By R. Evan Ellis

The security environment in Mexico is characterized by a dangerous fragmentation of and competition among criminal groups that pushed the nation’s homicide rate to a record high of 22.5 per 100,000 in 2017, a 27.5 percent increase over the prior year.1 The nation, whose security and prosperity strongly impacts the United States through geographic proximity and associated flows of people, money, and goods (both licit and illicit), is at a critical juncture in its fight against transnational organized crime. Since Mexican President Felipe Calderón launched the “war against the cartels” in December 2006 with the deployment of the Mexican army into the state of Michoacán, the nation’s security forces have taken down the leaders of multiple powerful criminal groups and debilitated their organizations.2 In the process, the Mexican military, police, and other security institutions have evolved their institutional structures, modified both their strategy and their doctrine, and strengthened their ability to combat transnational organized crime. Yet as with the experience of the United States in combatting terrorist groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, Mexico’s fight against the cartels, both despite and because of its successes, has created a more chaotic criminal landscape, with both a higher level of violence and a broader range of criminality.

Complicating Mexico’s security challenge is the disposition of the Trump administration to act aggressively against illegal immigration from Mexico (among other countries) into the United States, along with U.S. renegotiation and possible abandonment of the North American Free Trade Agreement. These actions increase stressors on Mexico, including the prospect of expanded deportations of immigrants to Mexico, the loss of remittance income, and impeded access by Mexican producers to the U.S. market. The Trump administration’s actions, magnified by rhetoric that many Mexicans perceive as an insult to their country and people, have combined with Mexican frustration over the persistence of violence and corruption to create the real prospect that leftist populist candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador could win the July 2018 presidential election, potentially taking Mexico on a course of more distant political relations and decreased security cooperation with the United States and expanded engagement with extra-hemispheric rivals of the United States such as Russia and China.

This article examines Mexico’s serious and evolving security challenges, and the key initiatives and critical issues confronting the nation’s security forces. It argues that the Mexican government has made important progress against a range of criminal groups and in innovating and strengthening its own capabilities to combat such entities and associated flows of illegal goods—capabilities that deserve to be recognized, further refined, and exploited in partnership with the United States and Mexico’s other neighbors. It concludes with recommendations for U.S. policy makers regarding the importance of strong and respectful support for Mexico at the present critical juncture.

2028. 13p.

Women and Illicit Finance in Russia’s Occupation of Ukraine Orly Stern Olivia Allison

Addressing police and military involvement in serious organised crime (Research Paper 39)

By Michael Miklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer

I llicit networks affect everyone in our modern, globalized world. From human trafficking in Eastern Europe to drug smuggling in East Asia, to the illicit arms trade in Africa, to terrorist cells in East Asia and insurgents in the Caucasus, transnational illicit networks have tentacles that reach everywhere. The trade in illegal narcotics is perhaps most worrisome, but of growing concern is the illicit trafficking of counterfeit items, weapons, natural resources, money, cultural property, and even people by shrewd, well-resourced, and nefarious adversaries. I have experience combating these threats personally at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. As a young naval officer on a variety of ships, I spent a fair amount of time patrolling the global commons where transnational criminals in the guise of pirates and drug smugglers proliferate. I was in the Pentagon on 9/11 and personally experienced the global reach of modern terrorism. Later on, when I commanded U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), one of my subordinate commands was Joint Interagency Task Force–South in Key West, Florida, a multinational and interagency/interministerial command that counters drug trafficking in the Western Hemisphere. I also experienced the pernicious effects that transnational crime has on our friends as it ranges throughout the entire Western Hemisphere. After leaving USSOUTHCOM to become commander at U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), I saw that Europe was also challenged by the same types of transnational crime. In response, I stood up the Joint/Interagency Counter Trafficking Center in Stuttgart, Germany, designed to counter transnational criminal networks in cooperation with our international partners. When I took command of USEUCOM, I also became the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). As SACEUR, I command Operation Active Endeavor, which counters trafficking in the Mediterranean, and Operation Ocean Shield, which is part of the international counterpiracy efforts off the Somali coast. In addition, we have pioneered responses to cyber threats. At the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, we have the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Computer Incident Response Center, and at USEUCOM, we are taking steps to create a subunified cyber command that will have links to both U.S. Cyber Command in the United States and USEUCOM in Germany. All of these organizations were designed to facilitate a whole-of-government approach, where all elements of national power work together in order to address emerging threats. Eventually, once societies understand the nature of the threats facing them, they will hope- fully mobilize nongovernmental assets, adopting a “whole of society” approach. When all of these elements work together, governmental and nongovernmental groups can join international regional and global groups to form a “whole of international society” approach, allowing us to close the seams that exist between nations and regions. Only then will we be able to close these illicit transnational networks. These networks have taken advantage of modern advances in communications and transportation to globalize. Narcotraffickers in the Andean Ridge, for instance, have expanded operations as far as their markets in the United States and Europe. Illegal arms merchants have expanded their operations around the world. Human smugglers have moved their slaves from underdeveloped countries to sex operations throughout the developed world. And, of course, we have all seen the global reach of modern transnational terrorism. No one is immune from this insidious threat. 

