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Posts in violence and oppression
The Triumphs of Gods revenge

By Reynolds, John, active 1621-1650

The triumphs of Gods revenge against the crying and execrable sinne of (wilful and premeditated) murther : with his miraculous discoveries, and severe punishment thereof : in thirty several tragical histories, (digested into six books) committed in divers countreys beyond the seas : never published or imprinted in any other language.

London : Printed by A.M. for William Lee, and are to be sold by George Sawbridg, Francis Tyton, John Martin ... [and 9 others]. 1670. 508p.

Bandits

By Eric Hobsbawm

“Two brief methodological notes. First, it will be clear that I have tried to explain why social banditry is so remarkably uniform a pheno­menon throughout the ages and continents. Can this explanation be tested? Yes, insofar as it predicts, broadly speaking, how bandits will act and what stories people will tell about them in areas hitherto un­studied. The present essay elaborates the ‘model’ originally sketched out in my Primitive Rebels, which was based exclusively on European - mostly Spanish and Italian - material, but does not, I hope, conflict with it. Still, the wider the generalization, the more likely it is that individual peculiarities are neglected. Second, I have relied largely on a rather tricky historical source namely poems and ballads. So far as the facts of banditry are concerned, these records of public memory and myth are of course quite unreliable, however remotely based on real events, though they give much inci­dental information about the social environment of banditry, at least insofar as there is no reason why this should be distorted. But there is a more serious difficulty. How far does the ‘myth' of banditry throw light on the real pattern of bandit behaviour? In other words, how far do bandits live up to the social role they have been assigned in the drama of peasant life ? There is plainly some connection. I hope that in formulating it I have not gone beyond the bounds of common sense.”

London. George Wedenfield & Nicolson Ltd. 1969. 157p.

An Empirical Assessment of Homicide and Suicide Outcomes with Red Flag Laws

By Rachel Delafave

This Article empirically illustrates that red flag laws—laws which permit removal of firearms from a person who presents a risk to themselves or others—contribute to a statistically significant decrease in suicide rates, but do not influence homicide rates. I exploit state-level variation across time in the existence of red flag laws between 1990 and 2018 and find that the existence of a risk-based law reduces firearm-related suicides by 6.4% and overall suicides by 3.7%, with no substitution to non-firearm suicides. Red flag laws are not associated with a statistically significant change in homicides rates. Policymakers should consider red flag laws an effective tool to prevent firearm-related suicide, one of the most prevalent preventable causes of death in the United States. In light of this evidence, red flag laws should be more politically successful in the current partisan environment than other forms of gun control legislation because of their targeted nature and potential to balance the interests of gun owners against the negative externalities of gun violence.

52 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 867 (2021)

Tow Truck Wars: How organized crime infiltrates the transport industry

By Yvon Dandurand

This policy brief focuses on a small but especially vulnerable type of transportation business that has been prone to infiltration by organized crime groups through violence, intimidation and corruption: the vehicle-towing services industry. This type of criminal infiltration has been observed in different countries and it involves violent confrontation and competition for a share of the market. As such, this brief provides an opportunity for a comparison between patterns of infiltration and the use of violence by criminal organizations, as well as a review of law enforcement and policy responses  

Geneva: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2021. 26p.

The Future of International Cooperation Against Transnational Organized Crime: The Undoing of UNTOC?

By Yvon Dandurand and Jessica Jahn

Success in addressing transnational organized crime hinges on multilateral cooperation. However, existing cooperation regimes are ineffective at countering the rapid changes in the organized crime landscape and countries increasingly tend to turn to national solutions. The diminishing support for multilateral cooperation means the international criminal justice system has become disjointed, insufficient and reactive. This paper sets out five possible scenarios that could affect the future of international criminal justice cooperation, and raises thought-provoking questions about possible outcomes and impacts on transnational organized crime. To be useful as planning tools, any scenario or vision of the future must be connectable to decisions in the present, and therefore the scenarios described here are presented in the framework of current challenges. It is hoped that civil society organizations will take the lead in formulating a comprehensive international criminal justice cooperation strategy, built on what works. Such a strategy should also supplemented with new ideas to address shortcomings and to facilitate effective reforms of the multilateral institutions needed to implement such a strategy.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2021. 18p.

