By Robin S. Engel, Jennifer Calnon Cherkauskas

The 2024 Annual Report of the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Traffic Stop Study presents a comprehensive analysis of member-initiated traffic stops conducted between January 1 and December 31, 2024. It continues a multi-year initiative to collect, audit, and analyze traffic stop data. In 2021, the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) revitalized its effort to collect traffic stop data This initiative builds on a voluntary traffic stop data collection system created by the PSP twenty-five years ago in partnership with the current research team, which was operational from 2001 to 2010 and served as a national model for traffic stop data collection (Engel & Cherkauskas, 2022). The report provides a detailed breakdown of traffic stop characteristics and outcomes at the department level, as well as across PSP’s four Areas, 16 Troops, and 89 Stations. PSP’s voluntary data collection and analysis align with best practices, showcasing its commitment to transparency and accountability to its communities and reinforcing its dedication to evidence-based policing practices. The objectives of the traffic stop data collection and analysis are to: (1) identify patterns and trends in traffic stops and their outcomes, specifically documenting any racial/ethnic disparities; (2) utilize data analysis to promote effective and fair law enforcement practices that enhance public and traffic safety; (3) foster public trust through transparent documentation of traffic stop data and findings; (4) identify opportunities for improvement in PSP policies, training, and supervisory oversight concerning traffic stops. 

Harrisburg: Pennsylvania State Police, 2025. 139p.

By Letitia James

  Every day, millions of New Yorkers take to the roads. They deserve traffic safety and policing that is fair and effective. This report describes some of the harms that can arise from police vehicle pursuits and high-speed vehicle chases and proposes reforms to help keep New Yorkers safe. Police chases have been shown to increase danger and result in injury or fatalities to drivers, passengers, bystanders, and police. We offer the following recommendations: Pass legislation to increase transparency New York law enforcement agencies should be required to track and publish a standardized set of data about traffic pursuits and high-speed chases. This should be facilitated by a centralized agency such as the Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS). Ban high-speed police pursuits, with very narrow exceptions High-speed chases can be deadly. Chases may be necessary when a serious or violent felony has been or will be committed, and when the driver’s conduct poses an imminent threat of death. But, in large part, ordinary speeding or minor traffic infractions should not lead to a high-speed, dangerous chase.  

Albany:  Office of the New York State Attorney General Letitia James, 2025. 11p.

Regulations from 100 Cities, Post-Floyd Policy Reforms, and Revisiting Constitutional Standards

By Dan Sutton, Fatima Dahir

Five years after George Floyd’s killing sparked unprecedented demands for police reform, questions persist about the changes that have—and haven’t—been made to American policing. Many Americans may be surprised to learn that policing rules vary significantly across jurisdictions, with stark differences in how officers are permitted to use force. One city may require officers to try de-escalating a traffic stop before using any force, while another city may permit officers to immediately draw their weapons without attempting alternatives.

The post-Floyd reform movement has produced a complex landscape of change: departments have largely converged on reforms like chokehold bans and requiring officers to intervene against excessive force, but they remain deeply divided on fundamental questions of when and how force should be used. Our study, which we believe represents the largest systematic analysis of American force regulations to date, examines 22 distinct policy dimensions across the nation’s 100 largest cities, comprising 2,200 total regulations collected through 2023. See Figure 1. This research was motivated by the troubling and well-documented relationship between race and police violence and the ongoing need to address systemic issues at the intersection of race, policy, and use of force.

Palo Alto, CA: Stanford Center for Racial Justice, 2025. 34p.By Dan Sutton, Fatima Dahir

