By Matt Herbert | Rupert Horsely | Emadeddin Badi

Libya has been a key focus of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) since the country’s 2011 revolution. A June 2023 UNSC meeting on Libya focused on the country’s political process, the need to hold elections and support work around the reunification of security and defence forces.1 That same month, the Council re-authorized its arms embargo on the country2 and in late 2023 it is set to renew the UN mission in Libya. The UNSC has sought to advance an effective political process, reunify the country’s divided institutions and address threats to peace and security, and human rights abuses. To effect this change, the UNSC authorized and draws on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), a sanctions committee and linked Panel of Experts, and the European Union Naval Force Mediterranean Operations Sophia and IRINI.3 Despite these efforts, Libya remains a highly fragile country. Although large-scale violence has ebbed since the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF)’s loss in the 2019–2020 war for Tripoli, the country remains divided. The Government of National Unity (GNU) – the internationally recognized government in Tripoli led by Abd al-Hamid Dabaiba – exerts direct influence over limited areas of the country’s territory, mainly in Tripolitania. Most territory, including Cyrenaica and the Fezzan, is held by the LAAF, led by Khalifa Haftar. Attempts to bridge these divides, hold elections and forge a broadly legitimate government have repeatedly failed, most recently in December 2021.4 Nonetheless, UNSC efforts in this regard continue, reflecting an international consensus that the way out of Libya’s protracted instability is likely to be found in the political track, through the establishment of a government capable of superseding the current divides and exercising sovereign control over the country.5 However, the distribution of power within Libya challenges efforts to stabilize the country through the political track alone. Belying the simple narrative of national bifurcation, the GNU and LAAF have limited and contingent control over their respective areas. Instead, armed groups rooted in municipal or tribal groupings dominate local power. Governance and security often hinge on deals and agreements continually being renegotiated between these groups and the GNU or the LAAF.

Libya’s thriving illicit economies, and their links to armed groups and political actors throughout the country, compound the challenges to the UNSC’s efforts to promote a stable peace and the rule of law.6 Profits from these markets provide a crucial funding source for armed groups, enabling and incentivizing pushback against state efforts to assert control, and drive conflicts between groups over control of key markets and routes.7 They also fuel petty and large-scale corruption, stymying efforts to rebuild rule of law and security-force effectiveness in the country.8 Efforts to prevent criminal penetration of the Libyan state have failed. Actors linked to illicit economies have increasingly become embedded within the security forces, while others seek opportunities for high-level positions and political influence. This raises the risk that criminal interests, predation and corruption will be fused into the state. Equally problematically, it risks poisoning citizen trust in and possible acceptance of future governance and security structures involving compromised actors. For these reasons, understanding how illicit economies function in Libya and their impacts, and how they are changing, is essential for the UNSC as it seeks to promote political solutions and stability in the country. This brief provides the UN and member states with a snapshot of how Libya’s illicit economies have developed over the last three years and the impact those shifts have had. In the interest of length, the brief does not detail all changes or offer a full description of the structural elements in all markets. Rather, it focuses on the most salient aspects for policymakers assessing the challenge of illicit markets. The brief begins by detailing the impact illicit economies have on armed groups and political dynamics. Next, it assesses the state of play of the main illicit markets in the country: fuel smuggling, drug trafficking, mercenaries, arms and ammunition smuggling, and migrant smuggling and trafficking. It ends with a brief set of recommendations.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , 2023. 35p.

Genevieve Kotarska and Lauren Young

This paper explores the environmental and human security risks associated with critical mineral extraction, how rising demand for critical minerals in the context of the net zero transition will impact these risks, and what options exist for the UK to address these risks.

Critical minerals are broadly defined as minerals that are of vital importance for technology, the economy and national security and are also subject to serious risks relating to the security of their supply. This paper uses the term ‘critical minerals’ broadly, focusing on minerals considered to be of high criticality to the UK in particular. It recognises that this is not a fixed list, and that a country’s specific assessment will affect whether a mineral is considered critical.

A dramatically increased supply of these minerals will be vital for the net zero transition – both in the UK and internationally – and to meet the target to limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, set at the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Paris Conference in 2015.

Yet the extraction of critical minerals poses various environmental and human security risks, many of which pose a threat to the net zero transition, in the UK and globally. This paper explores the environmental and human security risks associated with critical mineral extraction, how rising demand for critical minerals in the context of the net zero transition will impact these risks, and what options exist for the UK to address these risks. It identifies key environmental risks as including the potential for critical mineral extraction to contribute to deforestation, pollution, soil degradation, water scarcity and biodiversity loss. In relation to human security, key risks identified include the potential for critical mineral extraction to contribute to human rights abuses, labour exploitation, crime, conflict and corruption. Where mining takes place on or near Indigenous lands, both environmental and human security risks are found to disproportionately affect already-disenfranchised communities.

