By Kateira Aryaeinejad and Thomas Leo Scherer

Over the years, the National Institute of Justice’s (NIJ) funding for research has provided important opportunities to advance our understanding of topics related to crime and justice within the United States. Drawing from this portfolio, this synthesis paper compares and contrasts the data and findings from NIJ-sponsored research projects on violent extremism, mass shootings, and bias crimes. This comparison focuses both on the content of the data and on the creation and coverage of the data, examining findings from four research projects: ■ The Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) database of 2,226 individuals who demonstrated at least 1 of 5 extremist or radicalized behaviors. ■ The Bias Incidents and Actors Study (BIAS) database of 966 adults arrested or indicted for bias crimes. ■ The National Hate Crime Investigation Study (NHCIS) database of 1,230 hate crime cases. ■ The Violence Project dataset of 172 mass shootings. This synthesis first reviews the creation of each dataset and the types of information that are collected to better understand their generalizability and the ability to make comparisons across separate datasets. There are significant differences in the size, time span, and information of the four datasets, which limits the comparisons that can be made between the individuals described in each dataset and necessitates caution in drawing strong conclusions from such comparisons. With that caution in mind, the datasets suggest some similarities in the individuals who commit bias crimes and mass shootings and display violent extremist behavior. These individuals are primarily males in their 20s and 30s and unmarried at the time of their offenses. They may exhibit higher rates of unemployment than the general population and often have prior criminal histories. However, that is not to say that these characteristics should be used as a profile to determine who is at risk of or more likely to commit any of these types of offenses or behaviors. Rather, it calls into question what other factors may be impacting individuals with these characteristics who go on to commit these types of offenses. The datasets also suggest some differences in the individuals who commit each type of offense or behavior. Individuals associated with violent extremism tend to be more educated than those who commit mass shootings or bias crimes. Individuals who commit mass shootings exhibit higher rates of mental health issues than those who commit bias crimes or participate in violent extremism offenses. The comparison of individuals across categories also highlighted differences among individuals who committed the same type of offense. Among individuals who supported violent extremism, for example, those acting in support of far-right ideologies were more likely to have military experience than those following other ideologies. Comparing these datasets highlights their potential and their limitations, suggesting paths forward for future research. The different collection methods show the importance of precisely describing the data collection method, discussing which behaviors are missed by that method, and triangulating among data with different methods to understand what is missing. The differences in the types of information that each dataset collects about each individual and action suggest that future collections could have greater overlap and comparability. The establishment of potential similarities in demographics and life experiences also allows for more targeted data collection focusing on why most individuals who fit that profile do not commit an offense, while others do. In this way, these projects not only contribute to our current understanding of these types of offenses and behaviors but also allow future research and programming to be conducted more effectively.

Washington, DC : U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, 2024. 43p.

By Jacob D. Charles

Gun violence is a pressing national concern. And it has been for decades. Throughout nearly all that time, the primary tool lawmakers have deployed to stanch the violence has been the machinery of the criminal law. Increased policing, intrusive surveillance, vigorous prosecution, and punitive penalties are showered on gun offenders. This Article spotlights and specifies this approach—what it calls “firearms carceralism”—and details how a decades-long bipartisan consensus generated a set of state-centered solutions to gun violence that has not meaningfully impacted the problem. Instead, those policies have exacerbated racial inequity and compounded civic and community harms. The Article traces the escalating punitive measures imposed on gun offenders over the past half century. It first peers down into one microcosmic exemplar of firearms carceralism etched into federal mandatory minimum provisions and Supreme Court case law magnifying those penalties. It describes how criminal justice reforms have traditionally excluded those whose offenses are categorized as violent, and specifically and emphatically 2812 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [108:2811 those who offend with guns by their side. It then draws out promising hints of a path to including gun offenders in efforts to reform or reimagine the criminal legal system. Most fundamentally, however, the Article wages a sustained critique of the system of firearms carceralism that fronts aggressive law enforcement and draconian terms of incarceration. It describes the unjustifiable breadth and depth of these practices and the harmful, racialized, and exclusionary values they simultaneously draw from and reinscribe. Finally, the Article argues in favor of three alternative paths to equitable peace and safety. First, it outlines private sector steps to, for example, dampen illicit firearms supply. Second, it highlights civil legal interventions like red flag laws and tort lawsuits against irresponsible gun sellers. Third, and most prominently, it underscores the promise of community violence intervention and restorative justice programs to bring meaningful safety apart from the carceral tools of coercive control.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [108:2811), 2024.

