By John Collins and Ian tennant

This paper charts the history of Afghanistan’s interaction with the international drug control system and the complex relationship between national–international policy formation. It tells the story of Afghanistan’s relationship with and impact on evolving global drug regulations from the birth of the League of Nations drug control system through the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and up to the present day. It draws on primary documentation from US and British archives and an extensive review of secondary literature, as well as a series of interviews conducted for the purposes of this paper. It argues for a more nuanced historical awareness of Afghanistan’s role within multilateral drug control as a way to understand its roles in the creation of the modern licit drug economy and its continued role in the modern illicit drug economy. Further, it argues that there is a need to engage broader society in discussions, to ensure more continuity is built into the system—as relationships built with the old regime in Afghanistan have collapsed. It calls for re-centring international capacity-building efforts on community-centred approaches, not simply law enforcement and traditional alternative development (AD) programmes. Moving away from the former enforcementfocused activities also reduces the risks of human rights violations.

SOC ACE Research Paper No. 6 . Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2022. 34p.

By Diana Kim andYuhki Tajima

This article analyzes the efficacy of border enforcement against smuggling. We argue that walls, fences, patrols, and other efforts to secure porous borders can reduce smuggling, but only in the absence of collusion between smugglers and state agents at official border crossings. When such corruption occurs, border enforcement merely diverts smuggling flows without reducing their overall volume. We also identify the conditions under which corruption occurs and characterize border enforcement as a sorting mechanism that allows high-skilled smugglers to forge alternative border-crossing routes while deterring low-skilled smugglers or driving them to bribe local border agents. Combining a formal model and an archival case study of opium smuggling in Southeast Asia, we demonstrate that border enforcement has conditional effects on the routes and volumes of smuggling, depending on the nature of interactions between smugglers and border agents. By drawing attention to the technological and organizational aspects of smuggling, this article brings scholarship on criminal governance into the study of international relations, and contributes to debates on the effects of border enforcement and border politics more generally.