Negotiating with Violent Criminal Groups: Lessons and Guidelines from Global Practice

By Mark Freeman and Vanda Felbab-Brown

Negotiations with violent criminal groups – such as mafias, cartels, gangs and pirates – occur more often than imagined. This publication, grounded in more than three years of in-depth IFIT research and dozens of first-person interviews conducted with actual negotiators, offers key lessons drawn from the most diverse set of negotiations with violent criminal groups ever examined in one place. One of the prominent discoveries of this study – which centres on negotiations intended to reduce or end violence – is how the best of theory and practice regarding peace talks with militant groups (and associated areas such as transitional justice) appears largely absent from consideration or application in talks with violent criminal groups. The gap is striking and counterproductive, but also heralds an opportunity to achieve greater results in future. Another key discovery relates to the endgame of the negotiation. With militant groups, the point of negotiations is typically to end the use of organised political violence, by exchanging disarmament (and/or incorporation into the army) for some form of political empowerment and rehabilitation. With violent criminal groups, the endgame is harder to pin down, because their motivations are understood to be mainly pecuniary, leaving it unclear what they could transform into. However, the examined cases suggest that the challenge is surmountable – and under a surprising variety of conditions.

Barcelona, Spain: Institute for Integrated Transitions (IFIT), 2021. 34p.

Mafiaround Europe. C.R.I.M.E. Countering Regional Italian Mafia Expansion

By Anna Sergi and Alice Rizzuti

By using open data and primary resources, previous and ongoing research, and the privileged partnerships with Eurojust Italian Desk and Operations and Europol, the Mafiaround-Europe report - stemming from the CRIME (Countering Regional Italian Mafia Expansion) project presents the first analysis of the presence of Italian mafias in 7 European countries in addition to Italy and the challenges of cross border policing of mafia-type organised crime. Production of the report, Mafiaround Europe, was enabled by funding from the ESRC Impact Acceleration Account, block awards made to research organisations to accelerate the impact of research. The report highlights how mafia-type activities have adapted to individual countries, their economy, culture, infrastructure and logistics networks.

Colchester, UK:  University of Essex, 2021. 258p.  

Women and Organized Crime in Latin America: Beyond Victims and Victimizers

By  Colombian Organized Crime Observatory, Arlene B. Tickner, et al.

In Latin America, the participation of women in organized crime has been in the shadow of academic and public policy debate due to the male dominance in the different criminal economies and the tendency to see criminal activities as a “man’s activity”. However, a more detailed analysis of drug trafficking, human trafficking, and migrant smuggling, based on the application of a gender lens, allows the appreciation of the different roles that women play. After examining a series of documents, data and information collected through fieldwork, this investigation by the InSight Crime and Universidad del Rosario’s Colombian Observatory of Organized Crime, increases the complexity of female roles inside organized crime and questions the tendency to present women only as victims, or in some cases, as victimizers. From cooks and coca harvesters to owners of their drug empires or trafficking and smuggling networks, women operate in a versatile manner and move in a broad spectrum of roles, challenging the existent division of labor based on gender while at the same time coexisting with criminal organizations that continue to impose a patriarchal system. Through the description of these roles, the development of two case studies – one regarding women and gangs in El Salvador, and another tackling human trafficking and migrant smuggling in the Colombia-Venezuela border town of Cúcuta- and the construction of profiles of some of the greatest protagonists of organized crime in recent times, the investigation takes the shape of a woman. The document also analyses…..

  • the use of violence by women, a characteristic that is usually attributed to men and masculine behavior. However, violence is a tool often used by women in some organized crime structures. Based on this, as well as the examination of the main factors that push women to organized crime activities, a series of public policy recommendations are set forth for governments and local authorities. These are aimed at understanding a phenomenon that, aside from being under-analyzed, is continuously growing.   

Washington, DC: Washington, DC: InSight Crime, 2020.   41p.

Elites and Violence in Latin America: Logics of the Fragmented Security State

By Jenny Pearce

While Latin America’s high levels of chronic violence are mostly carried out by poor young men and mostly cost the lives of poor young men, the conditions for its reproduction are generated by logics of elite power and wealth accumulation. Drawing on more than 70 interviews with oligarchic elites from Colombia and Mexico, the paper offers propositions for further empirical research into these logics. It discusses why it makes sense to use the term “oligarchic elites” to analyse both the failure to invest in the rule of law and also the elite preference for a fragmented security state whose permeability facilitates influence trafficking. It studies the direct and indirect relationships between elites and varied forms of violence, exploring how they have affected the nature of the state in Latin America, the diffusion of criminal violences, and the emergence of micro criminal orders in many parts of the region. Latin America’s history of social action against violences – not least disappearances, feminicide, forced displacement, and state torture – should extend to de-sanctioning violence as a phenomenon. This could open up spaces for social and political participation to create the conditions of social justice which reduce violence.   

London:  LSE Latin America and Caribbean Centre, 2018. 30p.

