By Hans-Jakob Schindler

.The report outlines the current mechanisms set up in Germany to mitigate the risks emanating from the financing of terrorism, violent extremism, and non-violent extremism. These present three basic challenges for investigators: a restrictive legal basis and significant administrative limits on the ability of the security authorities to collect and analyze information concerning the financial operations of extremist entities; gaps in financial transparency and a wide distribution of relevant data; administrative and investigative silos as well as competing investigative priorities. The example of the Muslim Brotherhood-linked entities in Germany demonstrates that these challenges result in a lack of available information concerning the underlying financial structures of extremist entities. The report concludes with a range of policy recommendations to adjust the current legal and administrative mechanisms, increase financial transparency concerning associations and non-profit entities and establish more cooperation and coordination mechanisms.

berlin: Institute for Strategic, Political, Security and Economic Consultancy (ISPSW) 2023. 15p.

By Alexander Ritzmann

Key Findings  Research conducted by CEP Germany in September 2022 shows that a large portion of the “who’s who” of the (violence-oriented) German extreme-right are still present and active on Facebook, Instagram and YouTube. They use those platforms to promote their merchandise stores, martial arts associations, music labels, bands, and prepper organizations to fund their extremist activities, reach new customers, and recruit new members. These key actors are the foundation of the (transnational) violence-oriented right-wing extremist (VRWE) milieus in Germany.  The terms of service of Facebook, Instagram and YouTube state that they will “not allow” white supremacy actors to use and benefit from their platforms.  This research builds on a CEP policy report from November 2021, which documented that many of the key right-wing extremist actors in Germany are active on major social media platforms. These key actors are pursuing a strategy of “extreme normalization,” where they no longer carry out explicitly illegal activities on mainstream social media to avoid being permanently blocked from the platforms.  CEP provided their research findings to Facebook and YouTube directly 13 months ago. The same global social media companies publicly commit to work against hate speech, extremism and terrorism e.g. at the EU Internet Forum, the Christchurch Call To Action, and the United We Stand Summit.  Why is this a serious problem? The described key right-wing extremist actors do not only promote dangerous conspiracy narratives like the “Great Replacement” or “White Genocide”, which postulates that a Jewish-led elite seeks to destroy the “white race” by means of mass migration of “non-whites”, feminism and LGTBQI+ rights. They also build the “Erlebniswelten” (spaces for collective experiences) like music concerts and festivals or mixed martial arts tournaments to further expand the reach of extreme-right milieus in Germany, which can lead to increasing political violence and stochastic terrorism. .

New York, Berlin, London: Counter Terrorism Project, 2022. 6p.

By William Allchorn, Nigel Bromage, Bethan Johnson, Alexander Ritzmann, and Hans-Jakob Schindler

This study outlines and analyzes the financial strategies and activities of key right-wing extremist (RWE) organizations and actors in the United Kingdom (UK) and in Germany. The research focused on legal as well as (potentially) illegal financial activities and on key actors (individuals/ groups) with systemic relevance to the UK’s and Germany’s RWE milieus who have been active for a significant amount of time and have a significant track record of (being suspected or convicted) of relevant crimes as well as individuals who are likely to operate across national borders. 2. As identified in a 2020 CEP report1 on the transnational connectivity of key RWE actors in six countries, right-wing extremists apply various strategies for generating income streams. These can be classified as: 1) self-financing/ donations/crowdfunding/membership fees/ cryptocurrencies, 2) concerts and music festivals, 3) commercial activities like merchandise stores/web-shops, 4) combat sports events, 5) purchase of real estate for investment purposes and to establish “safe spaces,” and 6) organized/ financially motivated crimes, including money laundering. 3. Some of these financial strategies do generate significant amounts of income, as shown in another CEP report on RWE financing patterns and networks in 2021.2 A significant portion of the generated funds are in cash. In this context, illegal activities such as tax evasion or money laundering could present a weakness in these financial activities that offer potential opportunities for disruption by law enforcement and tax authorities if investigative priorities are set appropriately. 4. The objective of this study is to inform policymakers and practitioners working on the prevention and countering of right-wing extremism/ terrorism as well as financial crime with the goal of enhancing the understanding of the RWE financial strategies and to encourage further cooperation between relevant government agencies and civil society organizations.