International Organization , Volume 76 , Issue 4 , Fall 2022 , pp. 830 - 867

By Kingsley Madueke | Lawan Danjuma Adamu Katja Lindskov Jacobsen | Lucia Bird

Political violence is a major obstacle to democratic processes worldwide. Violence perpetrated in pursuit of electoral victory has widespread consequences: the destruction of lives and property, the displacement of people, undermining the credibility of the electoral process, and the erosion of public trust in democratic institutions.1 In countries throughout Africa, including Nigeria, Kenya, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Sierra Leone, gangs play a pivotal role in political violence. When they are not perpetrating political violence, the same gangs often engage in a range of illicit markets.2 Yet, so far, analyses have not adequately scrutinized the link between gangs, political violence and illicit markets, predominantly understanding them as separate phenomena.3 The intersection between them has been understated, with important implications for response strategies. Background Since Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999, criminal gangs have played an increasingly pivotal role in driving political violence in the country. These criminal actors engage in a broad spectrum of activities, including intimidation of voters and political opponents, assassinations and disruption of political rallies on behalf of political actors. Gangs are remunerated in cash, material gifts and other favours from political actors, including state appointments and protection. Despite the deployment of security forces, election periods in Nigeria have long been characterized by high levels of violence – the 2023 elections were no exception.4 Although data collated regarding political violence in Nigeria broadly demonstrates a decrease in lives lost compared to previous electoral cycles, the number of violent incidents recorded has grown. Furthermore, the research presented in this report underscores that number of incidents of political violence fails to capture the full impact of political violence in determining Nigeria’s most recent political outcomes. Disenfranchisement was a clear consequence of covert forms of threat and intimidation: the 2023 elections saw the lowest voter turnout in Nigeria’s history, with President Bola Tinubu’s mandate effectively granted by less than 10% of Nigeria’s electorate. Though electoral violence is a countrywide concern in Nigeria, Kano in the north and Rivers in the south are repeatedly among the states hit hardest by political violence. In 2023 both became flashpoints for election violence.5 Both states are highly politically competitive and have a strong presence of criminal gangs with links to politicians, which play a leading role in electoral violence. The long history of election violence, coupled with the incidents of attacks and clashes leading up to and during the 2023 elections, had a major impact on voter turnout, the voting process and, consequently, the outcome of the elections in these areas Criminal gangs are not the only actors that have been associated with violence in Nigeria. For example, different groups, including violent extremist organizations such as Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'adati wal-Jihad (JAS), armed bandits in the north, as well as secessionists such as the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) in the south-east have allegedly been involved in violence in different parts of the country. However, this report focuses on criminal gangs because they have featured more prominently in election-related violence and they have comparatively deeper roots in the country’s social and political landscape in the states under study. As case studies, the situations in Kano and Rivers demonstrate that political violence in Nigeria cannot be dismissed as a phenomenon limited to a particular geography or political party. The states are positioned in different regions, beset by different criminal and conflict dynamics, and have contrasting histories of political affiliation. Yet the centrality of political violence – and the pivotal interlinkages between crime and politics it reveals – is a common thread corroding democratic processes across both states, and Nigeria as a whole. In Kano and Rivers, the current dynamics of political violence emerged when political parties contracted elements of pre-existing groups (hunters’ associations and cult groups, respectively) to attack opponents, voters and election officials. The contracted groups benefited from this political alignment, and over time there emerged a mutually beneficial ecosystem between gangs and politicians. This ecosystem – the exact contours of which are shaped by complex local factors – is highly damaging for the Nigeria’s democracy. The two case studies presented in this report attempt to untangle this complex ecosystem and explore key questions: did gangs or political violence emerge first? What happens to gangs on the losing side of the political contest? Furthermore, elections are cyclical, and political gangs seem poised to service the demands of their political contractors at each four-year interlude. But what do these gangs do in the interim? This question – what do political thugs do when they are not doing political violence?6 – underpinned this research. Criminal markets provided the answer. This report argues that outside of election cycles, criminal gangs involved in political violence are engaged in a range of illicit markets for their sustainability and resilience. The link between political violence and illicit markets is a significant concern as it provides criminal actors with political cover and access to the means to perpetrate further acts of violence and criminality. Exploring the implications of such intersections for politics and governance, and identifying potential ways to disrupt such links, is therefore urgently required.

Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. 47p.

By Marie Nougier, Adrià Cots Fernández & Dania Putri

April 2021 marks the five-year anniversary of the 2016 United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on drugs. This report aims to take stock of progress made on the implementation of the operational recommendations included in the UNGASS Outcome Document. Using desk-based research, and drawing on data and analysis from UN reports, academia, civil society and the community, the report focuses on six critical areas: public health, development, human rights, civil society engagement, UN agency collaboration and cooperation, and drug policy evaluation. While some progress has been undeniably made, the research gathered in this report shows that in the last five years the gap between policy commitments on paper and meaningful change on the ground has continued to widen.

London: International Drug Policy Consortium, 2021. 115p.

By Enrico Lucca, et al.

In the wake of the Nazi regime’s policies, European Jewish cultural property was dispersed, dislocated, and destroyed. Books, manuscripts, and artworks were either taken by their fleeing owners and were transferred to different places worldwide, or they fell prey to systematic looting and destruction under German occupation. Until today, a significant amount of items can be found in private and public collections in Germany as well as abroad with an unclear or disputed provenance. Contested Heritage. Jewish Cultural Property after 1945 illuminates the political and cultural implications of Jewish cultural property looted and displaced during the Holocaust. The volume includes seventeen essays, accompanied by newly discovered archival material and illustrations, which address a wide range of topics: from the shifting meaning and character of the objects themselves, the so-called object biographies, their restitution processes after 1945, conflicting ideas about their appropriate location, political interests in their preservation, actors and networks involved in salvage operations, to questions of intellectual and cultural transfer processes revolving around the moving objects and their literary resonances. Thus, it offers a fascinating insight into lesser-known dimensions of the aftermath of the Holocaust and the history of Jews in postwar Europe.

