By Emilia Ziosi

Honduras has been Central America’s focal point for drug trafficking towards the United States for years as the region’s main transit country. Recent court cases held in the United States have revealed the symbiotic relationship between state actors, business elites and drug trafficking organisations in contemporary Honduras, uncovering the blurred boundaries between the licit and illicit, the upper and underworld in the country. In this article, a drug-trafficking family – ‘Los Cachiros’ transportista (transport) group – is analysed as a case study with the aim of exploring state actors’ involvement in cocaine trafficking.

Drawing on publicly available official judicial documents, this article explores the interpenetrations between formal and informal institutions in the country, arguing that state actors’ involvement in the drug trade in Honduras goes far beyond protection, and has evolved into a powerful network of public, private and criminal actors that has been able to capture the state’s basic sovereign functions with the aim of protecting and promoting their own private interests. In doing so, this article takes forward the state-crime nexus literature. Building on Hall’s (2018) networked approach in the study of illicit economies, this article proposes a conceptual framework to re-theorise the state-crime nexus as a transnationally networked set of relations, which considers the role of external states as actors of power within a country’s state-crime nexus. Looking at the unique relationship between Honduras and the United States, I argue that the concept is useful to understand the role of the United States as a transnational actor of power within the Honduran state-crime nexus.

Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 4(2), pp. 144–159.

By David Soud, Ian Ralby and Rohini Ralby: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

Gold flows within Venezuela can be categorized under two broad headings: centralised and dispersed. The centralised flows carry a portion of production from the country’s myriad small mining operations to the government-monitored trading hubs. Centralised flows reportedly include gold transfers from the Venezuelan Central Bank to foreign governments and other entities in Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Iran and elsewhere. While these flows of gold out of Venezuela might be considered legal, companies are still expected to carry out enhanced due diligence to ascertain whether conditions of extraction and trade are associated with actual or potential risks of severe human rights abuses, conflict financing and other financial crimes as per the OECD Guidance, as well as environmental harm.

In contrast, dispersed flows are those that leave the country from mining areas by various other routes. The Venezuelan military and political elites, Colombian militant groups, and domestic gangs are reported to be key actors in both categories of domestic gold flows. Gold from dispersed flows departing Venezuela appears to be laundered primarily within the Latin America and Caribbean region, mainly in one or more key regional transit hubs. Laundering networks can, however, extend across the globe and actors connected in other continents. Since many of the high-risk gold flows out of Venezuela involve regional transit hubs as well as distant transit countries and destination markets, any approach to mitigating the risks tied to Venezuelan gold should include regional and international coordination among both government and industry actors. This consideration is heightened by the evident involvement of transnational criminal organisations and designated terrorist groups in exploiting mining communities, extracting gold and laundering it into the legitimate supply chain. The resulting picture is preliminary but also revealing. The role of the maritime space in high-risk gold flows needs more attention; so does the role played by Free Trade Zones (FTZs) in facilitating gold flows and related financial crimes. A few recommendations on how best to address the risks that characterise Venezuelan gold flows conclude the report.

Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2021. 68p.

By Marcena Hunter

Exploitation and criminal capture of the ASGM sector is multifaceted and complex.

The development potential of the African artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM) sector is undermined by criminal consortia across the continent who exploit it for economic and political ends at the expense of vulnerable populations. Yet, much of the discourse around ASGM in Africa has not directly addressed criminality, instead being framed within development or conflict frameworks. In an effort to fill this gap, this report seeks to unpack how criminal consortia manipulate ASGM and associated gold flows to secure illicit rents and capture the sector. The findings highlight the need for nuance, especially regarding the role of informal and traditional actors in the sector. Through a more holistic understanding of the challenge, policymakers will better be able to identify and combat criminal consortia in ASGM.

ENACT - Africa, 2019. 44p.

By Fawzi Banao, Bertrand Laporte

The actions of terrorist groups destabilize border states and economies. The presence of mining activities, such as gold extraction, favors the illicit export of this ore to finance terrorist groups. Using COMTRADE data, we estimate gold customs fraud with mirror analysis (gold export missing) for 50 African countries between 2000 and 2019. We use ordinary least squares, two-stage least squares, generalized method of moments, and local impulse strategy in our empirical strategies to estimate the impact of terrorism on gold customs fraud. Our results suggest that states affected by terrorism must pay more attention to the trafficking of gold, as this is a valued mineral for terrorist groups. The response to conflict with terrorist groups cannot be solely military. The State must necessarily get the various state services to work together, particularly the army, the police, and customs. The institutionalization of this cooperation remains a real challenge for these states. Regarding customs administration efficiency, data analysis is at the core of customs modernization programs. Only internal and external trade data have been used in risk management systems. Cooperation with the armed forces must allow the acquisition of tools and skills to analyze other data sources, such as satellite data. Customs could then carry out all of its missions at the borders: collecting duties and taxes but also protecting the local/border economy and cutting off the funding sources for terrorist groups.