By Noémie Bouhana | Caitlin Clemmow | With contributions from Philip Doherty

Post 9/11, research on radicalisation and involvement in terrorism and violent extremism (henceforth, ITVE) has focussed on the role of individual-level attributes, such as the psychological characteristics, socio-economic background, demographic features, experiences, beliefs, past behaviours and criminality, and the social embeddedness of radicalised individuals and people involved in acts of terrorism (Borum, 2011; Stern, 2016; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017; Sageman, 2008; Wiktorowicz, 2005). Likewise, existing processes, methods and tools to identify and evaluate the risk of ITVE operate largely at the individual level. The Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF) used in the context of Channel is the best example of this. Comparatively less attention has been devoted to identifying and evaluating the characteristics of the socio-physical contexts which may contribute to the emergence of the risk of ITVE, or, conversely, to its suppression. Yet research on crime, arguably a closely related problem space, makes a strong case that many of the causes and enabling conditions of criminal development (of which ITVE is an instantiation) are found in the environment: crime and criminals concentrate in space and time. Modifying the environment in which crime occurs and the specific settings in which criminals develop and act has been shown at length to be an effective approach to crime prevention and disruption (Weisburd et al., 2012). In crime prevention, as in other areas of behavioural change, one size does not fit all: to design effective programs, the ability to tailor interventions to the socio-physical context is paramount, which means that the effect of key contextual features on the outcome of interest must be understood (Sampson et al., 2013); notably, the effect of exposing (susceptible) individuals with particular kinds of characteristics to (criminogenic) places with particular kinds of features. Situational Action Theory [SAT] is a theory of crime causation, which, as its name suggests, puts context at the centre of the explanation of crime (P.- O. H. Wikström et al., 2009). In 2010, ahead of the revision of the Prevent Strategy, the UK Home Office commissioned a Rapid Evidence Assessment of the cause of al-Qaeda-influenced radicalisation seen through the lens of SAT (Bouhana & Wikström, 2011), which identified the key levels of analysis in a causal model of radicalisation as relating to individual vulnerability to radicalising influence, exposure to radicalising settings, and the mechanisms of emergence of said settings. In the decade since, this theoretical model has been refined and now underpins a research programme concerned chiefly with going beyond "who" and "why" to the "where" of terrorism involvement. It has inspired, notably, the EU FP7-funded international PRIME project on lone actor terrorism, which, among other findings, has shown that individual-level risk indicators are multifinal (i.e., their meaning determined by the context in which they arise), and has provided support for a formulation of individual vulnerability which encompasses susceptibility to exposure to radicalising settings, as well as cognitive susceptibility to moral change with significant implications for prevention efforts (Corner et al., 2018). It has also produced evidence for distinct configurations of individual/ context interaction patterns leading to the emergence of lone actor risk, with further implications for risk assessment (Clemmow et al., 2019). To better support policy strategy and counter-terrorism practice, the theoretical SAT model of radicalisation was reformulated and expanded into a risk analysis framework for lone actor terrorism [PRIME RAF] (Bouhana et al., 2016, 2018) and a systemic inference framework to inform counter-extremism strategies [S5], commissioned by the UK Counter-Extremism Commission (Bouhana, 2019). Both of these integrate SAT with the broader behavioural and socio-cognitive knowledge-base to refine our understanding of personenvironment interaction. While the RAF is concerned specifically with the effect of situational interaction on the motivation and capability of lone actors to act (behaviour), S5 is more broadly focused on explaining the acquisition of extremist propensities (beliefs). Both frameworks are analytically related and can be logically integrated. However, these remain general frameworks. Inherent in their interactionist logic is the fact that, while environmental processes of risk can be set out in generic terms, specific risk (or protective) factors and – crucially – their observable indicators must be elicited with regards to a particular context. This is because indicators are subject to change over space and time (P. O. H. Wikström & Bouhana, 2017) and because risk assessment is most effective when calibrated to context (Hamilton et al., 2021). A recently completed, Home Office-funded project guided by S5 (State of the Union [SOTU]; Bouhana and Schumann, 2021), which aimed to assess the observability of key analytical concepts of mainstream models of terrorism involvement, demonstrated the difficulty, yet also the necessity of translating said concepts into observable indicators, inasmuch as any model is intended to guide risk assessment or intervention design and evaluation. It also suggested that environmental indicators may be more reliably observed than susceptibility-related indicators using commonly available sources of information, and it tentatively provided further support for the notion that susceptibility and exposure interact in specific ways, leading to the emergence of risk. This project investigated the feasibility of developing a framework to assess the risk of involvement in terrorism and violent extremism at the level of place, with a view towards – further down the line – designing an assessment tool along the lines of the Vulnerability Assessment Framework, intended to assess environments instead of individuals. As a first step towards establishing this feasibility, this project investigated whether the mechanisms articulated in the S5 framework could be operationalised; in other words, to what extent they could be associated with a set of observable indicators relevant to the UK ITVE context. Given the relative scarcity of empirical research into the characteristics of extremist social ecologies and settings in the UK (and largely elsewhere) – which would be prerequisite to the conduct of a systematic review – the researchers elected to carry out an e-Delphi exercise with U.K. Prevent practitioners, the results of which are presented at length in this report.