Measuring Organised Crime: Challenges and Solutions for Collecting Data on Armed Illicit Groups

By Christopher BlattmanGustavo DuncanBenjamin Lessing and Santiago Tobón

Organised criminal activities, by their nature, are hard to measure. Administrative data are often missing, problematic, or misleading. Moreover, organised criminal activities are under-reported, and under-reporting rates may be greatest where gangs are strongest. Researchers hoping to quantify organised crime systematically face daunting challenges. Collecting information on organised crime is inherently a slow process of cautious trial and error. It will vary from city to city, and typically within a city as well. Dozens of qualitative and quantitative researchers have shown that this can be done with care, ethically, and with adequate protection for human subjects. What they all have in common is that they commit themselves to a place, and they all take their time. While there are risks, the benefits can be enormous. The information these investigators collect is often rare and invaluable. Officials and policymakers commonly have little insight into criminal organisations, with terrible consequences for policy, be it inaction, mediocrity, or adverse and unintended consequences. Here we draw on our experience in Colombia, Brazil, and Liberia of collecting systematic data on illicit activities and armed groups, in order to share our learning with other researchers or organisations that fund research in this area, who may find this useful for their own research. We address: first steps before asking questions, common challenges and solutions, and alternative sources. Our work thus far emphasises the relevance of deep qualitative work to identify local partners; the need for intense piloting of…..

  • survey instruments and a close oversight of survey firms, ranging from how they hire enumerators to how they plan and implement field work; the power of using survey experiments to mitigate and measure measurement error; and the relevance of cross-validating findings with complementary data sources.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2022. 13p.

Online African Organized Crime from Surface to Dark Web

By INTERPOL and ENACT Africa

With the increase in Internet coverage, online trade of illicit goods is likely increasing on the African continent. In recent years, cyber-enabled crimes have increased on the African continent. This has been a result of a combination of factors, including, the improvement of Internet coverage, the wide availability of cyber-tools and the growing flexibility of cybercriminals. As a consequence, online crime nowadays represents a bigger security issue for law enforcement in African member countries than ever before. In this framework, INTERPOL, under the European Union funded ENACT Project, examines through this assessment the issue of cyber and cyber-enabled crimes in Africa in order to help drive a more strategic law enforcement response.

Lyon, France: INTERPOL; ENACT AFRICA, 2020. 79p.

Smugglersʼ Source: Japanʼ s Legal Ivory Market. An Analysis of Chinese Court Decisions of Ivory Illegally Exported from Japan

By Masayuki Sakamoto

Africaʼ s elephants continue to be poached for their ivory tusks. To combat the poaching crisis, and to support the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)ʼ s 1990 ban on international commercial ivory trade, nations and jurisdictions around the world have taken steps to close their domestic markets for ivory. By closing the market for ivory, governments send a strong signal that the trade in ivory and killing of elephants is unacceptable, streamline enforcement efforts by eliminating legal cover for illegal ivory, and support ivory demand reduction efforts. Nevertheless, one major consumer market remains open ‒ Japan. With an ivory stockpile of 244 tonnes, Japanʼ s domestic market is the worldʼ s largest and most significant legalized ivory market. Evidence indicates its ivory trade controls are porous, enabling the trade in illegal ivory and illegal ivory exports. At least 76 seizures of ivory from Japan were made between 2018 and 2020, mostly in China by Chinese authorities. To further examine illegal ivory export from Japan to China, the Japan Tiger and Elephant Fund (JTEF) turned to court cases in China, which could include more details than seizure data. JTEF identified court cases on illegal export of ivory from Japan into China, and analyzed them in order to contribute to evidence-based decision-making, constructive dialogue, and decisive outcomes from the Parties at the 19th Conference of the Parties (CoP19) to CITES,. In all, 49 public court decisions on 45 different cases between 2010 and 2019, published by the Government of China, were…..

  • identified and analyzed. Fifteen out of 45 cases occurred in 2018 and 2019, after Chinaʼ s domestic ivory market closure went into effect. In addition to summarizing basic information about each case, any information pertaining to the role of Japanʼ s legal market in illegal ivory export and information regarding the defining characteristics of transnational organized crime was assessed.  

Tokyo: Japan Tiger and Elephant Fund (JTEF) 2022. 88p.

Two Sides of the Same Coin: Tackling transnational wildlife trafficking between West and Central Africa and South-East Asia

By The Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA)

West and Central Africa continues to raise concerns among Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) as a significant hub for global wildlife trafficking. This briefing highlights the parallel responsibilities and shortcomings of both West and Central Africa and South-East Asia in implementing their commitments under CITES and outlines what needs to happen to tackle transnational wildlife crime more effectively. At SC74, EIA raised these concerns in our briefing document Joint Responsibilities: The Nigeria- Vietnam wildlife trafficking corridor and compliance with CITES, which similarly highlighted the need for urgent action.

