By Anne-Séverine Fabre, Nicolas Florquin, and Matt Schroeder

The trafficking of firearms and their use in criminal violence in Europe has received significant attention from researchers and policymakers. Less is known, however, about the illicit proliferation of firearm ammunition and other explosive munitions. Currently, detailed data on illicit munitions in Europe can only be accessed through specialized law enforcement agencies. National seizure statistics often lack the necessary detail for policy-relevant analysis, as do the media reports, which often include incomplete or inaccurate information on the types and calibres of ammunition.

Illicit firearms ammunition and other explosive munitions in the European Union—a new paper from the Small Arms Survey, as part of the INSIGHT project—provides a regional analysis and overview of the types, sources, and end users of these items, and addresses the need for detailed, policy-relevant data on illicit munitions in Europe.

Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, 2023. 24p.

By: Anne-Séverine Fabre, Nicolas Florquin, Matt Schroeder, and Andrea Edoardo Varisco

Improvements in technology and information sharing have transformed PMFs from crude, impractical homemade devices of limited value to most criminals into highly functional weapons that are increasingly viewed as viable substitutes for factory-built firearms. The effectiveness of national and international small arms control regimes are gradually being eroded; the lack of serial numbers on such weapons, for example, undermines tracing efforts that have been a cornerstone of investigations.

Privately Made Firearms in the European Union—a new paper from the Small Arms Survey, as part of the INSIGHT project—examines the emerging threat that privately made firearms and their illicit proliferation pose within Europe.

Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2023. 18p.

By: Holger Anders

Mali has faced more than a decade of armed violence perpetrated by extremists, resulting in thousands of victims among national and international armed forces, UN peacekeepers, and civilians.

Continuity and Change: Extremist-used Arms in Mali—a new Briefing Paper from the Small Arms Survey’s Security Assessment in North Africa (SANA) project—investigates the arms, ammunition, explosives, and other material used in extremist attacks in Mali from 2015 to 2022, and the sources and pathways through which they were obtained.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2024. 16p.

By Michaela Millender

On May 27, 1993, a car bomb blasted through the side of the Uffizi Gallery in Florence, Italy, killing five and wounding around thirty others, and destroying hundreds of priceless pieces of art in the gallery’s collection. Many contend that the gallery was targeted by the Cosa Nostra, or the Sicilian Mafia, not just in retaliation for crackdowns on the organization, but also due to the gallery’s embodiment of Italian culture and its symbolism of the Italian nation. As an open-access museum and a protected UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage site, the city of Florence presents unique challenges to both safeguarding its cultural heritage from risks but also, most critically, remaining open and accessible to the public. Not limited to the Florentine example, this challenge is ubiquitous in the protection of cultural heritage throughout the world. Its symbolic importance, as well as the fact that it attracts large crowds of civilians and may not always be adequately protected, means that cultural heritage – which is often also considered a so-called “soft target” – can be a prime target for violence and an objective for illicit actors, including criminals and terrorists.

New York: Soufan Center, 2024. 26p.

By Peter K. Levine, Joseph F. Adams, Amy A. Alrich, Rachel G. Augustine, Margaret D.M. Barber, Sujeeta B. Bhatt Kathleen M. Conley, Dave I. Cotting, Alan B. Gelder, Jeffery M. Jaworski, Mark F. Kaye, Carrington A. Metts, Neil V. Mithal, and Matthew J. Reed.

From the document: "The objectives of the IDA [Institute for Defense Analyses] study are to gain greater fidelity on the scope and nature of extremist ideologies and behaviors in the [DOD]; identify the sources of such ideologies and behavior; assess their impact; and develop strategies for preventing, countering, and neutralizing that impact. To that end, the project description calls for IDA to: 1. Document the range of known extremist ideologies and behaviors that are contrary to U.S. law and policy; 2. Identify existing definitions of extremism and prohibited extremist activities; 3. Identify pathways of extremist ideology and behavior broadly and within the Department in particular; 4. Assess why the DOD workforce and others in the military community (including veterans, DOD civilians, and contractor employees) might be susceptible to extremist recruiting efforts; 5. Survey DOD approaches to the prevention of other forms of violence (including suicide, domestic violence, assault, sexual assault, and hate crimes) to identify strategies that might be adopted; 6. Assess policies and initiatives of other federal agencies that might be helpful to the Department; 7. Identify existing legal frameworks for addressing prohibited extremist activities in the Total Force; 8. Evaluate current DOD efforts to counter extremist ideologies and behaviors in the ranks, identifying gaps and strengths; and 9. Review and evaluate current DOD information collection, tracking, and data sharing systems (including through the military justice, equal employment opportunity, command discipline, hotline response systems, insider threat, and law enforcement/security systems)."