London: CREST - Centre for Research and Evidence in Security Threats (CREST), 2025. 50p.

By Paul M. Reeping, Hannah S. Laqueur & Rose M. C. Kagawa

To date, there have been no peer-reviewed studies in the United States estimating the impact of gun-free zone policies in alcohol-serving establishments on rates of firearm violence in and around such establishments. In this study, we utilized a cross-sectional design to estimate the impact of Texas’s 51% alcohol law, which prohibits the carrying of firearms in establishments that generate over half of their revenue from alcohol sales. The analysis focused on the difference in shooting incidents in and around establishments with and without firearm carrying prohibitions in 2021 and 2022. After adjusting for establishment type (bar/restaurant), alcohol sales volume, census tract level demographic factors, and the number of nearby restaurants and bars, results indicated that gun-prohibiting bars experienced significantly fewer shootings compared to those that allowed guns. Specifically, establishments that were gun-prohibited had 37% fewer shootings within 50 m than those that were gun-allowing, with a 95% confidence interval ranging from 60% fewer to 0.2% fewer. This association was more prominent in bars than in restaurants. The protective association with gun-prohibited status diminished with increased distance from the establishments; results were not significant at 100 m. Our study findings align with research suggesting that gun-free zones can reduce firearm violence. However, future studies using quasi-experimental designs that can better support causal inference are needed to support such a conclusion, as are studies exploring the efficacy of such policies in various settings and over longer periods.

Texas. J Urban Health, 2024, 9p.

By Dru Stevenson

Firearm policy in the United States is subject to longstanding political gridlock. Up to now, most of the legal academic literature has focused on the constitutionality of various—or any—regulations regarding firearm possession, sales, or usage. This article inverts the problem and proposes a system for voluntary registration and certification of nonowners, those who want to waive or renounce their Second Amendment rights as a matter of personal conviction. The proposed system is analogous to both the registration of conscientious objectors during wartime conscriptions, and the newer suicide prevention laws whereby individuals can add their names to a do-not-sell list for firearm dealers—though the proposal made here is broader and more permanent. Voluntary registration, with official certification, would serve three important purposes. First, this would help create social identification markers for the gunless-by-choice movement, something that historically has been missing; formal signals and labels of identification with a movement are necessary for a movement’s success, especially with prohibition or abstinence movements. Second, registration and certification as gunless would be a personal moral commitment marker; all societies provide ways for solemnizing one’s vows and solidifying one’s resolve on serious, lifelong moral decisions. Third, certification allows for a market signaling effect, providing useful information that can trigger a beneficial response from the private sector; market responses, in turn, provide useful information about otherwise hotly-debated beliefs, such as whether guns in fact enhance or reduce safety for individuals and public places. This article develops each of these points and offers a unique and simple regulatory and statutory alternative for a new system of registration and certification.

86 Brook. L. Rev. (2021).

By C4ADS

Executive Summary

Gun violence in Guatemala is fueled by the licit import of handguns. Once weapons have entered Guatemala, illicit actors have greater opportunity to divert these firearms from their intended use and users, instead wielding them to pursue crime and perpetrate violence.

This report uses seizure data and supply chain analysis to assess how the international flow of weapons into Guatemala is vulnerable to diversion, or the rerouting of licitly transferred conventional arms from their intended recipient or use.