While a number of these risks are well established, there is a potential for burgeoning demand for critical minerals to accelerate potential harms. Such harms can occur in situations where rising demand pushes governments to remove or overlook relevant regulations; where new extractive operations open up in countries without mining histories, which lack the infrastructure or capacity to manage the associated risks; where harmful boom–bust cycles of extractive activity occur due to ongoing technological advances; and where a race to secure supplies of critical minerals exacerbates competition and geopolitical tensions.

If the mining sector fails to address these risks as demand booms, public opinion across source and supply countries might turn against the net zero transition as the harms are perceived to outweigh the benefits. It is crucial that the UK leverages its unique position as an international trade, financial and mining hub to help the international community mitigate the risks posed in this regard.

Based on the findings of this research, the authors suggest the following ways forward for consideration by the UK government, many of which are also applicable to other governments in the Global North:

• Use its role as a mining and financial hub to improve regulation, standards and transparency in relation to investment in critical minerals based on key environmental priorities, for example, through the application of the Taskforce on Nature-Related Financial Disclosures, Science-Based Targets for Nature, Global Reporting Initiative and other similar initiatives, thereby supporting integration of high-quality targeted frameworks into this burgeoning sub-sector. This will reward and enhance uptake of best practice by businesses and support regulation in producer countries globally.

• Develop an updated industrial strategy on critical mineral use specifically, to support the strategic acquisition and use of critical minerals and facilitate prioritisation across key industries should a shortage of critical minerals occur. This should be used alongside the UK’s Critical Minerals Strategy to ensure that critical minerals are used strategically, particularly in the face of fluctuations in supply.

• Given the criticality of the net zero transition and the minerals it requires, review domestic policies to maximise recovery of critical minerals that are already in consumer supply chains, in the form of waste. This would broaden opportunities for critical mineral sourcing aside from extraction via new mines. This should include prioritising the upscaling of the UK’s recycling capacity to facilitate the reuse of critical minerals, mindful of the fact that while recycling alone cannot meet demand for critical minerals, estimates suggest that recycling could meet 10% of global demand, while bringing jobs to the UK in support of the ‘levelling up’ agenda.

• Work with manufacturers on extended producer responsibility, right to repair and design-to-recycle best practice to move towards a circular economy and ensure that critical minerals are reused and recycled wherever possible, thereby reducing demand. This will help to reduce wastage of critical minerals and decrease pressure on supply chains.

• Support improved consumer requirements for standards around the production of critical minerals. An example of this can be seen in the case of the 2023 EU Regulation on Deforestation-Free Products, which could be adapted for the critical mineral sector in the UK and more widely across the Global North.

• Support governments in source countries to develop the infrastructure and capability to manage mining-related risks. This could involve providing development assistance to build capacity to apply regulation and best practice, while supporting initiatives that mainstream biodiversity, conservation and social justice into regulation. Such regulation should improve the development and practice of the mining sector in producer countries, in collaboration with other actors working in this area, such as relevant aid agencies and multilateral development banks.

• Consider how to integrate innovative concepts and proposals that call for a paradigm shift in our approach to economic activity, human wellbeing and the natural world. This can be achieved through an approach which prioritises the pursuit of human and ecological wellbeing over material growth, and has the potential to help us better assess, understand and mitigate the environmental and social harms associated with the mining sector and other sectors dependent on natural resources

London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies -RUSI, 2023. 49p.

By The Venezuela Investigative Unit

Ten years ago, Tren de Aragua was a little more than a prison gang, confined to the walls of the Tocorón penitentiary and largely unheard of outside its home state of Aragua in Venezuela. Today, it is one of the fastest-growing security threats in South America.

Tren de Aragua’s transnational network now stretches into Colombia, Peru, Chile, and beyond. It has established some of the most far-reaching and sophisticated migrant smuggling and sex trafficking networks seen in the region. And it has spread terror in host countries and among the Venezuelan migrant population, which it has ruthlessly exploited.

But the seizure of Tocorón by Venezuelan authorities in September 2023 directly attacked the nerve center of this network. Now, a new, more uncertain, era is beginning for Venezuela’s most notorious criminal export.

Washington DC: InSight Crime, 2023. 28p.

By The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

The monitor draws on information provided by field researchers working in gang-affected communities of the Western Cape. This includes interviews with current and former gang members, civil society and members of the criminal justice system.