By The Policing Project at NYU School of Law 

  The story of the Chicago Neighborhood Policing Initiative begins in 2019. At that time, the City of Chicago faced a number of serious challenges involving crime and community confidence in the police. Decades-long concerns about discriminatory policing, police accountability, use of force, external oversight, and community responsiveness had reached a critical point that demanded action. Following the police shooting of Laquan McDonald, the United States Department of Justice investigated and found a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing by the Chicago Police Department (CPD), linking a lack of public trust to reduced crime prevention effectiveness. Within this environment, CPD personnel visited New York City to learn about the New York Police Department’s (NYPD) recently developed Neighborhood Policing model. That approach focused on reorganizing patrol activities in police districts to allow officers to engage meaningfully with the community and address local issues. The NYPD credited this method with enhancing community involvement and revitalizing focus on community policing. It is worth noting that Chicago’s original, groundbreaking community policing model, the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS), shared many features with the NYPD model, such as promoting partnership with community. But CAPS became under-resourced over time and today is a stand-alone program focused on community events rather than crime strategy. Identifying the NYPD model as a promising approach to improving public safety and relationships with the community, CPD leadership asked the Policing Project at New York University School of Law to work with the Department and local communities to develop a strategy to re-imagine the NYPD model to meet the needs and particular challenges of Chicago. Since 2019, the Policing Project has been supporting the development and implementation of the model, made possible by the partnership of a dedicated coalition of Chicago philanthropic organizations. The Neighborhood Policing Initiative (NPI) is a core policing strategy focused on problem-solving and crime reduction activities, undertaken in collaboration with neighborhood residents in a manner that builds trust between police and community. Through NPI, the community and the police share responsibility for addressing public safety issues in communities. NPI’s goal is to transform the community-police dynamic to produce meaningful public safety. Rather than solely relying on traditional police responses, NPI seeks to bring together Chicago communities to identify problems and develop solutions to guide police efforts going forward.  NPI’s vision is for this philosophy to permeate every level of the Department, equipping CPD and the communities it serves to reach a shared understanding of what policing should look like. Under NPI, residents are an ongoing, central part of the actual decision-making process on how they are policed.

New York: NYU University School of Law, Policing Project, 2025. 118p.   

 By Lokniti in collaboration with Common Cause.Despite the prohibition of torture being a provision of the Indian Constitution, custodial torture by the police remains widespread and under-reported. A strong societal belief in the utility of torture as a response to crime normalises its use by the police. Cases of police brutality are generally brushed away and only come to light when they result in death. Fewer still result in inquiries or punitive actions against perpetrators. This SPIR study aims to address the normalisation of police violence by establishing reliable and accurate data on public perception of police violence. Unlike previous SPIR reports, the 2025 study does not account for the views of the common citizens but rather directly explores the perceptions of those in authority- police personnel. The study explores the patterns and practices of routine policing that eventually contribute to the use of violence by the police in their day-to-day operations, such as detention, investigation, arrest and interrogation. The study is designed to be utilised for policy and advocacy. It offers key insights into personnel’s belief in the rule of law and level of legal training.The study investigates the nature and contexts of custodial torture and police brutality in India. Furthermore, it examines the trends of official denial. To understand the enmeshment of law enforcement and society that creates propensities to violence, the survey data assesses police opinions on various parameters, such as frequent crimes and arrests, crime control measures, moral policing and mob violence. Police perceptions of the criminal justice system and its functioning, trials and justice-seekers are also assessed. The study engages with personnel’s views on justifications for custodial violence and torture during arrests, engagements with witnesses, interrogations, etc. In the same vein, the survey also probes into police personnel’s views of judicial scrutiny and accountability of custodial deaths, brutality and “encounters”. Views of other stakeholders involved in the process, such as lawyers, doctors, and judges, on police and magisterial accountability are recounted in the scope of the SPIR, too. Finally, the report evaluates the quality and status of official records on police torture and violence.The survey was conducted in 17 Indian states with a sample of 8,276 police personnel across rural areas, capital cities and urban areas. Of the respondents, 85 per cent were male respondents and the rest were female. 59 per cent of respondent personnel were of constabulary rank, forty per cent of upper subordinate rank and one per cent of IPS level ranks.

New Delhi: Common Cause and Lokniti - Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) , 2025. 218p.

By Salla Huikuri

  Online communities of pedophiles in darknet facilitate sexual violence against children. They provide a criminogenic space for socially sidelined offenders to share and reinforce their sexual distortions. They accommodate illegal Child Sexual Abuse Material and enable its trading, sharing, and exchange. They offer advice on how to protect one’s online identity and how to physically proceed into sexual violence against children. This review deals with online child sexual offenders and their communities in darknet. It defines key terms dealing with online sexual offences against children and discusses different types of child sexual abuse offenders operating online. Moreover, it sheds light on the psychological side of offending – the justifications for sexual violence against children – and elaborates the underlying logics underpinning the respective trains of though in the online communities of pedophiles.  

Tampere: Police University College.   2022.