This analysis reveals:

Handguns are the predominant weapon type used in violent crime in Guatemala. Many of the seized handguns are produced by major international weapons manufacturers such as Glock, Israeli Weapons Industries (IWI), Taurus, and Beretta.

Diversion pathways in-country appear among private citizens, commercial, andgovernment actors, presenting opportunities for illicit actors to acquire licit firearms.

Handguns, predominantly those made by top manufacturers, continue to flow into Guatemala.

These weapons are most often manufactured in the U.S., Brazil, and Turkey.

Manufacturers or entities within the manufacturer’s corporate network account for most handgun exports to Guatemala.

Handguns entering Guatemala primarily do so via air. They often transit through third countries and/or third parties, complicating due diligence and creating greater opportunity for diversion.

The U.S., Canada, and Germany are the most common transit countries for Guatemalan handgun imports.

U.S. gun stores are the most common non-manufacturer exporters of handguns to Guatemala.

The majority of Guatemalan importers are not end-users, but retailers that sell to both government and civilian consumers.

This report uses cases of weapons seizure and diversion to explore each of these findings. Using new data, we re-examine a case of Israeli arms that were sold in Guatemala in exchange for weapons later diverted to paramilitary forces in Colombia.

These findings illuminate areas where Guatemalan and international stakeholders can do more to counter the diversion of firearms in Guatemala. To this end, the report makes targeted recommendations for closing gaps in current legislation and enforcement.

Washington, DC: C4ADS2025. 24p.

By Richard Stansfield, Daniel Semenza, Jie Xu, Elizabeth Griffiths

This study uses a combination of tract-level and street network-level analyses to exam-ine: (1) the overall association between federally licensed firearm dealers (FFLs) and homicides, (2) the relation-ship between dealers with serious violations (such as selling to prohibited buyers or failing to record sales)and homicide, and (3) whether the dealer–homicideassociation is moderated by community disadvantage.Results replicate and confirm a relationship between dealers and homicides in disadvantaged neighborhoods.Importantly, however, we also find that proximity to non compliant dealers specifically elevates the risk of lethal violence.Policy implications: We detail how a coordinated effort between federal, state, and local agencies to reg-ulate firearm dealers and ensure that legal compliance can be instrumental in reducing gun violence. There Is a clear need for increased oversight of gun dealers and more robust policies that hold negligent dealers accountable, including the necessary funding and regu-latory manpower to enable regular auditing and support consistent follow-up for noncompliant dealers. A com-prehensive policy framework that supports supply-side gun violence reduction should include additions to state-level laws that require record keeping, videotap-ing and store security, and regular inspection for firearm dealers.

Criminology & Public Policy, 22, 323–345.

By Rocco Pallin, Amanda J. Aubel, Christopher E. Knoepke, Veronica A. Pear, Garen J. Wintemute & Nicole Kravitz-Wirtz

Background

Following the 2018 mass shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida, there was a dramatic increase in media coverage of extreme risk protection orders (ERPOs) and in state policy proposals for ERPO laws. This study documents the frequency of news coverage of ERPOs throughout 2018 and examines the narratives used by media outlets to describe this risk-based firearm policy.

Methods

Using a mixed-method descriptive design, we examine the frequency of national news media coverage of ERPO legislation in 2018, before and after the Parkland shooting, and analyze the content of news articles related to a sample of states that considered ERPO legislation after the shooting.

Results

We find a sharp increase in the frequency of articles related to ERPOs following the Parkland shooting and smaller increases in coverage surrounding ERPO policy proposals and other public mass shootings that year. Nearly three-quarters of articles in our content analysis mentioned the Parkland shooting. The news media often mentioned or quoted politicians compared to other stakeholders, infrequently specified uses for ERPOs (e.g., prevention of mass violence, suicide, or other violence), and rarely included evidence on effectiveness of such policies. More than one-quarter of articles mentioned a mass shooting perpetrator by name, and one-third of articles used the term “gun control.”

Conclusions

This study describes the emerging public discourse, as informed by media messaging and framing, on ERPOs as states continue to debate and implement these risk-based firearm violence prevention policies.

BMC Public Health 21, 1986 (2021), 13p.

