Edited By Olivier J. Walther, William F.S. Miles

Since the end of the Cold War, the monopoly of legitimate organized force of many African states has been eroded by a mix of rebel groups, violent extremist organizations, and self-defence militias created in response to the rise in organized violence on the continent. African Border Disorders explores the complex relationships that bind states, transnational rebels and extremist organizations, and borders on the African continent. Combining cutting edge network science with geographical analysis, the first part of the book highlights how the fluid alliances and conflicts between rebels, violent extremist organizations and states shape in large measure regional patterns of violence in Africa. The second part of the book examines the spread of Islamist violence around Lake Chad through the lens of the violent Nigerian Islamist group Boko Haram, which has evolved from a nationally-oriented militia group, to an internationally networked organization. The third part of the book explores how violent extremist organizations conceptualize state boundaries and territory and, reciprocally, how do the civil society and the state respond to the rise of transnational organizations. The book will be essential reading for all students and specialists of African politics and security studies, particularly those specializing on fragile states, sovereignty, new wars, and borders as well as governments and international organizations involved in conflict prevention and early intervention in the region.

London: Routledge, 2018. 230p

Edited by Julia M. Eckert

This book addresses two developments in the conceptualisation of citizenship that arise from the »war on terror«, namely the re-culturalisation of membership in a polity and the re-moralisation of access to rights. Taking an anthropological perspective, it traces the ways in which the trans-nationalisation of the »war on terror« has affected notions of »the dangerous other« in different political and social contexts, asking what changes in the ideas of the state and of the nation have been promoted by the emerging culture of security, and how these changes affect practices of citizenship and societal group relations.

\Bielefeld, Transcript Verlag, 2008. 197p.

By Bailey K. Roberts, Colleen P. Nofi, Emma Cornell, Sandeep Kapoor, MD, MS-HPPL,b,c,d,e Laura Harrison, MPH,c,d Chethan Sathya

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES: In 2020, firearm injuries became the leading cause of death among US abstract children and adolescents. This study aimed to evaluate new 2021 data on US pediatric firearm deaths and disparities to understand trends compared with previous years. METHODS: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Wide-ranging Online Data for Epidemiologic Research was queried for firearm mortalities in children/adolescents from 2018 to 2021. Absolute mortality, death rates, and characteristics were reported. Death rates were defined per 100 000 persons in that population per year. Death rates across states were illustrated via geographic heat maps, and correlations with state poverty levels were calculated. RESULTS: In 2021, firearms continued to be the leading cause of death among US children. From 2018 to 2021, there was a 41.6% increase in the firearm death rate. In 2021, among children who died by firearms, 84.8% were male, 49.9% were Black, 82.6% were aged 15 to 19 years, and 64.3% died by homicide. Black children accounted for 67.3% of firearm homicides, with a death rate increase of 1.8 from 2020 to 2021. White children accounted for 78.4% of firearm suicides. From 2020 to 2021, the suicide rate increased among Black and white children, yet decreased among American Indian or Alaskan Native children. Geographically, there were worsening clusters of firearm death rates in Southern states and increasing rates in Midwestern states from 2018 to 2021. Across the United States, higher poverty levels correlated with higher firearm death rates (R 5 0.76, P < .001).

Pediatrics, August 21, 2023.

by Lucy C. Sorensen, Montserrat Avila-Acosta, John Engberg, Shawn D. Bushway

U.S. public school students increasingly attend schools with sworn law enforcement officers present. Yet little is known about how these school resource officers (SROs) affect school environments or student outcomes. Our study uses a fuzzy regression discontinuity (RD) design with national school-level data from 2014 to 2018 to estimate the impacts of SRO placement. We construct this discontinuity based on the application scores for federal school-based policing grants of linked police agencies. We find that SROs effectively reduce some forms of violence in schools, but do not prevent gun-related incidents. We also find that SROs intensify the use of suspension, expulsion, police referral, and arrest of students. These increases in disciplinary and police actions are consistently largest for Black students, male students, and students with disabilities.''

By Brent R. Klein,

Joshua D. Freilich and

Steven M. Chermak

The American School Shooting Study (TASSS) is an ongoing mixedmethod project funded by the National Institute of Justice to catalog US school shootings. It has amassed data based on open sources and other public materials dating back to 1990. This brief presents new insights from TASSS, diving deeper into the database’s potential to examine the locations, timing, and student involvement of youth-perpetrated gun violence.