London; Washington, DC: EIA, 2022. 12p.

Rhinoceros Poaching in Botswana: A Situational Analysis

By Environmental Investigation Agency

In 2017, rhino poaching started to increase in Botswana as poachers began killing rhinos in the vast Okavango Delta region in the northwest of the country. EIA’s situational analysis highlights some of the key issues facing Botswana’s conservation sector and contains EIA’s recommendations for actions to be taken by Botswana and CITES CoP19.

London; Washington, DC: Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA), 2022. 11p.

Myanmar’s Timber Trade One Year Since the Coup: The Impact of International Sanctions

By Forest Trends

On February 1st, 2021, the military launched a coup d'état against the newly re-elected government of Myanmar. Over the past year, the military junta has been accused of massive human rights violations, arresting more than 12,000 people, killing more than 1,500, and instigating a growing humanitarian crisis that has seen more than 400,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) (AAPP Burma 2022, UN News 2022). Compounding the impact of COVID-19, the military’s violence has destroyed Myanmar’s economy. Furthermore, the majority of society has engaged in a predominately non-violent Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), including a boycott of companies with military links. Deprived of revenue, the junta has increasingly relied on revenue from natural resources to support their operations and their ongoing campaign to retain power, which has included escalation of armed conflict and attacks on civilians. While much international focus has been given to the revenues generated by the oil, gas, and mining sectors, the forest sector has in the past been an important source of revenue for Myanmar’s governments and entities associated with the military. This report reviews the timber sector’s role in the revenue now being generated for the current military regime.  

Washington, DC: Forest Trends, 2022. 42p.

Acts of Defiance: How US traders are ignoring sanctions to import conflict teak from Myanmar

By The Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA).

In February 2021, Myanmar’s democratically elected ruling party, the National League for Democracy, was overthrown by the Myanmar military in a coup d’état. In the months since the coup, the people of Myanmar (formerly Burma) have been subjected to a continued escalation of conflict and brutal human rights atrocities. To maintain its illegal regime and crush dissent, the military is dependent on a continual flow of hard currency. As for the previous regimes, natural resources provide a source of profit for the military, whereby the forests of Myanmar are defined by their monetary value and have been part of the military and economic elites’ profits and, in some cases, survival for decades.

London; Washington, DC: EIA, 2022. 16p.

Nature Crime: Understanding and Tackling a Key Threat to the Climate and Land Use Agenda

By Charles Victor Barber, Karen Winfield, and Rachael Petersen 

Nature crime1 occurs when individuals or criminal networks illegally exploit natural ecosystems to extract natural resources. Nature crimes include illegal logging, illegal mining, illegal fishing, illegal wildlife trade,2 and the illegal conversion of forests and wetlands for agriculture or other uses. These crimes are often associated with financial crime of various types, as well as labor and human violations and official corruption. The prevalence of nature crime and associated corruption and criminal behavior constitutes a serious barrier to progress in tackling climate change, slowing biodiversity loss, reducing the risk of future zoonotic pandemics, and achieving sustainable, peaceful, and equitable human development. The scale of the nature crime economy is immense. It is variably estimated to be the third- or fourth-largest illicit economy in the world (after drug trafficking and trade in counterfeit goods) with an annual value of as much as $281 billion, but this figure underestimates its indirect impacts: governments are deprived annually of some $7-12 billion in timber and fisheries revenues, while the indirect costs of undermining ecosystem services may be as high as $1-2 trillion per year (World Bank 2019a).  

San Francisco: Climate and Forests 2030, 2021. 30p.

Wildlife from Forests to Cages: An Analysis of Wildlife Seizures in the Philippines

By Emerson Y. Sy

The illegal wildlife trade is one of the most lucrative transnational crimes in the world. Numerous wildlife are threatened with extinction due to overexploitation for food, medicine, and as pets. Although it is difficult to quantify the illegal wildlife trade due to its mostly clandestine nature, analyzing seizure data can indicate its magnitude. Wildlife seizure records from the DENR, PCSDS, and other sources for the period 2010–2019 were collated and analyzed to identify species threatened by the illegal wildlife trade, hotspots, and trafficking routes. The 10-year seizure dataset involved 511 incidents, 283 taxa, and 44,647 wildlife individuals. Reptiles (n = 16,237 individuals) and birds (n = 6,042) were the top seized live wildlife, while pangolin scales (>2,100 kg) had the most quantity and seizure frequency among derivatives. Intervention policies on the key source, transit, and destination locations were proposed to address illegal wildlife trade in the country.