New York, Berlin, London: Counter Terrorism Project: 2023. 31p.

By Hans-Jakob Schindler, Alexander Ritzmann and Marco Macori

In an in-depth study in 2020, the Counter Extremism Project (CEP), commissioned by the Federal Foreign Office of Germany, analysed the transnational connectivity of the violent rightwing extremist (vXRW) and terrorist movement in five European countries and the US.1 It argued that in particular since 2014 a new leaderless apocalyptic transnational vXRW and terrorist movement emerged, which is responsible for a growing amount of violence in all countries at the centre of the study. The study also outlined that all governments had developed a variety of countermeasures, ranging from prevention and countering violent extremist (P/CVE) approaches, approaches with a focus on executive and intelligence-led measures to mixed strategies which integrated P/CVE with an increase in executive capacities as well as legal and administrative changes. However, the study argued that due to the growing transnational connectivity of right-wing extremist and terrorist networks, both offline in physical networking hubs as well as online through specific online ecosystems, transnational measures and mechanisms would be an effective, complementary tool to national strategies and tactics. From the analysis of the study, five main issue areas emerge, in which further transnational cooperation and coordination could be achieved to mitigate the threat emanating from this movement: (1) The further development of a common understanding and legal concepts, better capturing the terrorist nature of this developing threat. (2) Development of a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the various online ecosystems that underpin and connect the networks within this transnational movement and the deployment of already existing capacities, which are currently geared to counter Islamist terrorism online. (Topic of this briefing paper) (3) More in-depth analytics concerning the financial activities and transnational commercial connections of the vXRW and terrorist movement to allow for the potential adjustment of existing global counter terrorism financing mechanisms. (4) Greater awareness and the development of appropriate countermeasures focusing on the training activities within the vXRW movement, in particular paramilitary training. (5) The further development of P/CVE approaches and concepts on a local, national and transnational level, based on lessons learned. Throughout 2021, CEP, in cooperation with the Federal Foreign Office of Germany, will address these issues in a series of virtual events, bringing together relevant national and multilateral policy stakeholders. These events will be accompanied by a series of short reports, outlining the main operational and policy issues. Building on the discussions with relevant stakeholders, these papers will contain a range of concrete policy recommendations.

CEP Policy Brief

New York, Berlin, London: Counter Terrorism Project: 2021. 16p.

By Alexander Ritzmann, Dr Hans-Jakob Schindler, Dr Thorsten Hindrichs, Maximilian Kreter

The financial structures of violent right-wing extremist organisations and actors in Germany are broad and multifaceted. Currently, there is a lack of up-to-date and in-depth analyses of the various financial strategies employed by these groups and individuals as well as their different sources of income. It seems like the “follow the money” approach, which has been successfully deployed against organised crime and in the prevention and fight against Islamist extremism and terrorism, has not been adopted with regard to violent right-wing extremism. A part of the violent right-wing extremist milieu, in particular those actors that are closely integrated into wider transnational networks, seem to have professionalised their financial strategies. Interestingly, a superficial analysis of publicly available data concerning the business models and legal formats chosen by violent right-wing extremist entrepreneurs may give the impression that a discernible strategy is absent. However, it is important to note that large segments of the violent right-wing extremist milieu, especially those that are transnationally linked, are highly networked with discernible structures connecting the various nodes. Deploying the “Administrative Approach”, developed by the European Union to fight organised crime, could be an effective tool in the fight against right-wing extremist organised crime. This methodology targets the interface between illegal and supposedly legal activities and income of criminal actors and networks. For example, local authorities could carry out coordinated tax audits as well as controls concerning the adherence with building codes and fire protection regulations targeting companies and businesses of right-wing extremist entrepreneurs that are directly linked to convicted felons who are part of the same ideological network. The study identified 38 relevant business entities in Germany that are involved in the production and dissemination of violent right-wing extremist music. Interestingly, although the overall music market in Germany is characterised by high levels of competition, this subsegment does not seem to display economic or ideological conflicts and functions in a cooperative manner, with various stakeholders linked to each other. Right-wing rock concerts are both lifestyle events as well as marketplaces and function as central networking hubs of the overall movement. Therefore, a clear distinction between the social networks of the right-wing rock music scene and those of the violent right-wing extremist scene can only be made in a very abstract sense. Due to the intricate and opaque business relationships on both the national and transnational levels of the (legal) German right-wing rock music market, it is of utmost importance to further investigate the key stakeholders within this milieu. These actors should be conceptualised not as individual economic entities or individual perpetrators but as representatives of the right-wing terrorist networks that operate in the background. Extremist right-wing rock music can be a profitable business in Germany due to the increasing professionalisation of production, dissemination and event management. These financial structures will continue to thrive so long as they are led by professional entrepreneurs who are not effectively confronted by government authorities.