Over the past three months, our team has monitored and recorded almost a thousand instances of gang-related violence, which are unpacked here to provide a picture of some emerging trends in gang behaviour. The key findings analyzed here have been selected, as they would appear to be emblematic of broader trends in gang social dynamics, and because they have been under-reported elsewhere, or may have repercussions for how we understand developments in Western Cape gang violence.

In this first issue of the Gang Monitor, we also include a summary of key dynamics to watch, which draws on a longer-term view of how the gang landscape has changed in recent years. The analysis is based on the GI-TOC’s research over several years identifying how Western Cape gang dynamics have developed and to help us understand how they may continue to in future.

This quarter has been characterized by increased infighting between splinter groups within gangs. Conflict between Americans groups in Hanover Park provides a key example. The Fancy Boys are on an aggressive campaign to expand territorial control, including in Mitchells Plain and Manenberg. Pagad G-Force has become more vocal and visible in anti-gang campaigning. A shooting in Hanover Park may indicate that the group is taking a more militant stance. There has been an increase in young child gang recruits forming breakaway groups, as exemplified by KEY FINDINGS

ISSUE No. 1 | QUARTERLY OCTOBER 2023. Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. 8p.

By John Collins and Ian tennant

This paper charts the history of Afghanistan’s interaction with the international drug control system and the complex relationship between national–international policy formation. It tells the story of Afghanistan’s relationship with and impact on evolving global drug regulations from the birth of the League of Nations drug control system through the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and up to the present day. It draws on primary documentation from US and British archives and an extensive review of secondary literature, as well as a series of interviews conducted for the purposes of this paper. It argues for a more nuanced historical awareness of Afghanistan’s role within multilateral drug control as a way to understand its roles in the creation of the modern licit drug economy and its continued role in the modern illicit drug economy. Further, it argues that there is a need to engage broader society in discussions, to ensure more continuity is built into the system—as relationships built with the old regime in Afghanistan have collapsed. It calls for re-centring international capacity-building efforts on community-centred approaches, not simply law enforcement and traditional alternative development (AD) programmes. Moving away from the former enforcementfocused activities also reduces the risks of human rights violations.

SOC ACE Research Paper No. 6 . Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2022. 34p.

By The Congressional Budget Office

The United States has been experiencing an opioid crisis since the mid-1990s, and opioids have had a significant effect on public health and on the nation’s economic and social outcomes. In this report, the Congressional Budget Office examines the consequences and timeline of the crisis, the contributing factors and federal responses to it, and the effects of the coronavirus pandemic on the crisis.

Deaths. More than 500,000 opioid-involved deaths have occurred since 2000, and the United States has the world’s highest number of opioid-involved deaths per capita. Although federal funding to address the opioid crisis has increased in recent years, opioid overdose mortality has increased as well. Deaths from opioid-involved overdoses were among the leading causes of death in 2020.

Health and Other Effects. The use and misuse of opioids can result in serious health effects: People with certain harmful behaviors that result from opioid misuse—such as an increase in the amount and frequency of opioid use or failure to fulfill major responsibilities at work, home, or school—have opioid use disorder (OUD), which can affect people’s participation in the labor force and their ability to care for their children. Treatment for OUD is used far less than behavioral health professionals recommend.

Changes Over Time. The opioid crisis has occurred in waves distinguished by the different types of opioids involved in overdose deaths and the use of opioids in combination with other drugs.

Contributing Factors. A rise in opioid prescribing, changes in illegal opioid markets, and greater demand for opioids due to worsening economic and social conditions for certain populations are key contributors to the crisis.

Federal Laws. Between 2016 and 2018, three laws enacted in response to the crisis aimed to lower the demand for and supply of opioids and to reduce their harm. The funding in those laws complemented annual appropriations to agencies tasked with responding to substance use disorder, including opioid use disorder.

The Crisis After the Enactment of the Laws and During the Pandemic. Opioid-involved deaths continued to increase after the laws were enacted—initially more slowly than in preceding years but then more rapidly during the pandemic. Opioid misuse increased during the pandemic as people experienced worsened mental health, more social isolation, greater job losses, and reduced access to treatment. In addition, the use of more potent synthetic opioids led to a sharp increase in overdose deaths. The pandemic and other factors have made it difficult to isolate the effect of the laws on the opioid crisis.

Washington, DC: CBO, 2022. 38p.

