By Annelies Pauwels and Merlina Herbach

This policy brief examines the methods of firearms acquisition by right-wing extremists (RWEs) in Europe between 2019 and 2024. Based on a dataset of 118 cases, it reveals that RWEs resort to diverse legal and illegal acquisition strategies, including the use of illicit markets, legal possession, theft from military and law enforcement sources, and private manufacture, particularly 3D printing. The policy brief further discusses current EU countermeasures and their effectiveness in addressing RWE-specific acquisition methods. It identifies gaps in existing policies and enforcement, particularly regarding background checks in issuing and reviewing weapon licences, screening of military and law enforcement personnel, and regulation of emerging technologies like 3D printing. The authors call for further research to increase the understanding of the RWE-firearms nexus and to develop more targeted prevention strategies.

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), 2024, 30p.

By  Michael Osman, Monika Roszkowska, Murat Yildiz, Robert Muggah, et al.

Several Caribbean countries are registering an intensification of organized crime and rising incidence of lethal violence. A combination of risk factors including surging drug production in South America, the proliferation and competition of transnational and local gangs, and high availability and use of firearms have contributed to soaring homicide rates. Countries such as Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago currently register among the highest murder rates globally. Faced with exceedingly high levels of collective and interpersonal violence, some Caribbean governments, for example that of Jamaica have declared states of emergencies to fight violent crime while simultaneously ramping up regional efforts to curb the trafficking of firearms and ammunition. There is a growing consensus among the heads of government of CARICOM countries that the crime and violence situation could deteriorate further still. The perpetrators of collective violence in the Caribbean vary, though most are connected to a diverse array of criminal markets across the region. The determination of what constitutes  a “gang ” differs across the Caribbean. The capacity of these groups vary: there is no dominant configuration of criminal groups and criminal relationships across all locations in the region. Highly organized criminal networks and street gangs are involved in multiple transnational criminal markets spanning South and Central America, North America, and Western Europe. Larger, more sophisticated gangs alternately collude and compete with state actors and a host of non-state intermediaries to procure firearms and transport, transship, and traffic in cocaine, cannabis, and to a lesser extent heroin and amphetamines. For the most part, smaller street gangs are more domestically oriented; some are politically connected and secure government contracts to provide resources and services that are historically underserved by the state. In addition to providing social welfare, these organizations often impose protection rackets within the areas they operate. These protection rackets allow these neighborhood gangs to engage in criminal activities ranging from selling drugs, trafficking in firearms, human smuggling, and contract killing to managing lottery scams, extortion, and racketeering. A small number of the region’s gangs are more organized and have expanded their criminal networks to facilitate transnational crimes,   including the transportation and protection of drug shipments as well as firearms trafficking, human smuggling, and cyber-related crimes. In larger countries in the Caribbean such as Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, aggressive state-led anti-gang measures have accelerated the fragmentation or “splintering” of gangs, further heightening inter- and intra-factional violence and demand for firearms and ammunition. While the overall number and membership of Caribbean gangs appears to have expanded, a relatively small number of them are involved in transnational trafficking of drugs, firearms, and other contraband. Only a handful of the hundreds of gangs active in countries such as Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago appear to be directly implicated in cross-border crimes such as the trafficking of cocaine and cannabis or smuggling of weapons. In many cases, well-connected gang leaders, including former inmates of US prisons, facilitate shipments by leveraging their networks from Colombia and Venezuela to North America and Western Europe. Meanwhile, local gang members may be subcontracted for “protecting” transshipment of drugs, sourcing firearms abroad (primarily from the US), and organizing local distribution and retail. However, most gangs in the Caribbean  are inward-facing and connected to local political economies ranging from disrupting elections and securing government contracts to local drug dealing, prostitution, scams, and extortion. Rather than facilitate international drug shipments or human trafficking rings, gangs throughout the region are typically parochial and focused instead on protecting their territory. (continued)

Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 62p.

By The UNODC Global Programme on Criminal Network Disruption and the Global Maritime Crime Programme (Border Management Branch).

The Republic of Yemen has been embroiled in a violent conflict since September 2014 when Houthi forces took military control of the capital city Sana’a and displaced the government of interim President Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Yemen’s protracted conflict has claimed at least 377.000 lives, most of them civilians, and plunged Yemen, already the poorest country of the Arabian Peninsula, into a complex humanitarian catastrophe. The Houthis, who call themselves Ansar Allah (Partisans of God), originally were a revivalist Zaidi Shia religious movement formed in the Sa’dah governorate in the 1990s under the leadership of prominent cleric Hussein al-Houthi. Critical of Yemen’s long-term President Ali Abdullah Saleh (in office from 1990 to 2012), an order for the arrest of their leader led to a low-level insurgency resulting in the killing of Hussein al-Houthi by government forces in September 2004. Following his death, the political leadership of the movement passed on to his brother Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. The Houthis reportedly formed close political and military ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Lebanese movement Hezbollah and continued to challenge Saleh, exploiting the frustration of large parts of the Yemeni population with his government. They succeeded in capturing parts of the mountainous north of the country before a popular uprising linked to the Arab Spring swept the old regime from power in February 2011. In the wake of this regime change, which brought Hadi to power, the Houthis increased their presence in Sana’a and formed alliances with other groups, while simultaneously clashing with tribesmen loyal to other political movements, in particular those of the Sunni Islamist Al-Islah party (“The Yemeni Congregation of Reform Party”), a Yemeni affiliate of the Muslim brotherhood. Following the ouster of President Hadi and his subsequent flight to Aden, the Houthis consolidated their dominance over large parts of northern Yemen and significantly strengthened their military power through absorbing parts of the country’s armed