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES. 2023. 282p.

By PAYNE, KEITH B.

From the document: "With Russia and China as heavily armed and aligned nuclear foes, Washington faces an unprecedented deterrence context and looming threats. Given this new great power alignment, more than 30 states are at increased risk, namely, those allies directly covered by the U.S. nuclear deterrent and those partners greatly affected by the credibility of that deterrent, such as Taiwan and Ukraine. Most U.S. civilian and military leaders who must pay attention to this challenge appear to recognize that the U.S. understanding of deterrence, largely based on its Cold War experience, must be reconsidered in this unprecedented context. The search for guideposts for that understanding is now ongoing. The current war in the Middle East appears to offer some tentative lessons in this regard."

NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY (U.S.). 2024. 6p.

By GANDHI, MILAN

From the document: "Focussing on current and emerging issues, this policy briefing paper ('Paper') surveys the ways in which technologies under the umbrella of artificial intelligence ('AI') may interact with democracy and, specifically, extremism, mis/disinformation, and illegal and 'legal but harmful' content online. The Paper considers examples of how AI technologies can be used to mislead and harm citizens and how AI technologies can be used to detect and counter the same or associated harms, exploring risks to democracy and human rights emerging across the spectrum. [...] Given the immense scope and potential impacts of AI on different facets of democracy and human rights, the Paper does not consider every relevant or potential AI use case, nor the long-term horizon. For example, AI-powered kinetic weapons and cyber-attacks are not discussed. Moreover, the Paper is limited in examining questions at the intersection of AI and economics and AI and geopolitics, though both intersections have important implications for democracy in the digital age. Finally, the Paper only briefly discusses how AI and outputs such as deepfakes may exacerbate broader societal concerns relating to political trust and polarisation. Although there is a likelihood that aspects of the Paper will be out-of-date the moment it is published given the speed at which new issues, rules and innovations are emerging, the Paper is intended to empower policymakers, especially those working on mis/disinformation, hate, extremism and terrorism specifically, as well as security, democracy and human rights more broadly. It provides explanations of core concerns related to AI and links them to practical examples and possible public policy solutions."

INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC DIALOGUE. 2024.

By MACDONALD, STUART KEITH, 1979-; MATTHEIS, ASHLEY A.; WELLS, DAVID

From the document: "Online terrorist propaganda has been an important policy concern for at least the past decade. [...] [T]he EU Commission launched a call for proposals for projects aimed at supporting small companies in implementing the Regulation. Three projects were funded under this call. This report forms part of one of these projects, which is entitled Tech Against Terrorism Europe. It is important to note at the outset that the focus of this report is the use of AI and machine learning to identify terrorist content online using content-based approaches. Accordingly, the following are outside the scope of the report: [1] The moderation of so-called borderline content, i.e., content that does not violate a platform's Terms of Service but which is nevertheless regarded as potentially harmful. [2] The identification of individuals on a radicalisation trajectory, which is a different - and even more difficult - task; and, [3] The use of behaviour-based cues, such as abnormal posting volume and use of unrelated, trending hashtags, to identify accounts that are sharing terrorist content. This includes approaches based on recidivism. The report begins, in section 2, by explaining the terms AI, machine learning and terrorist content online. Readers that are already familiar with these concepts may wish to move straight to section 3, which discusses the two main content-based approaches to the automated identification of terrorist content online: matching-based approaches and classification-based ones. Having explained the limitations of each approach, section 4 details two ways in which it is necessary to supplement automated tools. Section 5 then addresses issues of resource, before the report concludes with three recommendations."

TECH AGAINST TERRORISM; TECH AGAINST TERRORISM EUROPE.. 2023.. 32p.

By Elinore J. Kaufman; Douglas J. Wiebe; Ruiying Aria Xiong

Importance  Firearm injury research in the US has focused on fatal injuries. The incidence and epidemiologic factors associated with nonfatal firearm injuries are less understood.