By Maximilian Meyer, Jean N. Westenberg , Kerry L. Jang , Fiona Choi , Stefanie Schreiter , Nickie Mathew , Conor King, Undine. Lang , Marc Vogel and R. Michael Krausz

Understanding drug market dynamics and their underlying driving factors is paramount to developing effective responses to the overdose crisis in North America. This paper summarises the distinct drug market trends observed locally and internationally over the past decade to extrapolate future drug market trajectories. The emergence of fentanyl on North American street markets from 2014 onwards led to a shift of street drug use patterns. Previously perceived as contaminants, novel synthetic opioids became the drugs of choice and a trend towards higher potency was observed across various substance classes. The diversification of distribution strategies as well as the regionalisation and industrialisation of production followed basic economic principles that were heavily influenced by prosecution and policy makers. Particularly, the trend towards higher potency is likely most indicative of what to expect from future illicit drug market developments. Nitazenes and fentanyl-analogues, several times more potent than fentanyl itself, are increasingly detected in toxicological testing and have the potential of becoming the drugs of choice in the future. The dynamic of drug import and local production is less clear and influenced by a multitude of factors like precursor availability, know-how, infrastructure, and the success of local drug enforcement strategies. Drug market dynamics and the current trajectory towards ultrapotent opioids need to be recognised by legislation, enforcement, and the health care system to prepare effective responses. Without significant improvements in treatment access, the implementation of preventative approaches and early warning systems, the mortality rate will continue to increase. Furthermore, there is no mechanism in place preventing the currently North American focused overdose crisis to spread to other parts of the globe, particularly Europe. A system of oversight, research, and treatment is needed to address mortality rates of historic proportions and prevent further harm.

International Journal of Mental Health Systems (2023) 17:36

By Melina Risso, et al.

Environmental crime became the world’s third most lucrative illicit economy after drug trafficking and smuggling, with estimates of $110 to $281 billion in annual profits. Between 2006 and 2016, environmental crimes grew at a rate of 5% to 7% per year, a pace two or three times faster than that of global GDP growth. Money laundering is part of the criminal machinery that plunders the Amazon Rainforest.

The study “Follow the Money: connecting anti-money laundering systems to disrupt environmental crime in the amazon” reveals the need for systems, agencies, and institutions responsible for preventing money laundering to turn their attention to the connections between this illicit practice and environmental crimes.

The Igarapé study shows that the money laundering cycle follows three stages before the laundered funds can enter the financial system: placement, layering, and integration. However, not all proceeds from criminal activity are directly laundered into the formal financial system. Thus, informal diversification constitutes the process of moving illegal flows into the informal economy. It is estimated that 30% of the money to be laundered is used to pay the operating expenses of illicit economies. Cash transactions, divided into small amounts and deposited by “money mules,” are used to finance the hiring of precarious labor, accommodations, food, security, transportation, health services, leisure, and machinery, for example. The remaining 70% of illicit proceeds are formally inserted into the financial system.

Rio de Janeiro - RJ - Brasil ; Igarape Institute, 2023. 33p.

By Melina Risso, et al.

Environmental crime in the Amazon has become one of the largest illicit economies in the world, generating annual profits estimated at between $110 billion and $281 billion. However, only 6.3% of money laundering cases reported between 2017 and 2020 to the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America (Gafilat), the main body responsible for combating illicit financial flows in the region, were related to environmental crimes.

To assess the level of attention and priority given to environmental crimes at each stage of the anti-money laundering system, we are launching the second publication in the “Follow the Money” series. Focusing on the three key countries of the Amazon basin – Brazil, Colombia, and Peru – the study proposes an analytical approach to the legal and institutional capacities to combat money laundering in five dimensions: 1) strategic planning and preventive measures; 2) monitoring and detection – financial intelligence units; 3) mandatory reporting of suspicious transactions; 4) criminal investigation; and 5) Prosecution and sanctions.

Rio de Janeiro - RJ - Brasil , Igarape Institute, 2023. 43p.

By Faith Ngum | Radha Barooah

What constitutes an environmental crime has long been subject to debate. However, human-induced environmental degradation and biodiversity loss are both pertinent. Local communities, largely indigenous groups, living around biodiverse areas comprising forests, mountains and marine ecosystems stand to be among the first affected. The presence of illegal extractive activities, whether mining or logging, attracts men from outside these areas and effectively ‘masculinizes’ these territories. This disrupts regular life and threatens the safety of women, who often have to venture into forests to carry out domestic activities. The impact varies from community to community and is linked to gender roles and patriarchy, and sometimes includes physical violence. This policy brief presents case studies from four forest ecosystems: the Arajuno forests of the Ecuadorian Amazon, the Sierra Tarahumara forests in Mexico, the Yabassi forests in Cameroon and the rainforests of North Sumatra in Indonesia. The findings show that while local indigenous communities rally to defend their territories against extractive operations and perceived environmental crimes, gender norms and patriarchy limit women’s voices and participation. However, women’s participation in resistance movements has gradually increased, especially against large-scale state concessions, and many have become leading environmental defenders in their communities. Their motivation to voice their perspectives and challenge dominant narratives against indigenous communities through various acts of solidarity is firmly rooted in their desire to protect their livelihoods. Their resilience strategies are similar but context-specific and nuanced across the communities in the four forest ecosystems analyzed in this brief.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2023. 34p.