Although statistically rare, fatal and nonfatal shootings in the United States at elementary, middle, and secondary schools remain important crime problems with significant public policy implications. Indeed, the impact of such violence exceeds the devastating fatalities and immense sorrow that survivors, families, and communities experience. Even one gunshot fired at a school can subject numerous individuals to the traumas of gun violence.1 Recent polls indicate that school shootings can also sway broader public views on crime, including attitudes toward violence reduction.2 As a result, school shootings have become a focal point of US politics, sparking crucial debates on the most effective strategies for preventing and responding to gun violence, both inside and outside K-12 schools.

Albany, NY: Rockefeller Institute of Government, 2023. 21p.

By Sarah Watson

Mass sho are otingsone example of a focusing event that has particular significance for firearms legislation. Mass shootings shock, disturb and provoke enormous and controversial debate, often causing significant public and media resonance, becoming the subject of intense discussion politically. At times providing an impetus for legislative amendments, often in distinct ways that routine gun violence does not. If certain events highlight the need for reform, policy change becomes more likely. Cases with the lowest number of victims are likely to generate the least amount of attention and are most likely to be missed in data collection, rendering them the least noteworthy, least important in terms of lethality and social and political consequence. Various problems come to the attention of people in and around government, necessitating an understanding of why such problems occupy officials’ attention and appear to be more ‘deserved>

Criminology & Criminal JusticeOnlineFirst, July 19, 2022

By Michael D. Makowsky and Patrick L. Warren

We assess firearms as a means of Black self-defense in the Jim Crow South. We infer firearm access by race and place by measuring the fraction of suicides committed with a firearm. Corroborating anecdotal accounts and historical claims, state bans on pistols and increases in White law enforcement personnel served as mechanisms to disarm the Black community, while having no comparable effect on White firearms. The interaction of these mechanisms with changing national market prices for firearms provides us with a credible identification strategy for Black firearm access. Rates of Black lynching decreased with greater Black firearm access.

Prepublication paper, 2022. 35p

By Josh Levine

The firearms debate in the United States often pits public health against freedom. This false dichotomy implies that gun laws, even wise ones, inherently erode individual liberty. Indeed, this appeal to liberty finds fertile ground in the United States, where many Americans intuitively reject any incursion on their freedom. Yet this one-sided conception of liberty is, at best, incomplete: while the government can certainly encroach on our freedom, so too can our fellow citizens.

A historically grounded conception of liberty in the United States includes the sense of security that fosters self-expression without fear of arbitrary constraint. That is, when citizens feel safe, they can properly exercise their will. But this tranquility doesn't exist naturally. To achieve it, the government must exercise a monopoly of force and ensure that citizens do not fear other citizens. Only then can people act and express themselves without fear of reprisal.

Yet when civilians openly wield their guns in public, they impose an arbitrary constraint on others that represses others' ability to exercise their will. Armed goers change the risk calculations for their fellow citizens—often forcing them to avoid areas where guns are present or arm themselves in self-defense. As this Note discusses, each of these options begets a compounding harm to our liberty. And the resulting proliferation of civilian defensive arms in the United States—the modern arms race—does not represent peace, only détente.

By this understanding, open carrying itself subverts liberty, and its regulation upholds it. Although an individual's arms may constitute a productive solution to his own fear, the externalities on others are substantial. The state must prevent these costs to the liberty of others by regulating those wielding firearms in public spaces.

18 Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy Sidebar–265 (Arlington, VA: National Policing Institute 2022.

Edited by Gian Ege, Christian Schwarzenegger and Monika Stempkowski

Trafficking in arms and weapons material is, perhaps, one of the most notorious forms of organised crime. Fuelled by both the movie industry as well as real world examples, criminal organisations are widely believed to engage in the trafficking of firearms and weapons material, including nuclear material. This illicit trade is further facilitated by corruption and other forms of collusion with government entities as well as by links between the criminal elements and the arms industry. As part of a joint teaching programme on transnational organised crime, students from the Universities of Queensland, Vienna and Zurich researched the topic of arms trafficking in a year-long course. Some of their academic papers are compiled in this volume, addressing topics ranging from international and national legal frameworks to levels and characteristics of this phenomenon in selected places, and enforcement and industry measures adopted to prevent and suppress this illicit trade.

Berllin: Carl Grossman Verlag, 2022. 300p.