Göttingen : Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, [2020]

By Jos van Beurden

The discussion about objects, human remains and archives from former colonial territories is becoming increasingly heated. Over the centuries, a multitude of items – including a cannon of the King of Kandy, power-objects from DR Congo, Benin bronzes, Javanese temple statues, M.ori heads and strategic documents – has ended up in museums and private collections in Belgium and the Netherlands by improper means. Since gaining independence, former colonies have been calling for the return of their lost heritage. As continued possession of these objects only grows more uncomfortable, governments and museums must decide what to do. How did these objects get here? Are they all looted, and how can we find out? How does restitution work in practice? Are there any appealing examples? How do other former colonial powers deal with restitution? Do former colonies trust their intentions? The answers to these questions are far from unambiguous, but indispensable for a balanced discussion.

Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2022. 249p.

By Jos van Beurden

This pioneering study charts the one-way traffic of cultural and historical objects during five centuries of European colonialism. It presents abundant examples of disappeared colonial objects and systematises these into war booty, confiscations by missionaries and contestable acquisitions by private persons and other categories. Former colonies consider this as a historical injustice that has not been undone. Former colonial powers have kept most of the objects in their custody. In the 1970s the Netherlands and Belgium returned objects to their former colonies Indonesia and DR Congo; but their number was considerably smaller than what had been asked for. Nigeria’s requests for the return of some Benin objects, confiscated by British soldiers in 1897, are rejected. As there is no consensus on how to deal with colonial objects, disputes about other categories of contestable objects are analysed. For Nazi-looted art-works, the 1998 Washington Conference Principles have been widely accepted. Although non-binding, they promote fair and just solutions and help people to reclaim art works that they lost involuntarily. To promote solutions for colonial objects, Principles for Dealing with Colonial Cultural and Historical Objects are presented, based on the 1998 Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art. They are part of a model to facilitate mediation in disputes about them. Europe, the former colonisers, should do more pro-active provenance research into the acquisitions from the colonial era, both in public institutions and private collections.

Leiden: Sidestone Press Dissertations, 2017. 206[p.

Eric L. Sevigny, Jared Greathouse, Danye N. Medhin

Background. Globally, cannabis laws and regulations are rapidly changing. Countries are increasingly permitting access to cannabis under various decriminalization, medicalization, and legalization laws. With strong economic, public health, and social justice incentives driving these domestic cannabis policy reforms, liberalization trends are bound to continue. However, despite a large and growing body of interdisciplinary research addressing the policy-relevant health, safety, and socioeconomic consequences of cannabis liberalization, there is a lack of robust primary and systematic research that comprehensively investigates the consequences of these reforms.

Objectives. This evidence and gap map (EGM) summarizes the empirical evidence on cannabis liberalization policies. Primary objectives were to develop a conceptual framework linking cannabis liberalization policies to relevant outcomes, descriptively summarize the empirical evidence, and identify areas of evidence concentration and gaps.

Search Methods. We comprehensively searched for eligible English-language empirical studies published across 23 academic databases and 11 gray literature sources through August 2020. Additions to the pool of potentially eligible studies from supplemental sources were made through November 2020.

Selection Criteria. The conceptual framework for this EGM draws upon a legal epidemiological perspective highlighting the causal effects of law and policy on population-level outcomes. Eligible interventions include policies that create or expand access to a legal or decriminalized supply of cannabis: comprehensive medical cannabis laws (MCLs), limited medical cannabidiol laws (CBDLs), recreational cannabis laws (RCLs), industrial hemp laws (IHLs), and decriminalization of cultivations laws (DCLs). Eligible outcomes include intermediate responses (i.e., attitudes/behaviors and markets/environments) and longer-term consequences (health, safety, and socioeconomic outcomes) of these laws.

Data Collection and Analysis. Both dual screening and dual data extraction were performed with third person deconfliction. Primary studies were appraised using the Maryland Scientific Methods Scale and systematic reviews were assessed using AMSTAR 2.