Objective  To evaluate estimates of incidence and trends over time of fatal and nonfatal firearm injuries.

Design, Setting, and Participants  A cross-sectional, ecologic study was conducted using data throughout the US from 2009 to 2017. Data on fatal injuries from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention were combined with national data on emergency department visits for nonfatal firearm injury from the Nationwide Emergency Department (ED) sample. Data analysis was conducted from August 2019 to September 2020.

Exposures  Firearm injuries identified with International Classification of Diseases external cause of injury codes and categorized by intent of injury, age group, and urban-rural location.

Main Outcomes and Measures  Incidence, case fatality rate, and trends over time of firearm injury according to intent, age group, and urban-rural location.

JAMA Intern Med. 20210 181(2): 1–8

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By Ndubuisi Christian Ani

The densely populated southern regions of Kayes and Koulikoro in Mali are at a watershed moment, with the rapid expansion into the regions by Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) from the north and central regions. The two regions provide JNIM with new and profitable frontiers for resource exploitation, such as access to a vast tax base and control of the lucrative timber logging sector. The regions also provide JNIM with opportunities for cattle rustling, kidnapping, banditry and access to artisanal gold mining sites. Key points For the government l Promote regular confidence-building initiatives between farmer and herder communities in order to reduce stigmatisation and alliance with JNIM. l Initiate a national dialogue with the aim of prohibiting hereditary slavery. l Work proactively together with community. For ECOWAS l Urge Mali to revitalise the 2015 Algiers peace agreement. l Seek international partnerships to support developmental and humanitarian initiatives in Mali in order to prevent radicalisation in the southern regions. l Support national consultations over the abolition of hereditary slavery.

Africa, OCWAR-T Research Report 13  Ecowas Commission. 2023. 20pg

By Alexander Landry, James Druckman, and Robb Willer

Recent, high-profile acts of partisan violence have stimulated interest among academics and the general public in the etiology of support for such violence. Here, Landry, Druckman, and Willer report results of an exploratory study that (1) measures support for partisan violence with both abstract items (e.g., general support for partisan violence) and support for more specific acts (e.g., support for a partisan motivated shooting), (2) follows recently established best practices by including attention checks to attenuate response bias, and (3) incorporates measures of a wide range of potential confounders as control variables. Across three data collections (total N = 2,003), including two with nationally representative samples, and tracking seven unique operationalizations of support for the use of violence against out-partisans, they find the most consistent and typically largest relationships with an individual’s reported “need for chaos” (e.g., agreement with statements like: “Sometimes I just feel like destroying beautiful things”) and the extent to which they dehumanize supporters of the opposing party. The researchers speculate this reflects a motivation to use extreme methods (need for chaos) toward one’s political rivals, liberated from the moral restraints that inhibit harming fellow human beings (dehumanization). System justification and social dominance orientation were also both positively related to support for partisan violence, which may reflect partisans’ desire to protect their preferred social order from out-partisans deemed to threaten it. Collectively, these results offer a framework for future research on support for partisan violence, highlighting the role of extreme orientations toward society and rival partisans.

United States, Northwestern University,  Institute for Policy Research. 2023, 56pg

By  Anne-Séverine Fabre, Nicolas Florquin and Matt Schroeder

Calibres typically associated with handguns and widely available commercial brands of ammunition usually represent the bulk of the illicit firearm ammunition seen in the countries studied.

Illicit firearms ammunition is not necessarily trafficked from abroad, as shown by the misuse of domestically produced cartridges in the five surveyed countries. Moreover, cartridges produced legally within the European Union (EU) have been recovered the same year at crime scenes.

A large percentage of illicit hand grenades and other factory-produced explosive munitions seized in the European countries under review were manufactured in the former Yugoslavia. The seizures are consistent with media reports and government statements indicating that the Balkans are a major source of illicit grenades acquired and used by criminals in the EU.

The number of illicit grenades documented in the Netherlands and Sweden has decreased significantly in recent years, possibly owing to Covid-19-related travel and shipping disruptions, an increased reliance on other types of explosives by criminals, and national and regional counter-trafficking efforts.