By Laura Bailey, Vincent Harinam and Barak Ariel

Knife crime is a source of concern for the police in England and Wales, however little published research exists on this crime type. Who are the offenders who use knives to commit crime, when and why? Who are their victims, and is there a victim-offender overlap? What is the social network formation for people who are exposed to knife crime? Using a multidimensional approach, our aim is to answer these questions about one of England and Wales’ largest jurisdictions: Thames Valley. We first provide a state-of-the-art narrative review of the knife crime literature, followed by an analysis of population-level data on central tendency and dispersion of knife crimes reported to the police (2015–2019), on offences, offenders, victims, victim-offender overlaps and gang-related assaults. Social network analysis was used to explore the formations of offender-victim networks. Our findings show that knife crime represents a small proportion of crime (1.86%) and is associated largely with violence offenses. 16–34 year-old white males are at greatest risk of being the victims, offenders or victim-offenders of knife crime, with similar relative risks between these three categories. Both knife offenders and victims are likely to have a criminal record. Knife crimes are usually not gang-related (less than 20%), and experienced mostly between strangers, with the altercation often a non-retaliatory ‘one-off event’. Even gang-related knife crimes do not follow ‘tit-for-tat’ relationships—except when the individuals involved have extensive offending histories and then are likely to retaliate instantaneously. We conclude that while rare, an incident of knife crime remains predictable, as a substantial ratio of offenders and victims of future knife crime can be found in police records. Prevention strategies should not be focused on gang-related criminals, but on either prolific violent offenders or repeat victims who are known to the police—and therefore more susceptible to knife crime exposure.

PLoS ONE 15(12):2020.

By K.D. Browne , K. Green , S. Jareno-Ripoll , E. Paddock

Knives and sharp objects are tools used in a wide range of violent offences. However, knife offending may have different risk factors than general violence, thus requiring tailored interventions. This systematic review aims to synthesise evidence on the characteristics of knife offenders and interventions aimed at the reduction of knife crime. After screening 1352 titles and abstracts, 344 articles were fully considered of which 21 papers met the inclusion criteria and were quality assessed. These consisted of 15 offender characteristic studies and six intervention studies. Findings suggested that knife crime may be associated with illicit drug use, exposure to any violence as a witness, victim or perpetrator and mental health problems. Males were more at risk of engaging in knife crime in the community and females in domestic settings. Different risk factors were found between gang involved and non-involved knife offenders. Primary prevention strategies, such as stop and search, knife amnesties, media campaigns and curfews did not show a significant impact in reducing knife crime. By contrast, increasing offenders' access to tailored support regarding housing, education, and employment showed an impact in reducing weapon carrying. Further research is required in the area to support the reliability of outcomes.

Aggression and Violent Behavior. Volume 67, November–December 2022, 101774

By Sara Haylock, Talia Boshari, Emma C. Alexander, Ameeta Kumar , Logan Manikam and Richard Pinder

Background: Since 2013, the number of violent crimes and offences by sharp instruments have increased continually, following a previous decrease, with the majority of cases occurring among young people and in London. There is limited understanding surrounding the drivers influencing this change in trends, with mostly American-based research identifying risk factors. Methods: The aim of this review is to identify and synthesise evidence from a range of literature to identify risk factors associated with weapon-related crime, for young people (aged 10–24 years) within the UK. A search strategy was generated to conduct a systematic search of published and grey literature within four databases (EMBASE, Medline, PsycINFO, and OpenGrey), identifying papers within a UK-context. Abstracts and full texts were screened by two independent reviewers to assess eligibility for inclusion, namely study focus in line with the objectives of the review. Weight of Evidence approach was utilised to assess paper quality, resulting in inclusion of 16 papers. Thematic analysis was conducted for studies to identity and categorise risk factors according to the WHO ecological model. Results: No association was found between gender or ethnicity and youth violence, contrasting current understanding shown within media. Multiple research papers identified adverse childhood experiences and poor mental health as positively associated with youth and gang violence. It was suggested that community and societal risk factors, such as discrimination and economic inequality, were frequently linked to youth violence. A small number of studies were included within the review as this is a growing field of research, which may have led to a constrained number of risk factors identified. Due to heterogeneity of studies, a meta-analysis could not be conducted. As many studies displayed positive results, publication bias may be present. Conclusions: Several risk factors were identified, with evidence currently heterogeneous with minimal high-quality studies. However, findings highlight key areas for future research, including the link between poor mental health and knife-crime, and the trajectory into gangs. Risk factors should help identify high-risk individuals, targeting them within mitigation strategies to prevent involvement within crime. This should contribute to efforts aimed at reducing the rising crime rates within UK.