Center for Complex Operations Institute for National Strategic Studies By National Defense University Press Washington, D.C., 2013. 304p.

By Ashton Kingdon

Based on the combination of online observation, content analysis, as well as comparative and statistical analysis, this paper discusses the scale and structure of al-Qaeda’s and Islamic State’s propaganda output on the surface web. It explores qualitative and quantitative trends detectable in their propaganda between July and December 2023. This paper shows that during this period, the Islamic State released almost twice as many propaganda items on the surface web compared to al-Qaeda. Collected data indicates that the IS’s media production capability improved compared to its online crisis experienced around 2018. The recovery is, however, limited and caused primarily by efforts of the pro-IS media operatives, who are engaged in mass translation and reproduction of official releases of this violent extremist organization (VEO). Among al-Qaeda branches active on the surface web in the second half of 2023, Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin and media offices that support al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent demonstrated the most remarkable capabilities in strategic communication. This paper also proves that both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State manifested significant interest in the events taking place in Africa, Central Asia, and Palestine. However, they frequently adopted opposing ways of framing them.

Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 2025.

By MARIANA OLAIZOLA ROSENBLAT AND LUKE BARNES

Political violence in the United States has increased in recent years and shows no signs of declining.1 This trend was underscored in September 2025 by the assassination of conservative activist Charlie Kirk at Utah Valley University. In the two weeks before and after Kirk’s killing, shooting incidents in Colorado, Minneapolis, and Dallas seized public attention.2 Executive Summary Amid growing concern about the relationship between online rhetoric and real-world violence, this report examines how violent extremist actors across the ideological spectrum use digital platforms to respond to, amplify, and exploit acts of political violence in the United States. Drawing on opensource intelligence (OSINT) gathered initially from March 24 to June 6, 2025, and then extended to include a period following Kirk’s assassination, this analysis reveals sophisticated cross-platform strategies employed by far-right, far-left, violent Islamist, and nihilistic violent extremist (NVE) actors. This report uses “violent extremist” to refer to individuals who support or commit ideologically motivated violence to further political goals, as well as those who commit violence driven by generalized hatred rather than a coherent ideology. Key Findings • Violent extremist groups systematically exploit trigger events—high-profile incidents of violence—to recruit supporters, justify their ideologies, and call for retaliatory action. • These groups employ multi-platform strategies, using mainstream sites like X for visibility and recruitment while maintaining a presence on private or semi-private platforms for coordination and more extreme content. • Far-right groups capitalized on cases like the Austin Metcalf stabbing and the Iryna Zarutska killing to advance narratives of White victimhood and justify threats against perceived enemies. • Activities of both far-left and far-right networks revealed a troubling convergence around antisemitic targeting. • Violent Islamic groups are more aggressively monitored than domestic groups espousing similar levels of violence. • Violent Islamist groups, facing stricter moderation than domestic extremists, have migrated to decentralized platforms like Rocket.Chat while disseminating symbolic propaganda elsewhere. • Nihilistic Violent Extremist (NVE) communities glorify violence across ideological lines for shock value and digital notoriety, making their threats harder to predict based on political triggers. This report aims to bring clarity to a conversation clouded by vagueness and partisanship. It first maps the domestic threat landscape, offering timely examples of online violent discourse from across the ideological spectrum targeting US individuals or institutions, and sets out a clear definitional framework for types of speech that carry legal significance under US constitutional doctrine. It closes with practical recommendations for online service providers and policymakers.