Main Results. The EGM includes 447 studies, comprising 438 primary studies and nine systematic reviews. Most research derives from the United States, with little research from other countries. By far, most cannabis liberalization research focuses on the effects of MCLs and RCLs. Studies targeting other laws—including CBDLs, IHLs, and DCLs—are relatively rare. Of the 113 distinct outcomes we documented, cannabis use was the single most frequently investigated. More than half these outcomes were addressed by three or fewer studies, highlighting substantial evidence gaps in the literature. The systematic evidence base is relatively small, comprising just seven completed reviews on cannabis use (3), opioid-related harms (3), and alcohol-related outcomes (1). Moreover, we have limited confidence in the reviews, as five were appraised as minimal quality and two as low quality.

Authors’ Conclusions. More primary and systematic research is needed to better understand the effects of cannabis liberalization laws on longer-term—and arguably more salient—health, safety, and socioeconomic outcomes. Since most research concerns MCLs and RCLs, there is a critical need for research on the societal impacts of industrial hemp production, medical CBD products, and decriminalized cannabis cultivation. Future research should also prioritize understanding the heterogeneous effects of these laws given differences in specific provisions and implementation across jurisdictions

Systematic Reviews, vol. 19(4), 2023.

By European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction and Europol

EU Drug Market: Amphetamine describes the European amphetamine market from production and trafficking, to distribution and use. It details the processes, materials and actors involved at different stages and levels of the market. Taking a threat assessment approach, the module identifies key issues and makes recommendations for action at EU and Member State level.

Amphetamine is the most common synthetic stimulant drug available on the European drug market and it competes with cocaine and a range of new psychoactive substances for a share of the profitable European Union (EU) stimulant drug market. The prevalence of amphetamine use is higher than methamphetamine in most EU Member States, with notable exceptions, such as Czechia and Slovakia. Illicit amphetamine products mostly consist of powders or pastes, usually mixed with other ingredients, such as lactose, dextrose or caffeine, but tablets containing amphetamine are also available. The estimated annual value of the retail market for amphetamine in the EU is at least EUR 1.1 billion, with a range of EUR 0.9 billion to EUR 1.4 billion.

The demand for amphetamine in the EU is met by European production concentrated largely in the Netherlands and Belgium, where production is complex, large-scale and based on the drug precursor BMK. BMK has some limited use in industry and can be diverted from legitimate sources or smuggled into the EU, but more frequently it is made from chemicals known as designer precursors imported from China. Some of the amphetamine produced in the EU is used to produce captagon tablets, which are mainly trafficked to consumer markets in the Middle East

Lisbon, Portugal: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction and Europol, 2023. 8p.

By The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

From July 2021 to June 2023, the Mekong Australia Partnership on Transnational Crime and the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) organized an expert briefing series to enhance debate and collaboration on issues related to organized crime in the Mekong.

The outcome of the two-year briefing series was the creation of opportunities for discussion, collaboration and learning. It brought together a committed set of stakeholders working at the local, regional and international levels to reduce the harms of organized crime and helped build new partnerships while strengthening existing ones. The series enhanced the knowledge base on organized crime in the Mekong and helped bridge the gap between research and policy.

With the support of a dynamic set of stakeholders, the series explored some of the region’s most pertinent and pressing issues and their intersections globally.

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2023. 69p.

By Tihomir Bezlov | Atanas Rusev | Dardan Koçani

The war in Ukraine has spurred the largest refugee crisis in Europe since the Second World War. According to EU border and coastguard agency Frontex, by the end of 2022, 15 million Ukrainian citizens had fled to Europe since the beginning of the war, with roughly 3 million choosing to stay.

While the unforeseen scale of the refugee crisis meant that much of the border authorities’ efforts and resources were occupied, people smuggling networks took advantage of the situation, and the number of irregular migrants from the Middle East travelling along the Western Balkan route soared. There are many contributing factors to this trend, but migrant smuggling has indeed resurfaced as the fastest-growing market for organized crime in the Balkan region. At the start of September 2022, Frontex reported that they had documented the highest number of irregular entries since 2016, with a 75% increase compared to the same period in the previous year. Thus, in 2022, the Western Balkan route became the most active European migration route, surpassing the Central and Western Mediterranean routes.