By Elizabeth B. Klerman, Mahmoud Affouf, Rebecca Robbins, Jay M. Iyer|| , Cornelia Griggs, Peter T. Masiakos, Chana A. Sacks

Developing interventions to prevent firearm-related violence and to address its consequences requires an improved understanding of when these violent events are most likely to occur. We explored gunshot events in 6 of the most populated cities in the United States by time of day, day of week, holiday/ non-holiday, and month using publicly available datasets. In some of these cities, gunshot events occurred most often at nighttime, on holidays and weekends, and during summer months, with significant interaction effects. There were also time-related changes in characteristics of the victims. Primary prevention efforts aimed at curbing firearm-related violence should consider these differential risks.

J Biol Rhythms. 2024 February ; 39(1): 100–108.

By Jason R. Silva

This study examines the reality and news media coverage of all mass shootings in the United States from 1966 to 2016. It employs agenda-setting and framing theoretical frameworks to determine the social construction of mass shootings via the mass media. The project uses open-source data to create a comprehensive list of mass shooting incidents. It then identifies all published New York Times articles on each incident. The study summarizes both the reality of the social problem (i.e. incidents) and the news mediated reality (i.e. New York Times). Next, this dissertation conducts a media distortion analysis to determine the perpetrator, motivation, and incident characteristics influencing media selection, prominence, and framing. The purpose is to illustrate the media’s social construction of mass shootings that in turn shapes public perceptions, political discourse, and public policies. The study concludes by highlighting the findings and implications for scholars, practitioners, policy-makers, media outlets, and the general public.

New York: City University of New York (CUNY), 2019. 164p

By Center for Neighborhood Engaged Research & Science (Corners)

Gun violence is an urgent, but often overlooked, issue in Latino1 communities. With hundreds of Latinos shot and killed every year2, it is important to understand the unique forces that drive violence in Latino communities. This brief provides a descriptive overview of Latino gun violence victimization in Chicago. While most analysis in this brief is done at the city scale, we acknowledge that Latino communities in Chicago are diverse and that community violence intervention organizations who work in these communities employ different approaches that are responsive to their hyper-local context. We examine definitions, demographics, and gun violence networks before concluding with a summary of a convening of practitioners, leaders, and researchers in December 2022.

Chicago: CORNERS, 2022. 9p.'

by Kelly Drane

In many communities across the country, gun violence has been an unrelenting drumbeat. In a single deadly day, gun violence claimed the lives of a 31-year-old father in Port Allen, Louisiana; a 43-year-old in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, who was known as a stylish dresser with a great sense of humor; an 11-year-old in Columbia, Missouri, who loved to dance and play with her cousins; and a 17-year-old in Columbus, Ohio, who was a gifted boxer.

Each day, hundreds of lives like these are lost or irrevocably changed as this crisis rages on.

But in the last two years, the tempo of this beat has gotten faster. Gun violence has skyrocketed in cities and towns across the country, leaving more devastation and more trauma in its wake.

More than 45,000 Americans were killed in acts of gun violence in 2020—a 15% increase over the previous year. This increase was primarily driven by an unprecedented 35% rise in gun homicides. In fact, more people were lost to gun violence in 2020 than any other year on record, and although final data is not yet available, the gun death total in 2021 is likely to surpass these records.

This drumbeat is ever-present, but one to which too many have become numb. For too long, this epidemic has gone unchecked, and even as it has spiraled out of control, too many leaders are choosing to do nothing. This moment demands attention, and we must do more to mitigate these increases and protect communities in crisis.

This report provides data describing how gun violence has skyrocketed in 2020 and 2021, showing that this historic rise in gun violence has primarily served to intensify this crisis in communities that already suffered the greatest burden. Additionally, this report describes and considers the factors that most likely contributed to these increases, based on available evidence, and makes suggestions for how policymakers can best respond to this unprecedented challenge.

San Francisco: Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence., 2022, 3p.

By Megan Donnelly, Catherine Kuza, Brynn Sargent, Lourdes Swentek, Christian de Virgilio, Areg Grigorian, Sebastian Schubl, and Jeffry Nahmias

