Inspectorate of Prisons (UK)

His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation has led an inspection, alongside HM Inspectorate of Constabulary, Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS), and HM Inspectorate of Prisons – looking at the work of the Probation Service’s National Security Division (NSD) and multi-agency arrangements for the management of terrorist offenders in the wake of terrorist attacks.

In response to terrorist attacks in 2019 and 2020, by known terrorist offenders who were subject to licence supervision, the NSD was created as a separate division of the Probation Service, working alongside police Counter Terrorism Nominal Management (CTNM) arrangements. Together with existing prison and probation services, these bodies are responsible for managing those convicted of terrorist offences or suspected of potential terrorist activity, even if they have no related convictions.

What we found

• This inspection looked at the management and progress of the strategy to supervise these offenders. It found:

• NSD, probation, police and prison services worked well together and are approaching managing counter terrorism cases collectively

• supervision within the community was robust overall, balancing rehabilitative needs with tight risk management

• probation practitioners within NSD were well trained specialist officers, holding a small and restricted caseload, delivering high quality case assessment and supervision

• terrorist offenders were subject to additional oversight throughout their sentences

• the arrangements to protect others from harm from terrorist cases in custody were effective

• there has been significant financial investment to improve services dealing with counter terrorism, and staffing levels were appropriate

• prison governors and directors were clear about the terrorist risk posed in their prisons and were actively managing this

• leadership across the NSD and CTNM was strong, and there were clear lines of accountability, enhanced by national multi-agency governance arrangements.

Manchester: His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation, 2023. 65p.