BMC Public Health (2020) 20:1451

By Hannah Gaffney, Darrick Jolliffe and Howard White

This technical report reviews the evidence on the effect of knife crime education interventions on the involvement of children and young people in crime and violence. This report is based primarily on a recent systematic review by Browne et al. (2022). Knife crime education interventions are implemented with children and young people in order to raise awareness of the legal implications of knife carrying as well as the physical and emotional implications. These interventions also aim to change attitudes about knife carrying and use in order to prevent and reduce the involvement of children and young people in crime and violence. Key components of these interventions include the delivery of educational sessions with groups of children and young people, the provision of workshops, and group discussions. Knife crime education interventions may adopt a ‘norms approach’, where the intervention content focuses on challenging children and young people’s perceptions that it is ‘normal’ to carry a knife. Other types of interventions to reduce knife crime, in particular media campaigns, have used real life stories to illustrate the profound impacts and consequences of carrying knives. For example, in 2017 the #knifefree campaign by the Home Office (2017) used stories from young people who had made the decision to not carry a knife. Knife crime education interventions would typically be implemented in settings where children and young people attend or gather, for example, schools or community centres. They could also be implemented in hospitals or Youth Offender Institutions. Interventions can be implemented by a range of personnel, including nurses working in emergency medicine (England & Jackson, 2013) or NonGovernment Organisations (Gilbert & Sinclair, 2019). The presumed causal mechanisms in knife crime education interventions are that by raising awareness around the impact and/or consequences of knife carrying and knife use for themselves and their friends and family, young people may be deterred. There can also be peer effects, if participants are less accepting of knife carrying by their friends, and by word of mouth to friends and siblings. There may be an adverse effect if the education creates a misperception regarding the prevalence of knife ownership and so encourages participants to carry

Youth Endowment Fund, 2023. 17p.

By Jaclyn Schildkraut and H. Jaymi Elsass

An Updated Look at Mass Public Shootings in America Over the last two years, there have been a number of high-profile mass public shootings in the United States that have dominated the headlines and captured the attention of the public and policymakers alike—from Buffalo, New York (May 14, 2022; 10 dead) to Uvalde, Texas (May 24, 2022; 21 dead), Highland Park, Illinois (July 4, 2022; 7 dead), Monterrey Park, California (January 21, 2023; 11 dead), and Louisville, Kentucky (April 10, 2023; 5 dead). Although mass public shootings rarely made headlines during the height of the pandemic, the frequency of events has since rebounded to pre-COVID levels. Consequently, these and other mass public shootings have reinforced the need to do more to prevent these tragedies from occurring and to mitigate the harms to individuals and communities if and when they happen. To achieve these goals, it is important to understand the trends associated with the phenomenon of mass public shootings.

The Regional Gun Violence Research Consortium (the Consortium) first published a report in 2018 analyzing 51 years (1966–2016) of mass public shootings data.1 In order to better understand the phenomenon of mass shootings, the report presented information on the location of shootings, weapons used, and demographics of the perpetrators. A follow-up report released in 2021 integrated an additional four years of data (2017–20).2 These reports were based on a comprehensive database of US mass public shootings from researchers Jaclyn Schildkraut and H. Jaymi Elsass.3 As the United States continues to face record rates of gun violence,4 with mass public shootings also increasing in frequency, the need for evidence-based policies is all the more important. A starting point, however, is understanding the different contexts and characteristics of various forms of firearm violence. Mass public shootings, although among the rarest forms of gun violence, require different strategies for prevention and response from other incidents. These shootings often involve considerable planning, which can provide important opportunities for identification, intervention, and de-escalation of the threat before it is carried out, unlike other forms of more spontaneous gun violence.5 Additionally, mass public shootings often are random in nature and occur in large, open public spaces, which present different challenges— including preventative security measures and law enforcement responses—from targeted incidents and those that occur in private locations.

Albany, NY: Rockefeller Institute of Government, 2023. 28p.