New York, Berlin, London: 2021. 41p.

By Alexander Ritzmann

This paper aims at informing governments on a federal, state and local level that want to investigate the financial strategies and networks of extremist key actors in a targeted and comprehensive manner. The main objective of implementing a "Follow The Money" strategy in this context is to investigate if illegal activities, such as tax evasion or money laundering are being conducted.

New York, Berlin, London : Counter-Extremism Project, 2024. 7p.

By Kateira Aryaeinejad and Thomas Leo Scherer

In 2012, the National Institute of Justice’s (NIJ) Domestic Radicalization to Terrorism program began funding research on issues related to domestic radicalization and terrorism in the United States. A component of this portfolio is focused specifically on evaluations and assessments of terrorism prevention programs implemented across different populations. This report synthesizes these efforts, reviewing shared and singular lessons from NIJ-sponsored evaluations of terrorism prevention and terrorism prevention-relevant programming and focusing on both evaluation findings and processes. The projects reviewed for this report vary notably in their timelines, methods, programmatic focuses, and audiences. As such, the lessons drawn from them are not necessarily scientifically comparable or generalizable. However, important lessons emerge from this research, underscoring shared insights from NIJ-sponsored evaluative efforts and illuminating important areas for consideration in future programmatic and evaluative endeavors. First, findings from NIJ-sponsored evaluations emphasize the importance of gaining community buy-in and assuring program relevance for participants before implementing terrorism prevention or terrorism prevention-relevant programs. Although this may vary based on the intended program audience (e.g., youth, communities, law enforcement), the findings overall suggest that to ensure program fidelity, utility, relevance, and buy-in, programs should be developed in close consultation and cooperation with the audiences for which they are constructed. Doing so can also help alleviate concerns regarding the perceived stigmatization or targeting of specific communities in which terrorism prevention efforts take place and help address concerns about and issues in associating specific communities or demographics with national security threats. Second, programs for terrorism prevention and preventing/countering violent extremism can yield benefits beyond meeting terrorism prevention goals. They can also be complementary to and even carried out within public health or community resilience initiatives. The utility of incorporating terrorism prevention into these frameworks may vary based on the intended program audience and outputs. Careful attention should be paid in framing program activities and language when they are implemented via these larger frameworks. Indeed, if violent extremism awareness and prevention efforts are not appropriately integrated into a public health or community resilience model, participants may be confused as to the purpose, goals, and nature of the activities in which they are participating, to the detriment of short- and long-term programmatic goals and awarenessraising activities. Third, evaluative efforts in general face programmatic and methodological challenges that limit their ability to assess the impact of a program and the generalizability and veracity of their findings. NIJ-sponsored evaluations went to commendable lengths to address issues associated with data availability, generalizability, validity, and determinations of impact; however, certain challenges — including participant attrition rates and lack of available data — limited their ability to do so. These challenges offer important lessons for future evaluations of terrorism prevention programs. These evaluation findings suggest that several activities should be considered in addressing challenges that may arise during the evaluation process. These activities could include implementing formative evaluations or evaluability assessments prior to program implementation and evaluation, implementing strategies to limit participant attrition in the interest of maintaining appropriate sample sizes, and ensuring adequate resourcing for continued engagement in terrorism prevention initiatives. In addition, NIJ-sponsored evaluation findings suggest that program evaluators should consider incorporating control or comparison groups to assess programmatic impact on individual attitudes, behaviors, and outcomes, along with comparative analysis focused on assessing the outcomes and impact of programs replicated in different communities and settings to increase the generalizability, validity, and utility of evaluation findings. More information about NIJ-sponsored efforts to incorporate these elements is detailed in this report. Looking forward, findings from this review suggest important gaps and considerations that should be addressed by and incorporated in future programmatic and evaluation decisions. These include evaluating the long-term impact of programs through follow-up assessments, incorporating additional indicators for measuring and assessing potential behavioral change and knowledge retention, and assessing the comparability of programs’ impact on different forms of terrorism across different ideological spectrums. Finally, further consideration should be given to determining the appropriate approach, strategy, and goals for terrorism prevention activities based on the audiences they are geared toward. Based on the evaluation findings, in some cases it may be beneficial to explore and test efforts aimed at incorporating terrorism prevention activities and programs within a broader portfolio of public health and violence reduction-focused efforts. Future programmatic, research, and policy-oriented activities might consider further exploration of the benefits and potential issues associated with doing so in addressing radicalization to terrorism within the United States