By Lucy Vigne and Esmond Martin

Executive summary ■ From 2013 to 2016, Laos’s retail ivory market has expanded more rapidly than in any other country surveyed recently. ■ Laos has not been conforming with CITES regulations that prohibit the import and export of ivory. Since joining CITES in 2004, only one ivory seizure into Laos has been reported to the Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS). ■ Almost no arrests, let alone prosecutions and punishments, have been made of smugglers with ivory coming in or out of the country. ■ Most worked ivory for sale in Laos originates from elephants poached in Africa. ■ Ivory has also been entering Laos illegally from Thailand, as Thai traders have been offloading their ivory following the imposition of much stricter regulations there. ■ In late 2013 the average wholesale price of raw ivory sold by Lao traders peaked at about USD 2,000/kg. ■ By late 2016, the average wholesale price of raw ivory in Laos had declined to USD 714/kg, in line with prices elsewhere in the region. This price was much higher than in African countries, such as Sudan (Omdurman/Khartoum), where the average wholesale price of ivory was USD 279/kg in early 2017. This price differential is due to the extra expenses incurred in transport and bribes to government officials on the long journey to Asia. ■ In Laos, the decline in the wholesale price of raw ivory between 2013 and 2016, as elsewhere in the region, was mainly due to the slowdown in China’s economy, that resulted in an oversupply of illegal ivory, relative to demand. ■ Ivory items seen for sale in Laos are carved or machine-processed in Vietnam by Vietnamese and smuggled into Laos for sale, or are processed by Chinese traders in Laos on new computerdriven machines. Ivory carving by Lao people is insignificant. ■ In Laos, the survey found 81 retail outlets with ivory on view for retail sale, 40 of which were in the capital, Vientiane, 21 in Luang Prabang, 8 in Kings Romans, 5 in Oudom Xay, 3 in Pakse, 2 in Dansavanh Nam Ngum Resort and 2 in Luang Nam Tha. ■ The survey counted 13,248 ivory items on display for sale, nearly all recently made to suit Chinese tastes. Vientiane had 7,014 items for sale, Luang Prabang 4,807, Kings Romans 1,014, Dansavanh Nam Ngum Resort 291, Oudom Xay 93, Luang Nam Tha 16, and Pakse 13. ■ Most outlets, displaying the majority of worked ivory, also sold souvenirs, Chinese herbal teas or jewellery, or were hotel gift shops. ■ Outlets were usually owned by traders from mainland China. The number of Chinese-owned shops had risen in Laos from none recorded in the early 2000s to several in 2013, including one main shop in Vientiane’s Chinese market and two on the main tourist street of Luang Prabang. By 2016, there were 22 and 15 outlets, respectively, in these two areas, both of which are popular with Chinese visitors. By 2016, Chinese outlets with ivory had also sprung up in other locations, mainly those visited by the increasing number of Chinese. ■ In 2016, the most common ivory items for sale were pendants, followed by necklaces, bangles, beaded bracelets and other jewellery, similar to items for sale in 2013, but in far larger quantities. ■ The least expensive item was a thin ring for USD 3 and the most expensive was a pair of polished tusks for USD 25,000. ■ Retail prices for ivory items of similar type were higher than elsewhere in Kings Romans, which is visited primarily by wealthier Chinese visitors with money to spend. ■ Mainland Chinese buy over 80% of the ivory items in Laos today. There are sometimes buyers from South Korea and other Asian countries, according to vendors. ■ Laotians today generally buy amulets that are made of bone or synthetic material, rather than ivory items.

Nairobi, Kenya: Save the Elephants, 2027. 92p.

By The Joint Analytical Cell (JAC)

In early October, the Joint Analytical Cell (JAC) released the results of a collaborative analysis into a fleet of Chinese-linked distant-water squid fishing vessels. These vessels are known as the “150 Series,” named as such because each vessel’s reported Maritime Mobile Service Identities (MMSI) numbers all start with the numbers one-five-zero. This group of vessels identified in the report appear to have engaged in behavior consistent with attempts to conceal their identity by MMSI spoofing — changing and sharing names over Automatic Identification System (AIS), as well as using multiple MMSIs, making it extremely challenging to monitor and enforce their activities. Following the identification of this behavior, which has been linked with illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing activities, the JAC engaged with China to better understand the nature and motivation of the behavior identified.

Long Beach CaliforniaL Global Fishing Watch, 2023. 46p.