Introduction: Past research has demonstrated a “reopening phenomenon” of increased firearm violence associated with the initial lifting of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic-related restrictions after the first wave. Now, with widespread societal reemergence from stay-at-home measures, we hypothesize another spike in firearm violence in the United States (US). Thus, the purpose of this study was to evaluate the trends in firearm violence before and after extensive community reopenings during the COVID-19 pandemic. Methods: The Gun Violence Archive was utilized to collect data on daily firearm violence incidents, injuries, and deaths as well as on types of firearm violence. ManneWhitney U-tests were performed for trends and types of firearm violence “before” (12/14/20-4/9/ 21) versus “after” (4/10/21-7/31/21) widespread societal reopening in the US. Additional analyses also sought to compare the after reopening time-period to historical data (2017- 2020) of similar calendar dates, to better control for possible annual/seasonal variation. Results: Median daily firearm violence incidents (153 versus 176, P < 0.001), injuries (89 versus 121, P < 0.001) and deaths (54 versus 58, P < 0.001) increased from before versus after reopening. Compared to all historical years, in the after reopening time-period there were consistent increases in total as well as mass shooting incidents/injuries/deaths (all P < 0.05). Conclusions: Firearm violence incidents, injuries, and deaths increased after societal reemergence from the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, there has been an increase in mass shootings despite a relative lull initially brought on by the pandemic. This suggests the “reopening phenomenon” has worsened an already substantial national firearm epidemic

J Surg Res. 2023 Jan 3;285:168–175. pages

By Noor Huda Ismail

Violent extremist groups exploit societal grievances, including climate-related disasters, to gain legitimacy and recruit members by positioning themselves as the true protectors of vulnerable communities. Strategic communication, including AI driven tools, is essential to counter extremist narratives and build resilience against manipulation. There is an urgent need for proactive, transmedia storytelling approaches to address both climate change and violent extremism, ultimately strengthening trust and promoting community unity.

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore, 2025. 4p.

By Iftekharul Bashar

Hizb ut-Tahrir Bangladesh, an extremist organisation banned since 2009, is swiftly expanding by recruiting Bangladeshi youth through social media and educational institutions. The group’s recent rally in Dhaka, attended by over 2,000 supporters, underscores its resurgence and the growing challenge for the government. Bangladesh must recalibrate its response to this threat by strengthening law enforcement measures, enhancing counter-radicalisation programmes, and creating job and entrepreneurship opportunities for its youth.

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore, 2025. 4p.

By  The Transnational Alliance to Combat Illicit Trade (TRACIT)  

The 2025 Illicit Trade Index provides governments, policymakers, and enforcement agencies with actionable insights to tackle the challenges of illicit trade. Covering 158 countries—from emerging markets to advanced economies—the Index highlights vulnerabilities, strengths, and trends across national systems. Its data-driven analysis and practical recommendations aim to strengthen policies, enhance enforcement, and promote international collaboration.

Evaluating countries across six key categories and 37 benchmarks, the Index provides a comprehensive framework for assessing resilience. In addition to rankings, it offers regional and economic group analyses, identifying shared challenges and performance trends.

New York: Transnational Alliance to Combat Illicit Trade  2025. 67p.. 

By Yarelix Estrada, Jeffery Sauer, Leonardo Dominguez, Izza Zaidi, Andrew J. Trinidad, Hannah Helmy, Alex Harocopos

Background: Drug checking is a harm reduction strategy that provides people who use drugs (PWUD) information about the composition of a substance. Drug checking has been identified as a key public health response to the continually evolving overdose crisis.

Methods: The New York City Health Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) partnered with existing syringe programs to launch a drug-checking pilot study. The study offered multiple point-of-care drug-checking technologies including fentanyl test strips (FTS) and Fourier-transformed infrared (FTIR) spectrometry, as well as secondary laboratory testing. Fentanyl positivity in major drug types was assessed for each drug-checking technology.

Results: Between November 2021 and December 2023, a total of N = 397 unique participants and drop-off samples contributed a total of N = 1644 samples for drug checking. The majority of samples were sold as opioids (n = 908), with fewer sold as cocaine (n = 314) and methamphetamine (n = 62). 95.3 % (852/894) of opioid samples produced positive FTS. FTIR and secondary laboratory testing resulted in a similarly high prevalence of fentanyl in opioid samples at 84.7 % (769/908) and 89.3 % (519/581), respectively. We did not observe the unexplained presence of fentanyl in samples sold as cocaine or methamphetamine. Further, we describe instances where discussions between technicians and PWUD provided important context that explained the presence of fentanyl in non-opioid samples.

Conclusion: The majority of opioid samples submitted to DOHMH's drug-checking pilot study contained fentanyl. Comparatively, there was little evidence suggesting fentanyl in samples sold as cocaine and methamphetamine. The drug-checking pilot study's point-of-care service delivery model was effective in providing information to PWUD.