Brussel, Belgium: Flemish Peace Institute. 2024, 24pg

ByJoshua D. Freilich, Steven M. Chermak, Rachael A. Arietti, and Noah D. Turner

This review focuses on terrorism and extremist crimes, including ideologically motivated hate crimes. Research on these topics has become more rigorous in recent decades, and more scholars have engaged in original data collection. Our assessment found a burgeoning literature that increasingly includes the application of integrated theories, but gaps remain as few studies examine life-course and critical approaches. Our review of the policing of terrorism found a limited evidence base for counterterrorism initiatives. We also found that court/sentencing issues are understudied. We suggest improving data quality in these areas by creating a national data collection protocol on these crimes, enhancing the rigor of offender and victim self-report studies, and requiring more transparency from open-source research efforts. We propose that government agencies fund rigorous evaluations of policing strategies in the terrorism context. Finally, it is hoped that increased access to federal court documents will lead to more scholarly attention on sentencing issues.

Annual Review of Criminology, Volume 7, Page 187 - 209

By David M. Hureau1 , Theodore Wilson , Hilary M. Jackl, Jalon Arthur , Christopher Patterson znc Andrew V. Papachristos

Gun violence is a leading cause of premature death and a driver of racial disparities in life expectancy in the United States. Community-based interventions are the foremost policy strategy for reducing gun violence without exacerbating harm associated with criminal justice approaches. However, little is known about the interventionist workforce. In 2021, we used a researcher-guided survey to obtain a near-census of Chicago violence interventionists (n = 181, 93% response rate). Workers were mostly male (84%) and Black (80.9%), with a mean age of 43.6 years. Interventionists commonly experienced work-related exposure to violence and direct victimization. A total of 59.4% witnessed someone being shot at, whereas 32.4% witnessed a victim struck by gunfire. During work hours, 19.6% were shot at, while 2.2% were nonfatally shot. Single-year rates of gun violence victimization exceeded those of Chicago police. Results suggest that investment in community violence intervention should prioritize improving worker safety and reducing violence exposure while developing support for vulnerable frontline practitioners.

Science Advances, Dec. 2022.

By The Educational Fund to Stop Gun Violence, DC Justice Lab, Cities United, March for Our Lives, Community Justice Action Fund, Consortium for Risk-Based Firearm Policy, and Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Violence Prevention and Policy

This report urges us to think carefully about the relationship between gun violence prevention and racial equity. Racial equity impact assessments (REIAs), such as the assessment proposed in this report, guide advocates, policy makers, and researchers through a thorough examination of policies with an equity lens to anticipate the potential outcomes and mitigate foreseeable risks. It requires one to ask fundamental questions about when to justify involvement with the criminal legal system, identify the costs and benefits of engagement, and think about alternatives to minimize harm. This framework acknowledges that solutions to gun violence, however well intentioned they may be, can exacerbate or compound upon the harms suffered by impacted communities if they are made without careful analysis and the input of those directly affected by it. Gun violence affects everyone. It inflicts an enormous burden upon our country, particularly within under-resourced Black and Latino/Hispanic communities. The politics of guns and race have long been intertwined, but racial equity only recently became a focal point of discussions among gun violence prevention groups, catalyzed by the advocacy of community-based and BIPOC2-led organizations. In partnership with many stakeholders across the gun violence prevention movement, this racial equity framework is a resource that can be used by policymakers, researchers, and organizations working in gun violence prevention. Representatives from the six authoring organizations comprised a small working group to plan development of the report and convened a series of conversations to share proposals and review feedback from expert contributors. In addition to advancing racial equity, the core values of inclusion, collaboration, and consensus-building guided the project from early stages through completion. Building upon existing racial equity work and guidance, this report is informed by the public health model of social determinants of health and has been tailored to the specific needs of gun violence prevention. The tools and recommendations proposed in this report are derived from relevant academic literature, racial equity impact assessments, and frameworks for building more equitable social movements. The racial equity framework for gun violence prevention is divided into three main sections: The first section introduces the most relevant considerations about gun policy and race. It helps contextualize the issue of racial disparities in gun violence and the role of the criminal legal system. The second section is the racial equity impact assessment tool (REIA) for gun violence prevention policy. It includes the analysis of the foundational assessments that were considered to develop the tool and a practical explanation of each of the questions that comprise the REIA. The third section provides resources to build a more equitable gun violence prevention movement. It describes the need to center and invest in BIPOC-led organizations and presents a set of recommendations for developing and sustaining a more equitable gun violence prevention movement.