By The Wildlife Justice Commission

The report builds on our first crime convergence report, published in 2021, which analysed a set of 12 case studies, and illustrated the varied ways that wildlife crime can overlap or intersect with other serious and organised crimes.

It presents additional analysis and insights from three in-depth case studies, based on open-source research and intelligence collected during Wildlife Justice Commission investigations. These three case studies add to the knowledge base on this issue, which will continue to develop globally as more cases are detected and analysed.

Wildlife crime is a cross-cutting criminal activity which cannot be tackled in isolation from other crimes. Crime convergence should be further studied and integrated as part of the approach to tackle wildlife crime and organised crime more broadly. An improved understanding of this intersection can help to identify more strategic policy and law enforcement responses to address it.

The Hague: Wildlife Justice Commission, 2023.39p.

By Lauren Young, Cathy Haenlein and Grace Evans

Comprising everything from small-scale, near-shore activity to industrial-scale, long-distance operations, the current IUU fishing threat has the potential to evolve significantly in a warming world. A global horizon scan explores the impacts of climate change on IUU fishing over the next 10 years and beyond.

Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is a multifaceted global threat, occurring worldwide in inland waters, exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and on the high seas. Comprising everything from small-scale, near-shore activity to industrial-scale, long-distance operations, the current IUU fishing threat has the potential to evolve significantly in a warming world.

These evolutions stand to occur as fish populations themselves respond to a warming climate. Alongside critical stressors such as overfishing, oceanic warming is set to continue to contribute to an ongoing overall decline in fish populations globally. In parallel, there is evidence that key species are shifting poleward and to deeper waters, with declines in marine catch potential expected in the tropics. Combined with the effects of melting sea ice, changing weather patterns and the growth of marine heatwaves, among other factors, the impact on aquatic ecosystems is potentially highly destabilising.

These disruptive environmental changes have a range of potential implications for IUU fishing activity. The need to anticipate future trends across the threat landscape is thus pressing.

This paper presents the results of a global horizon scan conducted to explore the impacts of climate change on IUU fishing over the next 10 years and beyond.

The scan gathered globally available information by eliciting submissions from contributors worldwide, with a group of expert assessors collating and prioritising trends based on their ‘novelty’, ‘plausibility’ and ‘potential impact’. The scan produced a ranked list of 20 priority trends, categorised into four thematic areas. While the scan considered both emerging threats and opportunities, most of the 20 priority trends speak to emerging challenges, with potential options to address them where feasible and appropriate.

The first group of trends emerging from the scan covers evolving IUU fishing issues linked to shifting fish stocks and distributions. A number of these have the potential to challenge existing management and enforcement frameworks. Potential trends identified relate to an emerging ‘race to fish’ in the Arctic; ice loss and rising demand in the Antarctic; climate change impacts on the Humboldt Current System; novel interactions between mobile industrial fleets and smaller vessels; and domestic fishery closures potentially altering the length of supply chains.

The second group of trends relates to contested maritime boundaries and ungoverned spaces. Potential emerging trends include risks arising where fish cross between EEZs, and where sea-level rise feeds into maritime boundary disputes; evolving intersections between IUU fishing and geopolitical tensions in the South China Sea; the rising importance of IUU fishing in maritime security discourse; and the push to expand marine protected area (MPA) cover despite unresolved issues around the policing of MPA borders.

The third group of trends relates to evolving socioeconomic and criminological dynamics across small-scale IUU fishing and larger-scale operations. Potential issues include the incentivisation of IUU activity as livelihoods are undermined; risk-taking and vulnerability in the face of extreme weather; reliance on illegal labour practices in the face of reduced profitability; and evolving criminal tactics and patterns of crime convergence with growing seafood scarcity.

The fourth group of trends relates to challenges and opportunities for monitoring and enforcement. Potential emerging issues relate to vessel monitoring capabilities to detect climate-driven changes in IUU activity; gaps around the evaluation of interventions; persistent weaknesses in the transnational response; port infrastructural upgrades; and mounting public pressure for transparency.

To support efforts to address these trends, this paper offers a set of broad considerations for the range of stakeholders involved in the global response to IUU fishing. With future policy unable to address climate impacts in isolation, these are designed to be considered in the wider context of other evolving aspects of fisheries management.

Advance planning is essential. Many identified potential impacts of climate change are rooted in already visible trends, with advance action needed given the time required to update multilateral agreements, for example. Dedicated monitoring is needed to track changes in fish stocks relative to specific governance arrangements, as are forward-looking fisheries crime assessments.

Vessel-monitoring capabilities must be bolstered to detect climate-driven changes in activity. IUU fishing vessels could exhibit greater spatial mobility as they pursue shifting fish stocks, yet numerous gaps persist in vessel identification and monitoring capabilities. Gaps in state-level capacity to analyse unprocessed data continue to act as a barrier, with sustained work to build analytical capacity required.