Clermont-Ferrand, France Centre d’Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International, 2022. 27p.

By Roman Grynberg, Jacob Nyambe & Fwasa Singogo

The article reviews recent research and controversies surrounding the quantification of illicit financial flows (IFF) in the gold mining sector in Africa. It is argued that the methodology and data used in the quantification of the most frequently analysed technique, i.e., export undervaluation, is flawed not only because of the recognized weakness of the international trade data, but also because it focuses only on one aspect of IFF, and does not attempt to address issues pertaining to actual under measurement or misspecification of volumes. It is argued that estimates of tax evasion activities can only be determined through forensic economic and accounting techniques, and not through macro-economic or trade data. The last section considers the increased evidence of gold smuggling to the UAE from various African countries, some of which produce no gold of any significance, but appear to export in very large volumes; and at unit import values well below world market prices.

Tanzanian Economic Review, Vol. 9 No. 1, 2019: 35–59

By Prem Mahadevan

India’s socio-economic realities have evolved significantly over the past four decades, particularly as far as attitudes to wealth accumulation are concerned. Gold is today no longer negatively associated with crooked businessmen, but rather positively with the consumerist aspirations of middle-class India. It is used to project enhanced family status at events such as the ‘great Indian wedding’, and is perceived as a high-return investment and a hedge against inflation. Demand for gold has consistently risen 14% annually since 2001, with prices altogether increasing eight-fold. The Indian love affair with gold continues even as the economy strains under the weight of gold imports that degrade the fiscal balance. Gold is metaphorically to many Indians what opium was to the Chinese in the 19th century: an addictive escape from institutional decay and social stagnation. But hoarding gold pits the individual and their family against the government and its need to keep liquidity flowing in order to grow the economy.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2020. 49p.

By Prem Mahadevan

India has seen a tripling of demand for sand from 2000 to 2017, creating a market worth 150 billion rupees, or just over two billion US dollars. The country has the third-largest construction industry in the world, following those of China and the United States, accounting for 9 per cent of its two-trillion-dollar economy and employing more than 35 million people. Given the dizzying rate of India’s construction boom, guesstimates indicate a massive shortage of licitly mined sand.

This paper looks at patterns of sand mining in India and the impact that it may have on governance, security, the environment and the growth of entrenched criminal networks. The conclusions suggest that civil administration is retreating before a mafia-like nexus of political, business and bureaucratic interests, which connive to flout judicial orders. The secondary and tertiary effects of such activity bode ill for societal stability, even though a certain amount of (tenuous and often exploitative) employment is generated by illicit sand mining. The paper also highlights a policy conundrum: can India, which, paradoxically, combines widespread economic backwardness with sky-high consumer aspirations, find a model of environmentally sustainable development? Or is it doomed to exacerbate the harshness of already abysmal living standards experienced by its rural population (who make up two-thirds of its population) to satisfy the needs of its urban middle class?

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2019. 27p.

By Eric Scheye

Using country specific formulae in three categories – water and electrical utilities, tax administration and land management – this paper presents an empirical methodology to measure state actors' political will to reduce organised crime.

A lack of political will is often used as an excuse by policymakers, donors and development practitioners to explain failures in policies and programmes. While this is true for most development programming, it is particularly salient with regard to anti-corruption, the rule of law, and efforts to combat organised crime. Indeed, political will is vital if governments are to reduce the deleterious activities of organised crime; without it, crime proliferates. Using country specific formulae in three categories, water and electrical utilities, tax administration and land management, this paper presents an empirical methodology to measure the political will possessed by state actors to reduce organised crime.

ENACT-Africa, 2020. 20p.

By Edward Wanyonyi and Lucia Bird

As the development of communications infrastructure accelerates, good governance and security are often sacrificed in the interest of a speedy rollout.

While Africa’s growing communications infrastructure and increasing internet penetration offer significant developmental benefits, they offer parallel opportunities to organised crime, which exploit the continent’s enhanced connectivity. These opportunities are set to grow with nascent research already indicating that the continent is an increasingly important source of both cyber-dependent and cyber-enabled crime. It is a crucial and already tardy moment to take stock of how these vulnerabilities manifest, and how they can best be addressed. If they remain ignored and unmitigated, organised crime will increasingly undermine progress and development, compromising the achievement of the very goals that enhanced infrastructure seeks to achieve.