Drug Alcohol Depend 10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2025.112578. Epub 2025 Jan 27, 47 p.

By  APRIL M. ZEOLI, ALEXANDER D. McCOURT, and JENNIFER K. PARUK 

We present the rationale behind four types of laws that restrict access to firearms for those who are deemed to be a high risk for future gun violence and two types of laws that implement firearm purchase prohibitions. We also present evidence on the effectiveness of these laws. Broadly, these are laws that restrict access for domestic violence abusers, individuals convicted of misdemeanor violence, and individuals at high risk of violence against themselves or others. We briefly discuss relinquishment of firearms by those who are newly restricted, but we focus mainly on how purchase restrictions are implemented by the federal government and across states. Extant research shows that well-implemented firearm policy that is based on evidence-based risk factors can be effective in reducing firearm injury 

  ANNALS, AAPSS, 704, November 2022  

By Amnesty International

A wide variety of electric shock devices are specifically designed for and marketed to law enforcement. These range from electric shock stun guns, batons and shields, and body-worn electric shock devices which deliver electric shocks through direct contact with the body; to projectile electric shock weapons (PESWs) which can be fired from a distance. Despite the clear human rights risks associated with this equipment, there are no global regulations controlling what type of electric shock law enforcement equipment is permitted to be manufactured and used, or where equipment which can have a legitimate role in law enforcement can be traded. There is an urgent need for legally-binding, global regulations – a Torture-Free Trade Treaty - which prohibits the production of and trade in inherently cruel, inhuman and degrading devices, such as direct contact electric shock equipment, and strictly controls the trade in PESWs to law enforcement agencies to ensure

London: Amnesty International, 2025. 72p..  

By Remadji Hoinathy, Malik Samuel and Akinola Olojo

  Some Lake Chad Basin countries (Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria) have been dealing with violent extremism for over a decade. Disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement processes in these countries may offer useful lessons for other West African contexts, including Mali and Burkina Faso, or more recently affected countries such as Benin, Côte d’Ivoire and Togo. Such lessons include incentivising defections, coordinating at national and regional levels, gender sensitivity, appropriate legal frameworks and community engagement.

Key findings Understanding the circumstances that lead people to join and leave violent extremist groups, and their experiences in those groups, is key to crafting incentives for disengagement. The willingness to leave violent extremist groups is often clouded by uncertainty, as well as long waiting periods between disengagement and enrolment in programmes for disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement (DDRRR). Waves of defection from Boko Haram caught Lake Chad Basin (LCB) states unprepared. DDRRR processes were thus implemented under pressure, hindering early coordination at a regional level. Women are treated mainly as victims, despite some voluntarily joining and playing active roles in Boko Haram, including volunteering as suicide bombers. DDRRR implementation in the LCB has revealed gaps in legal frameworks that require revisions. DDRRR lacks public support in some LCB countries, as many people view it as blanket amnesty for Boko Haram members. 

Recommendations Non-military means of countering violent extremism should incorporate incentives and opportunities for associates to leave these armed groups. By depleting these groups’ human resources, their fighting capacity is reduced. To encourage defection, clear processes for screening, prosecution and integration are needed. National ownership of these processes, inclusivity, adaptation to local context and adequate resourcing are key, from inception to implementation. National ownership should not lead to isolated approaches, but rather create bridges between countries to enable a cohesive regional approach. Organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States, the Liptako-Gourma States Integrated Development Authority, the G5 Sahel and the Accra Initiative could offer relevant regional frameworks for this. Authorities in charge of DDRRR programmes should consider the diverse needs and backgrounds of ex-associates. Distinguishing individuals according to why they joined and their roles within the groups is important for providing appropriate treatment. The specific needs of women and children should be taken into account. Affected West African countries should proactively formulate relevant legal and institutional frameworks. International and regional provisions and standards should be taken into account, including the need for transparent and predictable screening, prosecution and rehabilitation processes. Due to their position connecting the LCB and West Africa, Niger and Nigeria could play a key role in sharing lessons learned from DDRRR implementation. Community organisations, platforms, and media should be used by the DDRRR authorities to raise public awareness of the reintegration process. This would help prevent perceptions of general amnesty for Boko Haram members and preconceived ideas about the disengaged from undermining the process. 

Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2023. 12p.