By Vladas Tumalavičius

The recent illegal drugs market trends are connected with the flow of new psychoactive substances also through internet resources. Consequently, the states intensified its legislative initiative in this field. In addition there is a current trend related to the use of smuggled controlled substances and new psychoactive substances, illegal cultivation of marijuana as well as the involvement our countries citizens in the trafficking of narcotic substances. The problem of drug addiction has become very topical as an ever increasing number of youth who are involved in narcotics could become a threat to each and every one of us and security of society as a whole. This case study is devoted to the study of the transformation of approaches to ensuring the safety of society and combating drug trafficking at the international level. The aim of this study is to consider the general problem of drug trafficking as a challenge to modern international security and international economics development. The object of the study is the mechanism of combating drug trafficking at the stage of sustainable development. The analytical method, the method of situational analysis, the comparative method, theoretical studies and specific legal research methods were used as methods in the study as methods used in the social sciences to study objective reality. The methodological approach of the study is constructivism and social constructivism. On the one hand, the analysis of the formation of a global regime of non-coercive solution to the problem of drug trafficking requires a constructive analysis. On the other hand, the problems of global governance are best developed today mainly by constructivism. Finally, this case study testifies to the global dominance of shadow entrepreneurs in narco-states and their participation in illegal drug trafficking bypassing the participation of state institutions and confirms the assumption put forward about the lack of implementation of measures to counter this phenomenon on the part at the state level.

Access to Science, Business, Innovation in Digital Economy ISSN 2683-1007 (Online) 2023, 4(3), 409-418

By Lucia Bird | Jason Eligh,  Kingsley Madueke | Mouhamadou Kane

The proliferation of synthetic drugs across West Africa potentially represents one of the most urgent and complex public health and security challenges facing the region. In recent years, the illicit drug landscape has been fundamentally reshaped, moving away from traditional plant-based substances controlled by hierarchical criminal networks towards a fragmented, decentralized market for man-made psychoactive compounds. The harms driven by the synthetic drug market – overdoses, chronic health conditions, severe mental health conditions, community fragmentation – are escalating. Consumption, and consequences, are concentrated in the youth: in the worst-affected countries this poses a serious threat to future stability and economic development. The effects of synthetic drugs in parts of West Africa have become so severe that since 2024 two countries have declared states of emergency – an unprecedented response previously reserved for deadly epidemics and pandemics.1 This report examines the emergence and rapid expansion of this synthetic drug economy in West Africa, detailing how factors such as low barriers to entry, the convenience and anonymity afforded by the proliferation of online platforms and technology, and the minimal capital required for production have enabled a diverse array of new criminal actors to enter the trade. The subsequent influx of substances such as synthetic cannabinoids, nitazenes and other novel compounds of unknown composition, and the expansion of pre-existing synthetic drug markets such as methamphetamine, present a multifaceted threat that is rapidly outpacing the response capacity of regional governments. The breadth and depth of synthetic substance presence globally has grown enormously over the past decade. Increasingly, synthetic substances are being detected in local illicit drug markets that have no prior record of their presence, often being identified as contaminants of, or unknown substitutes for, other more traditional substances. Expanding use of synthetic opioids, particularly tramadol, tramadol derivatives (most prominently tapentadol) and nitazenes in West Africa, is a particularly alarming trend within this growing illicit drug marketplace. These substances, some vital to public health institutions for pain relief and palliative care purposes, have been responsible for a significant increase in drug-related morbidity and mortality worldwide. Their potency and availability pose unprecedented challenges to public health systems and law enforcement agencies alike.

The sheer diversity of substances being synthesized, the inability of existing surveillance systems to effectively identify many of them, and the challenge of interdicting and mitigating their harms significantly impairs the ability of health and security services to respond. Further, the intersection of synthetic drug markets with other illicit activities further complicates efforts to address these challenges effectively. Organized criminal networks leverage the profits generated from synthetic drug production, trafficking and distribution to fund their criminal operations and purchase protection, driving corruption. The report explores the mechanisms driving this rapid expansion in synthetic drug markets in West Africa, analyzing the critical roles of digital technology and globalized supply chains. It looks at how internet penetration across the region has facilitated growth in the online purchase of precursor chemicals and finished products, often from suppliers in Asia and Europe, which are smuggled into the region through difficult-to-monitor channels such as postal and courier services. The report discusses the profound economic incentives that make the synthetic drug trade so attractive, functioning as a ‘bridge’ market that allows new entrants to accumulate capital rapidly. By examining case studies and discussing market trends, the report illustrates how these dynamics have allowed synthetic drugs to capture a growing share of the retail market with alarming speed, potentially leading to devastating social and public health consequences.