Manila: USAID Philippines, 2021. 56p.

Pillagers in Paradise: The trafficking dynamics of the Palawan pangolin

By Alastair MacBeath, Simone Haysom, Emerson Sy

In recent years, several studies have raised alarm at the illicit trade pressure on the Philippines’ endemic pangolin species – the Palawan pangolin. Between 2018 and 2019, seizures of Palawan pangolins increased more than ninefold compared with the previous 18 years.1 Around 20 live pangolins have been ‘retrieved’ in and around Metro Manila, a several hundred kilometres boat ride away from their natural habitat, the province of Palawan – also known as the Philippines’ ‘last ecological frontier’. Recent studies have estimated that as many as 26 784 pangolins may be illegally hunted on the islands of Palawan per year,2 with much of the meat and most of the scales making their way to buyers based either in Manila or abroad, making this a national problem driven by international demand. In light of these indications of burgeoning illegal trade, this report was undertaken with three aims in mind: 1) to understand the broader context of drivers and factors that shape pangolin trafficking dynamics; 2) to shed light on the nature of networks driving the trade; and 3) to identify challenges and gaps in the state response. It is intended to complement work undertaken under the rubric of a broader project by the Zoological Society of London and six other organizations, namely 'Combating Palawan pangolin trafficking: Empowering community-based protection and proactive enforcement', funded by the UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. The primary components of this project focus on community-based responses to illegal hunting, but also seek to improve…..

  • the government response at various levels of the trade chain. The report sets out how trafficking of the Palawan pangolin has grown over the last two decades, with what appears to be a sharp acceleration from around 2016. This rise has been linked both to shifts in the broader illicit economy in the Philippines, burgeoning links between pangolin consumer populations and the country, and global shifts in the patterns of illicit trade. We also describe the challenges facing the Filipino government agencies charged with responding to wildlife trafficking, which have created gaps in the state response that trafficking networks have profited from.  

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2022. 46p.

Japan’s Tireless Ivory Market: A Trader’s Haven Free of Strict Controls

By Masayuki Sakamoto

Africa’s elephants continue to be in crisis due to poaching for trading their ivory, and domestic markets for ivory have been closing worldwide to combat this crisis. The 18th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (CoP18) to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) adopted a decision, aimed at promoting the implementation of the recommendation on the closure of domestic ivory markets included in Resolution Conf.10.10 amended at CoP17, which states “the Parties that have not closed their domestic markets for commercial trade in raw and worked ivory are requested to report to the Secretariat for consideration by the Standing Committee to CITES at its 73rd and 74th meetings on what measures they are taking to ensure that their domestic ivory markets are not contributing to poaching or illegal trade.” The Government of Japan (GoJ) submitted reports under the CITES Decision and insisted that “Japan has been implementing stringent measures to ensure that its domestic ivory market is not contributing to poaching or illegal trade”. Most importantly, Japan demonstrates a new business registration requiring ivory dealers to fulfill all requirements for registration and renew their registration every five years; a 100%-registration-mandate on whole tusks when they renew or initially receive their business registrations; maintenance of inventory data including transaction records and traceability information records for cut pieces; and, increased scrutiny of the registration of whole tusks by requiring the result of radiocarbon dating…..

  • However, GoJ’s claims of stringent market controls are flawed and unjustified. Firstly, according to the GoJ’s report, raw and worked ivory dealers must be registered. In this case, they must fulfill all requirements for registration, which requires renewal every five years. But, our analysis of the GoJ’s examination of eligibility of the business registration renewal indicates that businesses are being registered via a token examination with a lack of scrutiny by the competent authorities. Specifically, the reality of the examination of applications for business registration is that the competent authority has left it solely to the authorized private organization, even for the applications by kingpin dealers with track records of illegal trade engagement. Thus, it is obvious that the examination of business registration and renewal is in name only, and it has not exerted any effect on excluding problematic dealers. Secondly, GoJ insists ivory dealers must register all (whole) tusks in their possession when they renew or initially receive their business registrations. This approach is a countermeasure to the problem of unregulated unregistered whole tusks owned by the businesses; the Japanese domestic law requires whole tusks to be registered prior to transactions, however, exempts them from being registered as far as the owner does not intend to transfer them (even the case of tusks stocked by dealers for being consumed as raw material). Thus, it should be questioned whether the 100%-registration-mandate on whole tusks realized the goal of regulating the stockpile of registered dealers through the whole tusk registration or not. Our analysis indicates that registered dealers successfully evaded this requirement by cutting their whole tusks into pieces and then processing them into hanko beforehand. 

Japan: Japan Tiger and Elephant Fund, 2022. 24p.