Washington, DC: U.S. National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 2024. 33p.

By Paul Michael Reeping

Gun-free zones have the potential to increase or decrease the risk of gun crime and active shootings that occur within their borders. People who assume that gun-free zones increase gun related outcomes believe that the lack of the ability for law-abiding citizens to carry a firearm, and thus an inability to engage in defensive gun use if a threat presented itself, makes gun-free zones a soft target for crime. Those that assume gun-free zones decrease gun related outcomes believe the absence of firearms eliminates the risk of an escalation of violence to gunfire. Up until this point, there has been no quantitative research on the effectiveness of gun-free zones, despite the topic being highly controversial. This dissertation was therefore the first to: create and describe a dataset of active shootings in the United States, and assess the extent to which defensive gun use occurs during these events (Aim 1); conduct a cross-sectional ecological analysis for the in St. Louis, Missouri (2019), both city and county, comparing the proportion of crimes committed with a firearm that occur in gun-free school zones compared to gun-allowing zones immediately surrounding the gun-free zone to quantify the effectiveness of gun-free school zones and (Aim 2); conduct a spatial ecological case-control study in the United States where cases are the locations or establishments of active shootings between 2014 and 2020, to quantify the impact of gun-free zones on active shootings, and assess if active shooters target gun-free zones (Aim 3).. The results of Aim 1 of this study suggested that defensive gun use during active shootings was rare, usually does not stop the attack, and does not decrease the number of casualties compared to active shootings without defensive use. Aim 1 also thoroughly described the novel active shooting dataset. I found in Aim 2 that gun-free school zones had fewer crimes committed with a firearm than corresponding gun-allowing zones in St. Louis, MO in 2019. There were 13.4% fewer crimes involving a firearm in gun-free school zones, with a confidence interval ranging from 23.6% fewer to 1.8% fewer (p-value: 0.025). Aim 3 determined that the conditional odds of an active shooting in an establishment that was gun-free were 0.375 times the odds of an active shooting in a gun-allowing establishment with a confidence interval ranging from 0.193 to 0.728 (p-value<0.01), suggesting that gun-free zones did not attract active shooters, and may even be preventative. In conclusion, gun-free zones did not appear to increase gun related outcomes and may even be protective against active shootings. Efforts across the United States to repeal laws related to gun-free zones, due to the belief that gun-free zones are targeted for violence, are therefore not backed by data. However, these are the first quantitative studies ever conducted on the effectiveness of gun-free zones, so more research is needed to build on the results of this dissertation.

New York: Columbia University, 2022. 133p.

By Arianna Vedaschi and Chiara Graziani

While states and terrorists have always used emerging technology in their endeavours, there has seldom been an emerging technology with the reach, implications, and possibilities of AI. In this masterful book, Vedaschi and Graziani skilfully merge law, computer science, psychology and more to provide the authoritative account of how AI enables terrorist actors, promises security, and challenges the rule of law.’

Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2025. 168p.