Geneva:  Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2026. 47p.

By Sami Aftab Abdul , Huan Jiang , .Cayley Russell  , Tara Elton-Marshall ,  et al.

Background

British Columbia, Canada implemented a three-year pilot program on January 31, 2023 decriminalizing personal possession of select illegal drugs. The policy aimed to increase access to health and social services. This analysis evaluated the short-term impacts of decriminalization on clients dispensed opioid agonist treatment (OAT) medications and visits to supervised consumption and overdose prevention services (SCS/OPS).

Methods

Population-based data from 2015 to 2023 were sourced (Pre-decriminalization: Jan 2015–Jan 2023; Post-decriminalization Feb 2023–Dec 2023). Generalized additive models in an interrupted time series design were used to model monthly total and sex-stratified, age-standardized rates of clients and first-time clients dispensed OAT medications per 100,000 population, as well as crude rates of visits to SCS/OPS per 100,000 population. The models tested both immediate level changes (immediate effect at decriminalization) and trend changes (slope changes post-decriminalization).

Results

The models detected no association between decriminalization and changes in clients dispensed OAT medications (Immediate Change β [95 % CI]: −0.001 [−0.012, 0.011]; Trend Change β [95 % CI]: −0.004 [−0.011, 0.003]), first-time clients dispensed OAT medications (Immediate Change β [95 % CI]: 0.115 [−0.049, 0.279]; Trend Change β [95 % CI]: −0.006 [−0.048, 0.035]) or visits to SCS/OPS (Immediate Change β [95 % CI]: 0.048 [−0.100, 0.195]; Trend Change β [95 % CI]: 0.013 [−0.016, 0.043]). Findings for all outcomes remained consistent after stratifying by sex.

Conclusion

Decriminalization was not associated with changes in clients dispensed OAT medications, first-time clients dispensed OAT medications, or visits to SCS/OPS. These findings reflect only the initial eleven months following the implementation of the policy. Given the complexity of factors influencing service utilization, and the introduction of the second amendment which represents a significant rollback of the original exemption, longer-term evaluations are needed to more accurately assess whether decriminalization is contributing to its intended goals.

Journal of Substance Use and Addiction Treatment

Volume 180, January 2026, 209815

Lee Schlenker

US–Mexico security tensions are reaching potentially unprecedented levels amid repeated threats from President Trump to unilaterally strike Mexican drug cartels, which he now claims “run” the country. The violent reaction by the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación, or CJNG, after the Mexican National Guard killed its leader, “El Mencho,” with the support of US military intelligence in late February underscores the broad impacts of cartel terror in Mexico and the lack of neat solutions to eliminating it. 

What restraint-oriented strategies can the United States and Mexico develop together to tackle this scourge? To address the issue of crime and drugs from Mexico, Congress has appropriated $3.6 billion in security assistance between 2008 and 2024, and the Trump administration has designated six Mexican cartels as foreign terrorist organizations. Both of these measures have done little to address the surging demand for illicit narcotics or the “iron river” of US weapons flowing across the border. Meanwhile, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has deployed 10,000 additional troops to the US–Mexico border, transferred almost 100 high-level drug criminals to US custody, and allowed expanded US drone flights over Mexican territory. 

But unilateral US strikes in Mexico and American boots on the ground for joint operations with Mexican personnel remain a red line for Sheinbaum, who, under immense pressure, has overseen targeted interventions in high-crime Mexican states that have led to a 32 percent drop in homicides. 

The Trump administration should focus on three broad policy areas to help effectively stem the flow of illicit narcotics into the United States and weaken transnational criminal threats, while also avoiding counterproductive unilateral military strikes on Mexican territory: 

• Improved security cooperation and bilateral coordination, including making better use of the Department of Defense’s advise-and-assist, educational, and professional training programs as well as exploring a US advisory role in Mexican command centers over the country’s domestic operations. 

• Tougher laws to combat arms smuggling, judicial cooperation to disrupt illicit financial networks and money laundering, and joint cross-border investigations into Mexican and US officials credibly alleged of ties to drug trafficking and corruption. 