ENACT-Africa, 2021. 20p.

By Mark Shaw

Foreign criminals are a significant presence in Africa. Four typologies of foreign criminal actors are identified, allowing an exploration into why some actors develop more successful criminal enterprises than others. Success appears to be the result of a slow embedment in the local criminal economy, avoiding displays of wealth and the targeted corruption of officials. It also depends on the expansion of ethnic networks where high levels of trust or coercion of members prevent law enforcement penetration. Eroding these successful criminal operations requires an ability to disrupt recruitment into the networks and ultimately their more effective integration into legitimate economic activities.

ENACT-Africa, 2028. 24p.

By Olwethu Majola and Darren Brookbanks

This paper uses data and analysis to assess the UNTOC's effectiveness in addressing transnational organised crime on the continent. The international community prescribed the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) as the treatment to slow the global spread of TOC. However, current diagnoses suggest that this has not been as effective as anticipated. This paper assesses the efficacy of the UNTOC and recommends some changes to the treatment that are likely to yield more successful results.

ENACT-Africa, 2023. 32p,

By Lila Abed

o contribute to a reduction and, ultimately, the eradication of femicide in Mexico, the Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute launched its “Engendering Safety: Addressing Femicide in Mexico” Initiative in 2022 to bring together key stakeholders to raise awareness, explore the driving factors and enabling environment, and outline action items for both government and civil society. Since the launch of the initiative, the Mexico Institute has organized a series of events and consultations to help inform a report to the Mexican Senate on the policy options available to Mexico’s legislature to effect positive change for women’s safety.

In October 2022, the Mexico Institute, in partnership with the Mexican Senate’s Special Commission to Investigate Cases of Femicide of Girls and Adolescents, organized a National Forum titled Femicide: Visions and Solutions. During the one-day session, more than two dozen federal and state-level public officials, lawmakers, civil society organizations, activists, experts, and academics discussed preventive measures, best practices, and legislative actions that can reduce and eradicate femicide in Mexico. The data and research shared has informed the drafting and introduction by Mexican lawmakers of several legislative proposals.

This report is a compilation of the data, best practices, preventive measures, and public policy recommendations presented during the National Forum. The objective of this report is to summarize the findings of the conference in an effort to raise awareness and so that Mexican lawmakers can utilize this information when drafting and approving bills to prevent, reduce, and eliminate femicide and gender-based violence in Mexico.

Washington, DC: Wilson Center, Mexico Institute, 2023. 64p.

By Grahame Allen, Zoe Mansfield

This briefing paper looks at homicide statistics for England and Wales. It also covers equivalent statistics for Scotland and Northern Ireland, and other international comparisons. The paper examines statistics on the characteristics of victims and offenders, the methods used to kill and the outcomes for offenders.

London: House of Commons Library, 2023. 40p.

By Uglješa Ugi Zvekić, Sunčana Roksandić and Bojan Dobovšek,

This report uses the term ‘organized corruption’ to explain how corruption is embedded in the political economy of many countries in the region. Organized corruption is a ‘a symbiosis of organized crime, criminal methods and high-level corruption, which creates a crooked ecosystem that enriches and protects those with access to power’. Organized corruption is not only about systemic illicit financial gains and undue influence in decision-making, but also the systemic buying and influencing of social support to gain or maintain political and economic power.

Organized corruption is particularly evident in the political context of transitions towards democracy, when key parts of the economy are in the public domain, as is the case in the Western Balkans. In this context, control of politics and control of the economy are interlinked. Being in power means controlling the strings of the public purse. Political parties utilize political power to acquire economic influence through the control of public finances and public officials. Political victory enables the use of state funds and enterprises for patronage and to gain financial, political and social benefits. In such an environment, elections are often a winner-take-all contest, not only for the political parties but also for those who benefit from patronage. It therefore follows that those who profit from power have an interest in financing political parties and elections.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), 2023. 72p.

By Francisco Cuamea

Until 2012, when the United States gradually began the regulation and decriminalization of marijuana, Mexican cartels had secured a decades-long monopoly on the US cannabis market. As they became displaced from that market, the cartels scaled up their production of synthetic drugs, such as crystal methamphetamine, which is produced in clandestine laboratories that are generally set up in remote locations in the mountains, rural areas or small towns. The rich biodiversity that surrounds these sites is affected by the chemical waste resulting from crystal meth production that is dumped near these labs. In addition to the crystal meth market, Mexican organized crime groups also entered the black market in endangered marine species and industries built on other high-value species. Organized crime groups have begun to leave a significant environmental and social footprint, accelerating the disappearance of certain marine species and the disintegration of fishing communities.