Edited by Morten Bøås, Gilad Ben-Nun, Ulf Engel, and Kari Osland

Precarious living conditions across the Balkans, the Middle East, and North Africa create fertile ground for radical ideas. Yet, despite genuine grievances and legitimate grounds for anger, most people living in these regions are not radicalized and do not embrace ideas that lead to acts of violent extremism. Which raises the question ... why?

To answer this question, the authors of Resisting Radicalization investigate the nonoccurrence of violent extremism in what they term enabling environments. Their work, the result of a multiyear international project, has critical implications for the future of P/CVE (Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism) programs.

Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2025, 293p.

By Claudia Lanza, Abdelkader Lahmadi, and Jérôme François

This book presents the development of a classification scheme to organize and represent ransomware threat knowledge through the implementation of an innovative methodology centered around the semantic annotation of domain-specific source documentation. By combining principles from computer science, document management, and semantic data processing, the research establishes an innovative framework to organize ransomware data extracted from specialized source texts in a systematic classification system. Through detailed chapters, the book explores the process of applying semantic annotation to a specialized corpus comprising CVE prose descriptions linked to known ransomware threats. This approach not only organizes but also deeply analyzes these descriptions, uncovering patterns and vulnerabilities within ransomware operations. The book presents a pioneering methodology that integrates CVE descriptions with ATT&CK frameworks, significantly refining the granularity of threat intelligence. The insights gained from a pattern-based analysis of vulnerability-related documentation are structured into a hierarchical model within an ontology framework, enhancing the capability for predictive operations. This model prepares cybersecurity professionals to anticipate and mitigate risks associated with new vulnerabilities as they are cataloged in the CVE list, by identifying recurrent characteristics tied to specific ransomware and related vulnerabilities. With real-world examples, this book empowers its readers to implement these methodologies in their environments, leading to improved prediction and prevention strategies in the face of growing ransomware challenges.

Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2024. 113p.

By Norman Abrams

During the protests that roiled campuses throughout the United States (2023-2025), many students and student organizations have extolled the Hamas organization and praised its violent attack on Israel on October 7, 2023.

Since 1997, Hamas has been officially designated under U.S. law as a “foreign terrorist organization.” Providing “material support” to a foreign terrorist organization is a serious crime under the federal criminal code.

The fact that Hamas is a designated foreign terrorist organization and occupies a central place in the student protests raises two key questions: Does praise and advocacy in support of a foreign terrorist organization amount to “providing material support” under the relevant federal criminal statutes? Would attaching criminal penalties to such utterances violate the First Amendment?

To date, the federal statutes that criminalize the providing of material-support-to-a-foreign-terrorist-organization have been reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court only once, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (2010). The main burden of this article is to examine those statutes and the Holder decision and its legal and practical implications for the student protest statements.

In light of the foregoing, recommendations are made: a) whether there is a legal basis and a need for a federal law enforcement investigation, and b) the general form it might take. These recommendations reflect concerns both about the possibility that a foreign terrorist organization is manipulating U.S. campus discourse and maintaining campuses as bastions of free speech, debate and tolerance of diverse opinions.

Keywords: Student protests, demonstrations, encampments, campus free speech, First Amendment, foreign terrorist organization, material support offenses

Journal of National Security Law and Policy (forthcoming), UCLA School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 25-18, 31p.

By Emily Tiry and Arielle Jackson

Gun violence and violent crime more generally impose substantial costs on communities, including in Washington, DC. The Cost of Gun Violence in Washington, DC, project examined research on the broader community-level costs of gun violence on (1) economic indicators such as business activity and the housing market and (2) educational outcomes such as test scores and graduation rates. We also summarized the extent of gun violence, economic indicators, and educational outcomes in Washington, DC, using publicly available data and, to the extent possible, we put the costs in dollar terms. This appendix outlines our methodologies for our “Economic Costs of Gun Violence in Washington, DC” fact sheet and “Educational Costs of Gun Violence: Implications for Washington, DC” brief (Jackson et al. 2022;

Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2022. 6p.