New York: NYU Stern Center for Businsss, 2025. 36p.

By Katarzyna Jaskoa, Gary LaFree, James Piazzac , and Michael H. Beckerd

Although political violence has been perpetrated on behalf of a wide range of political ideologies, it is unclear whether there are systematic differences between ideologies in the use of violence to pursue a political cause. Prior research on this topic is scarce and mostly restricted to self-reported measures or less extreme forms of political aggression. Moreover, it has generally focused on respondents in Western countries and has been limited to either comparisons of the supporters of left-wing and right-wing causes or examinations of only Islamist extremism. In this research we address these gaps by comparing the use of political violence by left-wing, right-wing, and Islamist extremists in the United States and worldwide using two unique datasets that cover real-world examples of politically motivated, violent behaviors. Across both datasets, we find that radical acts perpetrated by individuals associated with left-wing causes are less likely to be violent. In the United States, we find no difference between the level of violence perpetrated by right-wing and Islamist extremists. However, differences in violence emerge on the global level, with Islamist extremists being more likely than right-wing extremists to engage in more violent acts.

Political violence in the United States has increased in recent years and shows no signs of declining.1 This trend was underscored in September 2025 by the assassination of conservative activist Charlie Kirk at Utah Valley University. In the two weeks before and after Kirk’s killing, shooting incidents in Colorado, Minneapolis, and Dallas seized public attention.2 Executive Summary Amid growing concern about the relationship between online rhetoric and real-world violence, this report examines how violent extremist actors across the ideological spectrum use digital platforms to respond to, amplify, and exploit acts of political violence in the United States. Drawing on opensource intelligence (OSINT) gathered initially from March 24 to June 6, 2025, and then extended to include a period following Kirk’s assassination, this analysis reveals sophisticated cross-platform strategies employed by far-right, far-left, violent Islamist, and nihilistic violent extremist (NVE) actors. This report uses “violent extremist” to refer to individuals who support or commit ideologically motivated violence to further political goals, as well as those who commit violence driven by generalized hatred rather than a coherent ideology. Key Findings • Violent extremist groups systematically exploit trigger events—high-profile incidents of violence—to recruit supporters, justify their ideologies, and call for retaliatory action. • These groups employ multi-platform strategies, using mainstream sites like X for visibility and recruitment while maintaining a presence on private or semi-private platforms for coordination and more extreme content. • Far-right groups capitalized on cases like the Austin Metcalf stabbing and the Iryna Zarutska killing to advance narratives of White victimhood and justify threats against perceived enemies. • Activities of both far-left and far-right networks revealed a troubling convergence around antisemitic targeting. • Violent Islamic groups are more aggressively monitored than domestic groups espousing similar levels of violence. • Violent Islamist groups, facing stricter moderation than domestic extremists, have migrated to decentralized platforms like Rocket.Chat while disseminating symbolic propaganda elsewhere. • Nihilistic Violent Extremist (NVE) communities glorify violence across ideological lines for shock value and digital notoriety, making their threats harder to predict based on political triggers. This report aims to bring clarity to a conversation clouded by vagueness and partisanship. It first maps the domestic threat landscape, offering timely examples of online violent discourse from across the ideological spectrum targeting US individuals or institutions, and sets out a clear definitional framework for types of speech that carry legal significance under US constitutional doctrine. It closes with practical recommendations for online service providers and policymakers.

PNAS 2022 Vol. 119 No. 30 e2122593119

By Noor Huda Ismail

SYNOPSIS

The increasing susceptibility of minors to recruitment by violent extremist groups via online platforms poses a clear and present danger. Cases in Singapore and Indonesia illustrate how radicalisation exploits factors such as identity crises, wounded masculinity, and digital isolation. Emphasis on rehabilitation as opposed to punishment is critical, necessitating the involvement of families, schools, and communities to safeguard children through fostering trust and empathy.

COMMENTARY

As a father of two teenage boys, aged 16 and 14, I cannot read the news of radicalised minors without feeling alarmed and deeply concerned. The recent case in Singapore, involving a 14-year-old student, is particularly striking.