• Funding for overdose-prevention and demand-reduction programs, strengthening the Treasury Department’s Counter-Fentanyl Strike Force, and pursuing commercial diplomacy with Mexico and China to stem the production and flow of precursor chemicals. 

Washington, DC: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft

2026. 6p.

By the European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA);

This report was prepared within the framework of Operational Action 1.5 of the 2024/2025 EMPACT Synthetic Drugs and New Psychoactive Substances action plan, entitled ’Intelligence picture on the trafficking of ketamine in the EU.’ The action was led by Belgium and co-led by Germany and the European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA). It was initiated in response to concerns raised by several Member States regarding indications that ketamine may represent an emerging drug-related issue in Europe.

Increasing challenges related to the availability, supply, non-medical use and associated risks of ketamine have been observed at the global and EU levels. As ketamine is listed by the World Health Organization as an essential medicine and is not subject to international control, systematic reporting is not required in most jurisdictions, creating monitoring blind spots. Within this context, the operational action focused on supporting situational awareness, early identification of potential security risks and, where appropriate, suggesting possible ways forward. This report is based on information contributions from 32 countries.

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2026. 41p.

By  Sandra J. Ley Gutiérre

When do protests against crime and insecurity take place, regardless of the risks that such mobilization may entail? This paper argues that while violence provides an initial motivation for participating in protests, social networks play a fundamental role in incentivizing citizen mobilization against insecurity. Socialization within networks helps generate solidarity and empathy among participants, while at the same time transforming emotions associated with living in a violent context into potential for action. Also, through networks, individuals share information about opportunities for collective action and change their perceptions about the effectiveness and risks of such activism. These distinct mechanisms are valuable for the activation of protest against crime across levels of violence. Supporting evidence is derived from an original dataset on protest events in reaction to violence in Mexico between 2006 and 2012. Additionally, I rely on qualitative in-depth interviews and participant observation to illustrate the role of networks in protest against crime across several Mexican states. This paper contributes to the growing literature on criminal violence and political participation.Notre Dame, IN: The Kellogg Institute for International Studies
University of Notre Dame, 2022.

By: Ghaleb Krame, Amanda Davies, Magdalena García & Noé Cuervo Vázquez 

This paper explores the power struggle between the Chapitos and Mayiza factions of the Sinaloa Cartel and its implications for U.S. and Mexican law enforcement. Employing scenario analysis, payoff matrices, and Nash equilibria, the study evaluates potential outcomes of this conflict and their impact on cartel power dynamics. While the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) is poised to exploit instability and expand its influence over fentanyl trafficking and key territories, for the United States of America (U.S.A.), this internal fragmentation complicates efforts to control the opioid crisis. In Mexico, Omar García Harfuch faces the challenge of stabilizing cartel-affected regions and countering CJNG’s growth. A Mayiza victory is seen as the most favorable outcome, reducing violence and curbing CJNG’s expansion. Coordinated intelligence-sharing and strategic responses are essential for regional stability.