By Arielle Jackson, Emily Tiry, Paige S. Thompson, and Jesse Jannetta

Like many cities, Washington, DC, has experienced a spike in gun violence in the past few years. Gun violence and violent crime more generally impose substantial costs on communities. These include direct costs like those for health care for victims and costs for law enforcement and incarceration, but they also include indirect costs such as the effects on business activity and the housing market. Research indicates that gun violence and violent crime can negatively affect educational outcomes as well. Social and economic inequities are often at the root of community gun violence and disproportionately affect Black and Latinx communities, underscoring the importance of addressing these systemic inequities and investing in resources that will reduce gun violence and promote opportunity for young people living in structurally disadvantaged neighborhoods in the District. We summarize research on this topic, situate this evidence in the context of the geography of gun violence and educational outcomes in DC, and describe implications for DC communities

Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2022. 12p.

By Northwestern Neighborhood & Network Initiative (N3).

A new research brief from Northwestern Neighborhood & Network Initiative (N3) was just published affirming that Chicago CRED:

works with the highest-risk individuals.

successfully connects them with needed services.

“potentially” reduces their likelihood of being shot or arrested by 50% and 48% respectively. As always, they are cautious about suggesting direct causation, but it is nevertheless encouraging.

The report explicitly mentions that “other outreach-focused programs such as Communities Partnering 4 Peace (CP4P) and READI Chicago find similar results.”

The report also says, “for every one CRED participant, we found more than 20 other individuals with similar risk profiles who were not receiving similar services,” so the case for going to scale is real.

” Chicago CRED is a multifaceted approach to reducing gun violence that strives to create lasting change by working directly with individuals who are most likely to be involved in serious gun violence. Beginning with direct street outreach efforts, CRED invites its participants to engage in a comprehensive intervention that connects this hard-to-reach population to services, including dedicated life coaching, trauma counseling, education, and, ultimately, reliable jobs. CRED launched its efforts in 2016 and operates in communities on Chicago’s South and West Sides. The current study examines the 234 men who entered the CRED program in 2019 from Roseland and West Pullman. All of these participants are Black, the average participant age at intake is roughly 24 years old, and the average level of completed education was 11 years of school. Some 85% of participants reported a personal or familial history of gang/group involvement, 75% reported a criminal record, and 9% reported being a gunshot victim prior to intake.

Chicago: Northwestern Neighborhood & Network Initiative (N3) at the Institute for Policy Research, Northwestern University, 2021. 5p.

By Marisa C. Ross, Erin M. Ochoa, and Andrew V. Papachristos

The past several years have witnessed increased calls for community violence interventions (CVIs) that address firearm violence while centering local expertise and avoiding the criminal legal system. Currently, little evidence exists on CVI effectiveness at the individual level. This study presents an evaluation of the impact of a street outreach-based CVI [Chicago CRED (Create Real Economic Destiny)] on participant involvement in violence. We used a quasiexperimental design with a treatment sample of 324 men recruited by outreach staff from 2016 to 2021 and a balanced comparison sample of 2,500 men from a network of individuals arrested in CRED’s service areas. We conducted a Bayesian survival analysis to evaluate CRED’s effect on individual violence-related outcomes on three levels of treatment: All enrolled participants, a subsample that made it through the initial phase, and those who completed programming. The intervention had a strong favorable effect on the probability of arrest for a violent crime for those completing the program: After 24 mo, CRED alumni experienced an 11.3 percentage point increase in survival rates of arrest for a violent crime relative to their comparisons (or, stated differently, a 73.4% reduction in violent crime arrests). The other two treatment levels experienced nontrivial declines in arrests but did not reach statistical significance. No statistically significant reduction in victimization risk was detected for any of the treatment levels. Results demonstrate that completion of violence intervention had a strong favorable effect on the probability of arrest for a violent crime for those completing the program: After 24 mo, CRED alumni experienced an 11.3 percentage point increase in survival rates of arrest for a violent crime relative to their comparisons (or, stated differently, a 73.4% reduction in violent crime arrests). The other two treatment levels experienced nontrivial declines in arrests but did not reach statistical significance. No statistically significant reduction in victimization risk was detected for any of the treatment levels. Results demonstrate that completion of violence intervention programming reduces the likelihood of criminal legal involvement for participants, despite the numerous systemic and environmental factors that impede personal success.

PNAS, Vol. 120 | No. 46, 2023. 8p.