Security officials reported that the boy was influenced by a “salad bar” of extremist beliefs, including ISIS propaganda, incel subculture and those on the far-right and far-left. He is not much older than my youngest child, who, like millions of teenagers, spends hours on gaming, social media, and online communities that quietly shape their identity, sense of belonging, and moral compass.

For the unfamiliar, incel stands for “involuntary celibate”. These are mostly young men, expressing deep resentment toward women and society for their sexual frustrations. From a gender perspective, incel ideology feeds on what scholars call wounded masculinity.

Many boys today struggle with identity in a world where traditional markers of male success – financial stability, social recognition, romantic relationships – are increasingly uncertain. Online platforms amplify these feelings, creating spaces where humiliation and anger are validated, sometimes evolving into misogyny or even violence.

By Phil Williams and Sandra Quincoses

The economic and political environments in Latin America have been advantageous for local, regional, and transnational threat networks. Specifically, technology, increased international trade and economic interdependence, heightened interest in natural resources for profit, synthetic drug production, economic disparities, corruption, impunity, and unstable political conditions have led to a complex web of opportunities that requires new, progressive ways to address criminal activities. The creativity of threat networks along with their entrepreneurial strategies have resulted in increasing power and influence. Despite efforts by the United States and some governments in Latin America to combat these networks, the everchanging global environment has worked in their favor. Indeed, some countries in Central and South America are in danger of transforming into what Jorge Chabat described as “criminally possessed states.” Furthermore, gangs in Central America, especially in Honduras where MS-13 has become more closely linked to drug trafficking, have reduced local extortion, become more aware of their nascent political power and have even engaged in rudimentary social welfare provision.

By Daniel Schaeffer

Often viewed through a myopic lens as an environmental issue or one relegated to fisheries authorities, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing affects all coastal nations in the Western Hemisphere and has national security implications on the United States. A regional problem requires a regional solution and greater cooperation across agencies, private industry, and governments. Actions to address IUU fishing in Latin America have the potential to achieve greater aims of maritime security in the region. The report will frame the problem of IUU fishing by first highlighting its overall impacts globally and regionally. Food security, employment, national revenue, and other illicit activities are discussed. The report concludes with recommendations for interagency and regional coordination.

Miami:2021. 

By Daniela Marggraff

From piracy to illegal fishing, maritime threats in the region demand urgent, coordinated policy action.



The Western Indian Ocean contains a multitude of threats to inhabitants’ maritime security, ranging from climate change and pollution to piracy, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, maritime violence and increasing militarisation. This report emphasises a policymaking approach that addresses issues through a cyclical rather than linear lens, recognising how one threat can lead to the emergence of another.

Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2025. 24p.

By Noor Huda Ismail

Indonesia is witnessing a disturbing rise in the online radicalisation of minors, with police confirming that 110 children aged 10-18 have been influenced or recruited by extremist networks in twenty-three provinces. The challenge in countering this trend lies in understanding why the phenomenon is intensifying and what it would demand from policymakers, particularly in involving the youth themselves in co-creating prevention strategies.

COMMENTARY

Recent disclosures from the Indonesian National Police underscore an unsettling shift in the country’s counter-terrorism landscape. Brigjen Polisi Trunoyudo Wisnu Andiko reported that 110 minors aged 10 to 18 have been exposed to radical ideology and recruited into terrorist networks, with the highest concentrations in Banten, DKI Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, and East Java.

The recruitment of these minors is a subtle, highly digitalised process, beginning on social media platforms such as Facebook and Instagram, and through online games, before moving to private channels like WhatsApp and Telegram. Extremists employ short videos, animations, memes, and music that resonate with adolescent culture, embedding ideology within content designed for entertainment and identity formation. This approach allows gradual indoctrination, exploiting both the cognitive vulnerabilities of youth and the emotional allure of belonging to a community.

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore, 2025. 

By The International Crisis Group

What’s new? Since October 2019, Lebanon’s economic crisis has gutted funding for the country’s security forces, including the army and national police. Overstretched, these agencies have resorted to makeshift solutions for keeping the peace, including initiatives that allow communities to help police themselves.