Security Journal (2025) 38:57

By  Maia Sacchetto

  Premising that there are more flexible forms of Nigerian crime, such as small and scattered groups not in connection with each other that operate mainly as drug dealers of small districts in the suburbs of northern Italy, this research focuses on the most structured forms of criminal organizations, those directly descended from the cultist circles born in Nigeria in the '60s and resulted in real mafia associations already in the motherland and then extended throughout Europe. The choice of this theme and this very specific category of Nigerian organized crime is based on the belief that well-structured and organized groups are more dangerous and difficult to counter for three reasons basically: the first is that it is rarer for associates to decide to betray the group to favor information to the police or intelligence. This is because of the closer ties between group members (and in this case this element takes on an even more incisive relevance since the subject is an ethnically based organized mafia in which ethniccultural ties provide the basis for interaction between associates), but also and especially because of the coercive and intimidating forces between members of mafia associations towards the ones prone to cheat on the group; the second is developed from the assumption that a more sophisticated internal structure of the association also corresponds to more elaborate modus operandi and operational strategies that allow prosecutors of illicit activities to camouflage or hide the proceeds of illicit activities; the third reason is closely related to the first and second and consists in the fact that mafia associations that are highly organized and capable of taking advantage of substantial material resources are also more likely to act in a capillary, widespread, large-scale and sprawling manner to the point of infiltrating the legal economy. As will be described in the first chapter of this research, the Black Mafia originated in Nigeria as a protest movement against constituted power and composed mainly of members of Nigeria's leading universities. Over time it expanded, heightened the violence of its manifestations, and began to move out of the realm of mere ideological rebellion by directly affecting public institutions. In a short time, the cults turned into full-fledged clans and began to act in Nigeria as the Italian mafia acts in Italy, intimidating political and economic opponents who would stand between their illicit activities and the achievement of their goals: the accumulation of wealth and power. From the outset, these associations are thus characterized by a high degree of pervasiveness in the political, social and economic structure of their country, as well as multifacetedness by dealing with a massive and varied range of illicit activities, including support in the arms trafficking of terrorist groups such as Boko Haram. With the conclusion of the Cold War, the tearing down of the Berlin Wall and restrictions in the mobility of people, and the emergence of the new globalized and interconnected world, the Black Mafia, which had already shown a remarkable predisposition to expand and sprawl, crossed its national borders. Following a progressive evolution, it has developed into a form of transnational organized crime which according to the UNODC represents the main threat to the security and political and economic stability of states (UNODC, 2006)1 . Undergoing continuous metamorphosis and adapting immediately to the changing needs of the market and globalization, it has then become increasingly sophisticated and pervasive (UNODC, 2018)2 . Out of sheer opportunism, it started allying itself with other forms of crime in order to strengthen its organization and to extend to more and more operators: drug traffickers, arms traffickers, human traffickers, up to encompassing operators that act daily in a regime of legality, all in order to increase their revenues 

By The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized CrimeGlobal Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime,Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime,

Online illegal wildlife trade (IWT) continues to expand across social media and e-commerce platforms, with 13,254 wildlife advertisements detected between April 2024 and August 2025 across Africa, the Americas, Asia and the Middle East. Our monitoring shows a persistent concentration on Facebook, which accounts for 83.8% of all detections, alongside growing activity on e-commerce and business-to-business platforms. The rise in both volume and geographic coverage underscores how sellers exploit online environments, regulatory loopholes and shifting demand to reach consumers and adapt rapidly to enforcement efforts.

Drawing on structured monitoring by ten regional data hubs, this new iteration of the Global Trend Report highlights how species, platforms and market drivers differ widely across regions. Mammals dominate detections, led by elephants, big cats and African grey parrots, and many adverts involve species listed under CITES Appendix I or II without accompanying permit information. Hubs recorded diverse tactics: Facebook Stories designed for 24-hour visibility, coded emojis in Colombia, claims of official registration in Mexico, children’s YouTube channels in South Asia that normalize protected wildlife as pets, and loopholes around legally owned lions in Thailand.

A central focus of the report is North Korea’s Angong Niuhuang Wan (ANW) pills, whose packaging explicitly lists “rhinoceros horn” as an ingredient. Open-source intelligence shows these pills are produced in Pyongyang and moved through Sinuiju and Namyang into China before circulating across markets in Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Laos, Vietnam and Myanmar. Embedding small amounts of rhino horn into labelled traditional medicine significantly amplifies value and demand, while illustrating how the rhino horn trade intersects with conservation and security concerns, including sanctions evasion and illicit revenue streams linked to North Korean entities.

The report also documents how markets pivot when supply declines or regulations tighten. After all pangolin species were uplisted to CITES Appendix I in 2016, Mexican export data shows an exponential rise in pirarucu leather exports, with pirarucu now positioned as a visually similar substitute. Online markets show mislabelled and misidentified leathers, such as pirarucu sold as pangolin and vice versa, revealing laundering risks along supply chains. Traceability gaps, especially once skins are processed, make verification difficult and complicate enforcement.

Taxidermy and leatherworking form another blind spot. In Mexico, highly active social-media groups advertise mounted specimens, ivory figurines and worked products derived from rhinos, elephants, manta rays, crocodilians, jaguars, pangolins, pirarucu and primates. Adverts frequently lack documentation, rely on coded language and misspellings, and exploit enforcement priorities that remain focused on live trade rather than processed parts.

Finally, declining availability of tiger products has driven substitutions such as lion canines in Thai amulet Facebook groups and jaguar parts sourced from Latin America. Cross-border movements of lion bones and skeletons, and online offers for jaguar skins, teeth and paste show how big-cat parts circulate as substitutes, shaped by availability and legal risk.