Enforcement must be strengthened and adapted to a climate-changed future. With perpetrators of large-scale IUU fishing potentially becoming increasingly geographically mobile, gaps in international cooperation must be addressed. Systematic evaluation of existing enforcement, mitigation and deterrence methods is also needed to inform future interventions. Beyond this, challenges around the policing of expanding MPAs must be addressed.

Enhanced transparency and traceability must be pursued. As fish distributions shift and potentially alter the length of supply chains, responses continue to be hindered by a lack of transparency. Fishing-specific transparency legislation should be passed, ultimate beneficial ownership registries expanded, and schemes such as the Fisheries Transparency Initiative supported.

Geopolitical stakes woven into fishing activity must be accounted for. As stocks of key species decline and their distributions shift, new juxtapositions of marine biomass concentration and fishing effort across jurisdictional boundaries risk altering the geopolitical stakes involved. A clear focus on fisheries is needed as part of wider efforts to build mutual trust and cooperation in affected areas.

Resilience among artisanal fishing communities must be strengthened. In a range of locations, climate change could affect the vulnerabilities facing fishing-dependent communities as key species shift out of reach to deeper, cooler waters. Evidence-based measures must be enacted to enhance resilience to climate change, including long-term ‘pro-poor’ strategies to strengthen adaptive capacities.

High-volume IUU fishing must be treated with the severity it deserves. With IUU fishing often treated as a minor issue, the disconnect between crime type and response could grow, as shifting fishing grounds potentially increase IUU actors’ reliance on sophisticated organised criminal operations. National legislation must be updated such that large-scale IUU fishing qualifies as a serious crime per the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, with enforcement responses tailored to address shifting crime convergence.

London: RUSI, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, RUSI Occasional Paper, March 2023. 67p.

By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Observatory on Smuggling of Migrants.

Our new snapshot, produced in the context of a partnership with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Observatory on Smuggling of Migrants, examines respondents’ reasons for leaving their country of origin, access to smuggling services, and protection incidents experienced en route, as well as the involvement of state officials in smuggling between Cambodia-Thailand and Lao PDR-Thailand.

Key findings include:

• Almost all Cambodian respondents (96%) and most Laotian respondents (84%) used smugglers to facilitate their migration to Thailand.

• Smuggling dynamics vary significantly between Cambodian and Laotian respondents: Cambodians primarily used smugglers due to a lack of knowledge of alternatives (79%), while most Laotians were motivated by the perception that using smugglers would be easier (63%).

• Cambodian respondents more often reported the involvement of state officials in smuggling (63%) than Laotian respondents (13%).

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Observatory on Smuggling of Migrants. 2023, 12p.

By Nagesh N. Borse, June Cha, Christina G. Chase, Raashi Gaur, et al.

Substandard and falsified medical products such as vaccines and medicines are a serious and growing global health issue1 . Other health products such as diagnostic kits and infection preventatives, including but not limited to masks and hand sanitizers, are also found on the market in substandard and falsified versions, as discussed below. In this article, the authors refer to all of these products as substandard and falsified health products (SFHP).* COVID-19, like previous pandemics, has increased the vulnerability of global supply chains to SFHP. This paper explores the basics of SFHP, reviews what we have learned from past pandemics, and offers a perspective on existing and needed tools to protect health products, and the people who use them, from the threat of SFHP.

Washington, DC: USP, 2021. 11p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Restrictions on movement imposed by govern- ments across the world due to the COVID-19 pandemic have had an impact on the trafficking of substandard and falsified medical products. Interpol and the World Customs Organization (WCO) reported that seizures of substandard and falsified medical products, including person- al protective equipment (PPE), increased for the first time in March 2020. The emergence of trafficking in PPE signals a significant shift in organized criminal group behaviour that is directly attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic, which has brought huge demand for medical products such as PPE over a relatively short period of time. It is foreseeable that, with the evolution of COVID-19 and developments in medicinal treatments and/or the repurposing of existing medicines, criminal behaviour will shift from trafficking in PPE to the development and delivery of a COVID-19 vaccine. Furthermore, cyberattacks on critical infrastructure involved in addressing the pandemic are likely to continue in the form of online scams aimed at health procurement authorities. Challenges in pandemic preparedness, ranging from weak regulatory and legal frameworks to the prevention of the manufacturing and trafficking of substandard and falsified products and cyber security shortcomings, were evident before COVID-19, but the pandemic has exacerbated them and it will be difficult to make significant improvements in the immediate short term. The report concludes that crime targeting COVID-19 medical products will become more focused with significantly greater risks to pub- lic health as the containment phase of the pan- demic passes to the treatment and prevention stages.