By Elise White, Basaime Spate, Javonte Alexander, and Rachel Swaner

In 2020, while the world was wrestling with how to keep safe from a new contagious respiratory virus, many young, urban Americans were navigating how best to protect themselves from another public health crisis: a steep increase in gun violence. Long before these dual pandemics came to dominate media coverage, researchers at the Center for Justice Innovation [the Center] had been grappling with understanding gun violence in cities around the country: Why are young people carrying and using guns? What factors—social and structural—are creating and impacting gun culture? What cultural strategies do youth develop in response to gun culture, and how can those strategies be leveraged to stem the violence? To answer these questions and build on the Center’s previous study of New York City youth gun carrying (Swaner et al. 2020), the Center received funding from the National Collaborative on Gun Violence Research to conduct an exploratory, participatory action research study of the socio-cultural roots of gun violence in four cities (Brooklyn, NY; Wilmington, DE; Philadelphia, PA; Detroit, MI) that will each produce site-specific findings. This report focuses on the findings from the Brooklyn, NY site, where we conducted interviews with 103 youth ages 15-24 who had carried a gun in the previous year. Data were collected between February 27, 2020, and March 30, 2021.

New York: Center for Justice Innovation , 2023. 72p.

By Leslie M. Barnard, Erin Wright-Kelly, Ashley Brooks-Russell; Marian E. Betz

The US has more than 10 times the number of mass shooting events as other developed countries.1 Mass shootings in the US have increased in frequency, with more than half occurring since the year 2000.2 These events have a direct toll on individuals injured or killed, as well as a psychological impact on families, friends, and society.3 Little research has examined the types and distribution of mass shooting events across the US.4 A geographic analysis by type may inform if specific events have disproportionately occurred in particular states or regions of the US. This may generate hypotheses about the contextual (policy, environmental, or sociocultural) factors that may be associated with the distribution of types of mass shooting events and may suggest recommendations for tailored prevention. The purpose of this study was to examine state rates of mass shooting event types and total injuries and deaths in the US.

JAMA Open 2023.

By Ariel Bogle

As mainstream social media companies have increased their scrutiny and moderation of right-wing extremist (RWE) content and groups,1 there’s been a move to alternative online content platforms.2 There’s also growing concern about right-wing extremism in Australia,3 and about how this shift has diversified the mechanisms used to fundraise by RWE entities.4 This phenomenon isn’t well understood in Australia, despite the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) advising in March 2021 that ‘ideological extremism’5 now makes up around 40% of its priority counterterrorism caseload.6 Research by ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre (ICPC) has found that nine Australian Telegram channels7 that share RWE content used at least 22 different funding platforms, including online monetisation tools and cryptocurrencies, to solicit, process and earn funds between 1 January 2021 and 15 July 2021. Due to the opaque nature of many online financial platforms, it’s difficult to obtain a complete picture of online fundraising, so this sample is necessarily limited. However, in this report we aim to provide a preliminary map of the online financial platforms and services that may both support and incentivise an RWE content ecosystem in Australia. Most funding platforms found in our sample have policies that explicitly prohibit the use of their services for hate speech, but we found that those policies were often unclear and not uniformly enforced. Of course, there’s debate about how to balance civil liberties with the risks posed by online communities that promote RWE ideology (and much of that activity isn’t illegal), but a better understanding of online funding mechanisms is necessary, given the growing concern about the role online propaganda may play in inspiring acts of violence8 as well as the risk that, like other social divisions, such channels and movements could be exploited by adversaries.9 The fundraising facilitated by these platforms not only has the potential to grow the resources of groups and individuals linked to right-wing extremism, but it’s also likely to be a means of building the RWE community both within Australia and with overseas groups and a vector for spreading RWE propaganda through the engagement inherent in fundraising efforts. The funding platforms mirror those used by RWE figures overseas, and funding requests were boosted by foreign actors, continuing Australian RWEs’ history of ‘meaningful international exchange’ with overseas counterparts.

Barton, ACT: The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited, International Cyber Policy Centre 2021.36p.