Across all hubs and product types, the report demonstrates how online IWT can be linked to global security and sanctions evasion issues, and how it adapts through substitutions, processed wildlife products and regulatory loopholes, reinforcing the need for coordinated monitoring, enforcement and policy responses.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2025. 35p.

By Eric Hershberg, Edward Maguire, Steven Dudley

In October 2012, the U.S. government designated MS-13 as a transnational criminal organization (TCO), raising serious questions about the breadth of the gang’s criminal capacity. Some analysts have pointed to a steady growth and professionalization of this criminal organization, but insufficient data has hindered the formulation and implementation of policies aimed at countering this trend. Our multiyear project proposed to fill gaps in the extant literature by conducting qualitative and quantitative research designed to assess MS-13’s transnational criminal capacity. More specifically, our objectives were to: 1) conduct extensive interviews with local stakeholders, gang experts, and MS-13 members in three major metropolitan areas, including two in the U.S. and one in El Salvador; 2) analyze qualitative and quantitative data gathered through tested survey and interview instruments and from official sources, with particular attention to the following factors: type of criminal activities, organizational structure, inter- and intra-gang relationships, level of community penetration, accumulation of social capital, development and migration patterns, and recruitment strategies; 3) utilize social network analysis techniques to quantify the social reach of gang member respondents; and 4) disseminate project findings to relevant constituencies in law enforcement, policymaking circles, academe, and the general public. The purpose of our research was to provide policymakers and law enforcement officials with a comprehensive understanding of MS-13 by measuring the extent and range of the organization’s criminal activity and mapping its social networks. Our goal was to generate empirical data that could serve as a foundation upon which to shape new policies and practices. Specifically, our hope was that the data would provide insights regarding the optimal allocation of law enforcement resources, the likely movements of MS-13, and the design of intervention and suppression strategies. 

Washington DC: U..S. Department of Justice,  2019. 11p.

By : M. Richardson, M. Newman, G. Berry, C. Stansfield, A. Coombe & J. Hodgkinson

• Objective

  To identify and map evaluations of interventions on gang violence using innovative systematic review methods to inform future research needs.

  Methods

  A previous iteration of this map (Hodgkinson et al., (2009). “Reducing gang-related crime: A systematic review of ‘comprehensive’ interventions.”) was updated in 2021/22 with inclusion of evaluations since the original searches in 2006. Innovative automatic searching and screening was used concurrently with a ‘conventional’ strategy that utilised 58 databases and other online resources. Data were presented in an online interactive evidence gap map.

  Results

  Two hundred and forty-eight evaluations were described, including 114 controlled studies, characterised as comprehensive interventions, encompassing more than one distinct type of intervention.

  Conclusion

  This suggests a substantial body of previously unidentified robust evidence on interventions that could be synthesised to inform policy and practice decision-making. Further research is needed to investigate the extent to which using automated methodologies can improve the efficiency and quality of systematic reviews.

•  J Exp Criminol 20, 1125–1146 (2024).

By C. Proffit

Twenty-five years ago, Krivo and Peterson wrote a seminal piece on the context of disadvantage and its threshold effects. In The Structural Context of Homicide: Accounting for Racial Differences in the Process, they emphasize that extreme contexts of disadvantage may diminish the significance of certain structural conditions that contribute to higher crime rates, particularly in relation to homicide. However, remarkably few studies consider the threshold effects of disadvantage when studying homicide. Although their research primarily focuses on race groups and the varying degree of disadvantage as a crime-generating condition, the unequal distribution of disadvantage in communities may have unique effects on certain forms of violence, particularly gang homicide. This study will (1) explore how community predictors of gang homicide differ across contexts by comparing neighborhoods with extreme levels of disadvantage to those with low-moderate levels of disadvantage and (2) examine differences in this context of disadvantage between gang-related and nongang-related homicide to assess if differences emerge between these categorizations of lethal violence. Findings reaffirmed Krivo and Peterson’s conclusion. Disadvantage was associated with increases in gang homicide only in low to moderately disadvantaged areas while effects diminished in extremely disadvantaged communities.