By Guillermo Vázquez del Mercado, Ruggero Scaturro, Jerome Veyret and Alex Goodwin

The illicit trade in arms and ammunition not only is a serious criminal market but also strengthens and expands other illicit economies around the globe, increasing the potential or actual use of violence in the commission of crimes. With weapons recycled from conflicts in the past, illegally produced, diverted from state or private stockpiles, or smuggled (in parts or whole) from areas in which supply is abundant, arms trafficking has become the fourth most prevalent criminal market globally, and is particularly prevalent in the Americas and Africa.1 According to the Small Arms Survey database, global firearms-related deaths have decreased by 30% between 2016 and 2020 (from 3.9 per 100 000 in 2016 to 2.7 per 100 000 in 2020).2 However, the organization also estimated that, as of 2017, there were still 857 million firearms in civilian hands worldwide, of which only 12% were registered.3 These weapons can pose enormous threats to civil society and regional stability. Illicit arms enable organized crime and underpin criminal markets. Firearms trafficking can also have a severe destabilizing effect, as the conflicts in which they are used can fuel others in a region, along with further crime and violence. For example, civil wars in Central America in the late twentieth century led to the availability of weapons in the region multiplying. Many of the 30 000 M-16 rifles and the 260 000 M-67 grenades sent to the Salvadoran authorities by the US government are still in circulation and have been used by the Mara Salvatrucha-13 and Barrio 18 gangs and criminal organizations abroad.4

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2025. 29p.

By Jessica Davis

Illicit actors in Afghanistan, including drug traffickers, warlords, terrorist groups, and even former government officials, exploit the country to achieve their own political and economic objectives. Historical and contemporary sources demonstrate that there are patterns in how these actors raise, manage, store, move, and obscure money. This paper provides a historical and contemporary overview of illicit financing activities in Afghanistan. It uses a terrorist financing framework to explain the various mechanisms involved in how illicit actors raise, use, move, store, manage, and obscure their funds. Specific jurisdictions used for illicit finance and global financial vulnerabilities that illicit actors with a nexus to Afghanistan exploit in their financial activities are discussed, outlining the threat-agnostic capabilities that could tackle some of these illicit financial challenges.

To raise funds, illicit actors engage in the production and trafficking of narcotics, taxation and extortion activities, illegal mining and timber production, and any other activities that can generate revenues. Depending on the actor in question, management of the acquired funds might be centralised, within the purview of a financial head, or decentralised, with control vested within several stakeholders. Illicit actors store some of their funds in cash within Afghanistan and use hawalas and banks to both store and transfer wealth out of the country. Since the Taliban takeover, international sanctions have largely ended the ability of banks to transact with most aspects of the global financial sector, with the exception of regional banking relationships that remain intact. Therefore, in addition to hawalas, common methods of moving money out of Afghanistan include bulk cash couriers, the transfer of precious metals and stones, and trade-based money laundering schemes. Wealth is moved out of Afghanistan to several key jurisdictions. Much of it makes its way to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) where funds are invested in businesses and real estate. Funds are also moved to Pakistan, Turkey, and to a lesser extent Iran and other neighbouring or proximate countries.

The stability of illicit financing mechanisms over time and across illicit actors presents opportunities for detection and disruption. However, this also applies to limitations of disruption opportunities. Since illicit actors in Afghanistan raise most of their funds within the country, there are few opportunities to disrupt internal Afghan revenue sources in the post-August 2021 context. As such, other detection and disruption opportunities that can be used to combat illicit financing with a nexus to Afghanistan must be examined. The policy options elaborated in this report include: enhancing the monitoring of aid and donor funding entering the country, facilitating the adoption of foreign asset and beneficial ownership tracing, introducing reforms to the hawala and banking sectors, and addressing deficiencies in international sanctions regimes.

A regionally coordinated policy approach to counter illicit financing from Afghanistan can reduce the ability of illicit actors to access their wealth and fund their activities. However, without access to a cooperative government in Afghanistan, there are limits to what can be achieved. Nonetheless, many of the policy and disruption opportunities available to counter illicit Afghan finance also serve to strengthen the integrity of the global financial system, address existing policy gaps in other jurisdictions, and can generally serve to enhance international cooperation on counter-illicit financing.