This paper assesses the factors that contributed to the emergence of the Western Balkan route as the most critical for irregular migration to the EU during 2022, focusing in particular on the impact of the war in Ukraine on refugee flows from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and its implications for the future. It analyzes how, if anything, refugee flows from Ukraine have affected pre-existing movements of migrants from MENA countries on the Western Balkan route indirectly, exacerbating dynamics and network operations. It also estimates the overall number of irregular migrants smuggled along the Western Balkan route since 2016, describes the evolution of smuggling networks in 2022 and assesses the implications for South Eastern Europe.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2023. 3p.

By Ken Opala

Despite the August 2022 elections proceeding relatively smoothly, there is still a clear nexus between politics and crime in the country.

Election violence remains a major problem in Kenya despite attempts by the state and other actors to tackle it. Ahead of the country’s fifth general election, held on 9 August 2022, state agencies, the media and civil society predicted the re-emergence of gangs and militias keen to influence its outcome. Although the elections went off relatively smoothly there is still a clear nexus between politics and crime.

ENACT Africa, 2023. 24p.

By Joel Salvador Herrera and , Cesar B. Martinez-Alvarez

A growing body of evidence suggests that criminal organizations across the Global South actively exploit natural resources in the communities where they operate with important sociopolitical consequences. In this article, we investigate the case of Mexico where the incursion of criminal groups into the mining and export-agricultural sectors impacts violence at the local level. We propose two mechanisms that explain why criminal groups diversify. First, the war-profit motive suggests that competition and state repression prompt criminal organizations to look for non-traditional sources of incomes and to build up their violence-making capacities. Second, the governance motive suggests that extracting rents from key industries represents a strategy for these organizations to establish territorial control in local communities. Using homicide data from 2007 to 2011, we demonstrate that access to primary sector revenues is associated with higher levels of violence among Mexican municipalities. Using qualitative evidence from Michoacán, we show how the introduction of criminal governance systems to rural areas was a key factor in explaining why criminal groups diversified toward mining and export-agriculture.

World Development. Volume 151, March 2022, 105769

By Richard Bade, Bradley S. Simpson, Maulik Ghetia, Lynn Nguyen, Jason M. White, Cobus Gerber

Aim: To assess the effects of social distancing and social isolation policies triggered by COVID-19 on alcohol consumption using wastewater analysis in Adelaide, South Australia.

Design: Longitudinal quantitative analysis of influent wastewater data for alcohol concentration.

Setting: Adelaide, South Australia.

Participants: Wastewater catchment area representative of 1.1 million inhabitants.

Measurements: Twenty-four hour composite influent wastewater samples were collected from four wastewater treatment plants in Adelaide, South Australia for 7 consecutive days (Wednesday–Tuesday) every 2 months from April 2016–April 2020. The alcohol metabolite ethyl sulfate was measured in samples using chromatography–tandem mass spectrometry. Data were population-weighted adjusted with consumption expressed as standard drinks/day/1000 people. Weekly consumption and weekend to mid-week consumption ratios were analysed to identify changes in weekday alcohol use pattern.

Findings: Estimated weekend alcohol consumption was significantly lower (698 standard drinks/day/1000 people) after self-isolation measures were enforced in April 2020 compared with the preceding sampling period in February 2020 (1047 standard drinks/day/1000 people), P < 0.05. Weekend to midweek consumption ratio was 12% lower than the average ratio compared with all previous sampling periods. April 2020 recorded the lowest alcohol consumption relative to April in previous years, dating back to 2016.

Conclusions: Wastewater analysis suggests that introduction of social distancing and isolation policies triggered by COVID-19 in Adelaide, South Australia, was associated with a decrease in population-level weekend alcohol consumption.