  American Journal of Criminal Justice , July 2025

By Ana Muñiz

Through an analysis of interviews with Southern California attorneys, supplemented by archival materials, this article contributes to the literature on gangs, critical criminology, and Gothic tropes by examining how the ambiguous nature of gang profiling allows state actors to target racialized others in various legal and administrative venues with little evidence and few procedural protections. I conceptualize gang phantasmagoria as the constant, amorphous, unpredictable, and haunting threat of racialized gang allegations and argue that the dynamic shapes the work of legal practitioners and constitutes a state mechanism of racial terror. Specifically, first I argue that government officials deploy the specter of gangs to both portray asylum seekers as monstrous threats and justify restrictions in asylum eligibility. I then illustrate how the potential for gang phantasmagoria to upend asylum applications and trigger the deportation of their clients elicits constant low-grade anxiety for attorneys. Consequently, attorneys are forced to adopt more cautious approaches to legal work in a way that indirectly facilitates the social control of young Latinx immigrants.

Critical Criminology, olume 30, pages 159–175, (2022

By The International Crisis Group

  Principal Findings : What’s new? In President Nayib Bukele’s first year in office, El Salvador has seen a sharp drop in what long were sky-high murder rates. While the public celebrates his well-known “iron fist” policies, the reasons for success might lie in quiet, informal understandings between gangs and the government. Why does it matter? It is a major feat to reduce killings by the three main gangs in one of the world’s most violent countries. But the precise causes of the decline are complex and often unclear. Recent outbreaks of gang violence and political mudslinging underline the fragility and reversibility of this achievement. What should be done? Sustaining violence reduction is key. The government should prioritise community-focused development, rehabilitation of jailed gang members and more sophisticated policing efforts, including internal checks on security forces. Should gangs keep violence down and cooperate with authorities during the pandemic, Bukele should consider opening channels for local dialogue with them.   

  After decades of harrowing gang crime, homicides have plunged in El Salvador on the watch of the new president, Nayib Bukele. Faced with the growth of the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs, previous governments resorted to “iron fist” policies to crush them, only to find these fuelled a backlash. Since his 2019 election, President Bukele, a self-styled outsider, has won huge public support by presiding over a 60 per cent fall in murders. Yet prospects that this achievement will endure are in doubt. The collapsing homicide rate may stem not only from the government’s public security policies, but also from the gangs’ own decision to curb bloodshed, possibly due to a fragile non-aggression deal with authorities. In addition, Bukele’s confrontational style, which has been exacerbated during the COVID-19 pandemic, risks entangling his security reforms in political battles. Broadly backed efforts to support affected communities, assist members wishing to leave gangs and encourage local peacebuilding are more likely to end definitively El Salvador’s cycle of violence. The Bukele administration argues that the plummeting murder rate – with daily killings now standing at their lowest rate since the end of the country’s civil war (1980- 1992) – represents the crowning achievement of a new security strategy. In theory, the government’s Territorial Control Plan couples robust law enforcement with violence prevention schemes. It has reinforced joint police and military patrols in 22 municipalities suffering high rates of crime, while toughening confinement measures in jails in a bid to sever communications between inmates and the outside world. At the same time, the government’s goal of building dozens of “cubes” – glass-walled recreational and education centres – represents the flagship effort to brighten the lives of young people growing up under gang dominion and prevent recruitment into their ranks. The precise reasons for the nationwide drop in homicides are hard to pin down. Statistical studies show that the Territorial Control Plan is most likely not the sole cause; specific local falls in murder rates do not correspond precisely to those areas where the plan has been implemented. Instead, in large part, gangs appear to have themselves decided to scale back their use of lethal violence. Unassailable control over communities, declining gang rivalry and increasingly autonomous gang leadership outside jails may explain this decision more than the Territorial Control Plan. Yet other government policies might have played a role: numerous analysts and local activists ascribe the gangs’ move to an informal understanding between them and the authorities, who have allegedly ordered security forces to dial back their clashes with these groups. A sudden killing spree attributed to MS-13 in April illustrated just how precarious the gangs’ commitment to reducing violence can be. Bukele’s reaction to the attacks, which left over 80 dead in a five-day span, reaffirmed his inclination to adopt punitive measures to force gangs into submission. Images shared around the world from inside El Salvador’s high-security jails revealed inmates huddled together or forced into shared cells without any access to daylight. Although murder rates have since fallen again, the risk remains that gangs, now short of extortion income due to lockdown measures and indignant at the government’s crackdown, will once again resort to extreme violence.  

  Crisis Group Latin America Report N°81, 8 July 2020  

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2020. 46p.