Why does it matter? With the country’s security institutions struggling for resources, public safety in Lebanon is maintained by a patchwork of ad hoc solutions and quick fixes that cannot hold forever. As formal institutions continue to weaken, security will fray. Violence could follow, particularly in neglected and impoverished areas.

What should be done? Donors should keep pressing Lebanon’s leaders to better address the economic crisis so that the government can reinvest in the security forces’ long-term viability, especially after the latest destabilising Israel-Hizbollah war. In parallel, targeted interventions by donors can help bolster the security forces’ performance and professional integrity.

Brussels, Belgium : International Crisis Group, 2025. 49p.

By Abby Córdova and Helen Kras

 With a focus on the implementation of women’s police stations (WPS), we posit that local policies that address violence against women can result in positive feedback effects on institutional legitimacy. We theorize that WPS increase police legitimacy among women by improving perceptions of personal safety and government responsiveness. To test our hypotheses, we rely on municipal and public opinion data from more than 100 municipalities in Brazil. The results of our multilevel analysis indicate that WPS produce positive feedback effects among women, resulting in higher trust in the police among women than men and closing the gender gap in perceptions of police effectiveness. Incorporating an instrumental variable in the analyses yields similar results, suggesting that these effects are not endogenous. Moreover, the results of our mediation models show that WPS’ positive effects on women’s views of police legitimacy are driven by improved perceptions of personal safety, and not perceptions of government responsiveness. 

Comparative Political Studies 2020, Vol. 53(5) 775–808 

By Michael A Yonas ,, Patricia O’Campo , Jessica G Burke , Geri Peak , Andrea C Gielen 

This study explored how young boys and girls living in low income urban neighborhoods defined and described reasons associated with youth violence. Five focus groups were conducted with 29 youth between the ages of 8 and 12 recruited from four selected study neighborhoods. Participants were asked to describe youth violence. Appropriate probes were used to explore similarities and differences by gender with regard to the reasons for violence. Definitions of youth violence were consistent across participants and included verbal threats, physical contact, and often the use of a weapon. Several common reasons for violence were found among both boys and girls; romantic relationships, respect, idle time, gangs.cliques, and witnessing violence. Reasons for violence unique to boys include fighting about issues related to money and illicit drugs. Gossip was identified as a reason specific to why girls engage in violence. Youth violence was perceived as a common problem impacting the lives of the boys and girls in this study. Although many of the reasons identified for violence are similar among boys and girls, select gender differences do exist. Future research and prevention efforts to address youth violence should engage young people in efforts to understand and address this important public health topic.

J Urban Health

. 2005 Dec;82(4):543–551.

By Robin S. Engel, Jennifer Calnon Cherkauskas

The 2024 Annual Report of the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Traffic Stop Study presents a comprehensive analysis of member-initiated traffic stops conducted between January 1 and December 31, 2024. It continues a multi-year initiative to collect, audit, and analyze traffic stop data. In 2021, the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) revitalized its effort to collect traffic stop data This initiative builds on a voluntary traffic stop data collection system created by the PSP twenty-five years ago in partnership with the current research team, which was operational from 2001 to 2010 and served as a national model for traffic stop data collection (Engel & Cherkauskas, 2022). The report provides a detailed breakdown of traffic stop characteristics and outcomes at the department level, as well as across PSP’s four Areas, 16 Troops, and 89 Stations. PSP’s voluntary data collection and analysis align with best practices, showcasing its commitment to transparency and accountability to its communities and reinforcing its dedication to evidence-based policing practices. The objectives of the traffic stop data collection and analysis are to: (1) identify patterns and trends in traffic stops and their outcomes, specifically documenting any racial/ethnic disparities; (2) utilize data analysis to promote effective and fair law enforcement practices that enhance public and traffic safety; (3) foster public trust through transparent documentation of traffic stop data and findings; (4) identify opportunities for improvement in PSP policies, training, and supervisory oversight concerning traffic stops. 

Harrisburg: Pennsylvania State Police, 2025. 139p.