Addiction, Volume116, Issue6. June 2021. Pages 1600-1605

By Jennifer J. Carroll

Against the backdrop of a post-Soviet state set aflame by geopolitical conflict and violent revolution, Narkomania considers whether substance use disorders are everywhere the same and whether our responses to drug use presuppose what kind of people those who use drugs really are. Jennifer J. Carroll's ethnography is a story about public health and international efforts to quell the spread of HIV. Carroll focuses on Ukraine where the prevalence of HIV among people who use drugs is higher than in parts of sub-Saharan Africa and unpacks the arguments and myths surrounding medication-assisted treatment (MAT) in Ukraine. What she presents in Narkomania forces us to question drug policy, its uses, and its effects on "normal" citizens. Carroll uses her findings to explore what people who use drugs can teach us about the contemporary societies emerging in post-Soviet space. With examples of how MAT has been politicized, how drug use has been tied to ideas of "good" citizenship, and how vigilantism towards people who use drugs has occurred, Narkomania details the cultural and historical backstory of the situation in Ukraine. Carroll reveals how global efforts supporting MAT in Ukraine allow the ideas surrounding MAT, drug use, and HIV to resonate more broadly into international politics and echo into the heart of the Ukrainian public.

Ithaca, NY; London: Cornell University Press Ithaca and London, 2019. 251p.

By Christopher B.R. Smith

Examining the interdependent nature of substance, space, and subjectivity, this book constitutes an interdisciplinary analysis of the intoxication indigenous to what has been termed "our narcotic modernity." The first section – Drug/Culture – demonstrates how the body of the addict and the social body of the city are both inscribed by "controlled" substance. Positing addiction as a "pathology (out) of place" that is specific to the (late-)capitalist urban landscape, the second section – Dope/Sick – conducts a critique of the prevailing pathology paradigm of addiction, proposing in its place a theoretical reconceptualization of drug dependence in the terms of "p/re/in-scription." Remapping the successive stages or phases of our narcotic modernity, the third section –Narco/State – delineates three primary eras of narcotic modernity, including the contemporary city of "safe"/"supervised" consumption. Employing an experimental, "intra-textual" format, the fourth section –Brain/Disease – mimics the sense, state or scape of intoxication accompanying each permutation of narcotic modernity in the interchangeable terms of drug, dream and/or disease. Tracing the parallel evolution of "addiction," the (late-)capitalist cityscape, and the pathological project of modernity, the four parts of this book thus together constitute a users’ guide to urban space.

London; New York: Routledge, 2016. 252p.

By B.C.Tefft, and L.S.. & Arnold,

Washington State Initiative 502 (I-502), effective Dec. 6, 2012, legalized possession of small amounts of cannabis for recreational use by adults aged 21 years and older. It also included a prohibition against driving with 5 or more nanograms of delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) per milliliter of blood, along with a zero tolerance prohibition for drivers younger than 21 years of age. THC is the main psychoactive component in cannabis and detection of THC in blood is suggestive of recent use. A previous study by the AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety examined data from drivers involved in fatal crashes in Washington State in years 2010-2014 and estimated that the proportion of drivers with detectable THC approximately doubled several months after I-502 became effective (Tefft et al., 2016). The research reported here updates the previous study with three additional years of data, post-legalization. Multiple imputation was used to estimate the proportion of drivers who were THC-positive among those who were not tested for drugs or whose test results were unavailable. Results indicate that five years after I-502, the proportion of fatal-crash-involved drivers who are THC-positive has remained approximately double the level observed before I-502. An estimated 21% of all drivers involved in fatal crashes in Washington State in 2017 were THC-positive, higher than in any other year in the 10-year period examined

Washington, D.C.: AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety , 2020. 6p.

By Harm Reduction International

This report follows development aid being spent on narcotics control around the world. It calls on governments and donors to divest from punitive and prohibitionist drug control regimes which undermine their other health and human rights commitments, and invest in programmes which prioritise community, health and justice.

Mass incarceration and overpopulated prisons. Death sentences. Civilians killed during counter-narcotics operations by specialised police units. Poor farmers’ livelihoods destroyed by aerial spraying and other ‘forced eradication’ of crops they keep. Rights violated by forced treatment programmes, discrimination, and barriers to health care. These are among the consequences of the global war on drugs that has particularly impacted poor, marginalised, and racialised communities around the world.