The Authors, 2022. 54p.

By Astrid De Schutter and Nils Duquet

Firearms trafficking in the European Union (EU) is driven by criminal demand and is a key enabler for other criminal activities such as drug trafficking. Criminals seek to acquire firearms for instrumental purposes, namely to facilitate their criminal activities, where they use guns to threaten, intimidate or assault others (criminals or non-criminals), but they can also be acquired for the reputation afforded through the possession of – especially certain types of – firearms. Previous studies have shown that handguns are the type of firearm most commonly possessed by criminals in Europe as they are lightweight, easy to conceal and generally reliable. While automatic rifles can also be very effective for intimidation and assault purposes, their possession by criminals is less common. Criminal demand for firearms comes from various types of criminals ranging from international drug traffickers, armed robbers, youth gangs involved in street drug dealing, human traffickers, loan sharks, professional assassins and so on. Yet not all criminals have equal access to firearms. Given that legal access to firearms is almost impossible for criminals in Europe, they acquire them through other means. These firearms can, for example, be stolen from legal gun owners or state stockpiles, bought from a local criminal arms dealer or trafficked internationall . Interviews with experts, as well as previous studies, suggest also that the criminal demand for firearms is increasing in various EU Member States (9). Due to the traditionally closed character of illicit gun markets in Europe, firearms are often only accessible to criminals when they have the necessary criminal connections. Younger and less experienced criminals tend to experience more difficulties in their attempts to acquire firearms. In the past decade, however, law enforcement agencies from various European countries have noted an increased availability of firearms for criminals in their country. Previous studies have linked this to various trafficking methods, including the continuous supply of conflict legacy weapons from the Western Balkans, the increased trafficking in easy-to-reactivate firearms and in easy-to-convert blank-firing weapons and Flobert-calibre firearms . The possibilities generated by the internet have further eroded the closed character of illicit gun markets in Europe. The increased availability of firearms is believed to have ‘facilitated the gradual trickling-down of the possession and use of firearms to lower segments of the criminal hierarchy in several EU Member States, especially in western Europe’. In 2021 Europol noted that the use of violence in serious and organised crime seemed to be increasing in the EU, both in frequency and severity, augmented by the frequent use of firearms and explosives. A 2021 comparative study on gun violence in Europe, coordinated by the Flemish Peace Institute, concluded that firearms trafficking in Europe is not only driven by criminal demand, but is also strongly connected to criminal gun violence. The observed increased availability of various types of firearms to criminals has led to an escalation of criminal gun violence in several European countries and sometimes also to arms races among criminals. The study also concluded that shootings in the criminal underworld in Europe are mainly connected to the drugs trade and enabled by firearms trafficking. A 2018 EMCDDA study on drug-related homicide concluded that this type of homicide is more likely to involve the use of firearms than other means of violence . Findings from project TARGET state that young men (under the age of 35) are the main victims and perpetrators of lethal gun violence. This is also the case for non-lethal gun violence, but there is a more even age distribution in this category. In 2019 the EMCDDA and Europol noted that the criminal use of firearms, including automatic weapons, by organised crime groups involved in European drug markets appeared to be increasing (16). According to Europol, the use of violence related to the trade in drugs – cocaine and cannabis in particular – has escalated in recent years, and the availability of firearms and explosives is a key enabler for this violence (17). A previous study concluded that more research is needed to uncover the dynamics between drug markets in Europe and gun violence: ‘While there is clearly a link between the illegal drug trade and firearm violence, this connection and its enabling elements are an important avenue for further research’ (18). Counteracting drug-related gun violence requires a good intelligence picture of its scope, characteristics and dynamics. The objective of this report is to analyse the nexus between gun violence and the illegal drug market in Europe. To reach this objective, this paper addresses the following research questions: 1. What is the nexus between firearms trafficking and drug trafficking in the European Union? 2. What are the scope and characteristics of drug-related firearms violence in the European Union? 3. How does this violence impact society?

Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, 2023. 57p.

By Gergely Hideg

KEY FINDINGS: Between 2010 and the end of the 2014–15 phase of the Russo-Ukrainian war, lethal criminal violence in Ukraine increased by nearly 50 percent. This raises the possibility of an even steeper future increase in violent crime resulting from the current full-scale war.