SOC ACE Research Paper No 11.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2022. 32p.

By The Counter Extremism Project, Global Strategies to Combat Extremism

In recent years, the U.S. sanctions regime has targeted the world’s most egregious human rights violators. It has done so based on the 2016 Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (the Magnitsky Act) and the 2017 Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, which empower the U.S. government to impose “tangible and significant consequences on those who commit serious human rights abuse or engage in corruption, as well as to protect the financial system of the United States from abuse by these same persons.” Since then, the White House has used sanctions to target government organizations, officials, corporations, and private individuals engaged in the systematic violation of human rights around the globe. Such sanctions have been enacted against entities in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and beyond. Unfortunately, the crimes committed against the Yemeni people by the Houthi rebels have gone largely overlooked. Fewer than 15 Houthi officials have been sanctioned in total, and the majority of those targeted are military officials who have been sanctioned for their role in destabilizing Yemen (E.O. 13611), with minimal attention paid to Houthi violations committed against the population under their rule. This report will focus on the Houthis’ systematic abuse of women and journalists. While these are tragically common phenomena in Houthi-controlled areas, they remain poorly documented. In addition to clearly documenting these abuses, the report will also map out the Houthi mechanics of repression: from the security forces responsible for unjustly arresting and harassing vulnerable individuals to those officials in the justice and prison systems responsible for subjecting the victims to torture and sham trials. The aim of this report is to raise awareness of Houthi human rights violations and provide informational support for efforts to penalize those who can and should be targeted with sanctions for their crimes.

New York: The Counter Extremism Project, Global Strategies to Combat Extremism, 2023. 16p.

By Laura Winkelmuller-Real, Kacper Rekawek, Thomas Renard

How do counter-terrorism services assess the threat in Europe? What trends do they notice? What are their most pressing concerns? Experts and observers regularly discuss the evolution of the terrorist threat, but what do counter-terrorism professionals have to say about this? This report aims to bring to the fore the perspectives of those that are in the first line to assess or respond to terrorism. Compared with some other initiatives focused on key terrorism trends (such as terrorism databases or indexes),1 this report focuses more strictly on a counter-terrorism perspective. While some reports on counter-terrorism already exist, they are largely drafted by and for governments. This includes notably the assessments conducted by the UN Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (UN CTED), which are unfortunately not in the public domain. In Europe, Europol’s TE-SAT annual reports constitute a very useful publicly available resource, although very much focused on a law-enforcement perspective. This report constitutes, therefore, an innovative attempt to monitor counter-terrorism efforts, with a focus on European Union (EU) Member States. It focuses on original sources, such as reports published by security services, a treasure of information largely neglected by scholars. It covers various dimensions, namely: 1. National threat levels (related to terrorism and/or extremism); 2. Discussion on the main types of terrorist and extremist threats perceived; 3. National security contexts in which the aforementioned threat levels and threat assessments were produced; 4. New legislative efforts designed and introduced to help CT and P/CVE efforts; 5. Main challenges to CT or P/CVE activities encountered by the EU MS; 6. Major CT operations conducted in Europe; 7. Main efforts in countering the financing of terrorism by different EU MS; 8. Key developments with regard to terrorism sanctions and proscriptions; 9. Communication and transparency efforts related to CT and P/CVE; To conduct this research, the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) compiled and analysed more than 70 official counter-terrorism and security reports published by the EU Member States (MS) in 2024 and 2023, which it combined with a survey distributed among European counter-terrorism officials. More details on the methodology of this report are available in the appendix. By combining practitioner perspectives gathered through the survey with detailed, structured narratives from national security documents, the report captures both operational realities and strategic priorities.  . These insights were used to develop specific themes for analysis, and to effectively describe the state of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Europe, as described by security services themselves. Overall, this report, while combining new material with data from the aforementioned secondary sources, offers original insights into the secretive world of counter-terrorism and highlights interesting trends. Furthermore, it could serve as a basis for further investigations into counterterrorism efforts, in Europe or elsewhere, including with a view to their being evaluated.   

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) 2025. 34p.