The evidence base for such negative impacts is now vast and widely recognised internationally, including by United Nations (UN) agencies and in reports published by the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Also well-documented internationally are the benefits of alternative approaches to drug policy – including harm reduction initiatives that advance, rather than undermine, public health and human rights – and the lack of evidence that punitive and prohibitionist approaches to drugs have actually curbed drug use. Despite this, vast amounts of international funding continue to flow to punitive drug control activities, while harm reduction remains vastly underfunded.

There is a long history of drug policy being used by world powers to strengthen and enforce their control over other populations, and to target specific communities. Racist and colonial dynamics continue to this day, with wealthier governments, led by the US, spending billions of taxpayer dollars around the world to bolster or expand punitive drug control regimes and related law enforcement. These funding flows are out of pace with existing evidence, as well as international development, health, and human rights commitments, including the goal to end AIDS by 2030. They rely on and reinforce systems that disproportionately harm Black, Brown and Indigenous people worldwide.

In order to decolonise drug policy and advance health- and human rights-based approaches, the material and financial bases of punitive drug control must be revealed and redirected. This report contributes to these goals by synthesising existing research on international financial flows for punitive drug control, and adding new analysis of data on official development assistance (ODA) spent by aid donors and institutions on “narcotics control”. These specific, public budgets are supposed to support international development, including health goals and global poverty reduction. This spending is more commonly associated with initiatives to vaccinate and educate children, for instance – but project-level data included in this report shows that some of it has also gone to supporting things like undercover policing, “intelligence-led profiling”, and efforts to increase arrests and prosecutions for drug-related offences.

LACK OF TRANSPARENCY

Each year, aid donors report their spending to the OECD which maintains what is called its Creditor Reporting System (CRS). According to the most recent update of the data in this system (from mid-December 2022, covering spending through the end of 2021), more than USD 930 million of aid money was spent on “narcotics control” projects in countries around the world in the ten years from 2012-2021. This includes spending by dozens of donors – led by the US, EU, Japan, and the UK. Tens of millions of dollars of this total (at least USD 68 million over the period studied) were spent in countries that have the death penalty for drug-related offences. This raises particularly serious concerns about whether and how aid budgets have bolstered regimes that execute people, building upon previous HRI research in this area. While some donors, such as the UK, have spent less aid this way in recent years, others have increased it – most notably the US, where such spending rose significantly in 2021, in the first year of President Joe Biden’s administration.

Though data availability and transparency vary across projects and donors, this analysis reveals how aid money has supported approaches that undermine global development goals and “do no harm” principles. Put simply: aid funding is supposed to help poor and marginalised communities, while punitive drug control regimes have been shown to disproportionately negatively affect them. This makes such regimes a poor fit for such important yet limited development budgets. This research also shows how these donors have numerous opportunities – as well as obligations – to change how they invest in global drug policy by funding under-resourced, evidence-based, and health- and human rights-centred harm reduction efforts instead, worldwide.

London: HRI, 2023. 38p.

By The United Nations General Assembly. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

The present report outlines human rights challenges in addressing and countering key aspects of the world drug problem. It also offers an overview of recent positive developments to shift towards more human rights-centred drug policies, and provides recommendations on the way forward in view of the upcoming midterm review of the 2019 Ministerial Declaration and to contribute to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

United Nations, 2023. 19p.

By The International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC)

In September 2023, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights released a landmark report on human rights in drug policy. Prepared at the request of the Human Rights Council as a contribution to the mid-term review of the 2019 Ministerial Declaration on drugs, this report constitutes the most ambitious and comprehensive UN document to date on the alignment of drug policies with human rights. The report consolidates existing human rights standards, develops new recommendations, and proposes a blueprint for transformative change, from a global punitive paradigm to drug policies based on health and human rights.

This IDPC advocacy note focuses on three key issues. First, the new standards and recommendations developed in the OHCHR report, which update our understanding of the human rights dimension of drug policies. Secondly, the consolidation of prior human rights standards developed by other UN bodies. Lastly, we lay down our recommendations for an effective implementation of the vision proposed by the report.

London: IDPC, 2023. 7p.