By Letitia James

  Every day, millions of New Yorkers take to the roads. They deserve traffic safety and policing that is fair and effective. This report describes some of the harms that can arise from police vehicle pursuits and high-speed vehicle chases and proposes reforms to help keep New Yorkers safe. Police chases have been shown to increase danger and result in injury or fatalities to drivers, passengers, bystanders, and police. We offer the following recommendations: Pass legislation to increase transparency New York law enforcement agencies should be required to track and publish a standardized set of data about traffic pursuits and high-speed chases. This should be facilitated by a centralized agency such as the Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS). Ban high-speed police pursuits, with very narrow exceptions High-speed chases can be deadly. Chases may be necessary when a serious or violent felony has been or will be committed, and when the driver’s conduct poses an imminent threat of death. But, in large part, ordinary speeding or minor traffic infractions should not lead to a high-speed, dangerous chase.  

Albany:  Office of the New York State Attorney General Letitia James, 2025. 11p.

Regulations from 100 Cities, Post-Floyd Policy Reforms, and Revisiting Constitutional Standards

By Dan Sutton, Fatima Dahir

Five years after George Floyd’s killing sparked unprecedented demands for police reform, questions persist about the changes that have—and haven’t—been made to American policing. Many Americans may be surprised to learn that policing rules vary significantly across jurisdictions, with stark differences in how officers are permitted to use force. One city may require officers to try de-escalating a traffic stop before using any force, while another city may permit officers to immediately draw their weapons without attempting alternatives.

The post-Floyd reform movement has produced a complex landscape of change: departments have largely converged on reforms like chokehold bans and requiring officers to intervene against excessive force, but they remain deeply divided on fundamental questions of when and how force should be used. Our study, which we believe represents the largest systematic analysis of American force regulations to date, examines 22 distinct policy dimensions across the nation’s 100 largest cities, comprising 2,200 total regulations collected through 2023. See Figure 1. This research was motivated by the troubling and well-documented relationship between race and police violence and the ongoing need to address systemic issues at the intersection of race, policy, and use of force.

Palo Alto, CA: Stanford Center for Racial Justice, 2025. 34p.By Dan Sutton, Fatima Dahir

By The Policing Project at NYU School of Law 

  The story of the Chicago Neighborhood Policing Initiative begins in 2019. At that time, the City of Chicago faced a number of serious challenges involving crime and community confidence in the police. Decades-long concerns about discriminatory policing, police accountability, use of force, external oversight, and community responsiveness had reached a critical point that demanded action. Following the police shooting of Laquan McDonald, the United States Department of Justice investigated and found a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing by the Chicago Police Department (CPD), linking a lack of public trust to reduced crime prevention effectiveness. Within this environment, CPD personnel visited New York City to learn about the New York Police Department’s (NYPD) recently developed Neighborhood Policing model. That approach focused on reorganizing patrol activities in police districts to allow officers to engage meaningfully with the community and address local issues. The NYPD credited this method with enhancing community involvement and revitalizing focus on community policing. It is worth noting that Chicago’s original, groundbreaking community policing model, the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS), shared many features with the NYPD model, such as promoting partnership with community. But CAPS became under-resourced over time and today is a stand-alone program focused on community events rather than crime strategy. Identifying the NYPD model as a promising approach to improving public safety and relationships with the community, CPD leadership asked the Policing Project at New York University School of Law to work with the Department and local communities to develop a strategy to re-imagine the NYPD model to meet the needs and particular challenges of Chicago. Since 2019, the Policing Project has been supporting the development and implementation of the model, made possible by the partnership of a dedicated coalition of Chicago philanthropic organizations. The Neighborhood Policing Initiative (NPI) is a core policing strategy focused on problem-solving and crime reduction activities, undertaken in collaboration with neighborhood residents in a manner that builds trust between police and community. Through NPI, the community and the police share responsibility for addressing public safety issues in communities. NPI’s goal is to transform the community-police dynamic to produce meaningful public safety. Rather than solely relying on traditional police responses, NPI seeks to bring together Chicago communities to identify problems and develop solutions to guide police efforts going forward.  NPI’s vision is for this philosophy to permeate every level of the Department, equipping CPD and the communities it serves to reach a shared understanding of what policing should look like. Under NPI, residents are an ongoing, central part of the actual decision-making process on how they are policed.

New York: NYU University School of Law, Policing Project, 2025. 118p.   