forces. In March 2015, fearing a further deterioration of the security situation, a group of nine Arab countries led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia deployed military forces as part of Operation “Decisive Storm” with the aim to restore the authority of Yemen’s internationally recognized government. Meanwhile in the coastal province of Hadramawt, militants of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) exploited the political vacuum and seized control of the local capital of Mukalla in April 2015, which they held for more than one year before being forced out by military forces backed by the United Arab Emirates.4 While the Coalition reversed some of the Houthi advances, the Houthis managed to consolidate their positions in the mountainous north of the country. The period from 2016/2017 onwards, saw a significant increase in the military capabilities of the Houthis, which included the launch of ballistic missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs)5 against targets in Saudi Arabia, as well as the deployment of anti-ship missiles and waterborne improvised explosive devices (WBIED)6 against ships flying the flag of Coalition states in the Red Sea. While these attacks have done relatively little material damage, they allowed the Houthis to some extent to counterbalance the superiority of the Coalition forces and to project power beyond the immediate battlefield. (continued)

Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 30p.

By Benjamin Jongleux and Nicolas Florquin

Prior to the recent changes to the European Union (EU) Firearms Directive, and due to inconsistent national regulations, several types of readily convertible firearms could be purchased with few restrictions in a number of EU member states, modified into lethal weapons and trafficked within the region. This situation contributed to the growing criminal use of models that were easy to convert into lethal firearms. In response, the EU adopted a number of new regulatory measures from 2017 onwards and supported joint law enforcement operations that specifically targeted trafficking in converted firearms. Based on research undertaken by the Small Arms Survey, this paper reviews these EU efforts and the evolving dynamics of firearms conversion in Europe as a whole. It argues that while EU member states are moving towards greater harmonization of their national legislation, there have been significant delays in some countries, and that the interpretation of certain standards and procedures remains inconsistent. The paper also argues that improving the strategic intelligence picture of illicit firearms trafficking in Europe remains critical for measuring the success of these efforts and for detecting emerging threats.

Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Papers , no 70, EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium 2020. 16p

By Amy D. Lauger. Danielle Kaeble and Mark Motivans, etc.

The Combat Human Trafficking Act of 2015 (CHTA) (34 U.S.C. § 20709(e)) requires the director of the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) to prepare an annual report on human trafficking. The report must include information on the following: „ arrests by state law enforcement officers for human trafficking offenses „ prosecutions of individuals in state courts for human trafficking offenses „ convictions of individuals in state courts for human trafficking offenses „ sentences imposed on individuals convicted in state courts for human trafficking offenses. BJS obtains information on human trafficking through several data collections, including those on victim service providers, law enforcement, prosecution and adjudication, and corrections. For each collection, these data are available for some combination of the federal, state, local, and tribal levels. The information in each data collection contributes to a general profile of human trafficking in the United States. Some differences exist across collections due to varying definitions of human trafficking, data availability, and other factors. At the federal level, human trafficking offenses are defined according to federal statutes that include peonage, slavery, forced labor, sex trafficking, sexual exploitation and other abuse of children, and transportation for illegal sexual activity and related crimes. The classification of human trafficking offenses varies among state and local jurisdictions. This report describes the BJS data collections and activities across various jurisdictional levels that include various offenses that may be categorized as human trafficking, and it presents the most recent statistical findings.

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics , 2024. 7p.

By David Bruce

Mapping gun crimes can ensure that police resources are used in a targeted way to reduce violent offences.

Firearm crime is rife in South Africa. Mapping it can help ensure police resources are used in a targeted way to reduce firearm-related offences. This policy brief illustrates how firearm crime can be mapped by using police data. It focuses on Gauteng province, which has high levels of gun use by criminals.