Vienna: UNODC Research and Trend Analysis Branch. 2020. 31p

ByThe Financial Action Task Force

he COVID-19 pandemic has led to unprecedented global challenges, human suffering and economic disruption. It has also led to an increase in COVID-19-related crimes, including fraud, cybercrime, misdirection or exploitation of government funds or international financial assistance, which is creating new sources of proceeds for illicit actors. Using information provided to the members of the FATF Global Network on 7 and 23 April, this paper identifies challenges, good practices and policy responses to new money laundering and terrorist financing threats and vulnerabilities arising from the COVID-19 crisis.

As the world is focusing on responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, it is impacting on the ability of government and the private sector to implement anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing (AML/CFT) obligations in areas including supervision, regulation and policy reform, suspicious transaction reporting and international cooperation. This could lead to emerging risks and vulnerabilities that could result in criminals finding ways to:

• Bypass customer due diligence measures;

• Increase misuse of online financial services and virtual assets to move and conceal illicit funds;

• Exploit economic stimulus measures and insolvency schemes as a means for natural and legal persons to conceal and launder illicit proceeds;

• Increase use of the unregulated financial sector, creating additional opportunities for criminals to launder illicit funds;

• Misuse and misappropriation of domestic and international financial aid and emergency funding;

• Exploit COVID-19 and the associated economic downturn to move into new cash-intensive and high-liquidity lines of business in developing countries.

AML/CFT policy responses can help support the swift and effective implementation of measures to respond to COVID-19, while managing new risks and vulnerabilities. This paper provides examples of such responses, which include:

• Domestic coordination to assess the impact of COVID-19 on AML/CFT risks and systems;

• Strengthened communication with the private sector;

• Encouraging the full use of a risk-based approach to customer due diligence;

• Supporting electronic and digital payment options.

Paris: FATF, 2020. 34p.

By The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

The COVID-19 pandemic has led to unprecedented global challenges, human suffering and economic hardship. The pandemic has also spawned a range of COVID-19-related crimes, which are creating new sources of income for criminal networks. In May, the FATF highlighted the COVID-19-related money laundering and terrorist financing risks and policy responses.

Today, the FATF releases an Update-COVID-19-Related-Money-Laundering-and-Terrorist-Financing-Risks

The paper confirms the concerns expressed by the FATF in May, including:

• Changing financial behaviours - especially significant increases in online purchases due to widespread lockdowns and temporary closures of most physical bank branches, with services transitioning online.

• Increased financial volatility and economic contraction - largely caused by the losses of millions of jobs, closures of thousands of companies and a looming global economic crisis.

To respond to these evolving risks, authorities and the private sector need to take a risk-based approach, as required by the FATF Standards. This means mitigating the money laundering and terrorist financing risks without disrupting essential and legitimate financial services and without driving financial activities towards unregulated service providers.

Supervisors should also clearly communicate about the national risk situations and regulatory expectations. There is no one-size-fits-all approach. However, the FATF’s report on risks and policy responses provides guidance on how jurisdictions should address these issues.

Paris: FATF, 2020. 34;p.

y Adam Baird , Matthew Louis Bishop , Dylan Kerrigan

The Southern Caribbean became a key hemispheric drug transhipment point in the late 1990s, to which the alarmingly high level of homicidal violence in Trinidad is often attributed. Existing research, concentrated in criminology and mainstream international relations, as well as the anti-drug policy establishment, tends to accept this correlation, framing the challenge as a typical post-Westphalian security threat. However, conventional accounts struggle to explain why murders have continued to rise even as the relative salience of narcotrafficking has actually declined. By consciously disentangling the main variables, we advance a more nuanced empirical account of how ‘the local’ is both inserted into and mediates the impact of ‘the global’. Relatively little violence can be ascribed to the drug trade directly: cocaine frequently transits through Trinidad peacefully, whereas firearms stubbornly remain within a distinctive geostrategic context we term a ‘weapons sink’. The ensuing murders are driven by the ways in which these ‘residues’ of the trade reconstitute the domestic gangscape. As guns filter inexorably into the community, they reshape the norms and practices underpinning acceptable and anticipated gang behaviour, generating specifically ‘residual’ forms of violence that are not new in genesis, but rather draw on long historical antecedents to exacerbate the homicide panorama. Our analysis emphasises the importance of taking firearms more seriously in understanding the diversity of historically constituted violences in places that appear to resemble—but differ to—the predominant Latin American cases from which the conventional wisdom about supposed ‘drug violence’ is generally distilled.

Political Geography. Volume 106, October 2023, 102966