 By Lokniti in collaboration with Common Cause.Despite the prohibition of torture being a provision of the Indian Constitution, custodial torture by the police remains widespread and under-reported. A strong societal belief in the utility of torture as a response to crime normalises its use by the police. Cases of police brutality are generally brushed away and only come to light when they result in death. Fewer still result in inquiries or punitive actions against perpetrators. This SPIR study aims to address the normalisation of police violence by establishing reliable and accurate data on public perception of police violence. Unlike previous SPIR reports, the 2025 study does not account for the views of the common citizens but rather directly explores the perceptions of those in authority- police personnel. The study explores the patterns and practices of routine policing that eventually contribute to the use of violence by the police in their day-to-day operations, such as detention, investigation, arrest and interrogation. The study is designed to be utilised for policy and advocacy. It offers key insights into personnel’s belief in the rule of law and level of legal training.The study investigates the nature and contexts of custodial torture and police brutality in India. Furthermore, it examines the trends of official denial. To understand the enmeshment of law enforcement and society that creates propensities to violence, the survey data assesses police opinions on various parameters, such as frequent crimes and arrests, crime control measures, moral policing and mob violence. Police perceptions of the criminal justice system and its functioning, trials and justice-seekers are also assessed. The study engages with personnel’s views on justifications for custodial violence and torture during arrests, engagements with witnesses, interrogations, etc. In the same vein, the survey also probes into police personnel’s views of judicial scrutiny and accountability of custodial deaths, brutality and “encounters”. Views of other stakeholders involved in the process, such as lawyers, doctors, and judges, on police and magisterial accountability are recounted in the scope of the SPIR, too. Finally, the report evaluates the quality and status of official records on police torture and violence.The survey was conducted in 17 Indian states with a sample of 8,276 police personnel across rural areas, capital cities and urban areas. Of the respondents, 85 per cent were male respondents and the rest were female. 59 per cent of respondent personnel were of constabulary rank, forty per cent of upper subordinate rank and one per cent of IPS level ranks.

New Delhi: Common Cause and Lokniti - Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) , 2025. 218p.

By Salla Huikuri

  Online communities of pedophiles in darknet facilitate sexual violence against children. They provide a criminogenic space for socially sidelined offenders to share and reinforce their sexual distortions. They accommodate illegal Child Sexual Abuse Material and enable its trading, sharing, and exchange. They offer advice on how to protect one’s online identity and how to physically proceed into sexual violence against children. This review deals with online child sexual offenders and their communities in darknet. It defines key terms dealing with online sexual offences against children and discusses different types of child sexual abuse offenders operating online. Moreover, it sheds light on the psychological side of offending – the justifications for sexual violence against children – and elaborates the underlying logics underpinning the respective trains of though in the online communities of pedophiles.  

Tampere: Police University College.   2022.

By Vladas Tumalavičius

The recent illegal drugs market trends are connected with the flow of new psychoactive substances also through internet resources. Consequently, the states intensified its legislative initiative in this field. In addition there is a current trend related to the use of smuggled controlled substances and new psychoactive substances, illegal cultivation of marijuana as well as the involvement our countries citizens in the trafficking of narcotic substances. The problem of drug addiction has become very topical as an ever increasing number of youth who are involved in narcotics could become a threat to each and every one of us and security of society as a whole. This case study is devoted to the study of the transformation of approaches to ensuring the safety of society and combating drug trafficking at the international level. The aim of this study is to consider the general problem of drug trafficking as a challenge to modern international security and international economics development. The object of the study is the mechanism of combating drug trafficking at the stage of sustainable development. The analytical method, the method of situational analysis, the comparative method, theoretical studies and specific legal research methods were used as methods in the study as methods used in the social sciences to study objective reality. The methodological approach of the study is constructivism and social constructivism. On the one hand, the analysis of the formation of a global regime of non-coercive solution to the problem of drug trafficking requires a constructive analysis. On the other hand, the problems of global governance are best developed today mainly by constructivism. Finally, this case study testifies to the global dominance of shadow entrepreneurs in narco-states and their participation in illegal drug trafficking bypassing the participation of state institutions and confirms the assumption put forward about the lack of implementation of measures to counter this phenomenon on the part at the state level.

Access to Science, Business, Innovation in Digital Economy ISSN 2683-1007 (Online) 2023, 4(3), 409-418