Key findings Firearms make a major contribution to crime-related death, injury and fear in South Africa. In areas with high firearm crime levels, there are seven main gun-related crime categories: murder, attempted murder, robbery with aggravating circumstances, carjacking, residential robbery, nonresidential robbery and illegal possession of guns and ammunition. South Africa’s highest gun-related crime levels are in the following provinces: Gauteng, Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and parts of the Eastern Cape. Recommendations The SAPS should develop a focused strategy to reduce levels of firearm crime and violence. The SAPS should use crime data to identify the areas where firearm crime is most concentrated. This will support the targeted use of resources to reduce firearm crime. Targeted evidence-based strategies are more likely to have a measurable impact on levels of violent crimes associated with firearm use. As an initial step, the SAPS should use available information on ‘instruments’ used in crime from the Crime Administration System (CAS), or docket analysis, to assess levels of firearm crime in each police station area. The results will show the provinces, metropolitan In these provinces, police station areas with the highest levels of crime in the seven main gun-related crime categories are also high firearm-use areas. South African Police Service (SAPS) data on Gauteng police stations with high levels of these seven crimes highlights 41 high firearm crime police stations. Although data collection standards differ between stations, SAPS Crime Administration System data generally includes details on weapons used and can be used to map gun crime more precisely. areas and districts, and stations where firearm crime is most concentrated. Docket quality, data collection, recording, mapping and analysis on all crimes related to firearms and ammunition should be improved. Dedicated firearm crime reduction units with adequate intelligence support should be established. Their key performance measure must be a reduction in murders, attempted murders and robberies involving firearms. Police measures to reduce firearm crime must be aligned with efforts to lessen the overall problem of firearm proliferation in South Africa.

Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2024. 16p.

By Kristine Hamann,  Sophia Roach, and Sarah Solano Geisler

Overview of Gunshot Detection Systems GDS systems works by recording sounds on a network of audio sensors clustered around a designated location. The sensors transmit sound recordings, timestamps, and Global Positioning System (GPS) data to computers with proprietary algorithms that compare the input to known waveforms (graphic representations of sound) associated with the sound of gunfire. The mathematical calculations used to establish the location of gunfire are based on the same scientific principles that are used to locate the epicenter of an earthquake. Environmental factors may affect the accuracy of captured information, but modern GDS systems can detect 80% of gunfire in uncontrolled environments and pinpoint where shots were fired within as little as a 10-foot radius.2 Reliable GDS evidence has been admitted in nearly 200 cases and has established innocence, as well as guilt. GDS notifications can save lives through quicker response times and can help the police find suspects, victims, witnesses, and other evidence. Prosecutors seeking admission of GDS evidence must understand the scientific foundation of the technology, determine that it is accurate, and be prepared for legal objections. This is an evolving area where preparation by prosecutors is essential, as their work will impact the future admissibility of GDS. Information Captured in GDS Reports GDS reports generally contain information that can be used to further an investigation or as evidence in trial. This may include the date and time of the sound event, location of the sound, number of shots, and pattern of shots. An audio recording of the shots and plotting the shots on a map is usually also available. Gunshot Detection Systems as Evidence GDS recordings of live gunfire have been used as demonstrative evidence, usually through an expert witnesss in various ways including: § Connecting shooting events. § Proving the time, location, and number of shots. § Displaying characteristics of shots that provide relevant information about a firearm or use of more than one firearm. § Establishing the location of a crime scene, and, in some cases, a suspect. Considerations for Prosecutors Prosecutors should educate themselves about the many issues surrounding this evolving topic including: § How the specific technology used in their jurisdiction works. § How to preserve the data from GDS. § The standards for admissibility in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction and relevant case law, including these cases: o State v. Hill, 288 Neb. 788 (2014) o United States v. Rickmon, 952 F.3d 876, (7th Cir. 2020) o US v. Godinez, No. 19-3425, (7th Cir. 2021) o People v. Hardy, 275 Cal. Rptr. 3d 566 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021) o Wisconsin v. Nimmer, 2022 WI 47 (CASE No. 2020AP878-CR 2022) § The proprietary nature of algorithms used to interpret the data and existence of other trade secret concerns, that could affect discovery and admissibility. § The type of expert is needed to interpret the evidence at trial. § Why expert testimony may be inconsistent with automated interpretations of the data. § Criticisms of GDS technology and defense tactics to exclude GDS evidence or juror concerns about GDS evidence.  

Washington, DC: National Crime Gun Intelligence Center Initiative, 2023 17p.

By Jacob D. Charles

In popular and professional discourse, debate about the right to keep and bear arms most often revolves around the Second Amendment. But that narrow reference ignores a vast and expansive nonconstitutional legal regime privileging guns and their owners. This collection of non constitutional gun rights confers broad powers and immunities on gun owners that go far beyond those required by the Constitution, like rights to bring guns on private property against an owner’s wishes and to carry a concealed firearm in public with no training or background check. This Article catalogues this set of expansive laws and critically assesses them. Unlike the formal constitutional guarantee, this broad collection is not solely libertarian, concerned only with guaranteeing noninterference with a negative right. Instead, it is also aggressively interventionist, countermanding contrary policy judgments by employers, universities, property owners, and local government officials, conferring robust rights and privileges, and shifting the distribution of violence in society. This Article underscores the rhetorical and legal connection between this gun rights expansionism and the formal Second Amendment guarantee. These laws do not derive from a judicial interpretation of the scope of the Constitution, but they are expressed and advocated for in constitutional terms. The Article also highlights how broad gun rights can create unique harm to the body politic and to marginalized groups by fostering fear and mistrust and empowering sometimes-problematic private actors to proactively police their own communities. Finally, the Article shows how gun-rights expansionism influences constitutional doctrine in the context of the Second Amendment, as well as of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments.  

 Michigan Law Review Volume 120 Issue 4 2022