In spite of the increasing crime victimization rate of households since the 2022 invasion, incidents involving firearms remain less common compared to the pre-invasion period. Nonetheless, trust in the police—while still high—has declined since winter 2022–23, and approximately 14 percent of Ukrainian civilians now carry some form of typically non-lethal weapon for self-defense, which is more than a twofold increase from 2019 and more than a threefold increase from 2011.

The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine initially led to a slight decrease in firearms kept in households as civilians and weapons were mobilized for the war effort. As of summer 2023, household ownership levels have gone back up, but the number of firearms held by these households has decreased by approximately 20 percent since the start of the full-scale war.

Survey respondents believe that the acquisition of firearms has become more straightforward than in winter 2022–23, although it still presents much greater challenges than in 2019. Acquiring ammunition appears to be more difficult than acquiring firearms.

Between 43 and 46 percent of men in every age group indicated that they either already own a firearm (7 percent overall) or would like to own one. Only 11 percent of women expressed the desire to own a firearm.

The survey indicated that more women than men expressed negative views about firearms: they have less desire to own a firearm, they are less likely to think they are necessary, and not many would feel safer if their household had a firearm. Nonetheless, many respondents, among them women, thought women ‘in their area’ expected their husbands to be able to use a firearm.

Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, 2023. 9p.

Edited by Atsushi Yasutomi, Rosalie Arcala Hall and Saya Kiba

An exploration of the roles that pro- and anti-government militias, private armed groups, vigilantes, and gangs play in local communities in the new democracies of Southeast Asia. Scholars have typically characterized irregular forces as spoilers and infiltrators in post-conflict peacebuilding processes. The contributors to this book challenge this conventional understanding of irregular forces in Southeast Asia, demonstrating that they often attract solid support from civilians and can be major contributors to the building of local security — a process by which local residents, in the absence of an effective police force, develop, partner or are at least included in the management of community crimes and other violence. They analyze irregular forces’ dealings with political actors at the community level, explaining why and how forces are incorporated in and collaborate with legitimate institutions without using violence against them. Offering a new approach to dealing with irregular forces in Southeast Asia, contributors explore new theoretical frameworks that are better suited for evaluating irregular forces’ relationship to different security providers and the political environments in the region. Specifically, they examine case studies from Indonesia, Timor-Leste, the Philippines, and Thailand. A valuable resource for researchers, students and practitioners in the areas of conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and security governance, especially those with a focus on Southeast Asia. This book will also be of great interest to scholars of the sociology and anthropology of the region.

Abingdon, Oxon, UK: New York: Routledge, 2022. 215p.

By United States. Department Of Justice. Office Of Community Oriented Policing Services

From the document: "At the request of then Uvalde Mayor Don McLaughlin, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced on May 29, 2022, that it would conduct a Critical Incident Review (CIR) of the law enforcement response to the mass shooting. [...] A full understanding of the response of local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies and personnel is critical for addressing many unanswered questions, identifying crucial lessons learned, enhancing prevention initiatives, and improving future preparation for and responses to mass shootings in other communities. In providing a detailed accounting and critical assessment of the first responder actions in Uvalde, and the efforts since to ameliorate gaps and deficiencies in that response, the CIR is intended to build on the knowledge base for responding to incidents of mass violence. It also will identify generally accepted practices for an effective law enforcement response to such incidents. Finally, the CIR is intended to help honor the victims and survivors of the Robb Elementary School tragedy."

United States. Department Of Justice. Office Of Community Oriented Policing Services . 2024. 62p.

By Michael German and Kaylana Mueller-Hsia

The failure of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other law enforcement agencies to anticipate and prepare for the January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol by far-right insurrectionists has elicited proposals to expand the bureau’s authority to investigate domestic terrorism.1 The FBI already received expansive new powers after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and its current guidelines place few limits on agents’ ability to search broadly for potential threats. Confusion about the current scope of the bureau’s powers is understandable, however, as FBI leaders have regularly misstated their authorities in public testimony.2 These misstatements deflect FBI accountability by focusing overseers on filling perceived gaps in its authority rather than examining how the bureau uses, misuses, or fails to use the tools it already has.

New York: Brennan Center for Justice, 2022. 21p.