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  One of the affected regions is the Sea of Cortez, also known as the Gulf of California, made up of the Mexican states of Baja California, Baja California Sur, Nayarit, Sinaloa and Sonora, which together contribute 11% of the country’s gross domestic product and are united by the immense gulf of north-western Mexico, declared a world heritage site by UNESCO. According to UNESCO, the Sea of Cortez comprises 244 islands, islets and coastal areas. It contains 695 vascular plant species and 891 types of fish, of which 90 are endemic. The number of plant species is much higher than those recorded at any other island or marine site on the World Heritage List. The region is home to 39% of the world’s total number of marine mammal species and 33% of the global number of cetacean species. The region also contains a wealth of endangered land flora and fauna as well as examples of intangible cultural heritage, many of which come from the indigenous peoples of north-western Mexico, such as the Yaqui, the Cora and the Cucapá.6 This brief explores the threat that illicit economic activities pose to biodiversity and ecosystems in the Sea of Cortez region, as well as to some of the area’s most vulnerable communities, those that depend on the fishing industry.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), 2023. 17p.

By Anastasia Austin and Douwe den Held

The Dominican Republic prides itself on its openness to the world. As one of the first countries to open up during the COVID-19 pandemic, it seeks to be ever welcoming to tourism and business. But criminals may feel welcome as well. In this three-part series, InSight Crime dives into the infrastructure, the trafficking networks, and the corruption facilitating organized crime in the Dominican Republic.

Washington, Insight Crime, 2022. 26p.

By Venezuela Investigative Unit

In 2013, Nicolás Maduro became president of Venezuela following the death of his charismatic predecessor Hugo Chávez. Since then, the country’s cocaine trade has undergone revolutionary changes. Today, Venezuela is at risk of becoming the world’s fourth cocaine-producing country. And the Maduro regime has positioned itself as the gatekeeper to the country’s drug trade, controlling access to cocaine’s riches not only for drug traffickers but also for corrupt politicians and the military-embedded trafficking network known as the “Cartel of the Suns.” The product of more than three years of investigations, hundreds of interviews and field work in all of Venezuela’s key drug trafficking territories, this InSight Crime investigation looks at one of the world’s most important cocaine trafficking hubs – and the authoritarian regime that keeps the drugs flowing.

Washington, DC: Insight Crime, 2022. 53p.

By Eleanor Beevor 

In May 2022, two Nigerian citizens were arrested in Niamey, Niger, while trying to drive back to Nigeria in a stolen Toyota Corolla. The Corolla had a Nigerian licence plate, but police discovered that the car had recently been stolen from a Nigerien police officer. Fake military identification cards, and another Nigerian licence plate, were found in the car. The men were posing as Nigerian military officers. One had in fact been a former officer but was discharged in 2017 for desertion, and the other worked for Nigeria’s correctional service. After an investigation, it transpired that the men had left Nigeria three days before the arrest, and they had driven to Niamey in a stolen Toyota Hilux. The car, stolen in Nigeria, was resold in Niamey with the assistance of a Nigerien accomplice who was later arrested. It appears that this accomplice was also involved in the theft and resale of motorbikes, and possibly of other illicit commodities such as weapons. He was found with three AK-47 rifles and 151 cartridges, along with a stolen motorbike, other motorbike parts and three wristwatches. This example showcases many of the dynamics of car theft in the central Sahel region….

Geneva, SWIT::Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , 2023.  38p.

 By Anastasia Austin and Douwe den Held 

The Dominican Republic prides itself on its openness to the world. As one of the first countries to open up during the COVID-19 pandemic, it seeks to be ever welcoming to tourism and business. But criminals may feel welcome as well. In this three-part series, InSight Crime dives into the infrastructure, the trafficking networks, and the corruption facilitating organized crime in the Dominican Republic.

Washington, DC, Insight Crime, 2022. 26p

By Alexandru Cernat, David Buil-Gil, Ian Brunton-Smith, Jose Pina-Sánchez and Marta Murrià-Sangenís

We assess if asking victims about the places where crimes happen leads to estimates of “crime in place” with better measurement properties. We analyze data from the Barcelona Victimization Survey (2015–2020) aggregated in 73 neighborhoods using longitudinal quasi-simplex models and criterion validity to estimate the quality of four types of survey-based measures of crime. The distribution of survey-based offense location estimates, as opposed to victim residence estimates, is highly similar to police-recorded crime statistics, and there is little trade off in terms of the reliability and validity of offense location and victim residence measures. Estimates of crimes reported to the police show a better validity, but their reliability is lower and capture fewer crimes.

Crime & DelinquencyVolume 68, Issue 11 Oct 2022 Pages 1923-2171