By Kathryn M. Roberts

Countering the radical Islamist narrative remains a high-profile priority of the United States in its ongoing efforts to counter domestic violent extremism. Since mid-2014, government officials have condemned the United States as unable to muster a satisfactory counter-narrative, and emphasize the potentially devastating consequences of failure. Experts inside and outside the government describe the Islamic State as masters of the internet capable of reaching into the United States and turning its people into hate-filled, violently inspired terrorists at will. The idea that the United States must aggressively work to counter these messages domestically remains a given but should it The focus of this thesis is to examine current U.S. efforts in counter-messaging to determine why the United States believes it is failing, and what, if any, evidence supports the idea that a counter-narrative or counter-messaging should be part of domestic countering violent extremism CVE programs. Review of official documents found little basis to assess U.S. programs, as no meaningful published strategy, objectives, or performance data exist for current efforts. Moreover, the foundational assumptions underlying current programs suggest malalignment between what U.S. officials desire a counter-messaging effort to accomplish and what is realistically achievable. Based on these findings, it is recommended that domestic CVE programs eliminate counter-messaging from their portfolio.

Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2020. 119p,

By HM Inspectorate of Probation, Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services and HM Inspectorate of Prisons (UK)

His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation has led an inspection, alongside HM Inspectorate of Constabulary, Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS), and HM Inspectorate of Prisons – looking at the work of the Probation Service’s National Security Division (NSD) and multi-agency arrangements for the management of terrorist offenders in the wake of terrorist attacks.

In response to terrorist attacks in 2019 and 2020, by known terrorist offenders who were subject to licence supervision, the NSD was created as a separate division of the Probation Service, working alongside police Counter Terrorism Nominal Management (CTNM) arrangements. Together with existing prison and probation services, these bodies are responsible for managing those convicted of terrorist offences or suspected of potential terrorist activity, even if they have no related convictions.

What we found

• This inspection looked at the management and progress of the strategy to supervise these offenders. It found:

• NSD, probation, police and prison services worked well together and are approaching managing counter terrorism cases collectively

• supervision within the community was robust overall, balancing rehabilitative needs with tight risk management

• probation practitioners within NSD were well trained specialist officers, holding a small and restricted caseload, delivering high quality case assessment and supervision

• terrorist offenders were subject to additional oversight throughout their sentences

• the arrangements to protect others from harm from terrorist cases in custody were effective

• there has been significant financial investment to improve services dealing with counter terrorism, and staffing levels were appropriate

• prison governors and directors were clear about the terrorist risk posed in their prisons and were actively managing this

• leadership across the NSD and CTNM was strong, and there were clear lines of accountability, enhanced by national multi-agency governance arrangements.

Manchester: His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation, 2023. 65p.

By Riza Kumar

Protracted insurgencies and the growing threat by local affiliates of the global terrorism networks of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS) throughout Nigeria, Somalia, and Burkina Faso have transformed on-the-ground responses to violent extremism throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. Somalia continues to grapple with the unrelenting force of the al-Qaeda affiliated al-Shabaab; Burkina Faso contends with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), ISIS in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and Ansarul Islam; and Nigeria remains encumbered by Boko Haram’s 14-year insurgency and the increasingly violent Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). As serious and sustained militant and terrorist movements continue to kill thousands and displace millions, the three respective governments have altered their responses to violent extremists and terrorism, integrating civilian-led, community-based security strategies into their national counterterrorism programs. National armies and their international partners have offered some reprieve from enduring violent conflicts, but in many cases have failed to offer comprehensive protections to all civilians. Civilian counterterrorism militias emerged to provide security to vulnerable communities and were quickly recognized as an alternative to state-sponsored counterinsurgency campaigns. However, once these counterterrorism militias were enlisted and absorbed into the national security apparatus, new—albeit long-established—challenges quickly emerged. Localized counterterrorism campaigns have at times devolved into vengeful operations against ethnic rivals as well as opportunities to carry out illicit activities such as extortion, drug trafficking, and looting. The benefits and drawbacks of civilian counterterrorism militias remain consistent across different regions. The strategy is cost-effective and practical as civilian defense forces are often cheaper than formal security units, such as the national army and the police. There is a ready pool of potential local recruits to safeguard vulnerable communities, and they are knowledgeable about the communities they protect. Most importantly, civilian troops establish a level of community loyalty that can be difficult to achieve with national armies. Significant drawbacks of civilian forces are that troops can become unreliable and difficult to control if not properly managed. Furthermore, without strong and effective oversight mechanisms, civilian troops are capable of undermining government authority, rule of law, and governance. Unfortunately, if not carefully executed, civilian forces could deteriorate into armed criminal networks,1 transforming from vanguards of safety into long-term sources of instability and insecurity.

Berlin: Counter Extremism Project, 2023. 24p.